INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SITUATION REPORT #28

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001200120001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 17, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence igence Agency
Washington, D C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
International Financial Situation Report #28
17 May 1984
Summary
We believe Latin American debtors will more actively seek to gain easier debt repayment
terms from creditors over the next several months as a result of the recent rise in US interest
rates. The Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela have expressed
their concerns publicly over the impact that US interest rates will have on Latin American debt
service payments. Other developments in recent weeks include:
Despite some problems with monetary aggregates and continuing inflation, Brazil's
performance under its IMF-supported stabilization program has generally been in line
with projections in the early months of 1984. and Brasilia should obtain its next
drawinLrs from the IMF and commercial banks.
o Buenos Aires appears to be making little progress toward agreeing on the terms of a
letter of intent with the IMF team currently in the country. Although Central Bank
President Garcia Vazquez last week confirmed with the Embassy Argentina's intention
to complete Fund negotiations by the end of May, we believe the deadline is unrealistic.
o According to Embassy reporting, the IMF on 26 April approved $340 million in
compensatory financing and standby credit facilities for Peru after Lima agreed to
sl!Lrhtly revise its austerity program,
o An IMF team in Manila last week indicated that progress is being made with the
Philippine government on terms and conditions for a new standby arrangement. The
Embassy expects that adoption of these measures - including an adjustment of the
exchange rate system - could occur within two weeks after the 14 May parliamentary
elections.
This situation report was prepared by analysts of the Intelligence Directorate. Comments are
welcome and may be addressed to the Situation Report Coordinator,
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KEY ISSUE
Latin American Complaints over Rising US Interest Rates
We believe Latin American debtors will more actively seek to gain easier debt
repayment terms from their creditors over the next several months as a result of the
recent rise in US interest rates. Although several LDCs have made exaggerated
statements about the impact of a rise in US interest rates on debt service payments, we
estimate that a one percentage point rise in both the Eurodollar and the US prime rate
increases the annual net interest payments on Latin American debt by nearly $2 billion
after a lag of 3-6 months. The Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and
Venezuela have expressed their concerns publicly over the impact that US interest rates
will have on Latin American debt service payments. According to press reporting,
Argentine President Alfonsin recently contemplated calling a meeting of Latin American
presidents over the issue, but other major debtors such as Brazil have been reluctant to
DEVELOPMENTS IN MAJOR COUNTRIES
Mexico
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According to press reporting, Grupo Alfa-Mexico's largest private sector debtor-
has reached a tentative agreement to reschedule part of the holding company's $800
million debt over 12 years, including five years of grace, at a fixed interest rate of 10
percent. Subject to Mexico City's approval, $300 million of this debt will be converted to
equity. This agreement, however, is dependent on reaching an overall restructuring on
the corporation's total debt of $2.5 billion. Rescheduling negotiations have been
underway since early 1982, and creditors admit a final agreement is still months away.
According to the press, bankers reluctantly agreed to the 10 percent interest rate - as
opposed to the average private sector interest rate of 2 percentage points above LIBOR
- because they believe it is the only way to recover their funds.
private debt reschedulings under this
at a standstill since late March,
Private sector creditors are refusing to absorb the 15 percent
withholding tax on foreign interest payments as they did in the past. Mexico City
recently closed a tax loophole that had allowed companies to avoid the tax by converting
their debt to floating rate notes held by creditor banks. The tax exemption is now only
available for notes actively traded on a foreign stock exchange. We believe private
sector reschedulings will continue to progress slowly with government assistance limited.
to the coverage of exchange risk through the FICORCA program. Mexico City may
provide some limited additional assistance in cases similar to the Moctezuma Brewery
rescheduling where a foreign bank instigated bankruptcy proceedings and the domestic
firm is a large employer. Unless Mexico City changes its policy, we believe new foreign
loans to the private sector will probably be limited to trade credits that have government
guarantees.
Brazil
Brazil's performance under its IMF-supported stabilization program have been in
line with projections in the early months of 1984. A $3.5 billion trade surplus for January
through April easily surpasses most forecasts, and the US Embassy reports that Brazil is
within easy reach of its 198 4 target of $9.1 billion. According to Embassy reporting n
Brazil also met its other first quarter performance criteria -
drawings from the IMF and commercial banks.
