AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 18, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85TOO287ROO1302450001-8
Afghanistan Situation. Report
18 December 1984
rnp-seeFet-
NESA M 84-10319CX
SOYA M 84-10221 CX
Directorate of
Intelligence
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85TOO287ROO1302450001-8
18 December
r, 7 Q
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
TOP SECRET
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
POSSIBLE SHIFT IN AFGHAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
Activities by an Egyptian official in Kabul imply Cairo is
moderating its position with the Afghan regime. Egyptian
officials in Cairo state their basic position is unchanged.
AFGHANISTAN: INSIGHT INTO SOVIET OPERATIONS
Afghanistan provides an opportunity to observe and assess the
Soviet military capability to conduct military operations. The
Soviets recognize their shortcomings and from time to time
temporarily alleviate an issue, but the same problems reappear
later. The overall military system stifles initiative and
appears to be too rigid to make the changes necessary to ensure a
professional, highly motivated, flexible force.
18 December 1984
NESA M 84-10319CX
SOVA M 84-10221CX 25X1
i
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be directed to
18 December 1984
NESA M 84-10319CX
SOVA M 84?-10221CX
25X1
25X1
n
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
TOP SECRET
L is
yva"rfKUN oiaia an Eshka hoI
Sheberg8 M z9 -e du6~4DpKHS
I - eALKH ~hari TAK14P. y
[IRAN
~16
ARHA
iP~ T_ O PAKTIA
~
/
OZreh
Sharaq
%jay:ilbK
fiVkdrg.n
R
aadabad
~ ?`~
;;!
r r
bid
t~~eah8w' s~i ~~ ,~
P8[achinar n~b?f PB9 j t~`v IsIAI'-?bA1 I NOD I A
~/ Koh~af J J e elpindis J ', t
?Bannu
Jammu
~ 7' ~ th?-from - ~ ;t ~
fi Sargoj1ha.'
International boundary
-'- Province boundary
* National capital
O Province capital
Railroad
Road
18 December 1984
NESA M 84-10319CX
SOYA M 84-10221CX
~ApYAB ~ f ,
~Uel'ehye 7~\ /Bamien eAgvAN
Chaghclierl oa, r.,x ~aU~ i
i.I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
TOP SECRET
POSSIBLE SHIFT IN AFGHAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
US Embassy officials report the new head of the Egyptian
Interests Section in Kabul is encouraging foreign diplomats to
establish closer contacts with Afghans and has met with several
high-level Afghan officials. The new Egyptian official
reportedly believes visits by Muslim scholars and educators will
offset Soviet influence. Egyptian officials in Cairo say the new
contacts do not represent a change in Egyptian policy toward
Afghanistan--the Egyptians have avoided contacts with DRA
18 December 1984
NESA M 84-10319CX
SOVA M 84-10221CX 25X1
1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
iur aebfl i
Egypt probably hopes to reduce potential threats to its
officials in Kabul by moderating its public actions toward the
government. Cairo probably hopes that Muslim scholars and
educators will broaden contacts with Afghan Islamic leaders
Egypt
continues to support the resistance with guns and money and
probably will speak out strongly against the Afghan regime at the
Organization of Islamic Countries meeting beginning on 18
December.
insurgents in the
Herat area were experiencing shortages o eavy weapons and
ammunition earlier this year. The shortages were reportedly
caused by delays in transporting arms through Iran, diversion of
arms to noninsurgent buyers, and interdiction of arms convoys by
rival insurgent groups.
French medical directors
closed at least one medical center in the Hazarehjat last
September because insurgents were extorting money and sometimes
physically abusing the staff.
the regime has
halted its campaign to force students to join the party youth
organization because of widespread opposition by students and
parents.
18 December 1984
NESA M 84-10319CX
SOVA M 84-10221CX
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
The overriding impression of combat operations in Afghanistan is of a
large-scale Soviet effort which has, with few exceptions, been unable to
come to grips with reality. Increased expertise in the use of the
helicopter and the residual benefits of actual combat are more than
overshadowed by a highly centralized, rigid, and conventional military
approach to a difficult counterinsurgency problem. A marked lack of
initiative at all levels, coupled with serious morale, discipline, and
motivation problems, even amongst so-called elite groups, raises
important questions as to how the Soviet forces will fare in a more
conventional war.
