GREEK AND TURKISH MILITARY TIES WITH LIBYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001101120001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Memorandum for: THE RECORD
This typescript was prepared at the request of
Richard Haass, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Policy Planning, Europe.
E U R A
Office of European Analysis
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Central Intelligence AEFncv
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 December 1984
Greek and Turkish Military Ties with Libya
Summary
Both Greece and Turkey have established military
relationships with Libya which extend back at least two
decades. The Turkish connection is by far the most
significant at this time -- it includes major military
construction projects; the sale of military equipment; and
the provision of training to a sizable number of Libyan
naval and, at one time, air force cadets. The Greek
relationship has been much more modest -- limited military
construction and training activities -- but the Libyans
clearly hope that the Papandreou government will be open to
significant expansion of the relationship. The Libyans and
Greeks already have discussed arms purchases.
This memorandum was prepared by the Iberia-Aegean Branch, Western Europe
Division, Office of European Analysis. It was prepared at the request of
Richard Haass, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning.
Questions and comments may be addressed t Chief, Iberia-Aegean 25X1
Branch, EURA 25X1
EUR M 84-10248D
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Both Athens and Ankara view Libya as a major potential
market for military goods and services that could help
expand their nascent defense industries, and each is anxious
to deny the other any special influence in Tripoli. The
Greeks seek to capitalize on the alleged ideological
affinities between the Socialist government in Athens and
the radical Libyan regime, while the Turks look to the
historical and cultural heritage they share with Libya.
Both Greece and Turkey also feel constrained to impose
limits on their cooperation with Qadhafi because of doubts
about his reliability and because of the possible reactions
of their allies. There are other constraints as well. The
Turks do not want to strengthen Qadhafi to the point where
he could pose a threat to their direct and indirect security
interests in the Mediterranean, and both the Greeks and the
Turks must balance their interests in Libya against their
more important economic stakes in moderate Arab countries
hostile to or suspicious of Qadhafi.
Greek-Libyan Relations
The Military Relationship
Greece and Libya have maintained a military relationship since at least
the mid-1960s, centering on the training of small numbers of Libyan officers
in Greek military academies. There has been as yet no major change in the
relationship although Papandreou has chosen to give it a much higher public
profile. Libya clearly entertains the hope that the relationship can be
expanded significantly'and -- particularly in the past year -- has stepped up
efforts to persuade the Greeks to extend cooperation to include the repair and
maintenance of equipment and the supply of arms, ammunition, and spare
parts. The Greek Government has expressed interest in the Libyan overtures
and apparently has agreed in principle to repair Libyan ships and supply light
arms, ammunition, and uniforms -- although the details of these agreements
have yet to be worked out. If carried out this would be a new departure --
past Libyan efforts to procure military equipment from Greece have been
largely unsuccessful, the only one being a 1977 agreement for the sale of
small arms worth $5 million. At the same time, Athens has officially denied
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any intention to extend cooperation to operational training or the supply of
spare parts for Western and US equipment.
Greek-Libyan military cooperation to date includes the following:
The Greeks have offered training to Libyan military officers for the
past twenty years. The extent of training has fluctuated from year
to year and, if anything, has decreased slightly since the mid-
1970s. In 1976, 59 Libyan officers and NCOs were in training at
Greek military academies (49 at the Naval Academy and ten at the Air
Force Academy). As of September 1981, shortly before Papandreou took
office, the number of Libyan military trainees had fallen to 26 --
nearly all of them attending the Navy Cadet School. Eight Libyans
are currently attending the Greek Naval Academy. Defense Attache
reporting indicates that the drop in enrollments is primarily a
result of the Greek Government's desire to extend training
opportunities to other African and Middle Eastern candidates and of
the imposition of quotas on the number of Libyan students. (In the
past, Greece offered some basic and advanced flight training to
Libyan officers. This program appears to have been gradually phased
out, although the state-run Greek television recently reported that
the Libyans have resurfaced the possibility of getting technical
training for their air force.)