As a result, Brasilia sho obtain its next
Despite these economic achievements, growing political pressures for growth have
been evident in Brazil in recent months as the presidential race gains momentum.
Although some industrial recovery has been noted in early 1984 in sectors related to
exports and agriculture, it has not yet been translated into a broad-based upturn. The US
Consulate in Sao Paulo reports that the US business community in Brazil is generally
skeptical about an overall economic recovery this year, largely because of a continued
decline in investment and squeezed consumer purchasing power. Nevertheless, we
believe Brasilia may use its much improved payments and foreign exchange positions to
launch an import drive to boost economic growth in the second half of this year. The
Brazilians probably will increase substantially imports of raw or intermediate materials
and capital goods to promote industrial production. We also foresee greater food imports
in order to reduce inflationary pressures and alleviate the need for restrictive
government policies.
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Brasilia is becoming apprehensive of rising world interest rates because of the
potential for upsetting the government's economic plans. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry
issued a note to various foreign governments containing what is viewed by the US
Embassy to be extraordinarily strong criticism of last week's rise in the US prime rate.
In the view of the Embassy, the release of the note by the Foreign Ministry-instead of a
member of the economic team-suggests that Brasilia will pursue the issue in
intergovernmental talks. More importantly the
prime rate increase may precipitate a dramatic deterioration in relations between Brazil
and its foreign bank creditors. We believe that the rising interest rates since March will
harden Brasilia's resolve to force a major debt restructure on easier terms in
negotiations with banks planned late this summer.
Argentina
Buenos Aires appears to be making little progress toward agreeing on the terms of
a letter of intent with the IMF team currently in the country. Although Central Bank
President Garcia Vazquez last week confirmed with the Embassy Argentina's intention to
complete Fund negotiations by the end of May, we believe the deadline is unrealistic.
President Alfonsin has decided to postpone consultations on the debt with the opposition
Peronist party until 21 May when former President Isabel Peron is expected to return
from exile in Spain, according to press reporting. Alfonsin hopes that Peron will be able
to unify the opposition enough to begin negotiations leading to Congressional approval for
his financial programs. We believe, however, that Peron's return could open old wounds
within the party and further delay agreement on the debt
Meanwhile, the Embassy reports that a lack of a credible budget is hampering
progress with the Fund. Presidential advisor Prebisch told Alfonsin last week that some
government agencies have not provided monetary and budget data needed for the Fund
discussions. In an effort to overcome bureaucratic footdragging, Alfonsin directed
Prebisch to. tell each department exactly what information is needed and to demand it on
Presidential orders. Prebisch is then to travel to the United States and ?o explain the
efforts to resolve data problems, thereby assuring creditors that Argentina is not
stalling.
Should a letter of intent be delayed until June-which we now believe to be highly
probable-it would increase tensions in discussions with banks and prevent Buenos Aires
from meeting its self-imposed, mid-year deadline for completing refinancing of 1982-84
public sector maturities. Bank confidence received another blow last week with the
strong domestic criticism to the latest jump in the US prime interest rate. Alfonsin
stated that interest rate hikes over the past two months will add to the debt service
burden and threaten efforts to spur recovery perceived necessary to assuage domestic
discontent. His comments were mirrored by Congressmen of both major parties who are
expected to demand preferential interest rates for Argentina and therefore further delay
an agreement.
Meanwhile, commercial banks have rolled over to 15 June the $750 million
remaining payment on last year's $1.1 billion bridging loan. The financial press indicated
that the US Treasury also extended to 31 May its commitment to loan Argentina $300
million once a letter of intent is agreed upon with the IMF. Until an IMF letter of intent
agreement is concluded, bank creditors are declining to consider Argentina's request to
reopen negotiations on the 1982-83 rescheduling or disburse the remaining $1 billion in
the medium-term commercial facility.
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REGIONAL SITUATIONS
Latin America
In Latin America, Chile's new money loan is 90 percent subscribed, Venezuela has
made little progress in its rescheduling efforts, the IMF approved new funds for Peru, and
Colombia is approaching a foreign exchange crisis.
