CHERNENKO: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE MAN AND HIS POLICY AGENDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001400410001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 16, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
16 March 1984
Chernenko: A Preliminary Assessment
of the Man and His Policy Agenda
Summary
Konstantin Chernenko has staged a remarkable political
comeback, but he lacks some of the institutional strengths that
Brezhnev and Andropov could claim at their accession. We still
do not know what political tradeoffs have been struck that
enabled Chernenko to get the top job. Chernenko must look first
to consolidating his position, but a lack of vacancies at the top
and other significant political constraints dictate that he move
In the next few months, he will be compelled to grapple with
a host of complex domestic and foreign policy problems that
remain unresolved from Andropov's brief tenure. His initial
pronouncements as General Secretary suggest that he supports his
predecessor's general policy outline and intends to continue
along the same general path in both foreign and domestic
spheres. In terms of US-Soviet relations, Chernenko is on record
as favoring a US-Soviet dialogue and could give an impetus to
some movement in that direction. Chernenko's views are likely to
This memorandum was prepared by the Policy Analysis Division with
contributions from the Current Support and Soviet Economy Divisions, Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Acting Chief, Policy Analysis Division,
SOV M 84 10026
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be modified as he attempts to gain more support and even further
altered by the broader perspective of his new post and the
exigencies of international events.
In a more general sense, however, we are uncertain about the
nature of the new regime. We question how firm the coalition is
that picked Chernenko and we don't know his mandate. At first
there was scant reference by Defense Minister Ustinov to the new
General Secretary and the initial treatment of Chernenko b the
military paper Krasna a Zvezda was lukewarm.
Moreover, his selection represents the "old guard's" emphasis
on continuity, especially on domestic issues, the younger members
of the Politburo could contest the old guard's unwillingness to
rock the boat. We see the possibility, therefore, of overt
politicking and disc reement among the Soviet leaders in the days
ahead. F
The New Leader
Chernenko Gets the Nod. The political rise of Konstantin
ernen o-- rez nev s former aide and close confidant--into the
upper ranks of the leadership was especially rapid under
Brezhnev. Between April 1976 and November 1978 Chernenko was
promoted three times and became one of four top leaders in the
hierarchy. He is the only one of the four still in power today
(Brezhnev and Mikhail Suslov are dead; Kirilenko is retired).
After Suslov's death in 1982, Brezhnev gave a further boost to
Chernenko's career by signaling his intention to make him the their
apparent. This plan did not work then. however.
ernen o lost the contest with Andropov by a small
margin. His career then appeared to be on hold until two months
before the death of Andropov on 9 February 1984.
We do not know what political tradeoffs may have been made
in order for Chernenko to get the nod and what factions have now
been formed in the Politburo. This time, however, Chernenko
apparently benefited from the reluctance of the old guard--
Nikolay Tikhonov, Andrey Gromyko, and Dmitriy Ustinov--to pick a
younger candidate. Defense Minister Ustinov, the only other
senior leader who realistically might have been chosen by the old
guard, may not have wanted the job, may have health problems, may
have been considered indispensable in his current position, and
may have preferred to play the role of power broker, rather than
seek the post himself. Moreover, without a seat on the
Secretariat he lacked the institutional base that all previous
successors held. Ustinov thus would have found it more difficult
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to line up support from the provincial party apparatus and the
economic ministries and garner support from Politburo members
(e.g. Tikhonov and Kunayev) who represent these interests.
The old guard, especially Ustinov and Gromyko, probably
found Chernenko less threatening to their political careers and
policy commitments than the younger alternatives in the
Secretariat--Mikhail Gorbachev and Grigoriy Romanov. The senior
members of the Politburo probably considered Gorbachev at 52, too
young and lacking experience for the job. The more experienced
61-year-old Romanov, who moved from Leningrad to his post in
Moscow less than a year ago, probably had not had enough time to
build the required power base in the capital, and may have seen
his best political interests served by siding with Chernenko,
rather than see the job go to his younger rival Gorbachev. The
Politburo, moreover, may have been wary of picking the strong-
Chernenko also probably was supported by former and present
regional leaders on the Politburo, who may have supported him
last time. These would include Kazakh Party leader Dinmukhamed
Kunayev, a strong supporter of Brezhnev, and former Azerbaijan
Party chief Geydar Aliyev, a politically ambitious independent,
whose own interests would be best served by keeping the job from
a younger leader. Even Vladimir Shcherbitskiy (the Ukrainian
leader) and Viktor Grishin (the Moscow leader), both of whom may
have aspirations for the General Secretary post, may have sided
with Chernenko. Shcherbitskiy's reputed support for Andropov in
the previous succession contest did not benefit him politically,
and he may have refused to support Andropov's probable choice,
Gorbachev. In the March election speeches, such regional leaders
as Kunayev, Grishin and Eduard Shevardnadze (the Georgian leader)
were particularly supportive of Chernenko, while some of the
Moscow-based leaders were less effusive.