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-- Greek newspapers have referred to an agreement for the construction
and sale of warships to Libya.
speculates that the press may be referring to La Combattante type
patrol boats. (Libya already has a number of these guided-missile
patrol boats in its inventory.) He notes, however, that rumored
Greek sales of warships to other countries have yet to pan out. We
have no information to confirm or refute these rumors, although we
know the Libyans have expressed an interest in purchasing fast patrol
High level Libyan military delegations have traveled to Greece on
several occasions over the past year to discuss the purchase of light
arms and ammunition as well as training. Press reporting reveals
that the Libyans have met with representatives of the Hellenic Arms
Industry (a government-controlled company that produces small arms);
the Hellenic Aerospace Industry (a government-owned facility that
services primarily Greek and US aircraft); Steyr-Hellas (a joint
Greek-Austrian venture that produces trucks and armored personnel
carriers); and Pyrkal (a state-owned company that produces ammunition
and explosives). Press reports suggest that there has been agreement
in principle to supply Libya with small arms and ammunition but that
the specifics (type, quantity, cost) have yet to be worked out. The
Libyans also have expressed an interest in the Artemis-30 anti-
aircraft gun produced by the Hellenic Arms Industry and the Leonidas
armored personnel carrier made by Steyr-Hellas. We do not know,
however, if these will be included in the package of proposed
purchases. (In fact, this week the Greek Deputy Defense Minister is
in Libya to discuss potential military sales.)
Ihas ordered the Greek armed
forces to assist their Libyan counterparts in obtaining spare parts
for US and Western equipment. Reports began to surface in early
1982, however, that Olympic Airlines and the Hellenic Aerospace
Industry (HAI) signed contracts in January-February for the repair
and servicing of Libyan Airway's Boeing 707 aircraft. The agreement
reportedly included airframe maintenance and some engine repair
work. (The US Department of Commerce issued a temporary order in
September 1981 denying Libyan Airways -- which uses its aircraft for
military/paramilitary purposes -- access to US-origin products and
technical data.) An Embassy contact with excellent access was not
aware of any HAI contract with Libyan Airways and noted at the time
that HAI was fully booked with projects. HAI does have the
capability, however, for engine overhauling work, and Olympic
Airlines has the capability for partial servicing. We have no recent
information to confirm whether any maintenance work was actually
carried out or is currently planned.
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-- Greek construction firms apparently have been involved in at least
one military-related project in Libya. Embassy reporting from The
Hague in early 1982, for example, indicates that the Dutch firm Royal
Volker Shevir and an unidentified Greek firm were engaged in a joint
venture to build a military airbase near the town of Martuka in
Libya. The contract had reportedly been signed in 1980. We have no
further details but note that the-Greeks have relatively few
construction contracts with Libya. There are only about 2,000 Greek
workers in Libya.
Greek Motivations
Greece's relations with Libya are of relatively recent origin and are a
part of Greece's policy of expanding its ties with the Arab world in general
-- a policy which began in earnest in the mid-1970s under the leadership of
then-Prime Minister Karamanlis and which has taken on new impetus under
Papandreou. The prime motivat-ion in the relationship has been economic --
Greece's dependence on low-sulfur Libyan oil, its desire to attract sorely
needed investment in Greece, and the prospect of lucrative markets for
agricultural products and technical services. To a lesser but increasing
extent, relations are also a product of political motivations. On the one
hand, this includes Greece's desire to cast itself as the middleman between
Europe and the Middle East (a "bridge" to use Papandreou's metaphor). On the
other hand, it involves a competition between Greece and Turkey for Arab
support on Aegean disputes and on the Cyprus issue. Since Papandreou's
election, ideology has also played a role in Greek-Libyan relations, as
leaders of both countries have proclaimed their common opposition to
"superpower" dominance. To date, benefits -- especially in the economic area
-- have fallen far short of Greek expectations, but the Greeks continue to
hope for more concrete results.
Indications of Greek motivations include the following:
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Papandreou has continued and expanded upon his predecessors' tendency
to portray Greece as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East.
Papandreou's recent mediation effort between French President
Mitterrand and Colonel Qadhafi is the most recent outgrowth of this
posture and was calculated to earn Greece higher visibility abroad as
well as to win political points at home. It is doubtful that
Papandreou gained many admirers from among his allies, but according
to Athens press reports, his efforts were well received by Greeks
across the political spectrum.
Greece has long competed with Turkey to curry favor with the Arabs.