The chairman of Chile's bank advisory committee publicly announced on 9 May
that 90 percent of the $780 million new money loan was subscribed, but difficulties still
remain in completing the credit. US re ional banks are still reluctant to contribute to
the remaining 10 percent,
Although the bank
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committee is confident that these banks will soon commit, we believe some arm-twisting
will be required. concern about Chile's political future
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and ability to service the debt have heightened fears about new lending.
1iV1ILiiLe uI1 UL L1U. LVSwl IJ CrU1Zit11 uee use Lilt: Livil Will require CVILLIIIUCU 1eiiuer
support for Chile's adjustment program before releasing about $60 million from this
year's standby agreement. Although Chile likely will obtain these funds, we are growing
concerned about the resurgence of financial difficulties later in the year.
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these funds are insufficient to support the
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reactivation efforts announced by the new economic team under present IMF targets and
probably will require some drawdown in reserves. The recent rise in interest rates will
add to Chile's payments problems.
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These financial strains could be further intensified by a political decision to spur a
major economic recovery to reduce unemployment. Santiago has agreed to comply with
the IMF program negotiated by former Finance Minister Caceres in the first half of
1984. According to press reports, however, Finance Minister Escobar is demonstrating
more concern with reducing unemployment. Should Escobar pursue even more
expansionist policies than presently planned - and we believe political needs make this
likely - IMF targets probably would be not be met and some disbursements from the
Fund and commercial banks could be delayed. 25X1
Venezuela
Venezuela continues to move slowly toward breaking the impasse in its debt
restructuring talks. To improve repayment capabilities, President Lusinchi this month
centralized payment of interest to foreign creditors in the Finance Ministry, according to
the US Embassy.
the press reports that
Venezuela paid $40 million in overdue private interest, the first private debt payment
since February 1983. Creditors have indicated to Lusinchi their appreciation of these
moves and have granted Venezuela another 90-day extension on its repayments
moratorium on public-sector debt, according to Embassy reporting.
We judge, however, that Caracas' recent efforts fall short of bankers' expectations
about necessary corrective actions.
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Venezuela's failure to pay its debts has prompted US bank regulators to downgrade
classification of all Venezuelan public and private-sector loans, according to press
reports, a move that will also impede a quick reseheduli a reement. Moreover, we
believe new difficulties will 1 ue upcoming debt talks.
According to Embassy reporting, the IMF on 26 April approved $340 million in
compensatory financing and standby credit facilities for Peru after Lima agreed to
slightly revise its austerity program. The public sector deficit target - relaxed at
Lima's request from the previously agreed 3.8 percent of GDP to 4.1 percent - will still
require sharp cuts in government spending and large tax increases to reduce the deficit
from the 10 percent level recorded last year. Moreover, we believe the relaxation of
price controls and higher import surcharges likely will increase last year's triple-digit
inflation rate, further eroding living standards and raising social tensions.
We anticipate that an alternate scheme for economic revitalization - referred to
in Peru as the Toledo report - will gain adherents. The plan calls for easier credit for
employment-intensive industries and new export incentives for non-traditional goods.
According to the financial press, this plan is gaining the support of Central Bank
President Webb and other government officials. Should Lima opt for such a program,
however, relations with the Fund could be strained. We believe, however, that Belaunde
will probably try to avoid a complete break with the Fund to preserve his 1984
refinancing package.
Colombia
Embassy reporting indicates that the recent financial difficulties experienced by
Colombian banks are a prelude to a foreign exchange crisis. Banco de Colombia, the
largest Colombian bank, has requested a refinancing of $670 million in short-term debt,
and Banco de Bogota has suspended debt repayments. Embassy reporting also indicates
that these refinancings are causing credit lines to be cut by foreign banks.
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capital flight has
accelerated. With Colombia's liquid reserves being depleted and exports still depressed,
we believe Bogota probably will have to turn to the IMF soon in order to obtain foreign
financial support and to reschedule its debt.