Thus, despite the delayed announcement, it is possible that
Chernenko got the nod without much of a contest, although various
political deals and tradeoffs were probably required to smooth
the way for him. Precisely what bargains were struck may become
more evident in the coming weeks.
Strengths. Chernenko has long had important political assets
or example, ernen o never ost h is ranking as party
second-in-command during Andropov's tenure. Indeed, his position
was often highlighted under Andropov, such as when he occupied
center place on the podium at the November anniversary
celebration. He continued to influence policy and
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decisionmaking-
Having worked for 10 years behind
the scenes as the ea ers ip s top administrative officer,
Chernenko probably has considerable support at the Central
Committee level--a factor that he seemed to underscore by his
direct address of oblast party first secretaries (who comprise
the core of the Central Committee) in his first speech as General
Secretary. His control of the paper flow and his access to
Brezhnev put him in a good position to handle special requests,
solve problems, and show favor to oblast officials. The recent
Supreme Soviet election speeches also suggest that Chernenko has
strong support from regional party bureaucrats.
Presumably taking advantage of Andropov's illness, Chernenko
was able to use his position to promote his own cause. This was
apparent in several instances: he signed two obituaries in
Pravda in January that normally would not be signed by the
id
lo
eo
gy secretary and his signature appeared ahead of others and
out of the usual protocol sequence. In the recent nominations
for the Supreme Soviet, Chernenko received the second highest
number after Andropov. Moreover, in late January and early
February the Soviet media gave particular prominence to
'
Chernenko
s second volume of speeches and articles.
Chernenko also possesses personal attributes that have stood
him in good stead in the Soviet political context and will likely
continue to do so. For example, he possesses an excellent
knowledge of the functioning of the party. As an intimate of
Brezhnev and second-in-command under Andropov he has had good
access to information and familiarity with important issues.
Chernenko possesses a good sense of priorities,
i
l
i
nc
ud
ng those involving international issues.
US officials who met with Chernenko during Andropov's
funeral reported that he seemed politically shrewd and self-
confident and that he acted with complete authority. -
Chernenko has long been
thought of as a team player and capable apparatchik (party
bureaucrat); this has undoubtedly contributed to his acceptance
within the consensual style of the Politburo. While Chernenko's
knowledge of foreign affairs has been limited, he has scored high
marks in personal, one-on-one diplomatic meetings. As head of
Soviet delegations to Greece (1978) and France (1982), Chernenko
was reported to have been well prepared and well informed,
reflecting expanded knowledge and improved diplomatic skills
since the early 1970s when Brezhnev first thrust him into contact
with foreign officials. Moreover, Chernenko had regularly
attended Brezhnev's Crimean meetings with East European Communist
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leaders and knows them and other foreign party chiefs well.
As "Second" Secretary under Andropov. When Chernenko was passed
over as General Secretary in November 1982, he made the best out
of his situation. He appeared supportive of Andropov, nominating
him for the General Secretary post at the le um in November
1982. Chernenko in fact
supported many aspects of n ropov s po cies--a view that is
reinforced by Chernenko's statements and articles in the Soviet
press--particularly on the need to improve ideological and
economic discipline.
Chernenko attempted
to assert his independence and authority on personnel matters
under Andropov, but to little avail. Chernenko has modest
credentials in the area of foreign affairs and perhaps as a
result, did not seek to interfere in the conduct of foreign
policy under Andropov.
