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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1
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RIPPUB
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T
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14
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January 12, 2017
Document Release Date: 
August 27, 2010
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1
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Publication Date: 
February 16, 1984
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REPORT
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1 Central Intelligence igence Agency International Financial Situation Report #25 16 February 1984 Summary Several Latin American countries are following up on some of the speeches made during the Quito conference held in early January, including calls for a new approach to handling the debt problem and for acceptance by creditors of co-responsibility with the debtors in solving the debt crisis. There was no indication that these countries will seek to jointly renegotiate their debts, but several of them may band together in proposing that creditors substantially ease loan terms. Major developments in recent weeks include: o Foreign banks have nearly completed the signing of their $6.5 billion new money loan for Brazil. Despite the expected easing of Brazil's immediate cash problems, many international bankers and Brazilian officials continue to anticipate renewed financial problems later this year. o Embassy Lagos reports that a senior level Nigerian official sees little chance of signing an IMF letter of intent before June. This situation report was prepared by analysts of the Intelligence Directorate. Comments are - welcome and may be addressed to the International Finance Branch, Office of Global IssuesF Copy 70 of 76 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1 KEY ISSUE Latin American Joint Proposals for Reducing Debt Service Costs In contrast to previous debt conferences, several Latin American countries are following up on some of the speeches made during the Quito conference held in early January. In particular, calls continue for a new approach to handling the debt problem and for acceptance by creditors of co-responsibility with the debtors in solving it. Press reports indicate that presently several Latin American governments are more actively proposing that creditors grant softer terms on new and existing loans, including fixed or below-market interest rates as well as lower spreads and fees and longer maturities and grace periods. o On 5 February, Presidents Betancour of Colombia and Alfonsin of Argentina jointly emphasized the need for frank dialogue with creditors so as to work out affordable debt payment terms, according to a press report. Both leaders indicated that the current loan terms are detrimental to the development and political stability of Latin America. o According to an Embassy report, Alfonsin-while in Caracas attending the inauguration of President Lusinchi-called for common financial policies among Latin American countries to strengthen their international position. Alfonsin and Lusinchi stated jointly that the necessary measures of austerity and rationalization must not significantly affect economic development plans, according to a press report. There is no reason to believe that these countries will seek to jointly renegotiate their debts, but several of them may band together in proposing that creditors ease loan terms, even substantially beyond those recently given to Mexico, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador. For example, the Colombian Foreign Minister on 10 February indicated that the Latin countries should take actions aimed at extending maturities and reducing interest rates, but every country should carry out its own negotiations, according to a press report. In our judgment, Latin American countries will continue to propose softer loan terms in upcoming meetings, such as the OAS special committee on Finance and Trade and the Inter-American Development Bank meeting-both to be held at the end of March. Provided the Brazilian government does not support joint proposals for substantially softer loan terms, we believe bankers will not be greatly disturbed by these actions. DEVELOPMENTS IN MAJOR COUNTRIES Mexico Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1 25X1 Mexico City recently announced a series of measures to assist the private sector in meeting its debt obligations. o In mid-January, Mexico City expanded the FICORCA Program-which provides firms with foreign exchange at subsidized rates-to debts contracted after December 1982, according to Embassy reporting. To qualify for the