The style of Soviet command and control remains very rigid, requiring
decisions to be made at the higher echelons. It seems that General
Staff Moscow has attempted to direct the war 2,000 miles away in
Afghanistan. First Deputy Minister of the Soviet Union, Marshal Sergey
Leonidovich Sokolov, controlled operations at the onset of the invasion
and on several occasions has taken a personal interest in the daily
operations of the 40th Army.
The combat operational authority of commanders at unit level is
exercised through what the Soviets call operational groups formed from
officers of a higher headquarters, whose responsibility begins and ends
with that specific operation. In Afghanistan, the Ops Groups are
probably formed from officers of 40th Army HQ with either the Chief of
Staff or Deputy Commander of 40th Army in control. As the operation
begins to unfold, the Ops Group deploys out of the 40th Army HQ to a
forward secure area. Apart from the Soviet tendency for high-level
interference, the practice may indicate in part that regimental HQs are
not properly trained or equipped to handle a combined arms operation.
18 December 1984
NESA M 84-10319CX
SOVA M 84-10221CX
25X1
25X1
3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
The numerous examples of Moscow-level interference into the daily
operations add credence to the assessment that the Soviet military
remains a highly centralized organization which has trouble delegating
significant responsibility to lower echelon commanders. This command and
control system would, we suggest, be suspect in the context of a war in
Europe where swiftly moving formations and units would be required to
capitalize quickly on immediate opportunities.
Combat Operations
The Soviets have yet to perfect tactics to combat rebel insurgent
groups. Operations are conducted primarily at the multi-battalion level
jointly with Afghan forces. Ideally, the Soviets cordon off an area and
the Afghan forces engage in search and sweep operations. Indirect fire
support is provided both by Soviet and Afghan artillery units. Soviet
and Afghan helicopter gunships and aircraft strikes also provide support
when available. The decision for Soviet units to chiefly provide
blocking forces probably stems from a military appreciation of Soviet
troop strength and a conscious political decision to attempt to keep
Soviet casualties to an acceptable low level.
On the whole, large-scale Soviet multi-battalion operations have been
well-planned and executed but have resulted in few positive
accomplishments. The Soviets continue to be burdened with an
inflexible, inappropriate military method of operation and suffer the
same difficulties that all Western armies have in attempting to win
counterinsurgency campaigns by force of arms alone.
The Soviets have not been able to develop and maintain secure means
of moving personnel, equipment, and logistical supplies routinely from
one area to another. Casualties from ambush have remained a serious
concern. In general, the Soviets dedicated special troops, positioned
convoy control posts, improved convoy operating procedures, and cleared
vegetation along some roads in order to improve the security of lines of
communication (LOCs). In order to reduce the effectiveness of rebel
ambushes and to improve the security of LOCs, the Soviets and Afghans
also began forming several road traffic control units.
18 December 1984
NESA M 84-10319CX
SOVA M 84-10221CX
4
. 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
TOP SECRET
Training
Traditionally, Soviet training is geared to produce a team of well-
drilled soldiers and junior officers who follow set directives from
higher authorities. Such training does not suit a counterinsurgency
environment, and there have been few indications of training schools
either in the USSR or Afghanistan specifically designed for preparing
troops for Afghanistan. The average Soviet conscript arrives in
Afghanistan having completed only compulsory preservice training. The
junior officer arrives after the normal officer education. Both are
expected to be trained on the job within units and then leave
Afghanistan after the required two-year tour. Specialists, i.e.,
drivers, gunners, etc., on the other hand, arrive after six months at a
specialist school and serve the remaining 18 months of their
conscription in Afghanistan.