Chernenko's continuing influence--increasing as Andropov's
health deteriorated--was suggested by the regime's endorsement of
some of the policies that had been associated with him in the
past. The Andropov regime's practice of publicizing Politburo
agendas was a decision that bears Chernenko's mark. The
Politburo's attention to citizens' letters of complaint to the
party--which was mentioned at the Politburo's first publicized
meeting and signaled the beginning of the discipline campaign--
also seems to have resulted from his efforts. The Politburo's
concern with raising the quality of education and its approval of a
national program to improve consumer goods and services--goals long
advocated by Chernenko--appeared to reflect his influence.
Nevertheless, there may have been some significant policy
differences between Andropov and Chernenko and these
disagreements could resurface during the latter's tenure.
ernen o was pushing for greater
attention to investment in the civilian economy and a concerted
effort to improve the standard of living, even if this had a
negative impact on the growth of the military budget. His 2
March election speech suggests he is not eager to increase
defense spending. This contrasts with the high priority accorded
defense in recent speeches by others, notably Defense Minister
Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko.
Even so, Chernenko's speech did appear to reflect his
colleagues' sensitivities. At a Politburo meeting before his
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election speech the Soviet media indicated that Chernenko had
placed consumer welfare before defense needs in remarks to that
body. In his election speech, however, Chernenko merely noted
that the international situation had compelled the Soviet Union
to divert resources into defense.
Power and Position. At least at the outset it appears that
ernen o s cog ition is more fragile than was apparent during
Andropov's brief tenure. The coalition that backed Chernenko may
not have been based on anything more than the need to select him
over others and the reasons probably vary among coalition
members. Chernenko does not seem to have been selected on the
basis of a political platform. In his "inaugural" speech
Chernenko promised to use "collective" efforts to advance the
work begun by Andropov, but it was the older members of the
Politburo who played the predominent roles in all the public
ceremonies held since Andropov died. Tikhonov, rather than one
of the younger party secretaries, nominated Chernenko for the
General Secretary post at the party plenum that selected him.
Moreover, Chernenko, Tikhonov, Ustinov, and Gromyko stood at the
forefront of the leadership during the lying-in-state of
Andropov, and the eulogies were delivered by Chernenko, Ustinov
and Gromyko. These members of the old guard--and Tikhonov --were
the only Politburo members to hold discussions with visiting
Warsaw Pact leaders.
the Soviet regime w i l l continue to rule by consensus
witn e veteran Gromyko singled out as having a very strong
influence on foreign policy.
Consolidation of Power. Andropov was able to begin his
consolidation of-power by filling a large number of important
vacancies in key posts (e.g. industry party secretary, KGB Chief
representation on the Politburo and the Chairman of the Party
Control Committee). Chernenko does not have such vacancies to
fill. Chernenko, moreover, does not seem to have the power to
remove his opponents. Nevertheless, at least one person should
be moved to the Secretariat to fill a vacancy on that body
created by Chernenko's move up. This could be a politically
contentious issue, one that others in the leadership will look at
with an eye on the future because a new addition to the
Secretariat could affect their relative standing on it.
The presence of two younger and ambitious Politburo members
in the Secretariat will also complicate Chernenko's task.
Gorbachev as second in importance on the Secretariat will play a
prominent role in this regard. Soviet media reported an address
by Gorbachev to the Central Committee plenum that elected
Chernenko to be General Secretary,
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Judging from the
order in which the top leaders gave t r March Supreme Soviet
election speeches, Gorbachev is the senior secretary under
Chernenko. Nevertheless, the official media initially downplayed
Gorbachev's participation in leadership activity at the plenum.
Gorbachev's position has yet to be worked out. On balance, the
fact that Gorbachev's remarks were publicized--although
belatedly--his position next to Chernenko at Andropov's bier, and
the schedule of his election speech tend to support the view that
he ranks number two in the Secretariat. This "choice," however
probably was part of a compromise--which could prove only
temporary. To protect his own position Chernenko may try to use
Romanov as a counter balance, assuming that Gorbachev stays in
Liabilities. Age, health problems and an apparent lack of
support from some quarters are important liabilities of the new
party General Secretary. Some in the Soviet bureaucracy believe
that he is a transitional leader, according to remarks Soviets
officials have recently made to US counterparts. His ability to
fully consolidate power and move on policy will be made more
difficult if such a perception takes hold generally. Moreover,
the younger, more ambitious aspirants for the top job may seek to
utilize this perception to build-u support for themselves as
succession candidates.
