POLAND: JARUZELSKI'S DECEMBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001101020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 3, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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-Wsh+npon. D C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
3 December 1984
Poland: Jaruzeiski's December
Summary
Although some observers have voiced doubt about General
Jaruzelski's ability to survive this month in power, in our
view, he has managed the initial stage of the'Popieluszko
affair with considerable aplomb. He has kept public order,
reassured at least some of his allies, and secured the
Primate's assistance in restricting militant priests. He has
also cowed the human rights watch committees and won some
acclaim for ensuring a fair investigation of the murder.
Appearances suggest that he has turned a potential disaster
into an opportunity to remove a political opponent, Miroslaw
Milewski.
Jaruzelski's political strength will be further tested
this month, however, particularly if he attempts to oust some
political opponents at the party plenum scheduled for sometime
this month. Jaruzelski clearly has the support of the
majority of the leadership, and at least tacit Soviet
support. He can boast of short term economic achievements,
and disarm hardline criticism by pointing to his own tough
policies toward Solidarity and the church. Jaruzelski's
weaknesses--a narrow power base and a chronically ill economy-
-are long term issues that he has managed to cope with in the
past, but will plague him for the foreseeable future.
Jaruzelski's recent efforts to dampen expectations of a
thorough purge of the security apparatus probably indicates he
.does not plan a wholesale housecleaning. A limited purge will
not satisfy the populace and will leave Jaruzelski reliant on
a small cadre of military and civilian supporters and on a
party apparatus that resists implementing decisions made in
Warsaw. Moscow still seems to view Jaruzelski as Poland's
best hope for now and will allow him some leeway to deal with
his political problems. We doubt, however, Mosco would
tolerate an emasculation of the hardline faction.
This memorandum was req ested by Paula National Security
Council. It was prepared by East European
Division, Office of European Ana si ommen s and ques ons are welcome and
should be addressed to Chief, East European Division,
EURM84-10236
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Introduction
populace. A party plenum is also expected in December. We
believe it will give Jaruzelski the opportunity to try to use the
Popieluszko slaying to purge his hardline opponents. The outcome
may profoundly affect Jaruzelski's political future and his
efforts to establish a national accord. 25X1
supplies as th.e dominant subject of conversation among the 25X1
murderers of Father Popieluszko to justice. 25X1
the Popieluszko tragedy has overtaken food
popular expectations that General Jaruzelski
This December probably will be especially tense because of 25X1
effort to boost supplies during the Christmas season.
the general sense of unrest even though the regime makes an
In recent years December has been a troublesome month for
Polish authorities. Worker unrest following price increases in
December 1970 brought down Wladyslaw Gomulka. Martial law was
declared in December 1981. And commemorating these anniversaries
has raised the tension level between the rulers and the ruled,
requiring the use of force on occasion to contain
demonstrations. Finally, the shortages that are a way of life in
Poland seem more distressing during the holiday period and add to
The Impact of the Popieluszko Affair
The
murder o
f the priest
has
widened the
splits long evident
in many
Polish in
stitutions.
The
tragedy acce
ntuated the
division
among th
e clergy ove
r the
degree of a
ccommodation
Cardinal
Glemp di
splays towar
d the
regime. Th
e Primate's ban
late last week on the militant preaching of Father Malkowski is
the latest manifestation of this inner church quarrel. But it is
the least likely of all the Polish institutional disputes to get
The split within Solidarity parallels the radical versus
moderate factions within the church but is far more vocal and
less subject to discipline. The human rights watch committees,
formed against Walesa's wishes by the more militant Solidarity
leaders and their advisers, might lead to a serious confrontation
with the regime if they become active. Walesa, meanwhile, will
have an opportunity to present his views at the commemoration, on
The most significant political contest in the aftermath of
the Popieluszko affair is within the ruling establishment. The
murder has heightened the rivalry between the secret police and
the military and fueled jealousies caused by Jaruzelski's
tendency to place military officers in key government
positions. This competition is intertwined in another dispute
within the party between hardline officials who tend to have
supporters in the secret police and a more moderate faction which
16 December, of the Gdansk uprising of 1970.
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often agrees with the policies of Jaruzelski. Both sides
probably view the coming plenum as an opportunity to press their
case.
Jaruzelski's Vulnerabilities
of enemies--not only i the Ministry of the Interior but
among many bureaucrats who view his efforts, however modest, to
decentralize economic and political decision-making as threats to
their jobs. Jaruzelski's decision to grant amnesty to most of
the country's political prisoners last July,
reinforced a view held by a sizable minority within -the
party that he is too lenient.
One of Jaruzelski's chief weaknesses is the narrowne
his power base, which is restricted mainly to the army.
party machinery, therefore, remains strong enough at local levels
to sabotage the reformist-type policies that Jaruzelski
apparently deems necessary to achieve some national
reconciliation and economic recovery. Continued reliance on the
military is also inconsistent with Soviet practice and prolongs
Moscow's suspicion of Jaruzelski's leadership.
The long-term economic outlook will be a major problem for
whoever rules Poland, but the current situation, while far from
satisfactory, does not seem explosive. Worker concern about
retail price increases and supply shortages has prompted Warsaw
to moderate its 1985 plan to be more acceptable to workers.
Consumption and real income are now scheduled to rise by 3 to 3.5
percent instead of stagnating as originally planned, while market
supplies will increase by slightly more than that amount. Retail
prices will rise by 9 percent--the lowest hike since 1980--and
food prices will increase by only 3 to 4 percent.
