LEBANON: AFTER GEMAYEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001300550001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 7, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300550001-9
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
7 February 1984
LEBANON: After Gernayel
Summary
Lebanese President Amin Gemayel could be forced to resign
soon unless he strikes a deal with Syria and his domestic
opponents. Although Gemayel has no obvious successor, any
new government is likely to abrogate the 17 May Lebanon
Israel accord and request an end to the t411F mission.
Syria wants a weak Lebanese government dependent on
Damascus. The Syrians will seek political concessions for
their Lebanese allies, but-will not challenge Christian
preeminence to the point of driving them into a mt
dependent on Israel.
This memorandum was prepared by the Levant Branch, Aral_
Israeli Division, 0;-f ice of ,Dear Eastern and South 4sian Analusis
at the request of the Deputy Director of Central IntelZinenee.
InJ'orniation as of 7 Februarys 1984 was used in its preparation. 2.5X1
Comment and queries are welcome and shouZci be directed to C1z?ar' 25X1
Arab-Israeli Division,
NESA M#84-10064 SECRET
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300550001-9
With the security situation continuing to deteriorate,
Lebanese President Amin Gemayel could he forced to resign unless
he moves quickly to strike a deal with Syria and his domestic 25X1
opponents. F_~
Gemayel has no designated successor. Under Lebanon's
constitution, the prime minister and his cabinet exercise
executive authority until the parliament is convened to elect a
new president. Gemayel would certainly try to maintain the
concept of a Christian head of state by naming a Maronite prime
minister prior to his resignation. There is precedent; in 1952,
President Bishara Khoury named Maronite Army commander Fuad
Shihab as prime minister.
Possible Successors
Domestic opponents have not seriously challenged the concept
of a Maronite presidency. The Syrian-backed National Salvation
Front in meetings last week nominated former president Suleiman
Franjiyah, a lon'3time Syrian ally, as its candidate to succeed
Gemayel. Although Christian Phalange party members and Lebanese
Forces militiamen would challenge Franjiyah's candidacy, they
probably are too weak to impose their own candidate. Former
president Camille Shamun, although acceptable to the Phalange,
would probably .he vetoed by to Damascus because he has close ties
to Israel.
There are no obvious successors. Possible candidates
acceptable to Syria include Fuad Lahud, a former colonel in the
Lebanese Army, and former Army intelligence chief Gabriel
Lahud. ltie do not believe Army commander Tannous has sufficient
support within the Army and he is unacceptable to domestic
opponents because of Army actions in West and South Beirut.
Michel Khoury, president of the Lebanese Central Bank and son of
Lebanon's first post-independence president, and parliamentary
deputy Ilyas Harawi possibly would elicit less enmity from
Christian hardliners than others more closely identified with
Syria. The concept of power centralized in the presidency,
however, may be fading, and we expect to see the role of the
Muslim prime minister strengthened considerably. F__]
Impact on trey Policy Issues
Regardless of who succeeds Gemayel, the first act of a new
government is likely to he the abrogation of the 17 Play Lebanon-'%
Israel troop withdrawal accord. A request for an end to the ''1!F
mission probably would follow. Hardline Christians can be
expected to react harshly to these moves, which they will see as
severing their tangible ties to Israel and the US and leavin,
them vulnerable to the Muslim majority. !litimately the A+aronites
fear that Muslim pressures for Political reform will result in
significant revisions to te 1n-3 confessional rranciement that
established Christian hegemony in Lebanon.
-2-
SFCRFT
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Maronite Christians could try to stave off major changes in
Lebanon's political balance by cutting a deal with Syria. The
terms of such an arrangement would include concessions to Syrian
interests in return for which Damascus would become the guarantor
of Christian preeminence in Lebanon--a situation approximating
the circumstances in 1976, when Syrian troops were invited into
Lebanon by the Christian government of ex-president Franjiyah.
Syrian Demands
President Assad will insist on abrogation of the 17 May
agreement, political concessions to Syria's Lebanese Muslim
allies, and a signal from the Lebanese government that it will
abandon the US and Israeli option and reach an accomodation with
Damascus. Assad almost certainly has concluded that the current
fighting, active Shia involvement along with the Druze, and the
visit to Damascus earlier this week of Lebanon's leading Sunni
politicians will compel any t'1aronite regime to come to terms with
Damascus. F I 25x1
Damascus has not called for Gemayel's resignation, however,
and the Syrians may be concerned that the situation will
deteriorate into full-scale civil war and political collapse.
Syria's assets in Lebanon, though effective in mounting pressure
on Gemayel, may be considerably less useful in arranging a
politcal resolution of the crisis acceptable to Damascus.
Ku-slim victories driving the Christians into a mini-state
dependent on Israel and leaving a potentially fundamentalist or
radical '4uslim rump state are not in Syria's interests. Syria
prefers a weak government in Beirut that is politically de25X13ent
on Damascus, but representative enough to attract foreign
economic assistance.
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v _ V nL 1
SUBJECT: LEBANON: After Gemayel
DDCI
DDI
DDO/NE
DDO/NE
C/PES
CPAS/IMD/CB
NIO/NESA
D/NESA
NESA/PPS
NESA/AI
NESA/AI/L
2 - NESA/AI/I
DDI/NESA/AI/L~
07Feb84) 25X1
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SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R001300550001-9