There were variations in the way the press first handled the
leadership change, which suggested that the military in
particular was not enamored of Chernenko's selection. At first
Chernenko was lauded in an editorial in the government paper, .but
Pravda was more restrained in praising his qualifications, and
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the military's paper ignored them altogether. Moreover,
Ustinov's 23 February article in Pravda made scant reference to
General Secretary Chernenko.
To judge by the February-March election speeches of
Chernenko's Politburo colleagues, the leadership decided to build
Chernenko's image as a capable leader and one who is fully
supported by the members of the Politburo and their
constituents. For example, Ustinov praised Chernenko more than
adequately in his election speech. Even so, variations of his
treatment continued. Gromyko was particularly cool in his
remarks toward Chernenko and a few other leaders were perfunctory
i
n their praise of the new leader.
In the past foreign observers have called Chernenko inept,
plodding and a dullard. His earlier role as Brezhnev's right-
hand man tended to project the negative image of a Politburo
factotum, and his poor public speaking style furthers this
image. While all of this suggests that we could continue to
receive reports by both Soviet and foreign officials that
disparage Chernenko, the more likely course is for the Soviet
media and officialdom to boost Chernenko's status. Indeed,
Chernenko does have strong support from old-line bureaucrats and
it will become increasingly risky for those who are
unenthusiastic about his tenure to speak out. Even officials
within the security apparatus who may have low regard for
Chernenko will have to take their cues from the top.
Foreign Policy Issues
Chernenko's major problem in handling foreign policy issues
will be his lack of experience and a diffilcult foreign policy
agenda passed on by Andropov.
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? Soviet-US Relations and Arms Control--Chernenko
inherits the dilemma Andropov face in deciding how and
when to resume the dialogue with the United States,
particularly on nuclear arms negotiations. In concert
with Ustinov and Gromyko, Chernenko must decide whether
Moscow should return to the bargaining table before or
after the Presidential election in the United States.
Based on the record of his public statements, Chernenko
himself seems to favor the dialogue, and he might favor
giving new impetus to some movement in that
direction. In his 2 March election speech he suggested
that a significant improvement in the bilateral
relationship might result if Washington took the
initiative on any of several less contentious arms
control issues, particularly chemical warfare.
A return to the negotiations will not indicate
willingness to alter basic Soviet arms control
proposals. Chernenko probably lacks the political
power and the freedom of action to attempt dramatic new
initiatives or make abrupt policy changes--even if
inclined to do so. The regime is thus likely to
continue to resist US proposals that it believes would
result in substantial cuts in significant elements of
the strategic nuclear forces.
The most pressing arms control issue is INF. The
regime is likely to continue with military
counterdeployments in order to convince the West that
it has gained nothing by its Pershing II deployments.
With some new or additional weapons systems deployed
opposite Western Europe and near US territory by mid-
year, however, the regime might feel that it can afford
to return to the negotiating table.'
? China--Only significant Soviet concessions affecting
A hanistan, Kampuchea or Moscow's military posture in
Mongolia and along the Sino-Soviet border would open up
the prospect of a major improvement in Sino-Soviet
ties. The constraints on Chernenko at home and abroad--
particularly Moscow's relationship with Vietnam--argue
against any early movement in this direction.
Nevertheless, Chernenko is in a position to pursue
bilateral relations in such less critical areas as
economic and cultural ties, where the Chinese are
showing greater receptivity to Soviet overtures.
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Afghanistan--The inability of Moscow to reduce the
g an insurgency is one of its most intractable
problems, but the costs of alternative strategies are
quite high. Just before Andropov's death the Soviet
media indicated that the present approach will
continue. Chernenko's failure to meet with Pakistani
leader Zia at Andropov's funeral also suggests no early
Soviet initiative on Afghanistan, which contrasts
sharply with Andropov's meeting with Zia at the
Brezhnev funeral the Soviet look of flexibility at
that time.
? Middle East--The removal of the US military presence
from Lebanon and the Syrian diplomatic victory there
helps to compensate for the damage done to the Soviet
position in the wake of the Israeli invasion in 1982.