program, however, new borrowings must be for at least $100,000 and have an eight-year repayment schedule and a four-year grace period. According to press reporting, smaller credits with maturities of at least 2.5 years will be considered on a case-by-case basis. o Foreign exchange will be available at the controlled rate for the payment of suppliers' credits due in 1984, according to Embassy reporting. As a result, the private sector should be able to avoid rescheduling this debt. Mexico also extended the deadline for making peso deposits on overdue supplier credits by one month to 15 February. Mexico City still plans to transfer these funds to foreign creditors on 7 March 1984. o To ease the financial burden of firms with large peso debts, Mexican treasury officials announced that companies will be allowed to capitalize all or part of their past due interest payments and that domestic loans can be restructured for up to eight years. Brazil Foreign banks have nearly completed the signing of their $6.5 billion new money loan for Brazil, according to statements made by Central Bank President Pastore to the press, and probably will begin disbursements soon. Despite the expected easing of Brazil's immediate cash problems, many international bankers and Brazilian officials continue to anticipate renewed financial problems later this year. 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1 Argentina We expect bankers to await a preliminary agreement with the IM 25X1 25X1 25X1 new money available. In our judgment, Grinspun is likely to hold off talks on rescheduling the external debt-now estimated at some $44 billion or $5 billion higher than the figure used by the previous government-until both IMF and Paris Club agreements are close at hand. In the interim, we expect liquid reserves-currently estimated by the Embassy at about $700 million-to grow as arrearages are allowed to accumulate. REGIONAL SITUATIONS Latin America Among Latin American countries, Venezuelan President Lusinchi dismissed Central Bank president Diaz Bruzual, Chile is scheduled to begin negotiations with its bank advisory committee on new money for 1984, and Peru restructured $2 billion in debt Venezuela Newly inaugurated Venezuelan President Lusinchi issued an executive decree to dismiss controversial Central Bank president Diaz Bruzual because he was an obstacle to Venezuelan economic policy, according to Embassy and press reports. Lusinchi appointed Benito Raul Losada - the Central Bank president during 1974-78 - to replace him. Diaz Bruzual has indicated his intentions to fight the dismissal by appealing to Venezuela's Venezuela's creditor banks believe that private sector companies will finally pay some $700 million in interest arrearages, according to press reports. Diaz Bruzual had prevented private firms from obtaining foreign exchange to service their debts. Although public and private interest arrearages soon may be cleared up, bankers do not expect swift progress on restructuring Venezuelan debt. A recent meeting with the three co-chairmen of the 13-member bank advisory committee was postponed by Lusinchi because the new finance minister, Manuel Azpurua, was not yet ready to begin formal discussions, according to the press. The bankers suggested that the meeting be postponed for a few weeks. The Embassy also reports that the new administration is currently organizing a debt negotiation team. 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Lusinchi stated in his inaugural address on 2 February that Venezuela will pay all its foreign debts, according to Embassy and press reporting. He cautioned, however, that Venezuela will not permit debt repayments to hinder the country's capacity to achieve some economic growth. The US Embassy believes that this statement confirms their judgment that Lusinchi will not seek an IMF stabilization program but rather will aim at gradual adjustment that would appease international bankers. Lusinchi promised to announce an economic adjustment plan that would rebuild investor confidence in Venezuela. The bank advisory committee in late January granted Venezuela another 90-day deferral on principal repayments, according to press reporting. This is the fourth extension of Venezuela's debt moratorium since it stopped paying principal on most of its public sector debt in March 1983. According to press reporting, one of the co-chairmen of the bank advisory committee stated that Venezuela could complete the debt refinancing in late April or early May. Finance Minister Caceres was to begin negotiations with the bank advisory committee this week for a new money loan for 1984( During the past month, Chilean officials signed agreements with international banks to restructure about $1.6 billion in short- and medium-term credits to five public and private sector agencies, according to press reports The 25X1 companies - Banco Central de Chile, Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, Banco de Chile, Banco de Santiago, and Banco del Estada - constitute approximately two-thirds of the total foreign debt to be refinanced by commercial banks. the 25X1 bank advisory committee believes all 24 companies will sign restructuring agreements by the end of March. Under terms of the agreements, payments due between 31 January 1983 and 31 December 1984 will be refinanced as an eight- ear loan with a four-year grace period. Chile is guaranteeing the refinancing credits. 