LETTER TO WILLIAM SCHNEIDER JR. FROM ROBERT M. GATES

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• Content Type: LETTER

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
Mr. William Schneider, Jr.
Under Secretary of State for
Security Assistance, Science
and Technology
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Bill:
In your letter of 29 October 1984, you
requested an analytical assessment of several
issues relating to the question of whether
Cuba should be added to the list of proscribed
destinations for specified strategic goods
and technologies. For your convenience we
have arranged our responses into four separate
tabs. In order to be as comprehensive as
possible, we have used all-source reporting.
Be assured that this issue remains of high
interest to us. If you require any further
assistance, please inform me.
Sincerely,
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director
Enclosure:
ALA-M-84-10117C
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United States Department of State
Under Secretary of State for
Security Assistance, Science and Technology
Washington, D.C. 20520
October 29,
1984
LEI- __
O
Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Room 7E44, Headquarters
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
The strategic trade policy agencies are considering
whether or not to propose to COCOM that Cuba be made a
proscribed destination.
In formulating our final position on this question, it
would be most helpful if your Cuba specialists could prepare a
paper for us which addresses the following issues:
(1) Cuba as an extension of Soviet military power,
especially Cuba's role as a proxy for the USSR in the
Caribbean, Latin America, and Africa;
(2) Cuba's offensive military capabilities, current or
planned;
(3) Cuba's role in CEMA;
(4) the extent and type of Western (especially COCOM
member) dual-use sales to Cuba;
(5) examples of Western dual-use sales that have enhanced
Cuban military capabilities; and
(6) examples of any legal or illegal Western (especially
COCOM member) munitions-list sales to Cuba.
Please note the TTIC recently completed a quick study
entitled Cuba: The Technology Transfer Issue which makes clear
that there is no strong evidence of diversions to the USSR by
Cuba.
CONFIDENTIAL
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A paper of not more than 20 pages by November 30 would be
greatly appreciated. The reason for this date is that the next
COCOM High Level Meeting will be held in late January.
If we go ahead with the the Cuba action as a US objective
for that meeting, it will probably be necessary to brief COCOM
delegates in Paris in December.
We appreciate the excellent support we have gotten from
your office and your agency in general on the technology
transfer issue.
Sincerely,
William Schneider, Jr.
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Central Intelligence Agency
6FQ
CUBA: Discussion of Issues Related to Cuba as a
Potential COCON Destination
TAB 1. Cuba's Role as an Extension of Soviet Military Power
TAB 2. Cuba's offensive military Capabilities
TAB 3. Cuba's Role in CEMA
TAB 4. Western Dual Use and Munitions Sales to Cuba
Appendix: Western Sales to Cuba of Equipment with Dual Use
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TAB 1. Cuba's Role as an Extension of Soviet Military Power
The Soviet-Cuban military relationship differs from both the
USSR's relationship with its Warsaw Pact allies and with its
Third World client states. Although there is no evidence of a
formal military treaty between Cuba and the USSR, the military
establishments of the two countries have developed closer working
relations than exist between the Soviet Union and any non-Warsaw
Pact country. For example, in Ethiopia, the Soviets themselves
assumed control over Cuban combat operations in the Ogaden in the
late 1970s. Also, unlike any other recipient of Soviet military
assistance, either within the Warsaw Pact or in the Third World,
Cuba is not obligated to pay for the weapons it receives.
Implicit in the Soviet assistance, however, is the accrual by
Moscow of military and other benefits from this otherwise one-
sided relationship.
