PORTUGAL: POLITICAL CULTURE AND NATIONAL CHARACTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001001620001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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25X1-
Memorandum for:
This paper was prepared by IA 25X1
Branch for Ty Cobb, National Security Council
Staff.
Distribution:
Original - Ty Cobb
1 - NIO/WE -Milt Kovner
1 - OD/EURA
2 - Production Staff
4 - IMC/CB
1 - WE File
1 - Branch File
1 - Author
DDI/EURA/WE/IA 9Mar84 25X1
EUR M84-10050
E URA
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
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I I
Portugal: Political Culture and National Character
Portugal became anation-state in 1140, when most of the countries of
modern Europe had rot yet been formed, but it has failed bo keep pace with its
reighbors in its political, ecanmic, or social development. The country has
remained backward largely because the governing elites until the revolution in
1974 chose not to address sane fundamental problems: personalism, which
encouraged political and ideological factionalism; divergent.rorth-south
patterns of lard ownership; and the disparities between Lisbon and the less-
developed camtryside. Fran the early 16th century until the mid-1970s,
Portugal's extensive African and Asian colonies served as a safety valve for
~memployment pressures and provided a captive market and a guaranteed source
of revenue. But they also allowed successive regimes - monarchies and
dictatorships alike - to igrore domestic problems almost entirely. Now the
colonies are gone, and Portugal is simply small and poor. With ro remaining
foreign diversions, Portugal's leaders have slowly begun to realize that they
A. Accepting the predominance of individual or personal interests and
actions over collective or national interests has long been the norm
in Portugal.
- Because the country was governed for the benefit of a small elite,
the concept of the legitimacy of constitutional law or goverrnment
did rot take root. Most Portuguese still assume that those who
make laws or govern do so to further their own interests rather
than those of society as a whole. Protecting oneself and one's
resources fran the government is widely perceived as a natural and
legitimate activity.
must now confront the historic inhibitors of development.
I. Personalism
- Oanpo~u~ding the problem of personalism is the ration of
Sebastian-ism, the term given to a popular yearning for the sudden
appearance of a great man who will miraculously solve. the
country's problems. The idea dates back to the late 16th Century,
when the Spanish Crown claimed the Portuguese throne after the
heirless Portuguese Ring Sebastian fell in battle in Moroooo.
Popular belief held that Sebastian would return as a savior to
liberate the people from all oppression.
B. Today's leadership is struggling to win acceptance for the idea that
the goverrBnent must have the support err] participation of the
population if it is tD modernize Portugal and restore it: to
international respectability.
- These efforts are made all the more difficult by the public's lea
level of political sophistication err] a historic lack of sustained
political mobilization.
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- The yearning of the population for a-"man on a white horse" has
given partiwlar salience bo the ambitions of President Eames.
The non-partisan Eames canrat succeed himself as President, and
press statements show that the leaders of the democratic parties
fear that he will use his wide popular appeal bo create a strong
personalistic party that would undermine their efforts bo create a
modern pluralistic system (of course; they also fear that he will
take votes away from them.)
B. Prime Minister Scares' experiences in office are illustrative of the
practical effect of factionalism. He has formed three governments
since 1976, the first two of which failed because of personal and
party differences.
parties and tQ the failure of governing coalitions.
Political and Ideological Factionalism
A. Personalism has encouraged the splintering of the political elite
into small parties or groups. that fight among themselves.
- Portugal's recent history, although not as violent as Spain's, has
been a struggle between those holding`differing views of how
politics and government should be conducted - supporters of
liberal, parliamentary government versus authoritarian rulers;
clericalists versus anti~lericalists; republicans versus
monarchists; parliamentarians versus presidentialists.
- The tendency toward factionalism has prevented the governing
elites f ran reaching a vonsensus on fundamental issues, such as
the degree of government involvement in the economy.
- Factionalism has also delayed the development of a modern party
system: most of the parties lack disciplined cadres, clear goals,
distinct ideologies, or meaningful programs.