25X1 Last week's agreement with the bank advisory committee for a nine-year restructuring of some $2 billion in short- and medium-term debt at sharply reduced interest spreads will provide a political boost for the Belaunde government. The rescheduling, annnounced at meetings in New York last week, called for a cut in interest Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 25X1 charges by 0.6 percentage point to 1.625 percentage points above LIBOR, a five-year grace period, and a reduction of front-end fees by half a percentage point. The financial package received favorable press treatment at home where both President Belaunde and Finance Minister Rodriguez Pastor have been under fire for their handling of the economy. Rodriguez Pastor indicated publicly that Peru requested no new funds in 1984 beyond disbursement of the $200 million in loans delayed due to Lima's failure to meet IMF target . Bankers affreed to disburse these funds against the newly revised IMF agreement. Peru and the IMF have signed a new letter of intent for an 18-month standby agreement worth some $265 million; it replaced the $700 million Extended Fund Facility initiated in mid-1982. Embassy sources report that the new program calls for limiting payments for military imports to $200 million in 1984, down from an estimated $350 million last year. Ecuador According to steering committee reached preliminar half 1984 on somewhat softer terms. Embassy reporting, Ecuador and its bank y agreement to refinance debt maturing in first The steering committee has also agreed to suspend second-half 1984 debt payments until December to give the next government, which takes office in August, time to negotiate a new accord with the IMF and international creditors. The US Embassy anticipates that Quito will continue discussions with bankers to obtain $500 million in new money necessary to cover its current account deficit, although 25X1 25X1 bankers will likely resist commitments until Quito reaches a new 25X1 agreement with the Fund. Delays in reaching such an agreement by the new President- who will be elected in the May runoff-would strain Ecuador's cash position and probably 25X1 force the government to run up its arrearages well beyond last year's $500 million. 25X1 25X1 Bolivia We believe prospects for clearing up arrearages and reaching an IMF agreement are dim. We estimate that Bolivian exports will increase by only 1 percent in 1984, which would be insufficient to eliminate overdue payments. The IMF negotiations remained deadlocked over the budget deficit, and we believe it will be politically and technically difficult for La Paz to scale down the budget deficit from 20 percent of GDP Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 I I in 1983 to 4-5 percent in 1984 as the IMF is likely to demand. Moreover, according to Embassy reporting, the Siles government's recent concessions to labor-wage increases and temporary price controls-will impede negotiations with the IMF. Eastern Europe In Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia and the IMF are continuing talks on a 1984 standby agreement, and Poland's rescheduling talks with foreign creditors have made little progress. Yugoslavia After a one-week postponement, an IMF team went to Belgrade this week for the third round of talks on a standby agreement for 1984. Negotiators will try to break the deadlock on several tough issues, particularly the IMF's demand that Yugoslavia introduce positive real interest rates by yearend. According to Embassy reporting, Belgrade is willing to make this adjustment only in gradual stages over a two-year period. to the Embassy, the IMF has added a requirement that Yugoslavia devalue the dinar 18 pby mid-March; Yugoslavia has offered to devalue by 12 percent. F In our assessment, reaching agreement will be complicated by the Yugoslavs' tough stand on these issues. A high-ranking Yugoslav official has admitted publicly that the government is considering a so-called black option that would reject IMF support entirely. We believe failure to reach agreement with the