Intelligence Operations
The successful operation freeing several Soviet civilian hostages in
February of 1983 was accomplished primarily due to an emphasis on
improving the intelligence effort. The reevaluation of Soviet and
Afghan intelligence capability that took place throughout 1983 resulted
in a change in ambush operations. Ambushes normally lasted 24 to 48
hours; however, lately in some cases personnel have been expected to
remain in a specified area up to ten days.
During the past four years in Afghanistan, the Soviets experienced
difficulty in maintaining secrecy during the planning and execution of
combat missions. The Soviets estimated that the rebels were, in some
cases, aware of their operations several days in advance. This security
problem seemed to be due in part to the fact that operations became
stereotyped; their sequence and form obvious to the rebels. For
example, normally heavy air reconnaissance flights first saturated the
combat operational area. Airstrikes by fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopter gunships then occurred, followed shortly by artillery
strikes. Next, an influx of ground force battalions commenced. This
predictable sequence allowed time for the rebels to vacate an area or
properly prepare for a fight.
Although Soviet military doctrine and writings acknowledge the
importance of deception, the indications are that the 40th Army has not
18 December 1984
NESA M 84-10319CX
SOYA M 84-10221CX 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
5%F1 Vr V..r.
practiced it very well. Additionally, over the past four years the
Soviets almost ignored the rebel intelligence capability. The Soviets
need to vary their operations and practice more effective deception.
Stereotyped operations without proper deception and a lack of
appreciation for an enemy's intelligence' capability in a war in Europe
would place the Soviets at a significant disadvantage.
The Soviets have not properly used specially trained troops. The
airborne have not jumped, the Spetznaz have not operated in small.,
clandestine groups, and the air assault brigade, although trained for
rapid action, has not effectively or aggressively hampered the rebels.
Use of Helicopters
On the whole, the Soviets are satisfied and understand helicopter
limitations. We are aware that the Soviets have used helicopters
effectively and extensively as troop carriers and resupply vehicles in a
fire support role. In addition, the Soviets have demonstrated a growing
appreciation of the value of tactical heliborne assault operations. Not
only are air assault troops used in this role, but it is not uncommon
for motorized rifle troops to routinely participate in such operations
as well. There has been Soviet concern, however, over availability of
helicopters, qualified pilots, almost nonexistent night flight training
and vulnerability to rebel surface-to-air hand-held missiles.
Soviet methods of operation in the beginning of 1984 suggest an
improvement in tactics. Night ambushes in Qandahar reportedly employed
air operations to aggressively engage the rebels. The 103rd Guards
Airborne Division attached artillery spotters/observers down to company
units, which should make artillery support more responsive to the needs
of infantry. The ground forces were given tactically sound tasks such
as seizing heights and occupying choke points, and certain specialized
reconnaissance groups were formed for specific search and destroy
missions. Air support was tasked with close-air support, minelaying,
cover, and heliborne assault missions. It is difficult to tell,
however, whether we are seeing only individual incidents of tactical
competence or a new trend.
18 December 1984
NESA M 84-10319CX
SOVA M 84-10221CX
6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
iur ac,nci
Even with proper tactics, there are no guarantees of decisive
success. What is needed is a comprehensive plan to ensure the continual
use of sound tactical principles, instill more aggressiveness, promote
commander initiative, and continue serious experimentation with new
tactical approaches.
In Summary
The lessons learned from Soviet operations in Afghanistan have
revalidated and enhanced previous assessments based on Soviet writings
and personal observations of Soviet activity in a peacetime environment.
The Soviets recognize their shortcomings and from time to time
temporarily alleviate an issue, but the same problems reappear. The
overall military system remains too rigid to be able to initiate the
necessary changes and to ensure a professional, highly motivated,
flexible force. The present Soviet military system stifles initiative
and creates an expectation that decisions are for higher commanders.
Such a style of operation provides NATO with opportunities to exploit
inherent weaknesses and thus thwart an otherwise strong military
machine.
18 December 1984
NESA M 84-10319CX
SOVA M 84-10221CX 25X1
7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8
Top Secret
Top Secret
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/22 : CIA-RDP85T00287R001302450001-8