THE PHILIPPINES: PERSPECTIVES ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001001190001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 December 1984
The Philippines: Perspectives On.Presidential Succession
Summary
President Marcos's habit of keeping political
institutions weak--including an ambiguous succession
mechanism--points to a ,rocky road to new
leadership. The jockeying that has accompanied
Marcos's current health crisis has intensified
widespread anxiety about the soundness of the
succession process and has focused attention on
moves.in the National Assembly to clarify the legal
mechanism.
Despite the process's weaknesses, Marcos's
death probably would trigger the legal mechanism
although we are less sure how far the process would
be allowed to move forward. On the other hand, we
believe Marcos's physical incapacitation would
increase temptations within his inner circle to
circumvent the constitutional process altogether.
Imelda Marcos and her brother, Ambassador to the US
Benjamin Romualdez, would be the likely prime movers
in such a scheme, and they almost certainly would
depend on General Ver' to deliver military support
Factors at Play
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debate 25X1
over the prospects for a constitutional succession recently.has '
This memorandum was prepared byl (Southeast
Asia Division, Office of East Asian Analysis, and was coordinated
with the Office of Global Issaues. Information available as of 11
pecember 1984 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed 'to Chief, Southeast Asia
-
1 1
' Division, OEA, F
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dominated the agenda of senior officials in the military, the
cabinet, and the ruling party. No Filipino knows how the
succession would play out, and neither do we. It is possible
however, to evaluate the pressures for and against the legal
process that Marcos's demise would activate.
The constitution calls for the Speaker of the National
Assembly--currently Nicanor Yniguez--to act as caretaker
president if Marcos dies or is incapacitated before his term
expires in 1987. The National Assembly is to agree on special
election rules within seven days and the Speaker is then required
to set an election day within 60 days of Marcos's demise.
Constitutional provisions prevent the Speaker from declaring
martial law, dissolving the Assembly, and using the presidential
decree making powers.
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the Presidential Management Staff believes that this 25X1
.mechanism.-is open to legal interpretation. The staff also
-believes that the ambiguities could prompt debate within the
National Assembly after Marcos dies over whether the Speaker
would share presidential authority with the Pr-ime Minister--Cesar
Virata. Concern over the issue within the National Assembly is
already evident. Two ruling party resolutions and two opposition
resolutions designed to clarify the succession have been
introduced in Assembly sessions in recent weeks.* No matter how
the debate in.the Assembly turns out, a variety of political
factors suggest that the transition -to new leadership will not be
smooth.
Pressures Against'The Constitutional Process
The key threat to the constitutional succession is that
those with the most to lose from the legal transfer of power, in
the event that Marcos dies, are in the best position to intervene
in the process. Imelda Marcos and General Ver, in particular,
are potentially the two greatest losers in the post-Marcos
period, since neither has a strong independent power base.
Imelda's personal popularity has plummeted in the aftermath of
the Aquino assassination, and many ruling party members began
viewing her as a political liability.when she failed to-deliver
Manila's vote in the National Assembly election last May.
General Ver's position has also steadily eroded since the
Philippine press reports indicate that one
opposition resolution calls for the establishment of a panel of
military physicians to examine Marcos--should he be in
"seclusion" for several days--and_then report its findings to the
National Assembly. The local press has also reported a rulin
party resolution that deals with the succession in the event the
Speaker dies while acting as caretaker President.
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assassination, and this decline has accelerated since the release
of the Agrava Board's majority report in October.
Nonetheless, both continue to command political and military
assets that would allow them to intervene as a succession plays
itself out. Imel'da Marcos's tight control over information on
Marcos's health, for example`, gives. her an inside track. The
speaker, moreover, has longstanding political ties to Imelda and
may' be willing to manipulate the constitutional provisions to her
advantage. She would also be able to rely on the considerable
political and financial resources of her brother, Ambassador to
the US Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Romualdez reportedly has been
quietly lobbying behind-the-scenes with ruling party officials
the case for her candidacy in a presidential election.
General Ver's tenure as Chief of, the Armed Forces since 1981 25X1
has allowed him to weave a network of political alliances among
senior officers that--although weakening--might still afford him
sufficient clout to alter the outcome of a succession contest.
He almost certainly would be-urged by other inner circle members-
-including Imelda or=_-Marcos crony Eduardo Cojuangco--to defend
their interests in the event that the leadership question is not
settled before the National Assembly moves ahead with deciding on
election procedures. 25X1
Pressures in Support
In our judgment, the legal succession mechanism would have
extensive support in the event of Marcos'~? death. The military
for example, has traditionally kept its distance in political
affairs. Moreover.
I, on balance, the
officer corps would be unlikely to oppose a legal successor
unless peace and order in Manila were seriously threatened.
Much of the support for the constitution would come from
Marcos's own ruling party--the KBL. Marcos's death would place
initial control. of the government in the hands of the KBL`which,
through its majority in. the National Assembly, would determine
the procedures for the special election. The commission that
oversees elections (COMELEC), moreover, is a ruling party
creation--thus increasing the opportunity for manipulation of
election results. This suggests that pressures for
extraconstitutional measures initially would not be great,
provided that those at the helm of the party determine that they
Several key KBL members who we believe will emerge as
presidential candidates are Defense Minister Enrile, Deputy Prime,
Minister Rono, and Foreign Minister Tolentino--each of whom has
much to gain from the constitutional process. Rono is reportedly
well respected within the party, as is Tolentino, and both will
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probably receive support from party kingpins.