Bolivia
According to a US Embassy report, Latin American officials recently discussed a
proposal for a $200-250 million loan for Bolivia, along the lines of the recent $500 million
bridge loan for Argentina. This proposal may have been spawned by the UN Secretary
General's efforts to support Bolivia's ailing economy. Details of the composition of the
loan, however, are uncertain.
According to US Embassy reports,
Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil will be asked to contribute _$__16
million each, and Bolivia would like Argentina or Brazil to coordinate the effort.
Reactions by prospective donors have been mixed.
Braze ian Foreign Minister Guerreiro
has indicated that Brazil may participate, according to Embassy reporting. The US
Embassy in Caracas, however, reports that the Venezuelan Central Bank opposes
participation because of its $600 million in unpaid debts from other Latin countries. We
believe the loan would be an incentive for La Paz to implement further stabilization
measures, but it could also represent another step toward closer coordination of Latin
American financial policies.
Cuba
Cuba is pressing for more favorable terms for the rescheduling of $365 million of
debt falling due this year. In a report recently submitted to its creditors, Havana states
that the terms of last year's agreement - a spread of 2.25 percentage points above
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LIBOR with an 8.5-year repayment period, including 3.5 years of grace - would be
unacceptable. The report blames Cuba's debt problems solely on external factors: low
world sugar prices, inflation in the developed countries, the withdrawal by Western banks
of $500 million of short-term deposits in Cuban banks, and high world interest rates. It
further alleges that Havana's economic policies are sound and that Cuba overfulfilled the
economic performance targets set in its 1983 rescheduling agreement. Cuba is also
requesting that a clause be included in this year's agreement that would commit creditors
to reschedule 1985 maturities provided that Havana meets the terms of the 1984
agreement.
Eastern Europe
Poland
In late April, the Poles and Western bankers reached a tentative rescheduling
agreement, according to Embassy reporting. The terms included:
o rescheduling of 95 percent of principal repayments due from 1984
through 1987 over ten years, including a grace period of five years;
o an interest spread of 1.75 percentage points above LIBOR on
rescheduled obligations; and
o payment in 1984 to include ,the remaining 5 percent of principal, a
1-percent rescheduling fee, and interest on all of the debt to be
rescheduled
The banks also agreed to extend more than $700 million in short-term credit
facilities this year and next. Embassy reporting indicated that $330-350 million will be
new' credits in the form of a pool to backstop Polish letters of credit. Each bank will
contribute an amount equal to 4.5 percent of its exposure; the increase is split into two
tranches - the equivalent of 3.5 percent to be provided in 1984 and the remaining 1.0
percent in 1985. The remainder of the credit facilities is an extension on repayment of
$374 million in trade credits from the 1982 agreement which comes due next year. In
addition, Poland must pay off some $100 million in interest arrearages to banks before
the rescheduling agreement can go forward.
The chief hurdle that will have to be overcome before the scheduled Jul
signature is obtaining agreement from all of the banks to the new loan facility.
Western Europe
we believe they are likely to have difficulty in convincing all
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Philippines
An IMF team in Manila last week indicated that progress is being made with the
Philippine government on terms and conditions for a new standby arrangement, according
to Embassy reporting. President Marcos reportedly agreed to take action necessary to
reduce growth in the money supply and to limit government deficit spending. The
Embassy expects that adoption of these measures - including an adjustment of the
exchange rate system - could occur within two weeks after the 14 May parliamentary
Africa/Middle East
In Africa, Nigeria announced the terms for conversion of outstanding trade
arrearages to US dollar-denominated promissory notes, and the Ivory Coast and Sudan
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Nigeria
The Central Bank of Nigeria publicly announced on 18 April provisions for the
conversion of outstanding trade arrearages to US dollar-denominated six-year promissory
notes. US corporations have been given until 13 June to register their claims with the
Central Bank. The notes will be redeemable over a 3.5-year period beginning October
1986 and will bear interest from 1 January 1984 at one percentage point above LIBOR.