- The weakness of the democratic parties in the early days of the
Rewluticn allowed the Oa~miunists, with superior party discipline
and organizatirn, for a short time bo play a leading role in
deciding the political direction of the country.
- Finally, factionalism has contributed tro the instability of the
- At present, he sits atop a coalition that has a clearer program
than most previous governments for confronting the country's
_ problems - but it remains fragile because of the factional
strains within the parties.
- Eames, looking aver the politicians' shoulders, heightens the
III. Land Ownership - North versus South
A. The Tagus River - which flows through Lisbon - is a dividing line
between North~outh land ownership patterns.
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- In the rorth, geography, isolated markets, and an age~ld system
of subdivision by inheritance have produced an economic structure
based on numerous small private businesses and a patctn~ork of
family-run farms.
- By contrast, the south-an area of expansive anc3 arid plains -
has the nation's largest concentration of landless rural workers,
who are employed in the inefficient exploitation of vast land
tracts with origins in the Rrn~an estates and the latifundia of
B.' The rorth is. also the stronghold of Portuguese Catholicism, which has
long buttressed a political conservatism marked by firm opposition to
Marxism and a close identification with the traditional society and
ecoryanic system. The Salazar-~aetaro regime that preceded the
Revolution, ro less than the 19th Century monarchy, viewed this
constituency as a key element of its power base.
- Despite anticlerical initiatives mounted in the name of social
and political reform -- especially during the First Republic and
at the outset of the Revolution - the church has retained its
hold on the rural rorth, playing a central role in the
conservative backlashes that followed in both cases.
C. Before the Rewlution, the social structure in the south was
dominated by a rigidly hierarchical patron-client system of
eoonrnucally oppressive and autocratic local rule. The Church played
little role in social development in the south, and secularization
took hold.
- The peasants, confronting daily the uneven distribution of wealth,
were attracted to the message of the CcRmunist Party and served as
a ready-made, militant following when the Revolution came.
D. The fundamental differences in the social arr] political attitudes of
the landholding small farmers in the rorth and those of the landless
southern peasants have created t4 scene extent "two Fortugals."
- Implementing social and agrarian reforms to alleviate the
vountry's severe food .shortages and tmenployment pressures is
severely voc~licated by the conflicting pressures of these
ownership patterns.
IV. Lisbon versus the Provinces '
A. The tension between relatively oos~mpolitan Lisbon aryl the
underdeveloped provinces stems primarily from the vonflict between
the centralizing tendency. of the capital and the desire for
decentralization prevalent in the provinces.
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- Since the program of centralization undertaken in the 18th century
by the Marquis of Pambal b~ deal with recurring eoor~u c problems,
a number of governments have attempted do give the regions greater
autor~oimy in local administration and fiscal planning. Little has
happened, however.
- The failures are largely a result of the scarcity of resources in
a limited eooinny and the clashes over how to divide those
.resources.
- All-the democratic parties today theoretically support
decentralization as a means of strengthening democracy at the
local level - and rot just at election time. But to date they
have been ro more effective than their pre-revolutionary
A. The image of Portugal as a o~lonial power was an integral part of the
national psyche. Former dictator Salazar promoted the notion in
defining the country's uniqueness, and the average Portuguese citizen
accepted it.
predecessors at turning talk into action.
V. Reshaping the National Image
- The sudden attairsnent of independence by Portugal's African
o~lonies deprived the metropolis of its status as a world power
almost overnight. Adjusting to that c3~ange has proven difficult
B. Zb recover same prestige, Portugal is trying to regain a position in
Africa, to secure a place in the European Oamttuiity, and to
strengthen its relations with NATO and the United States.
- Lacking the ecomnic resources to aid Africa, Portugal must rely
on third parties - such as the IS - to underwrite its activities
there.
._ - _.
- Negotiations for EC membership have been long and arduous, and,
ironically, Portugal's admission has became hostage to Spain's
application.
- Moreover, Spain's membership in NATO has ceused Portugal to worry
that~its role in the Alliance will became even less important than
.d.
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