Jaruzelski's Strengths
Despite the difficulties he has with the party bureaucracy,
Jaruzelski appears to have sufficient support in the party
leadership. At the plenum in late October, for example, he
secured unanimous assent to a statement condemning the murder of
Popieluszko and authorizing an investigation of the heretofore
sacrosanct Ministry of the Interior. Although Jaruzelski was
said to have been pressed hard at the plenum by a "group of 9,"
the views of these middle-level Central Committee members have
not been given wide circulation. In contrast, the official
press--including newspapers that are reportedly opposed to
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Jaruzelski--has generally been supportive and condemned the
crime. Finally, Jaruzelski got the Politburo to place him
directly in charge of party cadres in the Interior Ministry, a
move that undercut his opponent, Miroslaw Milewski, party
Meanwhile, Jaruzelski is taking decisive action to mar h 1
support for the December
On 14 November, the party's Central Control
Commission approved proposals aimed at strengthening the
effectiveness of internal party control. During brief trips to
Budapest and East Berlin in mid November, Jaruzelski reportedly
sought support from and gave assurances to his neighbors in
connection with Poland's political turbulence.- The-visits had
the effect of displaying a confident leader in charge, as did his
performance at an unusual press conference on 28 November.
Jaruzelski told the journalists that a "rotten cell" had been
discovered in the security apparatus, and r is promise to
pursue the investigation vigorously.
Jaruzelski has taken steps to polish his hardline
credentials as well. He has adopted a tough attitude t r he
newly formed human rights groups, he
has put the brake on the dialogue witm the church. The
government is also taking further steps to tighten the liberal
law on higher education, a move that has already evoked protests
from academics and Solidarity. Finally, Warsaw set conditions
which made it virtually impossible for West German Foreign
Minister Genscher to visit Poland in late November.
In addition probably to holding a discussion of the problems
associated with the Popieluszko affair, the plenum this month is
scheduled to address the economy. Jaruzelski should be able to
deflect criticism by opponents dissatisfied over his economic
programs. Industrial production increased by 4 percent this year
and the grain harvest was at near-record levels. The supply of
goods on the market improved by about 7 percent and, despite the
fall in livestock production, the meat rationing requirement was
met through imports. The hard currency trade surplus again was
above $1 billion and the USSR allowed Poland to run a trade
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deficit. The Poles negotiated a favorable rescheduling agreement
with private banks and continued a de facto moratorium on
payments to government creditors. At the same time, Jaruzelski
has made little progress in dealing with the deep-rooted causes
of Poland's economic problems and still needs to reach an
accommodation with the West in order to ensure resumption of
normal economic relations.
The Soviet View
The Soviets probably regard Jaruzelski as a mixed blessing.
He keeps order but has not been able fully to revitalize the
economy or unify the party. Moscow probably sympathizes with
those Polish hardliners who are uneasy about the July amnesty,
although Premier Tikhonov's presence in Warsaw when the amnesty
was announced suggests -t-hey -madam -n-o--attem-pt- to-6-lock the move.
Moscow probably views the relative calm in the wake of the
Popieluszko murder, and Jaruzelski's tough posture toward the new
human rights monitoring groups, as indications that his
leadership still offers the best hope for stability in Poland. 25X1
The Soviets are undoubtedly concerned, however, over the impact
that the investigation will have on the more ardently pro-Soviet
elements in the government.
Outlook 25X1
The political fallout from the Popieluszko murder is not yet
over. Most Poles believe that punishment should extend beyond
the four accused. If Jaruzelski is unable or unwilling to purge
Milewski and perhaps others, the public's sense of outrage over
the crime will not be satisfied, and Jaruzelski will be perceived
as weak and an instrument of the hardline faction. Under these
circumstances even his political allies would begin to question
whether he should continue as head of the party. If on the other
hand Milewski and several others in the party apparatus and the
secret police are removed, Jaruzelski's position will be
enhanced.
A partial purge seems the most likely outcome. Both
Jaruzelski and the government's press spokesman have already
tried to dampen expectations of a wide-ranging house cleaning by
publicly warning that the authorities will not create scapegoats
and that the continuing investigation may not uncover any high-
level instigators. Milewski's ouster, however, would still be a
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coup for Jaruzelski and might encourage him to make a new attempt
in the coming months to gain control of the party apparatus.
But it is equally possible that Jaruzelski will have to pay
a political price for Milewski's removal that would include the
departure of some of Jaruzelski's supporters. Such a scenario
would likely mean a continuing stalemate between moderates and
hardliners, failure to solve Poland's numerous problems, and
continuing crisis. The popular reaction to such a compromise
almost certainly would be hostile.
But even under these circumstances, we do not expect an
eruption of civil disorder this month. Supplies of goods,
including food, traditionally are better during the holiday
season and there are no indications that major shortages of
staple goods will occur in December. Retail prices are an
average of only 13 percent higher than last year--the lowest
increase in three years--because the regime placed strict central
controls on price hikes of many goods. Most workers, moreover,
have more cash to spend in December because of the usual year-end
bonuses given out by firms.
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SUBJECT: December in Poland
Distribution:
Original -
Paula Dobriansky, NSC
1 G. Kolt, NIO/Europe
1 DDT
1 DDI Registry
1 D/EURA
1 C/EURA/EE
1 DC/EURA/EE
1 C/EURA/EE/NE
2 EURA/PS
4 IMC/CB
1 EURA/EE/NE Chrono
2
2
EURA/EE/NE)
3Dec 84
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