MOROCCAN-LIBYAN UNION: STATUS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001302370001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 30, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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an'.L-cr
Centml Intelligence gency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
30 November 1984
Moroccan-Libyan Union: Status and Prospects
Summary
Libya and Morocco are moving to implement their union
agreement and to demonstrate that the accord is providing
tangible benefits. Morocco's King Hassan will emphasize
Libyan financial assistance as a means to ease the country's
deteriorating economic and social conditions that sparked
riots last January. The seating of the Polisario's self-
proclaimed republic at the recent OAU summit and Morocco's
subsequent withdrawal will encourage Rabat to continue the
union as a useful way to eliminate Tripoli's support to the
guerrillas.
The union has provided Libyan leader Qadhafi with a
diplomatic coup in his effort to enhance his international
standing and to counter US attempts to isolate Libya. He
also will try to use Morocco as a middleman in obtaining
restricted US origin spare parts for aircraft and other
equipment.
We anticipate that Hassan will resist strongly any
international pressure to repudiate the union. We believe
that Hassan wants to maintain close relations with the
United States, but he would watch closely for signs that
Washington is taking punitive action against him. Of
particular concern would be a cut in US economic and
military-assistance. Such a move almost certainly would
prompt Hassan to reassess the usefulness of his military
access agreement with Washington. The union probably
presages additional shifts in Moroccan foreign policy which
will not coincide with US interests, including closer
economic ties with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
This typescript was prepared by the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 30
November 1984 was used in its preparation. Questions and comments should be
directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
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The rapprochement between Morocco and Libya began in late
June 1983 after King Hassan bowed to Saudi pressure and agreed to
see Qadhafi. During Qadhafi's visit, he promised to back Morocco
on the Western Sahara issue and to withdraw his support to the
Polisario Front. Hassan agreed in turn not to act against Libyan
Hassan publicly stated that he first considered the idea of
a union in mid-July 1984. Qadhafi and Hassan signed an
agreement--the Arab-African Federation treaty--at Oujda, Morocco
on 13 August and the union was popularly approved through
referenda held in Morocco and Libya on 31 August.
King Hassan and Qadhafi will preside jointly over the
union. Its headquarters will alternate between the two capitals,
with permanent representatives in each. Morocco's former
Minister of Cooperation Radi, a socialist, is Secr-etary General
of the union, and Kamal Hasan al Maqhur, former Libyan Petroleum
Minister and President of OPEC, is the Assistant Secretary
"General. Joint political, defense, economic, and education
councils are to be established. The agreement calls for
coordination of foreign policy, cooperation in economic
development and defense, and the creation of an Executive
Committee, Federal Court, and Federal Parliament. Each country
The US Embassy in Rabat reports that Morocco and Libya have
taken steps toward more active policy coordination on Middle East
issues. In recent international conferences, Rabat has adopted
positions closely aligned with those of Tripoli on such issues as
Israel's seat in the UN and nuclear proliferation. The Embassy,
however, notes that, thus far, coordination with Libya appears to
have only affected Morocco's public position on Israel and has
not interrupted private contacts.
Why Union?
The timing of Hassan's initiative suggests that the King
viewed the union as a quick way to relieve growing domestic
pressure over Morocco's deteriorating economic and social
conditions. In our opinion, the King, faced with potentially
disruptive parliamentary elections in mid-September and
considerable disgruntlement over cuts in education subsidies,
bought some time on the domestic front with promises of
additional economic aid and new jobs.
The Western Sahara conflict and the Algerian-Tunisian-
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Mauritanian friendship treaty also were factors in Hassan's
decision. Last spring, Algeria underscored its refusal to accept
a Moroccan military victory in Western Sahara with a vigorous
response to an extension of Rabat's defensive berm. Algerian
jets overflew Moroccan territory, and Algerian troops held large
scale military exercises near northern Morocco and ambushed a
Moroccan border patrol. Algiers also
Libya out of the Sahara question and to constrain Algerian
military options by having a Moroccan ally on Algiers' eastern
border.
Hassan probably saw the union as a way to get
Qadhafi's motives in signing the agreement are both tactical
and ideological. Qadhafi regards cooperation with moderate Arabs
as the best way to limit pressure on Libya and to promote radical
causes throughout the Middle East and Africa without isolating
Libya in Arab circles. He almost certainly will be encouraged by
the union to more aggressively pursue his long-standing policy of
threatening other Arab states with subversion unless they unite
in a more militant policy toward Israel. Moreover, Qadhafi has
nurtured a fervent ideological commitment to Arab unity since he
took power 15 years ago and probably hopes that union with
Morocco will set an example for other Arab states to follow.