Enrile is not as popular. Recently, however, he
has reportedly been mending fences within the party and taken a
lower profile in the National Assembly in an effort to make
himself a more palatable potential presidential candidate. In
addition, Enrile recently has made cooperative overtures to the
US Embassy that underscore his presidential ambition. We believe
that members within this group will seek to build alliances. from
ruling party factions, and perhaps will begin seeking support
from within the business community, the church, and the moderate
opposition.
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Other advocates of an orderly succession would include
members of the moderate opposition, who will view Marcos's demise
as their first real opportunity to share power since the
declaration of martial law in 1972. Most opposition leaders
reportedly are convinced that the succession mechanism, however
imperfect, will probably prevail and they have begun contingency
planning in the event of Marcos's death. Opposition
representatives from UNIDO, PDP-Laban, and the Liberal Party are
reportedly attempting.to agreeon a "fast track" slate of 25X1
contenders--including Salvador Laurel, Eva Estrada Kalaw, and
Butz Aquino--who coul,d be pitted against the presidential
candidate from the ruling party. 25X1
opposition leaders acknowledge their unity is fragile and they
have avoided trying to agree on a single candidate. 25X1
some opposition members are considering
alliances with ruling party members, including an Enrile/Ramon
,Mitre (PDP-LABAN) presidential 'ticket. 25X1
If Marcos Is Incapacitated
The picture will be more complicated--and prospects for the
constitution less promising--if Marcos is incapacitated. Only a
declaration-of Marcos's incapacitation by the first family or a,
formal determination by the National Assembly that Marcos is
unfit to rule will trip the legal succession mechanism. Imelda
Marcos, therefore, would be strongly tempted to hide Marcos's
medical condition in order to gain time and maneuvering room for
a succession struggle. Marcos's concealed incapacitation under
such circumstances would work to the disadvantage of other inner
We believe the political climate in Manila would become
increasing unstable as anxiety about the true status of Marcos's
health mounted. If violence erupted in Manila under these
circumstances, the military could choose to intervene in a
succession crisis. Widespread civil unrest, we believe, would
almost certainly force the military to assume the role of
principal power broker, even if it were disinclined to do so.
. We cannot rule out the possibility that Mrs. Marcos would
try to seize power if she determined that. she could not win
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support from the ruling party. She would almost certainly depend
on Ver for support. Ramos's potential vole in this case would be
more likely influenced by the wishes.,of both opposition leaders
and ruling party officials such as Prime Minister Virata. The
long standing emnity between Ramos and Imelda Marcos--she
reportedly favored Army Chief Ramas over Ramos for the Acting
Chief of Staff' position--makes it unlikely that he would be
influenced by her.
Can A Leadership Crisis Be Avoided?'
One of the leading arguments for a legal succession
occurring is that several key players who would be involved have
,ecently moved to bolster its prospects. The Speaker has met
with key military leaders, including Generals Ver and Ramos, to
solicit pledges to uphold the constitution during a succession
crisis. He received such pledges from both men, with General
Ramos publicly stating that the military will uphold the
constitution. In our view, General Ver's current unsettled
status weakens the chances of military intervention in a
constitutional succession contest. Although Ver loyalists
continue to control key commands in Manila, it is not clear that
these ties would automatically translate into support for an
extra-constitutional bid for power.
already suggests that as Ramo's tenure lengthens, Ver's control
over the military is becoming increasingly tenuous.
Much institution-building has taken place over the past
year, probably more than most observers of the Philippines had
expected after nearly a decade of martial law. The new National
Assembly is a far more vigorous body than its predecessor, and
both ruling party and opposition performances have stirred
memories of the open--and according?to many critics, free-
wheeling--pre-martial law Congress. At the same time, several
actions of the Supreme Court and the legal proceedings that have
accompanied the release of the Agrava Board's majority findings
point to a more independent judiciary.
On balance, however, the continued strengthening of
political institutions--including the tightening of the
succession process--will take more time than events surrounding
Marcos's health will probably allow. For that reason, we believe
that a rough and dirty succession contest is probable, even as
these things go in the Philippines. The levers that were built
into the current constitution, including a weak, succession
mechanism, afford room for large-scale manipulation of the
system. The military's potentially conflicting role in domestic
poltics, moreover, makes it probable that pressures to short-
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Typescript: The Philippines: Perspectives on the Presidential
Succession
Original--OEA/SEA/IB
1--OEA/SEA/ITM
1--CH/OEA/SEAD
1--DC/OEA/SEAR
1--PDB (7F30)
1--C/NIC (7E62)
1--NIO/EA (7E62)
5--CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
1--C/PES/DLI (7F24)
1--DDI (7E44)
1--DCI (7D60)
1--DDCI (7D6011)
1--C/DDO/IAD (3D00)
1--C/DDO/EA (5D00)
1--D/OEAA (4F18)
1--Executive Director (7E12)
1--CPAS/ILS (7G215)
1--OEA/NEA (4G43)
1--OEA/CH (4G32)
1- NIC/Analytical Group (7E47)
1- 1C/DO/PPS (3D01)
1--OEA/Research Director (4G48)
Outside:
State:
1--Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
1--John Monjo
1--John Maisto
1--Thomas Hubbard
1--RADM Jonathan T. Howe
1--Rod Huff
1--Weaver Gim
1--Alan Kitchens
1--Bob Carroll
1--Corazon Foley
1--Hugh Montgomery
1--Anthony C. Albrecht
Treasury:
1--Douglas P. Mulholland
1--Bill McFadden
1--Bill Quinn
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'DOD:
1--Gaston Sigur
1--Richard Childress
1--Richard Armitage
1--Don Gregg
1--Robert Emery
1--David Laux
1--James Kelly
1--Tim Wright
Commerce: .
1--Eugene K. Lawson
1--David Peterson
1--William Brown
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