Middle Eastern support for the Greek position on the Cyprus issue
within the nonaligned movement has been an important factor in Greek-
Arab political relations -- especially since Greece must contend with
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot calls for Islamic solidarity. The
Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence last year encouraged even
greater Greek attempts to woo the Arabs in order to forestall Turkish
efforts to gain international recognition for northern Cyprus
Despite these efforts the Arabs play little or no role in Greek-
Turkish Aegean disputes and have generally followed a policy of
studied neutrality. Although Qadhafi has offered his services as a
mediator to both the Greeks and Turks, neither has taken the offer
seriously.
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Outlook
Despite Greece's emphasis on developing close ties to the Middle East --
and especially Papandreou's catering to the more radical Arab states -- there
are certain real and self-imposed restraints that limit the degree of
cooperation. The Middle East is a complex of countries, and Greece must
constantly balance off it interests with one Arab state against another. In
the case of Libya, the Greek Government 25X1
prefers to maintain a certain distance, and in the past it has expressed its
irritation over Libyan attempts to "direct" Greek policies.
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-- The Greeks
Athens, pa
one-month
have been embarrassed by Libyan-sp
rticularly by the shooting of four
period last spring. These incident
onsored terrorism in
Libyan dissidents over a
s occurred shortly
before and
after an official visit by the Lib
yan foreign minister.
--
A visit by
Qadhafi to Greece in spring 1982 f
ailed to materialize
because of
Qadhafi's unacceptable demands.
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Qadhafi wanted extended tal
ks with Papandreou and
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members. Perhaps more pertinently, he also insisted that the Greeks
agree as a precondition for the visit to import 2 million tons of
Libyan oil annually -- double the current level of purchases.
-- Shortly after?Papandreou's election, the government rebuffed demands
by the head of the Libyan People's Bureau in Athens that Greece kick
out the US bases, remove nuclear weapons from Greece, and sever its
diplomatic ties with Israel. While the government itself has given
voice to some of these same objectives, it has told the Libyans that
such remarks by Libyan officials constitute unacceptable interference
in Greece's internal affairs.
the right to address the Greek Parliament and Socialist Party
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The Turkish-Libyan Military Connection
Past and Present
the Turkish Navy has
agreed to organize and supervise a two- to three-month Libyan naval fast
attack craft exercise is the first evidence we have that the Turks would be
willing to provide operational training to Qadhafi's armed forces.
The recent history of Libyan-Turkish military relations appears to date
from 1974, when Qadhafi reportedly provided fuel and war materiel to the Turks
during their intervention in Cyprus. Since then, the relationship has come to
include a wide range of military sales and some training.
-- In 1975, during a visit by Qadhafi's right-hand man, Major Jallud, an
agreement was signed calling for training of Libyan air force
personnel and for the sale of Turkish-made munitions to Libya.
-- In 1979, during a visit by then-Prime Minister Ecevit to Libya,
agreement was reached on a ten-year military cooperation accord.
Turkey agreed to produce munitions, fast patrol boats, and other
naval craft for Libya. and to provide training to Libyan Air Force
and Naval cadets.
-- In 1980 the Turks agreed to build a munitions plant for the
Libyans. Turkey's government-owned producer of light arms and
munitions, MKEK, received the $1 billion contract. Ankara also
signed a $13.5 million contract for the sale of light weapons and
ammunition.
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In 1982 the Turkish Government agreed to service three Libyan
warships.
the Turkish navy also delivered to Libya ten unarmed, West erman
designed, Turkish-produced SAAR - 33 fast patrol boats. The Libyan
pilot training program, which reportedly included 50 students in 1981
and 28 students in 1982, appears to have concluded in 1982 with the
graduation of the last four cadets. (US urging probably played a
role in Turkey's apparent decision to refrain from signing another
such agreement with the Libyans. The Turks also reportedly were
exasperated with the poor quality of the students, most of whom were
unable to pass the flight training course, and concerned about the
potential involvement of some of the pilots in violent anti-US
actions. To our knowledge, there are now no Libyan Air Force cadets
at the Turkish Air War School. However, the increasing adoption of
Soviet and East bloc weapons systems by the Libyan Air, Force may also
have made a Turkish training program less practical.)
