SCHMIDT BUNDESTAG ADDRESS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001100410001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 6, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Memorandum for:
Subject: Schmidt Bundestag Address on European
Security
Attached is a memorandum concerning remarks
made by former chancellor Schmidt before West
German Bundestag prepared on
6 July 1984.
Distribution:
4 - Ic/CB
1 - D/ELRA
2 - EURA Production
3 - EURA/EI
2 - EtJPA/EI/SI
1 - Joseph Halgus
DDI/EURA/EI/SI 04uI5 )
E l~
Office of European Analysis
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Washing on, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
6 July 1984
Schmidt Bundesta_Address on European Security
Summary
Former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
recently delivered a speech to the Bundestag in
which he called for increased Franco-West German
cooperation on defense matters. He also advocated
raising the nuclear threshold by eliminating West
German tactical nuclear forces. Schmidt's remarks
are consistent with a keynote speech he delivered
at the May 1984 Social Democratic party congress
and reflect his party's security platform. If
adopted, his proposal, in effect, would draw
French forces back into the NATO integrated
military structure and would substantially
increase French and West German responsibility for
West European defense.
The Kohl government has not taken a position
on Schmidt's proposals. In general, however, it
probably supports Schmidt's call for closer
Franco-West German defense cooperation, since it
demonstrate to the West German public Kohl's
strong ties to other West European capitals and
his independence from the United States. The
government, however, will oppose the withdrawal of
US troops from West Germany, and react positively
to the commitment of French divisions to NATO.
Bonn is also likely to reject eliminating the
Bundeswehr's tactical nuclear capabilities, which
implies a fundamental change in NATO strategy that
Bonn is not yet ready to support. In the short-
term, however, Kohl and the West German public
almost certainly do not expect a positive French
response to Schmidt's proposals. We expect the
Kohl government feels little obligation to respond
to them specifically at this time.
This memorandum was prepared by
Division, Office of European Analysis. Comments
are welcome and should be addressed to
European Issues Division, EUR
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Background
Since the 1950s, the West German public has strongly
supported NATO and the US contribution to West European
defense. Recently, these attitudes have withstood the strains of
INF deployments and debate among West German security experts on
the credibility of NATO strategy. Polls conducted late last year
showed that 78 percent of West Germans back their country's
membership in NATO, and 69 percent expressed the belief that
American troops stationed in West Germany serve the interests of
both the US and West Germany.
. On the other hand, West Germans have expressed great concern
over INF deployment and the danger of a nuclear holocaust.
Doubts about the credibility of NATO's conventional capability
have led West German defense experts to question NATO's excessive
reliance on nuclear deterrence. The Kohl government has taken
note of this concern and has emphasized its interest in improving
West Germany's conventional force structure. Rather than seeking
additional funds for the defense budget, however, Kohl has
concentrated on rationalizing current programs and on
strengthening Franco-German relations. He enthusiastically
supports French efforts to reinvigorate the Western European
Union to the extent that they are designed to strengthen rather
than supplant NATO. The Social Democratic Party also supports
improving conventional defense capabilities and reinvigorating
Schmidt's Bundestag Address
In his 28 June speech to the Bundestag, former Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt, referring to the Nunn Amendment's proposal to
reduce US forces in Europe, called for strengthened Franco-West
German defense cooperation, including French commitment of 12
divisions to West European defense within the NATO framework.
Schmidt contended that these 12 divisions, plus 18 divisions that
West Germany would mobilize, could more than compensate for any
US reduction (see attachment).
A key element of the Schmidt proposal is the requirement for
France to commit forces to the defense of West Germany--an
objective long sought by the SPD as well as the Kohl
government.
Schmidt acknowledged that additional conventional weapons
and equipment--and thus more defense funds--would be required to
field a full 18-division German force, but he contended that the
money could be found b sacrificing the Bundeswehr's tactical
nuclear capabilities.
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Appeal to West German Public
Schmidt's proposal could have considerable appeal to the West
German public:
It would preserve the US strategic nuclear guarantee but
would raise the nuclear threshold by eliminating the
need for tactical nuclear weapons.