Nigeria's Paris Club creditors have issued a joint response to Lagos noting that the
announcement failed to distinguish between holders of guaranteed and nonguaranteed
credits, according to Embassy reporting. The statement reiterated that all guaranteed
credits must be rescheduled through negotiations conducted multilaterally by the
governments that guaranteed the claims and not in the framework set up for uninsured
creditors. The letter also stated that holders of insured credits are not bound by the
terms presented in last month's offer. In addition, Paris Club creditors have insisted that
Lagos must first reach agreement with the IMF before any rescheduling can occur. An
IMF team is currently in Lagos to continue negotiations on a possible standby
arrangement. Lagos' 1984 budget announced earlier this month includes some measures
likely to meet IMF and creditor approval, such as a large allocation to service public
sector debt. It fails, however, to address key issues still under discussion, including a
devaluation and reductions in some government subsidies.
Lagos announced on 23 April that new naira notes would be issued to replace the
country's old naira. The government ordered Nigeria's land borders sealed until 6 May -
the date old naira notes ceased to be legal tender, - in an effort to prevent naira held
illegally abroad from being repatriated. According topress reports, the move was hailed
publicly as a forward step in the- government's campaign against corruption. The
financial press notes, however, that it is highly doubtful that the conversion will proceed
efficiently or that it will actually catch many of the corrupt individuals that are its
target. The currency swap may temporarily tighten liquidity and help the government
control growth in the money supply, but we believe these benefits will be short-lived and
do not address the distortions resulting from the overvalued naira.
Ivory Coast
The Ivory Coast and 12 Paris Club creditors agreed on 5 May to reschedule about
$300 million in principal and interest payments due official creditors this year. The debt
was rescheduled over nine years with four years of grace. The rescheduling follows
approval of a one-year IMF standby program for the Ivory Coast and marks the first time
the country has had to seek formal debt relief. Meanwhile, Embassy reporting indicated
that an Ivorian financial delegation traveled to New York last week to begin discussions
aimed at reschedulin& some $400 million in principal repayments due to commercial bank
Sudan
Sudan's official creditors agreed on 3 May to reschedule about $500 million in 1984
repayment obligations over 15 years, including six years of grace. The terms of this
Paris Club rescheduling are similar to those of the 1983 agreement - principal, interest,
and arrearages were all rescheduled, and half of the interest on arrearages was
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capitalized. Previously rescheduled debt, however, was excluded from the agreement.
During the discussions, creditors noted the illogic of continuing to capitalize interest, a
procedure which increases the stock of outstanding debt. However, no concrete
alternatives were presented, according to Embassy reporting.
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Latin American Reactions to Rising US Interest Rates
Several South American leaders have recently voiced complaints that rising US
interest rates are undermining the adjustment measures they have taken. According to
Embassy reporting, Argentine President Alfonsin denounced the interest rate hike and
urged the leaders of Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela to make similar
statements. These countries subsequently issued individual statements condemning the
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In Brazil, President Figueiredo released an official note indicating concern that
the increase in US interest rates will do away with a significant portion of the results
obtained thus far in making adjustments, according to press reporting. Figueiredo also
indicated that the rise in interest rates will in no way contribute to stimulating hopes for
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According to Embassy reporting, Ecuador's Central Bank Manager Pachano
claimed that the efforts being made by the developing countries are being partially
frustrated by the behavior of the international financial market and the tremendous
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We believe Latin American debtors will more closely coordinate their criticism of
rising US interest rates in the future and could issue collective statements against rising
interest rates before the London Economic Summit next month. ~ 25X1
Several Latin American governments have made statements on the estimated
impact of a rise in US interest rates on their debt service payments; however. we believe
these claims are inflated and do not accurately reflect the true cost.
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Argentina: Medium-Term Financial Outlook Under
Alternative Economic Scenarios*
Although the 11th-hour agreement that prevented US banks from having to classify
over $4 billion in Argentine loans as nonperforming eased Argentina's immediate
financial crisis, many observers remain skeptical that Buenos Aires can obtain sufficient
funds to satisfy its longer term borrowing needs and avoid a prolonged financial crisis. In
order to investigate whether the country's financial difficulties will persist throughout
the rest of the decade, we have developed a balance-of-payments simulation model.
Given assumptions about future global economic conditions and the future course of the
Argentine economy, the model projects the key variables required to calculate net
borrowing needs. We used the model to to examine Argentina's net borrowing needs through
1990 under four sets of assumptions.