This Soviet military assistance has enabled Cuba,
unilaterally or in collaboration with the USSR, to aid leftist
governments or liberation movements in the Third World. For
Castro, this means an opportunity to play a role on the world
scene which is out of proportion to Cuba's size, location, and
resources. For Moscow, it affords a chance to promote dissidence
or insurgency or buttress friendly regimes without direct Soviet
military participation. The Soviets also make substantial use of
Cuban facilities. Such access facilitates greatly the collection
of intelligence against the US, makes possible extended naval
surface deployments to the Caribbean, and permits them to conduct
naval air reconnaissance over the North Atlantic and along the
Moscow's willingness to accelerate the flow of weapons to
Cuba, beginning in 1976, was probably related to Castro's
involvement in Angola, and willingness to engage in a combat role
in Ethiopia. Since 1975, Cuba has provided significant military
aid to leftist regimes in Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada and
Nicaragua--the latter serving in turn as the principal arms
conduit to insurgents in El Salvador. For the most part, Cuban
military personnel abroad perform as advisors at all levels of
the indigenous army, fill technical billets, train personnel in
technical specialties, provide security for key officials, and
function as a reserve force. In a few countries--primarily
Angola and Ethiopia--Cubans have engaged in combat against
Western-backed forces. About 40,000 Cuban military personnel are
currently serving abroad, with sizable contingents in the
following countries:
Algeria
Angola
Congo
Ethiopia
Libya
Mozambique
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30,000
300
5,000-6,000
150
1,000
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Nicaragua
2,500-3,500
South Yemen
500
The Cuban role as a Soviet surrogate in the Americas has
differed from that in Africa. In Ethiopia, the Soviets and the
Cubans were closely involved in a joint undertaking from late
1977. The USSR maintained command and control, and provided
ships and planes to transport Cuban troops. Cuba's initial
involvement in Angola, during mid-1975, was intended only to
administer Soviet military aid, but the Cuban contingent was in
danger of being overrun and subsequently was expanded to a major
combat role. In contrast to the joint Soviet-Cuban role in
Africa, Havana has taken the lead in the Caribbean and Central
America. Here the Cuban role has been one of covert support of
dissident movements, and military and security assistance, rather
than direct military intervention.
These Cuban activities have clearly yielded benefits to the
Soviet Union. In two countries--Ethiopia and Angola--Marxist
regimes would probably not have survived without Cuban support.
In Nicaragua, Cuban arms and tactical advice played a key role in
the ouster of Somoza, and Cuban assistance remains important to
the survival of the regime. The Cuban presence in other Third
World countries is also important in providing sympathetic
entree, and has advanced Soviet material and ideological
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TAB 2. Cuba's Offensive Military Capabilities
Since Fidel Castro's seizure of power in 1959, Cuban-Soviet
military ties have grown steadily, and over the years both
parties have benefited from the relationship. Since 1975, the
relationship appears to have broadened considerably, with Cuba
receiving large quantities of Soviet military equipment of
increasing sophistication. While most of the equipment could be
characterized as defensive in chara er, much of it can be used
in an "offensive" role as well.
As a consequence of this aid, Cuba has been able to develop
a modern military establishment capable of mounting not only a
formidable defense of its own territory, but also of projecting
military power some distance from its shores. Cuba has by far
the largest, best-equipped, and most capable armed forces in the
Caribbean (excepting only the US). In terms of size, only one
country in all of Latin America--Brazil--has a larger military
establishment.
All branches of the Cuban armed forces have benefited from
Soviet largesse. The primary focus of ground forces
modernization has been the improvement of unit mobility and
firepower by the introduction of more capable tanks and armored
equipment field artillery and mobile air defense systems.
Capabilities of reserve forces, too, have been enhanced by new
equipment, and upgraded training. The result of this have been
substantially improved capabilities to draw upon mobilized forces
to mount an aggressive, in-depth territorial defense.
About two-thirds of the Cuban-Navy's operational ships have
been delivered since 1977. Most of the vessels received are
improved missile attack and torpedo boats and minesweepers that
would be most appropriate for coastal defense and anti-blockade
activities. The addition of several OSA-II-class guided-missile
patrol boats has trebled the missile carrying capacity of a
decade ago. The acquisition of three Foxtrot-class diesel attack
submarines and two Koni-class frigates has given the Cuban Navy
its first bluewater capability, and in conjunction with new MI-14
helicopters, a nascent capability to conduct anti-submarine
warfare. With the acquisition of two Polnocny-class landing
ships, and a merchant marine which has increased substantially in
size to about 100 ships of 1000 tons or greater in the past
decade, Cuba has developed the capability to transport and
support small combat units throughout the Caribbean if uno osed
militarily, and to support military activities elsewhere. p7
All-weather air defenses have been extended to cover the
entire island by the addition of overlapping longer-range radars,
stationing more capable interceptor aircraft outside the Havana
area, and supplementing the surface-to-air missile network with
the low-altitude SA-3 system. More than three-fourths of the
fighter and combat-capable jet trainers in the Cuban inventory
have been introduced since 1977, with the bulk of these being
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late-model MIG-21 and MIG-23 fighters and L-39 jet trainers. The
later-model MIGs are especially significant, as their operational
radius has expanded greatly the offensive potential of the Cuban
air force. The Soviets have also delivered several MI-24 ground
attack helicopters and a large number of MI-8/17 transport
helicopters.
