TAIWAN: ABANDONING LOW KEY DIPLOMACY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001001050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 14, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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I TRANSMITTAL SLIP 1 _14 November 1984 I
CPAS/IMC/CB
ROOM NO. BUILDING
4G32 Has.
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 November 1984
Taiwan: Abandoning Low Key Diplomacy
Summary
Taiwan is apparently moving away from its "low-
key diplomacy" of the past three years, reverting to
a tougher and more aggressive stance in defending
its international standing. Thus far, this shift
has not affected US-Taiwan relations, but it could
now that the US elections are over. Hardliners
among President Chiang's senior advisers, who have
increased their influence, could try to seize on US-
China military relations in particular to push for a
more aggressive, public campaign in Washington on
arms and other issues--designed in large part to
disrupt Sino-US relations. Those who favor quiet,
behind-the-scenes lobbying to promote Taiwan's
interests, such as Fred Chien would almost certainly
oppose such a tack as dangerous and counter-
productive. If the hardliners were to prevail,
however, we would expect such a change in Taiwan's
tactics to provoke a sharp reaction from Beijing,
potentially creating new tensions in US-China
relations.
This memorandum was prepared byl (China Division,
Office of East Asian Analysis. Information available as of
14 November 1984. Comments and questions are welcome and should
be addressed to Chief, China Division, OEA,
Copy of 37 _ff EA M 84-30 OOL
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Background
Since 1981, Taiwan's foreign policy has been more flexible
with Taipei abandoning efforts tq compete with Beijing for
official diplomatic recognition. Conceding that it had already
lost that battle, Taipei turned to what it called "substa-ntive
diplomacy," using its economic clout--primarily trade--to promote
better political ties. Taipei has opened "trade offices" or
other such informal entities in 37 major countries with which it
no longer has diplomatic ties. In its dealings with the United
States moreover, Taiwan had shifted from public calls for .
increased US-Taiwan official contacts to low-key, behind-the-
Taiwan also moderated its policy of "no contacts, no
negotiations" with the Chinese by quietly allowing travel to the
mainland and increased trade. Contacts between PRC and Taiwan
delegations have increased at various international conferences
and conventions, and athletes from both sides have competed in
international sports competitions, including this year's
Olympics. In all these cases, Taiwan agreed not to use its
formal political designation as the Republic of China (ROC),. but
to use the "Olympic formula," calling itself either "China,
Taipei," or "Chinese, Taipei."
In addition, Taiwan has over the past three years rejoined a
number of international organizations that it had left following
Chinese admission. In other cases, Taiwan has remained in an
international organization after the Chinese joined.
A Tougher Stance
Late this summer, that policy changed. In September, for
example, the government published an order that had been sent to
all of its unofficial overseas offices calling on them to use
"ROC," rather than "Taiwan." Foreign Minister Chu Fu-snug
announced publicly on 15 October that Taiwan would now insist on
its principles (commitment to use of the title ROC), and that
these principles would not be compromised "simply for the sake of
participation in international organizations." Reflecting that
shift, Taiwan sports delegations have recently pulled out of
three international competitions after their requests to fly
their national flag were refused. In other international
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organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank and Interpol,
where Taiwan had hinted at compromise, Taipei is either
threatening to leave or has already pulled out after the
admission of China.
Taiwan is also taking a tougher public line on its-r-ival-ry
with China. President Chiang's speech celebrating the island's
national day--always hardline--was even more so this year.
Taiwan media have also stopped hinting about the possibility of
eventually reaching some sort of undefined accomodation with
Beijing, a periodic staple of the 1981-1983 period. The recent
Chinese economic reforms, which could have prompted favor
media commentary on Taiwan, have instead been scorned.
New Personalities
We believe that the change toward a harder line began
shortly after the departure from office of two major supporters
of flexible policies. Premier Sun Yun-hsuan was removed as a key
supporter of the moderate line last spring.
In June 1982, he had publicly proclaimed that because of the
reforms taking place in China, the two economies would eventually
converge, at which point reunification could take place. The
departure of Sun also left his coterie of younger advisers, who
used Sun's name to promote the low-key policy, without a
patron. Sun's successor as premier is a conservative technocrat
with little interest in innovative approches to foreign policy.
Another important change was the demotion and transfer last
year of former security strongman General Wang Sheng. Although
Wang was a bitter anticommunist, he nonetheless recognized that
Taiwan needed to appear flexible in order to avoid charges of
intransigence, and was apparently able to persuade the normally
rigid security services to go along.
for example, Wang was behind Taiwan's decision to
invite China to send a team to an international softball
tournament that was to have been held in Taiwan last year.
The departure of Sun coincided with a major government and
party shuffle that moved Shen Chang-huan, 72, to Secretary
General of the President's Office--a key position that controls
access to the President. Shen has long been associated with a
tough line on the question of "officiality" and on the use of
"ROC." Shen was the
author of the 1978 "Five Principles Governing Relations with the
United States," of which the first principle was to maintain as
many of the formal trappings of official relations with the
United States as possible.
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We believe that Shen's position is supported by many in the
ruling Kuomintang who believe that the use of designations other
than ROC is demeaning. Even President Chiang charged in
September that China was using the "Olympic'formula" to create
the impression internationally that Taiwan is simply a local
government under Beijing. This group has always believed;*unlike
younger officials, that the Beijing-Taipei rivalry is a zero-sum
game, and that the nations of the world must be forced to chose
We believe that Shen's appointment has threatened the
position of those who still favor quiet diplomacy, most notably
Fred Chien (Chien Fu), the director of Taiwan's informal
representative office in Washington. Chien, a tough, aggressive
diplomat, has made a determined effort to promote Taiwan's
interests by cultivating key figures in the US government and
private sector. Although he would like to see Taiwan achieve
greater official status in Washington, he has been willing to
compromise on form in order to obtain a stronger substantive
relationship.