In 1983 then-Naval Forces Commander in Chief Admiral Nejat Turner
publicly disclosed that there currently were 120 Libyan students at
the Naval War School, that three Libyan warships were undergoing
repair at the Golcuk Naval shipyard (probably the three mentioned
above), and that Turkey was in the process of constructing about 150
small landing craft for the Libyan naval forces.
attending courses at the War School designed to prepare officers for
command at the brigade level and that, as of February 1984, a Libyan
submarine was undergoing repairs at Golcuk Shipyard.
three Libyan lieutenants were being trained in port
administration at the same shipyard.
-- In 1984, Turkish contractors held approximately $840 million in
contracts for military-related construction. Military construction
accounts for about 10 percent of the total value of construction
contracts held by Turkish companies in Libya (see Table).
Turkish Motivations
Ottomans and Soldiers
The Turks take a historical view toward Libya and tend to belittle
Qadhafi's importance as a political and military threat to either Turkish or
NATO interests. The Turkish-Libyan military connection predates Qadhafi's
regime by centuries. Four hundred years of Ottoman rule in Libya ended in
1911, when Libyans and Turks -- including the founder of the modern Turkish
Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk -- fought unsuccessfully to repel invading
Italian troops. Older Turks remember that many Libyan-born Ottomans fled to
Turkey after this defeat, and some became heroes during the Turkish war of
independence. There are some familial ties between the Libyan and Turkish
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elites dating from intermarriage in this period. More recently, Libyan cadets
have been students at the Turkish naval and ground forces academies at various
times since World War IT.
Islamic solidarity, if only in form, is also an inseparable element of
this shared past. On the occasion of state visits between the two countries,
mention is often made, on both sides, of the glorious days when Turks and
Libyans fought side by side to keep "non-Muslims" out of the Middle East.
This is largely rhetoric on the part of both -- "Islamic solidarity" does not
keep the Libyans from paying the Turks less than the Italians for naval cadet
training, nor the Turks from demanding an amount equal to that of the
Italians. However, the Turks almost certainly seek to exploit and reinforce
Qadhafi's tendency to make some decisions on ostensibly religious grounds,
when it serves their interests: for example, winning for themselves a
military contract that might have gone to the Greeks. Qadhafi, for his part,
probably hopes to reinforce the Turks' willingness to behave in "Islamic"
fashion by persuading them that they received Libyan-business-because-they are
fellow Muslims
In short, the Turks see their military ties to Libya from the perspective
of their historical relationship and not as an endorsement of the Qadhafi
regime and its policies. This view predisposes them to regard Turkey's
military supply and training relationship with Libya as a legitimate pursuit
of economic, political, and military interests.
Economic Interests
The Turkish military services each have sizable interests in Turkish
firms that produce military equipment, all of which are government-owned.
Thus, the services profit along with the firms, and the military is
understandably predisposed to push for the ex ansion of ex ort sales of
military equipment and training services
If Libyan
payments for military goods are, in fact, in hard currency, the Turkish
military has an advantage over other Turkish exporters because Libya generally
pays in kind (oil).
Turkish-Libyan military relations have become increasingly important as
overall trade has declined. Turkish nonmilitary exports peaked in 1981 at
$442 million (see chart). Libyan payment problems, due largely to declining
oil revenues, cut Turkish nonmilitary sales to $184 million in 1983. Tripoli
currently owes about $400 million to some 100 Turkish contractors operating in
Libya. (Total outstanding contracts are worth approximately $8.4 billion.)
Despite these r blem Turkish military steady for several
years. in recent years as
follows:
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1979 - $3.3 million
1980 - $144.3 million
1981 - $154.3 million
1982 - $144.4 million
1983 - $143 million
1984 - $141 million
These figures are significant when compared with Turkey's modest economy and
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Political-Military Interests
In addition to the motivating factors of economic self-interest and
historical linkages, Ankara's apparent view of a military connection with
Libya as a kind of political investment is also at play: military cooperation
provides an opportunity to shape Libyan views and moderate its policies toward
Turkey.
-- A reasonably friendly Libya would be less likely to aid Turkey's
arch-enemy, Syria. (This is not to say, of course, that Turkey
expects Libya to restrain Syrian support for Turkish terrorists.
Indeed, the Turks are aware that the Libyans have themselves been
involved from time to time with Turkish terrorists.)