IMF, however, will jeopardize assistance from Western governments and rescheduling efforts with Western banks. Poland Rescheduling negotiations with banks and the Paris Club have made little progress. In November, government creditors had demanded that Warsaw pay obligations under the rescheduling agreement for 1981 before starting talks on further debt relief. The Poles did not pay, and Polish officials told the West Germans and British that they would not pay without new credits. After postponing a meeting set for January, the Paris Club met on 6 February to consider a response. Polish officials claimed they did not have enough time to prepare and did not attend the meeting. According to Embassy Paris, the discussion was dominated by the creditors' concern that the banks will continue to receive payments as scheduled. At the same time, the creditors wanted to offer a sweetener to bring the Poles back into the negotiations. West Germany proposed a rescheduling package covering obligations for 1982-84 which would be contingent on payment of arrearages from 1981. the proposal, but because of US objections, the delegates agreed to seek concurrence from their capitals. The next meeting is tentatively set for early March. According 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 I I Western Europe In Western Europe, serious problems have emerged between Portugal and the IMF regarding 1984 targets, and the international banking community is becoming concerned about Greece's economic situation. Portugal According to Embassy reporting, serious problems have emerged between the Portuguese government and the IMF regarding renegotiation of 1984 targets. The IMF was unable to complete the work planned for the recent February mssion due to insufficient data collection and preparation on public companies and inadequate policy articulation by Portuguese officials. To complete the mission, the government must send a team to Washington before the end of February with the necessary data. The IMF will then decide whether a basis exists under which certain standby targets might be renegotiated. As a consequence of the IMF's inability to complete the review at this time, Portugal would be temporarily unable to make further drawings under the standby agreement after 31 March. Greece The international banking community is becoming increasingly concerned about the continued deterioration of the Greek economy External debt has risen by 50 percent during the past two years to $13 billion. Greece has more than $3 billion in foreign debt maturing in 1984, but international reserves amount to only $850 million, representing less than one month of imports 20-percent annual inflation rate and a fiscal deficit that exceeds 15 percent of o date, the country has had few problems in raising external credits. Philippine Prime Minister Virata hopes to sign an IMF letter of intent by late February, but negotiations may stretch until the May elections. Elsewhere, Indonesia successfully marketed a $500 million syndication. Philippines Prime Minister Virata, in a conversation on 26 January with Treasury officials, predicted that a letter of intent could be signed with the IMF by the third week of February, but the Philippine government will stretch negotiations until the May parliamentary elections. According to Embassy reporting, Virata indicated that the Fund is willing to tolerate a dual exchange rate system on a temporary basis. However, Manila is balking at the IMF's demand for a devaluation of the peso prior to the May elections, and it is not clear that Marcos is willing to accept even the two-tiered 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 rate. Commercial banks in Manila are responding positively to a Central Bank pledge to accept peso deposits in exchange for a Central Bank guarantee to pay dollars at an unspecified future date 25X1 25X1 new Central Bank Governor 25X1 Fernandez said that he Plans chap es in personnel and in the organization of the Central Bank. three Laya loyalists-each of whom could have been 25X1 involved in the falsification of Central Bank reserves data-are likely candidates for dismissal. Fernandez said the Central Bank is currently setting aside foreign exchange to 25X1 bring all public sector interest arrearages current through yearend 1983. The IMF remains troubled by Manila's management of foreign exchange controls, Philippine banks are reportedly offering to place deposits with foreign banks in exchange for new lines of credit. if Manila could plug these and other foreign exchange leakages, it could maintain interest payments through the current moratorium. While such measures are maintaining trade finance at only half of last October's levels, inventories are now running low; we expect