The Castro regime's air transport capabilities have been
significantly upgraded since the late 1970s. Short-range air
transport assets have been substantially improved with the
acquisition of AN-26 aircraft. Long-range capabilities have been
enhanced by the expansion in Cubana, the island's national
airline, which has received five TU-154 and nine IL-62 jet
airlines in recent years. Most recently, Cubana has received its
first IL-76 transport, capable of carrying up to 40 tons,
including oversize cargo (i.e. light armored vehicles).
According to a recent national intelligence estimate, Havana
has developed a limited but growing potential to conduct
offensive off-island military actions, with or without Soviet
support, as a*consequence of the improvements in its defensive
capabilities. In addition to the ability to provide small
combat units and technical advisory teams to friendly regimes,
Havana has acquired nascent capabilities to intervene in
neighboring states without direct Soviet support if unopposed.
In particular, its 5,000-7,000 elite troops (airborne-,
airmobile- or amphibious-qualified) can be deployed rapidly in
the Caribbean basin to reinforce friendly regimes. or attack
targets not defended by substantial forces.
To put this in perspective, an airborne attack using all of
Cuba's AN-26 transports could deliver about 1,000 paratroops in a
single unopposed drop, but no heavy equipment. Havana's
amphibious assault ships and merchant vessels could easily
deliver a regimental-size unit to a friendly port. If utilizing
both its sealift capacity and passenger aircraft, Havana could
introduce a large, well-equipped force in a short time for
security or combat duty. Cuba could independently introduce as
many as 25,000 men, but keeping a force of this size supplied
under sustained combat or dispersed garrison conditions would
severely tax the capabilities of the transportation and logistics
* Cuba's intervention capabilities have improved
considerably since its large-scale intervention into Angola nine
years ago. Havana relied heavily on a few worn Bristol Britannia
aircraft, which suffered from maintenance difficulties and needed
two refueling stops en route, to airlift troops at the beginning
of the Angola operation. Since then, it has received its entire
fleet of long range transport aircraft, more than doubling its
airlift ca acity, and its sealift capacity has greatly expanded as well. 25X1
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systems; supporting a force of about 10,000 appears well within
Cuban capabilities, assuming secure lines of communication.
MIG-23B (Flogger F) fighter-bombers and more than 40
attack/transport helicopters provide Havana's primary ground
attack capability, although the late-model MIG-21 and MIG-23
fighters that form the bulk of its inventory also could be used
in that role. The latter would be less capable in the attack
role than the MIG-23B, however--they can deliver one-sixth the
bomblood at about two-thirds the range of the MIG-23B. Cuban
fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft have insufficient range to
secure air superiority and operate effectively over Central
America* or the Eastern Caribbean from Cuban bases. From
airfields in Nicaragua, however, Cuban MIGs would be able to
cover most of Central America, including the approaches to the
Panama Canal.
Over the next few years, Havana's military
capabilities--both offensive and defensive--will continue to grow
as it receives additional arms and transport assets from the
Soviets. Likely deliveries include more submarines and
amphibious landing ships; more-capable interceptor aircraft,
including perhaps the MIG-25; and additional ground weapons. All
of these systems will further improve Havana's defensive
capabilities, and many could be used offensively as well. We
also expect the Cubans to receive two or three additional IL-76
heavy lift transport aircraft, which will give them increased
flexibility in quickly responding to requests for assistance from
allies throughout the region.
* Depending on mission profile and payload, MIG-23's,
operating from bases in Western Cuba, could conduct limited ground-
attack missions inside an arc extending from Western Yucatan,
Mexico, through Honduras to north-central Nicaragua.
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TAB 3. Cuba's Role in CEMA
Cuba became a CEMA member in 1972, but its integration into
the Soviet-dominated organization has accelerated in recent
years, primarily due to Soviet efforts to redistribute the
growing cost of providing economic support to the Castro
regime. Cuba is one of only three non-Warsaw Pact members of the
organization (Mongolia and Vietnam are the other two). Havana's
membership in CEMA requires it to submit investment and foreign
trade plans to CEMA's Executive Committee in Moscow, and planning
is mutually coordinated among the different CEMA partners. Cuba
became a member in 1974 of the International Investment Bank and
the International Bank for Economic Cooperation, both controlled
by CEMA. Since the mid-1970s, aid to Cuba provided by CEMA's
Eastern European members has grown substantially to an estimated
$744 million in 1983, and an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 Eastern
European technical advisors are stationed in Cuba.
Under CEMA, Cuba has assumed the role of producer of
agricultural and raw materials. In r-turn, as a developing
economy, it is the recipient of technical assistance and
manufactured goods from the East European members. The CEMA
Council meeting held in Havana in October of this year reaffirmed
Cuba's status as a supplier of agricultural produce and raw
materials, and gave us indication of a new emphasis on industrial
or high technology development.