We first projected Argentina's net borrowing needs assuming favorable economic
conditions-moderate economic growth and export price inflation, slowly falling interest
rates, and slowly rising oil prices. Under these conditions, the results indicate that
Buenos Aires' net borrowing needs through 1990, would remain high at 55 percent of the
level in the peak borrowing years of 1979-81. Net borrowing would rise to $6.5 billion in
1984-up from $3.3 billion in 1983-before falling back to an average of $4.5 billion per
year in the 1985-90 period. Consequently, outstanding debt would rise by $34 billion,
reaching $74 billion in 1990.
Although we believe that Argentina's net borrowing needs would be high under
favorable economic conditions, they are projected to be considerably higher-up to 85
percent of the average level in the peak borrowing years 1979-81-under scenarios
incorporating global economic shocks. Of the three shocks examined, a classical
recession-assumed to hit in 1985-would raise Buenos Aires' net borrowing needs the
least. Such a recession would push the country's net borrowing to an average of $5.5
billion per year in the 1985-90 period. Using the favorable economic conditions case as a
baseline, the additional amount of net borrowing generated by such a recession in the
period would be $6 billion. Argentina's debt would rise to $79 billion in 1990.
As another alternative, we examined the impact of an oil supply disruption -
assumed to occur in 1985 - on Argentina's net borrowing needs. Our projections indicate
that an oil supply disruption would raise Buenos Aires' net borrowing needs significantly
more than a classical recession, to an annual average of $6.7 billion in the 1985-90
period. Total net borrowing following the oil shock would exceed the favorable economic
condition baseline by $13 billion during this period. Ou ebt would jump nearly
120 percent from last year's level to $87 billion in 1990. Finally, Argentina's net borrowing needs were projected under the assumption that
a tight money recession occurs in 1985. We estimate that a tight money recession would
do more damage to net borrowing needs than the other two shocks examined. In the
event of a tight money recession, the country's net borrowing would rise to an average of
$7.3 billion per year in the 1985-90 period. Compared to the favorable economic
conditions baseline, the additional amount of net borrowing generated in the period would
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be about $17 billion. Outstanding debt would rise to $90 billion in 1990.
In addition to the size of Argentina's net borrowing needs through 1990, the
country's longer term financial outlook will depend on lender attitudes towards the
country. Although it is difficult to predict lender attitudes toward any LDC several
years in the future, many financial experts are convinced that lenders would be unwilling
to finance Buenos Aires' projected borrowing needs even under favorable economic
conditions. There is little disagreement, however, that the country's projected net
borrowing needs following the shocks to the global economy that we examined would
clearly be more than lenders would be willing to provide. Recognizing that economic
shocks to the world economy are likely and that many experts are convinced that Buenos
Aires' projected borrowing needs would not be satisfied even under favorable economic
conditions, we believe Argentina will be plagued by severe financial difficulties
throughout the rest of the decade.