large worker layoffs if agreement is not reached with the IMF Indonesia Embassy and press reports indicate that Indonesia has received an enthusiastic response to its long awaited $500 million loan syndication. Indeed, the loan was sold down within a week, and Indonesia has agreed to take a $600 million loan. Indonesia had originally intended to enter the financial markets in late 1983 but postponed its borrowing out of concern over possible adverse market reaction due to events in the Philippines. Indonesia has no immediate need for the funds, and bankers expect Jakarta to use the loan to bolster the country's estimated $4.5 billion in foreign reserves. In order to insure the success of the syndication, Indonesia, like South Korea, has been forced to price its loans more attractively. The eight-year loan has been split into a $375 million tranche priced at 0.75 percentage points above LIBOR and a $125 million portion at 0.2 above US prime. Last year's $500 million credit was for eight years at a spread of 0.5 percentage points above LIBOR. Africa/Middle East Nigeria Embassy Lagos reports that a senior level Nigerian finance ministry official sees little chance of Si nin an IMF letter of intent before June. A Nigerian delegation is currently meeting with the Fund in Washington. Nigerian Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Finance, Alhaji, indicated to US Embassy and Treasury officials that a Fund program is "absolutely essential." In addition to a three-year extended facility of between $2.7 and $3.2 billion, Nigeria also intends to renew its drive for a Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) on the basis of a shortfall in 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 25X1 oil export revenues. The Nigerian government is anxious to conclude refinancing discussions with commercial and official creditors prior to signing an agreement with the IMF. According to Embassy reporting, Nigerian officials noted that as long as trade finance lines remain blocked, Lagos is at a disadvantage in negotiations with the Fund. However, most official creditors continue to link the rescheduling of $2 billion in officially guaranteed trade credits and the extension of new credits to an IMF agreement. Nigeria remains curren on me ium- erm o iga ions according to Embassy reporting, has no intention of rescheduling these obligations. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Trade Trends in Key Debt-Troubled Countries Million US Dollars at a Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate Quarterly 1983 1981 1982 82I 82II 82III 82IV 831 8311 83111 Jul Se C ~!ja onment Argentina Exports Imports 9,140 9 430 7,620 8,780 5 340 6 490 8,340 5 5,980 7,380 7,800 7,440 7,770 7,620 7,750 7, 930 New import control system imposed Balance , -290 , , 2 ,450 4,840 4,770 4,280 4,840 4,880 4,860 5,020 4, 750 last month Brazil Exports Imports 23,290 24 080 ,280 2,290 20,180 21,680 21 070 22 080 2,890 19,930 21 600 1,140 20,170 20 2,610 19,070 3,520 20,810 2,600 23,110 2,890 22,430 2,760 21,910 2,730 3, 23,300 22, 180 090 . Embassy reports full year 1983 surplus Balance , -790 , , -890 -400 , -1 670 ,770 19,880 17,560 16,220 16,060 14,780 17,170 16, 240 at $6.5 billion, and Jan. 1984 Chile Exports Im o t 3,910 6 360 3,820 3,910 , 3,880 -600 3,850 -810 3,590 3,250 3,660 6,890 4,170 6,370 3,940 7,130 3,420 6,130 5, 4,380 4, 850 020 surplus at $8.7 billion annual rate. p r s Bala , -2 450 3,530 4,210 4,390 2,960 2,770 2,820 2,690 2,970 2,240 2,770 3, 900 nce Costa Rica Exports Im o t , 960 1 210 290 -300 870 920 -510 920 890 840 820 800 840 790 1,480 810 970 990 1,180 820 1,610 1,070 1,0 120 80 p r s B l , 870 860 880 890 820 900 990 980 950 960 1,0 30 a ance Ecuador Exports Imports -250 2,540 2 250 0 60 2,140 2,360 1 990 2 290 40 2,190 2 0 0 -50 2,250 -20 1,800 -110 2,280 -180 2,210 10 2,020 -130 1,940 110 2,160 1,9 50 60 Embassy reports $900 million trade Balance , 290 , , 150 7 , 4 2,120 1,510 1,560 1,440 1,290 1,320 1,340 1,2 10 surplus for full year 1983 Indonesia Exports I t 22,260 1 0 22,290 22,390 150 22,400 130 20,730 290 23,270 720 18,030 770 15,930 730 16,750 620 17,470 820 7 17,160 15,6 50 10 . mpor s B l 3,270 16,860 15,920 17,400 15,260 18,260 20,580 13,950 14,460 14,950 14,480 13,9 30 a ance Ivory Coast Exports I t 8,990 2,530 2 5,430 6,470 2,300 2,820 5,000 2,350 5,470 1,870 5,010 2,160 -2,550 2,400 1,980 1,720 2,290 1,780 2,520 2,040 2,680 1,6 1,380 1,9 80 20 mpor s Balance ,380 150 2,180 2,580 2,150 2,070 1,940 2,150 1,760 1,600 2,180 1,570 1,0 60 Kenya Exports Imports 1,180 2,130 120 240 1,050 1,130 1 740 2 180 200 1,030 1 670 -200 1,000 1 220 930 250 820 -40 800 180 680 -140 560 -190 8 770 7 60 10 Narobi has slashed duties on most Balance -950 , , -690 -1 050 , ,270 1,340 1,070 1,140 1,020 760 840 1,2 60 imports by an average of 15 percent Mexico Exports Imports 19,380 24 070 , 21,580 17,470 14 560 22 400 -640 20,170 16 620 -270 24,360 -410 24,520 -250 19,970 - -340 20,700 -340 21,820 -200 20,840 -70 -5 22,240 22,3 50 70 . Mexico has eliminated licensing Balance , -4 690 , , 7 020 -4 930 , 3 5 12,120 7,400 6,560 8,810 8,800 7,670 9,430 9,2 90 requirements for about 5 percent , , , , 50 12,240 17,120 13,410 11,890 13,020 13,170 12,810 13,0 80 of its imports. