SPAIN: GONZALEZ MOVES CLOSER TO A POLICY ON NATO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001100330001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 21, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Memorandum for: A copy of this memo was
sent to the External Dist.
List attached.
Attached is a memo that I thought you might
find interesting on Prime Minister Gonzalez's
handling of Spanish membership in NATO. The author
concludes that pressure from Allied capitals could
be an important factor for Gonzalez in keeping open
the option of future military integration into the
Alliance.
21 June 1984
EURA
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
21 June 1984
SPAIN: Gonzalez Moves Closer to a Policy on NATO
Summary
important elements in Gonzalez's Socialist Party have
increased their opposition to NATO. In the face of these
conflicting pressures Gonzalez has inched further toward
public endorsement of continued Spanish membership in the
Alliance, but also has said that he will stop short of full
military integration. Gonzalez probably can keep the option
of future integration open, and continued prompting from
other Western leaders could be an important factor in moving
him i
_
___
that
n
dire
t
Pressure to Move Forward on NATO
This memorandum was written by Iberian-Aegean Branch, Western
Europe
i
v
sion, Office of-European Analysis, with a contribution from
European Analysis. Comments may be aririroccori to the rhi
.p
e
EUR M84-10133
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The Spanish military has also spoken out increasingly in favor of NATO.
Since joining the Alliance the armed services have become better informed of
the Soviet military threat and of NATO's potential contribution to Spain's
defense. Three weeks ago, in fact, General Peralba, the Air Force Chief of
Staff, publicly declared that full integration into NATO would be "very
beneficial" for the armed forces. The Socialists value good relations with
the militar
d li
y an
sten seriously to Spain's top commanders.
imposition to the Alliance 25X1
Gonzalez opposed the previous center-right government's decision to enter
NATO, pledged in his election campaign in 1982 to hold a referendum on Spanish
membership, and froze military integration at a largely representational
level. Although he has gradually adopted a more positive public stance since
then, published polls show that most 25X1
voters still have reservations about the Alliance.
The Communists have tried to capitalize on public misgivings and have
joined with a variety of peace groups in the past several weeks in sponsoring
large anti-NATO demonstrations. Gonzalez has probably been even more troubled
by the open opposition to NATO of Socialist trade unions and youth groups as
well as in the party's strong regional organization in Catalonia. 1,a?11
Searching for Options
Gonzalez has publicly reaffirmed his commitment in rle to Western
defense efforts.
signalled to the press
freeze on full integration.
On the other hand, he has
t at he will not completely lift the
*Spain formally joined NATO in May 1982. By the time Gonzalez took office and
froze further integration in December, Spain was actively participating on the
political side of the Alliance, primarily through the North Atlantic Council
and the Political Advisors and Economic Advisors meetings. On the military
side Spanish participation was substantially less and was limited largely to
representation on the Military Committee, the Defense Planning Committee, the
Nuclear Policy Group, and a few technical committees and working groups.
Spanish forces were not integrated into NATO's military command structure, nor
was Madrid represented on the International Military Staff or at SHAPE. Since
December 1982 Madrid has made small, quiet steps toward increasing its
participation. For example, Spain has linked up with NATO's communication
system, sent officers to NATO courses, and sought a role in Alliance arms
projects. Most recently, Spain applied earlier this month to join the
Maintenance and S
l- Or
n;_-l -_
upp
g
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Gonzalez appears to be concerned primarily with reducing the political
costs of support for continuing NATO membership rather than with defining the
terms of Spanish participation. The greatest problem Gonzalez faces is his
promise to hold a referendum before his term of office ends in October 1986.
According to the press, as much as 86 percent of the population wants him to
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likely time tor a referendum" and the Socialists have been working
painstakingly to draft "winnable" language. Gonzalez himself has recently
suggested publicly that he may ask the country to choose in effect between
NATO or the even more unpopular bilateral agreement with the United States.
However it is couched, a referendum would focus attention on NATO and
could harden opposition to the Alliance. Gonzalez also knows that a
referendum could divide his party. The Socialist Party's strong personal
allegiance to him means that he will probably be able to wring a formal
endorsement for membership from the party congress in December. A referendum
campaign, nevertheless. will test that unity and give party dissidents a
popular '^-.._
These dangers have led Gonzalez to consider ways of avoiding the
referendum. Last month, a prominent party moderate publicly
proposed that the NATO issue e eci e instead by Parliament. Two weeks ago
Gonzalez himself said publicly that he regretted his referendum promise,
although he added that he stood by that commitment.
Gonzalez's concern over his image as a man who keeps his
promises, however, will make it difficult, if not impossible, for him to
b
d
a
an
on his referendum pledge.
Reaching a Decision
Gonzalez is sensitive to public moods, and polls will almost certainly
continue to show opposition to NATO running across much of the political
spectrum. Gonzalez probably also knows, however, that any significant
backtracking on membership could trouble many business and banking leaders as
well a
th
s
e military whose confidence he has worked hard to win.
Well coordinated behind-the-scenes pressure from Allied capitals could
strengthen Gonzalez's resolve on NATO. Bonn, Paris, Brussels, and Rome could
be particularly influential. Gonzalez, though, needs and will want the Allies
to help him with the Spanish public by moving forward on Madrid's EC
application, which enjoys wide popular backing.
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Gonzalez is likely to move carefully in seeking public approval for the
Alliance. He will probably attempt to keep Spanish participation at the
minimum level acceptable to his NATO Allies, and try to keep as best he can
the appearance of an independent role within the Alliance. The key question
will be whether the Spanish decision leaves open the possibility of eventual
military integration. If Gonzalez believes it necessary to satisfy his NATO
Allies on this point, his popularity with the electorate and his generally
strong grip on his party should give him the political strength to win out.
There is a possibility that Gonzalez could balance his support for NATO
membership by depreciating Spain's bilateral agreement with Washington. The
bilateral agreement is the "sleeper" issue in Spanish foreign policy. Opinion
polls show that opposition to the presence of US forces in Spain is widespread
and growing. That sentiment was largely latent until recently. A referendum
campaign that indirectly pitted the bilateral agreement against NATO
membership, however, could bring that opposition to the surface and make
renegotiation of the accord more difficult in 1986. Gonzalez's interest in
continued good relations with Washington, however, will make him cautious on
Over the Longer Term
If Gonzalez manages to surmount the hurdles to winning approval for
membership in the Alliance, he will still have to face the issue of military
integration. An important consideration that would favor full integration
over the longer term is the financial burden of maintaining the separate
military structure favored by some Socialists. Full integration could free
scarce funds for the military modernization program Gonzalez has already
promised as well as for the expanded social expenditures he would almost
certainly like if he wins a second term. Another factor that could favor
*Ironically, the same polls show that pro-American sympathies are also
growing. The explanation for this apparently contradictory movement of
opinion appears to be Gonzalez himself. The Socialist Prime Minister has
undercut traditional leftist misgivings toward Washington by his open support
for positive US-Spanish ties. At the same time, he has continued to hold in a
low key way that a foreign military presence on Spanish soil can be justified
only on the grounds that it contributes to the defense of the West. This
grudging acceptance of the US use of bases contributed to a decline in public
support for the US military presence that began substantially before the well-
attended and well-publicized peace demonstrations this spring that focused on
th
b
e
ase issue as well as NATO membership.
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integration over the longer term is Gonzalez's interest in building up Spain's
arms industry and military exports. Allied officials will be able to point
out that full participation would improve Spain's understanding of NATO
equipment needs and make it easier to share in Alliance arms consortia.
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