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Trade Trends in Key Debt Troubled Countries
Million US Dollars at a Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
1981 1982 1983 831 8311 83111 831-V Oct Nov Dec
Argentina
Exports 9,040 7,620 7,940 7,720 7,360 7,480 9,200 8,280 9,600 9,720
Imports 9,530 5,380 4,510 4,320 4,880 4,760 4,080 3,960 4,440 3,840
Balance -490 2,240 3,430 3,400 2,480 2,720 5,120 4,320 5,160 5,880
Brazil
Exports 23,280 20,220 21,860 20,880 23,000 22,320 21,240 21,120 20,880 21,720
Imports 24,140 21,090 16,780 17,520 16,360 16,120 17,120 16,440 16,920 18,000
Balance -860 -870 5,080 3,360 6,640 6,200 4,120 4,680 3,960 3,720
Chile
Exports 3,980 3,810 3,840 3,640 4,160 3,920 3,640 3,720 3,840 3,360
Imports 6,410 3,560 2,770 2,840 2,680 2,720 2,840 2,880 2,760 2,880
Balance -2,430 250 1,070 800 1,480 1,200 $00 840 1,080 480
Costa Rica
Exports 950 890 870 800 800 1,000 880 960 960 720
Imports 1,190 850 990 880 960 1,000 1,120 960 1,200 1,200
Balance -240 40 -120 -80 -160 0 -240 0 -240 -480
Ecuador
Exports 2,530 2,160 2,210 2,240 2,360 2,080 2,160 2,040 2,160 2,280
Imports 2,240 2,000 1,470 1,560 1,440 1,280 1,600 1,320 1,560 1,920
Balance 290 160 740 680 920 800 560 720 600 360
Indonesia
Exports 22,230 22,160 20,810 18,760 20.920 21,960 21,600 19,560 22,320 22,920
Imports , 16,710 17,270 13,790 15,360 13,600 13,720 12,120 14,280 10,680 11,400
Balance 5,520 4,890 7,110 3,400 7,320 8,240 9,480 5,280 11,640 11,520
Ivory Coast
Exports 2,530 2,280 2,220 2,400 1,720 2,240 2,520 2,760 2,280 2,520
Imports 2,390 2,200 1,810 2,040 1,760 1,960 1,480 1,440 1,560 1,440
Balance 140 80 410 360 -40 280 1,040 1,320 720 1,080
Kenya
Exports 1,150 1,020 780 840 800 640 840 840 840 840
Imports 1,960 1,630 1,080 1,040 1,120 920 1,240 1,080 1,320 1,320
Balance -810 -610 -300 -200 -320 -280 -400 -240 -480 -480
Mexico
Exports 19,450 21,580 21,230 20,040 21,160 21,880 21,840 21,720 21,720 22,080
Imports 24,110 14,620 8,190 6,520 8,760 8,760 8,720 8,760 8,760 8,640
Balance -4,660 6,960 13,040 13,520 12,400 13,120 13,120 12,960 12,960 13,440
Preliminary 1st quarter data shows
trade surplus at $4.2 billion
annual rate.
Fknbassy reports Jan-Apr 1984 trade
surplus at $10.6 bill. ann. rate;
govt may ease import curbs.
Embassy reports narrowing of trade
surplus in 1st quarter following
easing of trade rules.
Nairobi has slashed duties on
most imports by an average
of 15 percent.
Jan data shows trade surplus
at $16 billion annual rate.
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Trade Trends in Key Debt Troubled Countries- (continued)
Million US Dollars at a Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
1981
1982
1983
831
8311
83111
831V
Oct
Nov
Dec
Morocco
Exports
2,350
2,050
2,090
2,000
2,040
2,040
2,280
2,760
2,400
1,680
Embassy reports sharp rise in
Imports
4,400
4,310
3,620
3,720
3,400
3,840
3,520
3,840
3,600
3,120
exports and imports in the first
Balance
-2,050
-2,260
1,530
-1,720
-1,360
-1,800
-1,240
-1,080
-1,200
-1,440
2 months of this year.
Nigeria
Exports
19,480
16,540
11,640
8,320
12,880
13,960
11,400
10,800
12,000
11,400
Military gov't announced higher
Imports
17,420
13,230
7,840
8,640
7,080
7,520
8,120
7,080
8,520
8,760
and more ccnprehensive tariffs
Balance
2,060
3,310
3,800
-320
5,800
6,440
3,280
3,720
3,480
2,640
this month.
Peru
Exports
3,260
3,270
3,000
2,720
3,280
3,320
2,680
2,640
2,640
2,760
Imports
3,470
3,610
2,510
2,520
2,440
2,400
2,680
2,760
2,760
2,520
Balance
-210
-340
490
200
840
920
;0
-120
-120
240
Philippines
Exports
5,660
4,960
4,890
4,680
4,800
5,000
5,080
5,160
4,920
5,160
Embassy reports additional 3% import
Imports
8,470
8,310
7,960
8,240
8,200
7,720
7,680
7,680
8,040
7,320
surcharge has been imposed this month.
Balance
-2,810
-3,350
-3,070
-3,560
-3,400
-2,720
-2,600
-2,520
-3,120
-2,160
Venezuela
Exports
20,990
17,480
15,390
15,000
17,000
14,920
14,640
14,400
13,920
15,600
Feb devaluation should aid
Imports
12,070
12,730
6,290
8,200
5,120
5,160
6,680
5,640
5,760
8,640
improvement in trade balance.