-- The Turks probably reason -- or at least rationalize -- that they may
to some extent limit the growth of Soviet influence in the Libyan
armed forces by moving into areas of the Libyan military marked
yet cornered by the Soviets -- the Libyan Navy, for example.
-- Turkey's politico-military rivalry with Greece is a strong driving
force in Turkish pursuit of a Libyan military connection. The
Libyans, in turn, probably exploit this contest for influence.
Greek-Turkish rivalry has surfaced in many areas: in competition for
training agreements, naval craft sales, aircraft servicing. munitions
sales, and even over the question of a Qadhafi visit.
-- For domestic political reasons, the Turkish government has an
interest in demonstrating a degree of political-military independence
from the US. Turkey's Libyan connection admirably serves that end.
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Outlook
Turkey's perceived economic and political stake in maintaining its
connection with Libya is significant, and even open US disapproval may not be
sufficient to persuade it to curb these ties. The Turks consistently have
been reluctant to accede to US requests regarding Libya. Most recently, the
Turks were reluctant to accept US reasoning on the likely responsibility of
Qadhafi for the mining of the Red Sea, and they declined to approach Egypt to
offer mine-sweeping assistance. Persistent Turkish interest in a Qadhafi
visit is another case in point.
The power of Libya over Turkey as a debtor (owing some $400 million to
Turkish contractors) and as an employer (absorbing 60,000-70,000 Turkish
workers when unemployment at home is high) will prompt Ankara to maintain its
f riendshio, including military links, with Libya in the foreseeble future.
Despite these many interests and the likelihood of continued US-Turkish
tension over the issue of Libyan relations, we expect the Turks to observe the
following self-imposed limitations:
-- The Turks will not pursue actions that they believe would seriously
endanger their relationships with the US and NATO, in which they see
their security ultimately residing. Thus far, for example, the Turks
have been careful to observe US and West German third-country
transfer provisions.
-- They will be fastidious about not permitting their Libyan connection
n harm NATO dpf nsP int r cts in any concrete wa ,
(US objections to Turkish training of Libyan Air Force
pilots, made in part on these grounds, probably helped to persuade
Ankara to wind down, and, eventually end, the program.
-- They will stop short of helping the Libyans acquire significant
offensive capabilities against Mediterranean NATO countries, or
against friends such as Egypt.
Other strong disincentives for Turkey's taking its relationship much past its
present status include its relationships with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Tunisia, all more friendly than that with Libya.
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Selected Turkish Military Construction Contracts in Libya
as of June 1984
Millions of US$
Firm
Type of Project Project Value
B.T.K.
Military Facili
ties at nine locations
35
BETA
Military Facili
ties and Housing
130
ENKA
40 Air Raid She
lters and Infrastructure -----
_39 _
METIS/MESA
Military Instal
Tripoli
lation, Housing and Hangers in
--
ONTAS
Military Facili
four locations
ties and Infrastructure at
140
ORYATAS
Military Barrac
ks
14
TE-TA
S. TURKES/
F. AKKAYA
40 Military Dep
Harbor Works fo
ots in Bin Valid
r Sidi-Belal Naval Base
29
--Harbor Works
Naval Base
and Civil Construction for Tripoli
101
--Jetties for the Naval Forces in Tobruq
23
--14 Hangers at five locations
36
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Trade with Libya
Millions of US$
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Greece
Exports
130
125
114
167
168
220
112
103
(percent of total)
(5.1)
(4.5)
(3.4)
(4.3)
(3.3)
(5.2)
(2.6)
(2.3)
Imports
47
53
21
131
263
322
710
348
(percent of total)
(0.8)
(0.8)
(0.3)
(1.3)
(2.5)
(3.7)
(7.1)
(3.7)
Turkey
Exports
10
14
50
43
60
442
235
184
(percent of total)
(0.5)
(0.8)
(2.2)
(1.9)
(2.1)
(9.4)
(4.1)
(3.2)
Imports
234
276
213
208
716
789
890
793
(percent of total)
(4.7)
(4.9)
(4.7)
(4.2)
(9.5)
(8.9)
(10.1)
(8.6)
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Distribution:
Orig - Addressee (Richard Haass)
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - OD/EURA
2 - Production Staff
4 - IMC/CB
1 - Branch file
1 - Division file
2 - Authors
EURA/WE/IA (19Dec84) 25X1
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