We believe that Qadhafi also views the union as an
opportunity to enhance his influence in regional affairs, to
strengthen his international standing, and to counter US attempts
to isolate him. He anticipates that improved relations with
Rabat will disrupt the Moroccan relationship with Washington or
at a minimum, that Rabat will be able to moderate US hostility
toward Libya.
Economic Dynamics of the Relationship
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The US Embassy in
Rabat says that Morocco has signed a contract for up to 480,000
tons of Libyan crude oil to be delivered before April, possibly
at concessional rates. The volume involved covers about ten
percent of Morocco's needs and will help reduce the one-third
share of Rabat's import bill absorbed by oil purchases. Morocco
also may be considering refining Libyan oil to help circumvent
Tripoli's OPEC production quota. Tripoli can finance its total
aid commitment to Rabat with revenues from about 95,000 barrels
of oil day--about ten percent of current oil exports.
Libya provides a market for Morocco's agricultural and
manufactured exports. Of particular concern is food which soaks
up over $500 million of Libya's foreign exchange annually.
Moroccan exports to Libya totaled only $18 million last year--
about one percent of Rabat's foreign trade--but Rabat hopes to
raise the total to $100 million by 1986. This increase will help
offset Morocco's stagnant agriculture exports--20 percent of
export receipts--which are being hurt by quota restrictions in
Europe.
The movement of Moroccan workers to Libya is particularly
important to Rabat because of a severe unemployment problem--30
percent of the labor force--and because of the reduced need for
foreign workers in Europe. In addition, worker remittances are
the most important single source of foreign exchange--$900
million last year. Under the accord, Tripoli plans to replace
Tunisian, Egyptian and other foreign workers with about 80,000
Moroccans. The US Embassy in Tunis reports that Qadhafi recently
threatened to expel all 70,000 Tunisians working in Libya by 31
December and replace them with Moroccans. While very difficult
to carry out, Qadhafi's statement underscores his willingness to
bring in large numbers of Moroccans.
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Regional Implications
The union has sharpened political differences in North
Africa. The region now is divided into two blocs comprised of
Tunisia, Mauritania, and Algeria on the one hand, and Libya and
Morocco on the other. Algeria views the union as a tactical move
by Hassan to block Algerian efforts to promote regional unity and
end the Western Sahara conflict. According to US Embassy
reports, the Algerians also believe the union will encourage
Qadhafi's efforts to destabilize the region.
Algeria is eager to see the Libyan-Moroccan union sour, but
Algeria will move cautiously to encourage its early demise. The
Bendjedid regime no doubt is aware of the personal incompatabilities
between Qadhafi and Hassan and anticipates that these differences
will erode the "marriage of convenience."
Algiers also is using the union to isolate Libya from its
radical Arab allies. In discussions with Iran, Syria, Lebanon,
and radical PLO factions, Algerian officials are citing the union
as an indication that Qadhafi is not a reliable ally. Algiers is
accompanying this message with suggestions that Bendjedid may be
less inclined to give lip service to Syrian and Iranian policies
if Libya is not given the cool shoulder.
The union has caused Algeria to consider a harder stand on
the Western Sahara question. Algeria has the option of providing
the Polisario guerrillas with new weapons systems or it can
intervene selectively by providing Algerian tactical air
support. In addition, Algeria may provide financial and training
support to Libyan dissidents. The Algerian Government also is
trying to shore up international diplomatic support on Western
Sahara--an issue that could further alienate Qadhafi by
encouraging contacts between the Polisario guerrillas and Syria
and Iran.
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Prospects for the Union
Hassan will move forward with the union as long as Qadhafi
provides economic support, backs Morocco on the Western Sahara,
and continues to privately profess moderation in their bilateral
relationship. Morocco's turning over Libyan dissidents to
Qadhafi
(gives Qadhafi an important stake in
maintaining good relations. As a result, Qadhafi is likely to
continue promoting economic cooperation with Morocco and to give
limited financial aid to keep the union on track. Ethiopia's
assistance in training Libyan backed Sudanese dissidents, for
example, is a critical element in Qadhafi's willingness to
provide Addis Ababa with well over $300 million in cash since
1981.
Some aspects of the agreement, however, might lead Hassan to
abrogate the union. Qadhafi's failure to deliver on past
promises of aid--especially large aid commitments--and the bleak
outlook over the next year or so for Libyan oil sales suggest
that he may have difficulty in maintaining assistance on a level
satisfactory to Hassan. In addition, we expect that Qadhafi at
some point will try to involve Hassan in his radical stand
against the United States and Israel and in Libyan adventurism in
the region. Qadhafi also may be tempted to undertake subversive
activities in Morocco. Such moves are likely to reduce Hassan's
willingness to continue with the union.