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Trade Trends in Key Debt Troubled Countries- (continued) Million US Dollars at a Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate Annual Quarterly 1981 1982 821 8211 82111 821V 831 8311 83111 Jul Aug Sep Comment Morocco Exports 2,390 2,060 1,990 1,950 2,130 2,190 2,020 2,000 2,040 1,910 2,000 2,200 Imports 4,400 4,310 4,290 4,330 4,580 4,100 3,660 3,390 3,910 3,590 4,250 3,890 Balance -2,010 -2,250 -2,300 -2,380 -2,450 -1,910 -1,640 -1,390 -1,870 -1,680 -2,250 -1,690 Nigeria Exports 17,370 14,280 15,120 13,040 13,880 15,120 6,920 12,000 14,300 14,300 14,300 14,300 Military gov't has tightened import Imports 19,600 15,120 19,280 16,760 11,160 13,320 9,560 9,360 9,200 9,200 9,200 9,200 and foreign exchange restrictions. Balance -2,230 -840 -4,160 -3,720 2,720 1,800 -2,640 2,640 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,100 Peru Exports 3,250 3,290 3,210 3,470 3,160 3,210 2,680 3,250 2,840 2,960 2,870 2,690 5-10 percent tax imposed on Imports 3,450 3,600 4,120 3,540 3,540 3,230 2,530 2,420 2,540 2,300 2,560 2,770 traditional metals exports. Balance -200 -310 -910 -70 -380 -20 150 830 300 660 310 -80 Philippines Exports 5,650 4,970 5,080 5,190 4,760 4,830 4,660 4,780 4,920 5,370 4,810 4,590 Philippine press reports a sharp rise Imports 8,470 8,270 8,590 8,370 7,960 8,260 8,200 8,220 7,680 7,390 7,970 7,670 in the 4th qtr. trade deficit. Balance -2,820 -3,300 -3,510 -3,180 -3,200 -3,430 -3,540 -3,440 -2,760 -2,020 -3,160 -3,080 Venezuela Exports 20,120 16,440 18,600 16,200 16,600 18,530 14,990 16,970 14,730 14,730 14,730 14,730 Imports 13,110 12,580 12,520 13,080 12,990 11,670 10,020 8,120 8,020 8,020 8,020 8,020 Balance 7,010 3,860 6,080 3,120 3,610 6,860 4,970 8,850 6,710 6,710 6,710 6,710 Zaire Exports 660 570 700 590 500 500 610 560 520 440 600 520 Imports 670 480 570 520 470 380 370 570 510 470 490 580 Balance -10 90 130 70 30 120 240 -10 10 -30 110 -60 Total Exports 134,630 123,460 126,160 121,650 122,080 127,900 108,440 116,450 117,530 116,330 119,520 116,720 Imports 134,880 112,500 128,380 118,800 103,000 99,650 91,820 83,920 83,920 80,680 86,070 84,800 Balance -250 10,960 -2,220 2,850 19,080 28,250 16,620 32,530 33,610 35,650 33,450 31,920 Note: Exports f.o.b. and imports c.i.f. are based on IMF International Financial Statistics and are seasonally adjusted; consequently quarterly data may not add to annual totals. Numbers in bold are CIA estimates Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287RO01101270001-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1 SUBJECT: International Financial Situation Report #25 Copy No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Sec. D. T. Regan Treasury R. T. McNamar 11 Beryl Sprinkel David Chew Robert Cornell Thomas Dawson Charles Dallara Charles Schotta Stephen Canner Doug Mulholland Manuel Johnson George Hoguet Sec. George Shultz State Kenneth Dam it Hugh Montgomery L. Eagleburger Ralph Lindstrom W. Allen Wallis Langhorne Motley Richard Burt Richard McCormack Chester Crocker Paul Wolfowitz Nicholas Veliotes J.C. Kornblum Lionel Olmer Roger Robinson NSC Douglas McMinn Randall Fort PFIAB Leo Cherne PFIAB DCI ExDir SA/DDCI DDI ADDI Ch/PES/DDI David Low, NIO at Large NIO Economics NIC/AG DDO Ch/DDO/EPDS Ch/DDO/AF Ch/DDO/EA Ch/DDO/EUR ti NSA X16 February 1984 49 Ch/DDO/LA 50 Ch/DDO/NE 51 Ch/DDO/SE 52 IAD/OGC/ENO/PE 53 D/ALA 54 D/OEA 55 D/EURA 56 Ch/EURA/EE/EW 57 D/SOVA 58 D/NESA 59 DD/OGI, D/OGI 60 Ch/OGI/SRD 61 Ch/OGI/ISID 62 Ch/OGI/GD 63 Ch/OGI/ECD 64-65 Ch/OGI/ECD/IF 66 Ch/OGI/ECD/IT 67 OGI/CO 68 Chief, CPAS/ILS 69-76 OGI/Pub 1- 1- 1- Edwin Truman, Federal Reserve Board Henry Wallich, Federal Reserve Board Anthony Solomon, Federal Reserve of New York 1 - Leo Cherne, PFIAB, New York 1 - Alan Greenspan, PFIAB, New York 1 - Doug Mulholland, Treasury 1 - John Davis, State 1 - Paul McGonagle, State 1 Stephen Bosworth, State 1 - J.D.Bindenagel, State, (for pass to Ambassador Arthur Burns) 1 - Martin Feldstein, CEA 1 - David Wigg, CEA 5- Dave Peterson, Commerce 1 - Warren E. Farb, Commerce 25X1 25X1 1- DIA 25X1 1 - Steve Farrar, OMB 1 - William Isaac, Federal Deposit 25X1 1- 1 - Ch/ECD 1 - Ch/ECD/IF Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/04: CIA-RDP85T00287R001101270001-1