Shen and Chien have long been contenders for influence on
foreign policy issues. Shen's return to power--he had been
foreign minister until 1978--means that Chien may be ordered to
push Washington to grant Taipei more official status, and to
assume a much higher public profile. Such moves could include
demands for the opening of additional representative offices in
the United States, or allowing Taiwan's representatives to enjoy
more of the "diplomatic" priviledges accorded to representatives
from countries with which the United States has formal ties.
Other Factors
The Hong Kong Agreement. Taipei is also concerned that the
recent Sino-British agreement over the future of Hong Kong will
weaken Taiwan's support in the United States. In the past,
Taiwan had rejected calls for it to begin negotiations with the
mainland by arguing that Beijing could not be trusted to honor
any commitment, and by pointing to Tibet as evidence. Taipei
fears that the Hong Kong settlement, at least as long as it
continues to progress smoothly, will create a precedent
increasing the pressure on Taiwan to negotiate.
In addition, Taiwan may be responding to Chinese pressure--
in the ADB and Interpol, for example--to reduce Taiwan's status
to that of a province of China. Indeed, we believe that Taiwan's
top leaders now fear that their three-year effort to appear
forthcoming to Beijing's overtures was misconstrued as evidence
of Taipei's willingness to reach an eventual accommodation on the
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island's status. The government moved to correct this impression
last month when it disavowed the longstanding proposal of Wei
Yung, formerly one of Premier Sun's top advisers. Wei had
suggested that Taiwan and China could be reunified under the
concept of a "multisystem nation" granting each side sovereignty
over the area it controlled. Taiwan's leaders were alarmed, in
our view, that Wei's proposal sounded too similar to the "one
nations, two systems" formula that Deng Xiaoping has been
stressing since that Hong Kong accord was concluded. 25X1
US Arms to China and Taiwan's Tactics During a Second Reagan
Term. The prospect of US arms sales to China is of immediate
concern to Taipei, and could do the balance in favor of the
hardliners. Thus far, Taipei's fears about US-China military
relations have been mollified by the new weapons that the United
States has sold to Taiwan, and by private US assurances given to
Taipei. Nonetheless, those supporting a tougher stance believe
that US arms sales to China pose a direct threat to Taiwan's
interests that must be countered. Thus, they might argue that
Taiwan should, as it did prior to 1981, try to disrupt US-China 25X1
relations by publicizing, distorting, or even fabricating
information about developments in US-Taiwan relations, and by
trying to adopt as high a profile as possible in Washington.
The hardliners have not yet altered Taiwan's approach to
Washington, but they may simply have been waiting until after the
US elections to press for a change. If so, they may now begin to
push for a public campaign for increased signs of official status
for Taiwan representatives, or for sales to Taiwan of
sophisticated US arms that they know would provoke a sharp
reaction from Beijing. They might also lobby the US Congress to
try to block the US-China nuclear cooperations agreement. putting
Washington in a cross fire between Beijing and Taipei.
Not all of President Chiang's top advisers, however, would
support such a shift. Many of them are satisfied with US policy
and are optimistic that a second Reagan term promises further
progress. Fred Chien--whose influence with Chiang rivals Shen
Chang-Huan's--probably would argue that such an provocative
approach would undo the progress he has made and risk alienating
Taiwan's strongest supporters in the US Government. In the final
analysis, therefore, whether the hardline or more flexible
approach prevails could hinge on the outcome of the Shen-Fred
Chien rivalry. But in either case, we expect Taiwan to intensify
its efforts now to strengthen its influence in Washington and to
try to retard the growth of Sino-US relations, which Taipei fears
could eventually undermine its "special relationship" with the
United States.
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Subject: Taiwan:
Distribution:
Aban
doni
n
g Low Key D
iplomacy
1
of 37 -
Mr
. Dona
ld A
n
derson, EAP
/State
2
of 37 -
Mr
. Mark
Pra
t
t, EAP/Stat
e
3
of 37 -
Mr
. Davi
d La
u
x, NSC
4
of 37 -
Mr
. Jame
s Ke
l
ly, DOD
5
of 37 -
Mr
. Will
iam
B
rown, EAP/S
tate
6
- 9 of 3
7
- Offi
ce o
f
Legislativ
e Liaison
10
of 37 -
M
r. Joh
n Ta
y
lor, State/
INR
11
of 37 -
E
xecuti
ve D
i
rector (7E1
2)
12
of 37 -
D
DI (7E
44)
13
of 37 -
N
IO/E
7E6
2
)
14
of 37 -
C
/EA
I
(5D
1
0)
15
16
of 37 -
of 37 -
C
P
/PE
(
DB Sta
F24
ff (
)
7
F30)
17 of 37 - CPAS/ILS (7G50)
18 - 22 of 37 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
23 of 37 - D/OEA (4F18)
24 of 37 - OEA/Research (4G48)
25 of 37 - OEA China
26 of 37 - OEA/China/Domestic Policy Branch
27 of 37 - OEA/China/Development Issues Branch
28 of 37 - OEA/China/Defense Issues Branch
29 of 37 - OEA/China/Foreign Affiars Branch
3 O --3-1-o f 3.7 --O C-R-/-I,S.G__...(_1.H 19 )
32 of 37 - C/NIC (
33 of 37 - OCR/EA/
34 of 37 - DO/Chin
35 of
36 of
37 of
OEA/CH/FOR
37 - DO Taiwan
37 -
37 -
(14 N
ovember 1984)
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