At the CEMA Summit meeting in Moscow last June, a number of
agreements were reached which could lead Cuba to become a conduit
for denied technologies to the Soviet bloc. For example, member
countries agreed to cooperate in the production of micro-
processors and industrial robots. Members also agreed to speed
up jointly the introduction of advanced technolo and roduction
processes.
Despite Cuba's deepening involvement in CEMA, the Castro
regime's economic dependence on the USSR has grown even more
rapidly in recent years as a result of the slump in world sugar
prices, hard currency debt arrearages, and inability to attract
Western investment, especially for tourism ventures. Without
Soviet aid, Havana would be hard-pressed to meet even basic
consumption and investment needs. Soviet economic aid in
1982--valued at about $4.6 billion--corresponded to somewhat more
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than 30 percent of Cuba's real output. Overall, this
aid--comprising trade subsidies and development assistance and
totaling nearly~$29 billion since 1960--has increased markedly
Cuba depends on the Soviet Union for about 70 percent of its
total trade. Moscow supplies Havana with nearly all its crude
petroleum and petroleum products, grain, lumber and much of its
industrial, agricultural and transport equipment. In turn, Cuba
exports the bulk of its sugar, nickel and citrus production to
the USSR. Since the mid-1970s Soviet economic aid to facilitate
this commerce has consisted primarily of Moscow's paying
artificially high prices for Cuban goods while pricing its
exports to Cuba below world market levels. These
subsidies--actually representing grants--have totaled some $20
Moscow also provides Cuba--both directly and through
CEMA--materials, equipment and advisors for projects relating to
export development and import substit'ition. This aid is extended
in the form of long term credits and concessional interest
rates. According to a Soviet official, over 200 projects and
enterprises were constructed or expanded during Cuba's first five
year plan (1976-80) through Soviet assistance. Overall
development assistance-project aid as well as trade deficit
financing has totaled nearly $9 billion since 1960.
As Cuba's economic dependence upon the Soviet Union has
grown, Moscow has steadily increased its control over the
island's economic planning. The first significant step--the
formation of a "Cuban-Soviet Commission of Economic, Scientific
and Technical Collaboration--was taken in 1970, the year of
Castro's ill-fated attempt to harvest 10 million tons of sugar, a
desperate gamble designed to achieve economic independence and
thereby stave off Moscow's demands of major changes in Cuban
economic policies.
The Commission has become an instrument for strong Soviet
influence over Cuban economic policy. In 1975, the Soviet
directed "System for Economic Management and Planning" was
established prior to the implementation of Cuba's first five year
plan. Recently, the USSR and Cuba have concluded a long-term
economic cooperation accord for the period 1986 to 2000.* F_~
* One of the priority programs identified in the accord is
electronics, including work related to computer display
equipment. It is possible that implementation of this part of
the accord could lead to greater Soviet-Cuban est in
acquiring COCOM controlled computer products.
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TAB 4. Western Dual Use and Munitions Sales to Cuba
Definitional ambiguities and lack of data* make it difficult
to quantify the magnitude and value of Western dual-use sales to
Cuba. However, most of the Western sales to Cuba identified by
us as "dual-use" have gone either to civilian facilities or to
unknown end-users. The absence of explicit military end-users is
probably due to the provision by the Soviet Union of essentially
all of Cuba's military needs. Moreover, with few exceptions, the
dual-use equipment shipped to Cuba is rather low-level technology
and normally not designed for useful in, weapons systems or
military related functions.
Although we cannot make a convincing case for Cuban military
use of imported Western dual-use equipment, we can provide some
representative examples that at least illustrate the potential
for military use of several acquisitions:
* The only Western country which maintains data on Western
dual-use sales is the United States, which maintains but does not
publish the Department of Commerce export licensing data base.
Only data on broad (SITC) categories are available, and these
provide no useful information on COCOM dual-use trade.
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Further examples of Western sales to Cuba of equipment with
dual-use possibilities are included in the Appendix. F-7
We suspect that the limited level of military sales we note
indicates that our COCOM partners, frequently embargo sales of
military equipment to Cuba as they do to the COCOM-designated
communist countries. Moreover, with the major ongoing Bloc
effort to supply Cuba with military equipment, we doubt there is
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a need on the part of Havana to purchase essential military
equipment from the West. Also, the Soviets, for their part,
probably see no particular requirement for Cuba to expend hard
currency for the types of munitions and a which the
Cubans have so far sought from the West.
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