TURKEY: THE CURRENT SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001001920001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Memorandum for: RECORD
A copy of this paper was sent to Dave Peterson,
Dept of Commerce per his request.
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~1May84
EURA
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
Distribution:
Original - Dave Peterson
1 - OD/EURA
2 - Production Staff
4 - IMC/CB
1 - C/WE
1 - IA Branch
1-
DDI/EURA/WE/IA/
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Turkey: The Current Situation
Domestic Politics
1. Turkey's transition to democracy has gone smoothly since i;he
parliamentary election in November.
-- Despite President Evren's opposition to Prime Minister Ozal and his
Motherland Party in the election, the two men have settled into a
productive working relationship.
-- Each remains wary of the other, however, and we believe strains will
emerge as the new government struggles to overcome Turkey's serious
economic problems, broaden the democratic experiment, guarantee
internal security, and pursue a more independent and active foreign
policy.
-- The 1982 Constitution gives Evren considerable power, which is
enhanced by his military backing. If Turkey's transition to
democracy proceeds without major problems, however, Ozal's power base
and credibility will grow, making him a formidable competitor in any
2. Municipal elections held on 25 March continued Turkey's transition to
democracy.
-- The constitution adopted in 1982 established that municipal elections
would be held within one year of the first national election held
under the new order. Evren did not block the National Assembly's
decision to open the contest to all but extremist parties,. This made
it a far less restrictive affair than the national election, in which
only three parties were permitted to run.
-- The elections gave Ozal's Motherland Party a healthy plurality and
Turkey's democratic credentials a major boost. But the price could
be more splintering of the political party system. Six major parties
gained representation at municipal levels. All may not survive but
the resultant loosening of the political system could lead to the
very kind of political instability that prompted the coup,,
3. Ozal has put together a streamlined cabinet of politically unknown
technocrats whose primary concern is to rebuild and reform the economy along
free market lines. Because economic policy is Ozal's strongest suit and
Evren's weakest, the President will probably not interfere much as long as
Ozal produces good results.
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Ozal has moved quickly to implement his economic program, which aims
at furthering the 1980 Stabilization Program -- reducing inflation,
generating long-term development through increased exports and
foreign investment, shrinking the large state role in the economy,
and reducing unemployment.
So far he has tried to reach these goals by increasing prices on
several subsidized goods, raising interest rates on savings above
inflation, liberalizing imports, and abolishing most foreign exchange
controls. His most controversial measure has been a bill permitting
the government to sell profit shares in state enterprises to private
investors -- a dramatic departure from Turkey's tradition of
etatism.
Turkey's economic problems are serious, but we believe Ozal's free
market policies have a good chance of promoting economic reform. An
ardent monetarist, we expect Ozal to keep a tight rein on the money
supply. Inflation should begin to fall by the end of this year,
despite government efforts to reduce consumer subsidies, but will
still average about 30 to 35 percent. While GNP is expected to rise
by 4 to 5 percent in 1984, this will not be enough to prevent a rise
in the unemployment rate, which is currently around 20 percent.
-- Turkey will continue to need substantial amounts of aid, as large
payments on its rescheduled debt begin to fall due in late 1984 and
1985. ?
4. Martial law, introduced by the generals shortly after they took power
in 1980, has been extended to mid-July in all but five provinces. The threat
of violence and how it is handled remains a serious security and political
problem for the government.
Although the transition to civilian rule has been taking place in an
atmosphere of relative tranquility,
leftwing groups in particular remain active and that police officials
are pessimistic about their ability to eliminate terrorism.
There is great fear -- among both military leaders and the new
civilian elite -- that Turkey could face a rebirth of terrorist
activity threatening the democratic experiment if the government
loosens the reins too quickly, Their fear is well placed.
Terrorist acts are on the rise again, although we doubt that violence
will soon reach the pre-coup level of about 20 political murders per
day.
Armenian terrorism is a special problem. Although the leftwing
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia and the rightwing
Justice Commandos for,Armenian Genocide have focused on targets
outside Turkey, indications are that they may be planning operations
inside the country.
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-- Turkey continues to disclaim publicly any interest in forming "hit
teams" to retaliate a ainst Arm nian terrorists.
At the same time, the Armenian issue has emerged as an irritant in
Turkey's relations with several countries, especially Syria and
France. Ankara is particularly upset by what it perceives as Syrian
sponsorship of Armenian militants and France's cavalier approach
toward Armenian activists operating in France.
However necessary, anti-terrorist efforts carry political costs for
Turkey. About 30,000 "political" prisoners remain incarcerated, and
the special martial law courts continue to exercise extraordinary
powers. Several West European states in particular, are concerned
about Turkey's "human rights" policy and are making it difficult for
the Ozal government to develop normal political and economic
relations with democratic states.
Sensitivity to such criticism has spurred both opposition parties in
parliament to propose legislation on an amnesty for prisoners, and
the government recently has completed an investigation of prison
conditions. The Parliament will debate the terrorism/amne-sty issue
within the next few months. We expect there is likely to be a
limited amnesty for prisoners of "conscience" and a further
relaxation of martial law this sLmimer. But we doubt the government
will release hardcore terrorists or endanger the peace by completely
abandoning martial law.
Foreign
Policy
1. It is the common wisdom that Ozal takes a back seat to Evren in
foreign policy. In fact, it is a much more complex relationship in which both
men, but especially Ozal, are intent on instilling a new sense of independence
and activism in Turkey's foreign policy.