Implications for the United States
Hassan almost certainly calculated that a union agreement
would cause some cooling in his relationship with the United
States. We believe, however, that Hassan is sincere in telling
US officials that he wants to maintain close relations with the
United States and that he has no illusions about transforming
Qadhafi's errant behavior. Nevertheless, Hassan believes that he
can control the direction of the union.
At the same time Hassan will be watching closely for
indications that Washington wants to redefine its relationship
with Morocco. Hassan's wish to limit the damage to US-Moroccan
relations gives Washington some leverage with him
On the other
hand, Hassan's personal prestige is so heavily engaged in the
union that--as he has already amply demonstrated--he will
strongly resist any pressures to cancel it.
Hassan will consider as a punitive action any decision by
Washington to significantly reduce or delay ongoing bilateral
programs with Morocco. He has several options in deciding how to
respond:
-- reduce or stop US Naval ship visits and US military
exercises;
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-- refuse to allow US forces to use Moroccan facilities
under the US-Moroccan access and transit agreement;
-- stop the Voice of America operations in Morocco;
-- adopt a more radical stand on Middle East issues;
-- turn to Libya and the Soviet Union for military
Hassan will use any signs that Libya has turned over a new
leaf--an unlikely occurrence in our view--to point out that
dialogue is the only way to tame Qadhafi and that the United
States should Join the effort. Moroccans have already pointed to
Libya's willingness to conclude an agreement with France on
mutual troop withdrawal from Chad as evidence of Qadhafi's new
moderation. If Qadhafi does not withdraw, Hassan is likely to
remain quiet on Libya's meddling in Chad as long as Qadhafi
continues to back Morocco's position on Western Sahara. In any
event, Qadhafi will draw on the union to enhance his
international standing and encourage other moderate governments
to improve relations.
The union with Libya probably presages additional shifts in
Moroccan foreign policy to improve Rabat's financial position.
We believe that this will include closer economic ties with
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to expand trade and other
commercial relations. Hassan courted the Soviets in the 1960s
and knows that aligning his policies with them will not solve
Morocco's long term problems, would damage his moderate image,
and reduce his flexibility.
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Appendix
Key Indicators to Watch For
Scenario A: Morocco and Libya view the union as a useful
means to promote their national interests:
-- Libya provides promised financial assistance, oil, jobs
for Moroccan workers, and funding for joint development
projects.
- Increased Moroccan exports to Libya.
-- Frequent high level visits between the two countries.
-- Establish joint political, defense, economic and
educational councils, setting forth agenda that will
increase ties.
-- Meetings of the Executive Committee and the Federal
Parliament to discuss substantive issues.
-- Cooperation in international organizations on Middle East
issues.
-- Hassan assists Qadhafi in improving ties with moderate
Arabs and Western Europe.
-- Increased student exchanges.
- Military cooperation, to include visits, exchange of
military students, and joint exercises. Libya provides
military materiel to Morocco.
-- Increased cooperation in aviation, such as establishing
joint maintenance facilities.
Libyan military intervention if Morocco is attacked by
Algeria.
-- Morocco continues to provide information on--or denies
safehaven to--Libyan dissidents.
-- Other African and Arab countries join the union.
Scenario B: Morocco and Libya find union does not serve
their interests.
-- Libyans conduct subversive operations in Morocco, to
include funding radical Islamic fundamentalist and other
opposition groups, inciting students to a more radical
anti-regime positions, and spreading Libyan ":Ireen Book"
ideology.
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-- Libyan terrorist attacks in Morocco or against key
members of the PLO.
Public and private statements by Hassan and other
Moroccan officials that Libya's inadequate level of
economic assistance is responsible for Rabat's continuing
economic woes.
Hassan refuses Qadhafi's demands for a stronger stand by
Morocco against the US, Israel, and moderate Arab states,
even if Qadhafi ties economic aid to a more radical anti-
US position.
Unfavorable references to Hassan or Morocco in Qadhafi's
speeches or to Qadhafi in Moroccan press.
Libya resumes military and diplomatic support to the
Polisario.
Morocco recognizes Egypt without Libyan agreement.
Libya resumes cooperation with Algeria in an eff 7 t to
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NESA M# 84-10307
SUBJECT: Moroccan-Libyan Union: Status and Prospects
DISTRIBUTION:
External:
1 - Richald L. Armitage, Department of Defense
1 - Richard W. Murphy, Department of State
1 - Thomas Nassif, Department of State
1 - Arnold Raphel, Department of State
1 - Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Burns, Department of Defense
1 - Col. Alfred B. Prados, Department of Defense
1 - George S. Harris, INR State
1 - Geoffrey T. H. Kemp, Old Exc Office Bldg.
Internal:
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - CPAS/ILS
1 - C/PES
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
1 - DDO/NE
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M/
(30 Nov 84)
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