Balance
8,920
4,750
9,100
6,800
11,880
9,760
7,960
8,760
8,160
6,960
Zaire
Exports
660
570
570
640
560
560
520
480
480
600
Imports
670
500
500
400
600
480
520
480
600
480
Balance
-10
70
70
240
-40
80
0
0
-120
120
Total
Exports
137,510
126,620
119,310
110,760
122,720
123,280
120,480
117,360
120,840
123,240
Imports
135,170
111,250
80,000
83,840
78,400
78,320
79,440
78,720
78,360
81,240
Balance
2,340
15,370
39,310
26,920
44,320
44,960
41,040
38,640
42,480
42,000
Note: Exports f.o.b. and imports c.i.f. are on a customs basis and are derived from
IMF International Financial Statistics and other sources.
Imports for Indonesia, Nigeria, and Venezuela are estimated from trade partner data.
Numbers in bold are CIA estimates
25X1
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SUBJECT: International Financial Situation Report #28 17 May 1984
51 Ch/DDO/NE
Copy No. 1 Sec. D. T. Regan Treasury 52 Ch/DDO/-
2 R. T. McNamar 53 IAD/OGC
3 Beryl Sprinkel 54 D/ALA
4 David Chew 55 D/OEA
5 Robert Cornell 56 D/EURA
6 Thomas Dawson 57 Ch/EURA/EE/EW
7 Charles Dallara 58 D/SOVA
8 Charles Schotta 59 D/NESA
9 Stephen Canner 60 DD/OGI, D/OGI
10 Doug Mulholland 61 Ch/OGI/SRD
11 Manuel Johnson 62 Ch/OGI/ISID
12 George Hoguet 63 Ch/OGI/GD
13 David Mulford 64 Ch/OGI/ECD
14 Sec. George Shultz State 65-66 Ch/OGI/ECD/IF
67 Ch/OGI/ECD/IT
th D
am
15 Kenne
16 Hugh Montgomery 68 OGI/CO 25X1
17 Michael Armacost 69 Chief, CPAS ISS/SA/DA
18 Ralph Lindstrom 70 Ch/OGI/Pub
25X1
19 W. Allen Wallis 71-78 OGI/Pub
20 Langhorne Motley
21 Richard Burt
22 Richard McCormack
23 Chester Crocker
24 Paul Wolfowitz 1 - Edwin Truman, Federal Reserve Board
Federal Reserve Board
1 - Henry Wallich
,
25 Richard Murphy
26 J.C. Kornblum 1 - Anthony Solomon, Federal Reserve of
27 Dave Peterson Commerce New York
New York
PFIAB
fl 1 - Leo Cherne
28 Lionel Olmer
,
,
1 - Alan Greenspan, PFIAB, New York
2- Doug Mulholland, Treasury
t
St
i
D
31 Roger Robinson NSC
fl
e
a
av
s,
1 - John
State
1 - Paul McGonagle
,
32 Douglas McMinn
33 Randall Fort PFIAB 1 Peter W. Rodman, State
34 Leo Cherne PFIAB 1 - J.D.Bindenagel, State, (for pass to
Ambassador Arthur Burns)
35 DCI
36 ExDir 1 - Martin Feldstein, CEA
37 SA/DDCI 1 - David Wigg, CEA
38 DDI 5 - Dave Peterson, Commerce
39 ADDI 1 - Warren E. Farb, Commerce
1-
40 Ch/PES/DDI
41 David Low, NIO at Large 1- Steve Farrar, OMB
42 NIO Economics 1- William Isaac, Federal Deposit
NIC/AG Insurance Corporation
43
1-
44 DDO
45 Ch/DDO/EPDS 1 - Ch/ECD
46 Ch/DDO/NCD 1 - Ch/ECD/IF
47 Ch/DDO/AF 1 - Ch/ECD/TW
48 Ch/DDO/EA 1 - Ch/ECD/EA
49 Ch/DDO/EUR 1 - Ch/ECD/CM
50 Ch/DDO/LA
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