It would give West Germany a greater role in and, hence,
influence over its own national security.
According to Schmidt, it would not require increased
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We believe that the Schmidt proposal reflects a belief that
the West German public would be attracted to the notion of
raising the nuclear threshold and eventually reducing US troop
strength in West Germany. Opinion polls and media commentary
suggest that West Germans recognize and accept their reliance on
the United States. Nonetheless, we believe that West Germans
could accept a US troop reduction that appeared to give Bonn a
greater voice in NATO defense questions and that did not threaten
the US nuclear guarantee. The public, however, would also have
to be convinced that a French-West German conventional defense
force was effective and credible.
Kohl Government's Response
The Kohl government has not yet responded to Schmidt's
remarks, but Kohl probably will use elements of the speech to
support his pursuit of closer French-West German defense
relations within the NATO framework. Indeed, the Kohl government
has reacted enthusiastically to recent signs of French
willingness to increase. bilateral defense cooperation and would
like to build on this beginning.
Bonn had responded positively to French efforts to
reinvigorate the WEU in hopes of gaining French guarantees for
the conventional and nuclear defense of West Germany and to
demonstrate symbolically to the West German public the Kohl
government's strong ties to other West European capitals and its
independence from the United States. The Kohl government would
enthusiastically accept any French offer to commit conventional
forces to West German defense.
While Kohl probably believes the Schmidt proposals are a
useful reminder to the French that West Germany is interested in
genuine defense cooperation, Kohl no doubt questions the
feasibility of'the proposals. The government will likely reject
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suggestions that the number of US forces in West Germany could be
reduced and oppose any efforts to eliminate West Germany's
tactical nuclear capabilities.
-- Kohl will oppose Schmidt's calls for increased West
German defense contributions to compensate for possible
US troop reductions in part because of the severe West
German manpower crunch. Perhaps the most crucial
defense decisions now facing the Kohl government involve
the need to meet military manpower requirements in the
face of a rapidly declining manpower pool. Bonn is
,unlikely to aggravate this problem by taking on added
burdens.
The Kohl government also will reject Schmidt's
renunciation of West German tactical nuclear forces.
The Schmidt proposal not only calls into question the
essence of NATO strategy, since it sacrifices one leg of
the deterrent triad, but also would necessitate vastly
improved conventional forces. It is highly unlikely
that funds currently budgeted for Bundeswehr tactical
nuclear weapons would be sufficient to pay the costs of
a major conventional force improvement program. In
fact, West Germany is experiencing considerable
difficulty in meeting existing NATO conventional force
goals: we estimate that Bonn requires $13 billion more
than is now in national plans to meet NATO requirements
over the next five years.
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Attachment
French and West German Land Forces
1. Ground Canbat Units*
Approximate
Major Tactical Units Authorized Unit Strength
Armored Divisions 8 7,000
Infantry Divisions 4 6,900
Overseas Infantry Division 1 8,670
Alpine Division 1 9,460
Airborne Division 1 15,545
Foreign Legion Group 1 8,000
Overseas Regiments 13 600
2. Mobilizeable Forces
Under the existing mobilization concept, 14 reserve divisions are to be
organized to augment the 15 active divisions. The divisions will be canposed
of one light armored regiment, two infantry regiments, a command and support
regiment, and an engineer canpany. The core personnel for four of the
divisions are to be taken fran military schools, and the remaining 10
divisions are to be activated by cadre taken fran active units. Equipment for
reserve divisions is to be furnished by the active units and schools. Full
mobilization would be reached by M+ll days. This system of mobilization will
be revamped by the Five Year Defense Plan for 1984-88. Defense goals still
appear to include a total established Army mobilization force of about 526,000
personnel. The new mobilization system will be similar to the West German
plan to have active units manned only by a cadre in peacetime which is filled
out by reservisits in emergencies.
*The French Army is currently organized into a field army of three corps, one
of which is located in West Germany. The II French Corps, with headquarters
in Baden-Baden, consists of three armored divisions. France does not
participate in NATO's integrated military structure.
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