-- The US will remain Turkey's most important foreign partner. Turkey
will receive more than $853 million in US economic and military aid
in FY 1984. The US has some 240 security arrangements with the
Turks, including a,wide-ranaino Defense and Fcnnnmir fnnnaratinn
Agreement (DECA).
The problem of Cyprus threatened US-Turkish relations in the 1970s
and is doing so again. For FY 1985 the US Administration proposed
$947 million in combined economic and military aid. Ankara has
objected strongly to a proposed Congressional cut of $40 million in
military aid and to a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee
resolution to slash $215 million in military aid unless the Turks
make major concessions in returning Varosha to the Greek Cypriots.
The Turks are unlikely to buckle and could eventually retaliate by
demanding greater financial concessions under the DECA that expires
in 1985. They might also downgrade or sever relations with Israel.
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If relations with the US worsened substantially, the Turks, might
consider restricting access to some of the NATO facilities. in the
2. The'Cyprus problem and Turkey's involvement in it will not, be easily
resolved. the Turks remain deeply involved in
the party politics of their compatriots on the island.
-- Ankara, which provides the bulk of the funds for the "Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC) and has a sizable military
presence, continues to play a preponderant role in formulating
Turkish Cypriot policies toward the Greek Cypriots and toward UN
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar who mediates the dispute.
-- The current focus of attention is a set of UN proposals designed to
reduce tensions and rekindle negotiations. They remain highly
classified despite leaks in the Turkish press. Under the UN plan:
o The Turkish Cypriots would cease efforts to consolidate their
new Republic in return for Greek Cypriot promises to not take
their case to international forums.
o Both sides would cease efforts to militarize the island.
o The Turks would return a large portion of the former Greek
Cypriot resort town of VcTrosha to interim UN control before
Greek resettlement, in return for a Greek pledge to restart
intercommunal talks on a comprehensive settlement.
-- Denktash and Ankara have sought further clarifications of the UN
plan, primarily as a means of gauging Greek flexibility to-meet
Turkish demands in a settlement. In the meantime, the Turks and
Turkish Cypriots are unlikely to forego diplomatic initiatives aimed
at gaining international recognition for the Turkish Cypriot
"Republic" or stop efforts to devise its new political system.
-- Renewed tensions over Cyprus have produced additional strains in
Greek-Turkish relations, leading to the collapse of nascent bilateral
talks on trade and tourism -- the only meaningful point of contact in
recent months. Papandreou's overreaction to an incident involving
Turkish and Greek gunboats in the Aegean in March has reinforced the
Turkish view that the Socialist government in Athens wants to create
an artificial crisis in order to distract the Greek public. and
bolster its position with the Allies.
-- Ankara's policy toward Papandreou has been an adept mixture of moves
to both isolate the Greek government in the Western camp and show
Ankara's good intentions. In early April, for example, Prime
Minister Ozal announced that visas will no longer be required for
Greek citizens entering Turkey.
-- At the same time, the Turks have been quick to exhibit their
cooperation with the Allies in NATO forums and their dislike for the
Balkan nuclear-free zone idea promoted by Athens.
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3. The Ozal government wants to improve and expand relations with
Western Europe. At stake are EC loans, new markets for Turkish goods, and
ultimately membership in the Council of Europe and the EC. But Ozal will not
pursue better relations with Europe at any cost. Ankara believes that it has
made great progress in returning to democracy and correcting an admittedly
serious human rights problem, and it resents European "insensitivity" to
Turkey's problems. European refusal to accept Turkey as a legal and political
equal, or at least recognize the progress already made, would add impetus to
plans already underway to improve and expand relations with the Islamic world
and to enhance Turkey's influence in the Middle East.
-- Ozal, a devout Muslim, and Evren have begun to travel more to Islamic
countries. Evren went to the Islamic Conference in Casablanca
earlier this year where he worked to bolster Turkey's ties with
several Islamic states and recently visited Saudi Arabia to negotiate
economic and military training agreements.
-- Ozal has just returned from Iran and probably will go to Libya and
Iraq later in the year to discuss a wide range of economic and
political matters. Iran and to a lesser extent Iraq are Turkey's
chief trading partners and Ozal wants to strengthen Ankara's
relationship with both.
-- Turkey will strive to remain neutral in the Iran-Iraq war. But if
Iran's long threatened offensive materializes and succeeds and if the
government in Baghdad collapses,Turkey could be dragged into the
conflict to protect its interests along the border, particularly if
the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey
attempted to exploit the situation.
4. The most important obstacle to Turkey's pursuit of a larger role in
the Middle East and southwest Asia is Syria. Syrian-Turkish antagonism has a
long history, and relations between the two neighbors have been at best cool
since Ataturk's day.
-- The Turks also resent the growing Soviet presence and influence in
Syria which they see as an increasingly serious threat to the Islamic
movement in general and Turkey in particular.
-- If the Ozal government is even moderately successful in its efforts
to expand its role in the area, therefore, competition between Ankara
and Damascus for influence and markets is likely to in
heightening chances for a military confrontation.
5. For the time being, though, the Ozal government continues to see the
Soviet Union as the greatest threat to Turkey. Turkey will continue to uphold
its NATO responsibilities vis-a-vis the USSR despite serious deficiencies in
military equipment and training.
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-- At the same time, however, the Turks are interested in improving
relations with Moscow. Ankara wants in 'particular to reverse a
decade-long decline in economic and trade relations. To this end,
several delegations have traveled between Turkey and the Soviet Union
to discuss specific proposals to increase ties.
-- It is not altogether clear that the Turks will be successful in
reversing the decline in economic relations with the Soviets.
Whatever the outcome, Ankara would respond very cautiously to any
Soviet overtures for improved political relations.
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