A Syrian-Israel i war, however, would test Moscow's
commitment to a key Arab client. Moscow has no
interest in a wider war and will likely attempt to
constrain provocative Syrian actions. It is
nonetheless conceivable that the Soviets might look for
ways to expand their presence in Syria or provide more
sophisticated weaponry if they believe they might
otherwise lose out on the next phase of discussions on
a general Arab-Israeli settlement. The current level
of fighting between Iran and Iraq does not pose a
difficult problem for the new regime and it probably
will continue to sit on the fence. We believe that,
barring a US military invasion of Iran, the Soviets
would not commit their own forces to the fight. We do
not believe that the Soviets would intervene if the US
conducted bombing raids against Iranian ships or
? Africa--The most serious problems in Africa facing the
new leadership are the threats posed to the Marxist
regimes in Angola and Mozambique by South-African-
backed insurgent groups. Over the past year, the
Soviets have stepped up their military assistance to
Luanda--a tack the new leadership is likely.to
continue. Despite Angola's growing dependence on
Soviet arms and Cuban troops, Moscow is probably
concerned that US-brokered talks between Angola and
South Africa may adversely effect Soviet interests in
the region. The Soviets are opposed to linking Cuban
withdrawal from Angola to a political settlement on
Namibia. In Mozambique, insurgency and economic
deterioration have prompted the Machel regime to accept
an accommodation with Pretoria. The loss of influence
in Mozambique will provide greater incentive to hang on
to
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in Angola by providing greater amounts of military
? Latin America--Although the Soviets are faced with
problems in the region, there are now no critical
situations for Soviet foreign policy. Chernenko met
with Castro during Andropov's funeral and gave unusual
attention to Cuba in his 2 March election speech. His
election remarks, in which he criticized US pressure on
Havana and promised that Moscow would be "on Cuba's
side" in "fair weather and in storm" suggest that there
were some frictions with Castro over the downfall of
the Marxist regime in Grenada that needed to be
smoothed over. Chernenko probably wanted to ensure
that these do not interfere with the joint Soviet-Cuban
effort to bolster the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The
regime will probably continue to give Nicaragua
military assistance and some economic aid, but will
eschew any high profile involvement which could trigger
a strong US response against the Sandinistas.
Authoritative Soviet statements before Andropov's death
suggested that Moscow does not want to create a new
"economic dependent" in Latin America or to
unnecessarily complicate US-Soviet relations b
expanding activities in the region.
On the Domestic Front
Chernenko's initial remarks as General Secretary suggest a
continuation of Andropov's domestic policy line. He endorsed the
programs emphasized by Andropov--the economic experiment in
industry, the use of labor brigades, and measures to improve
consumer services--and affirmed the need to maintain labor
discipline. Chernenko's concern with building his political
base, however, is likely to mean that he will-make a sharper
distinction than Andropov did between the discipline campaign and
the campaign against corruption, which party and government
officials probably find threatening. In the near term, it is
questionable whether Chernenko will have the political strength
to push through new economic programs. By emphasizing
continuity, therefore, he may be making a virtue out of political
Since Chernenko's past statements do not- suggest a
completely defined or comprehensive economic program, it is
difficult to ascertain his approach to the economy over the long
run. Nevertheless, his speeches and articles suggest his policy
inclinations on the following issues:
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Consumer Well-Being--Chernenko has strongly urged more
attention to consumer welfare and corresponding increases
in the availability of consumer goods. He has spoken out
in favor of Brezhnev's Food Program and has made efforts
to cultivate the image of a leader attuned to popular
aspirations by calling for commissions to study public
opinion, more intraparty democracy, and greater attention
to letters from the rank and file. His pro-consumer
stance could prompt him to push for some redirection of
investment toward consumer goods and services--but that
would entail some political risk for him in view of the
current international situation.
Management Reform--There is nothing in Chernenko's
background that indicates he will be inclined toward bold
systemic change that would significantly reduce
centralized planning or management. He apparently
prefers, however, regional to ministerial organization and
spoke out in favor of the district agro-industrial
associations developed under the Food Program. In 1982 he
attacked the autonomy of the ministries which he said
"eats away like rust at the economic mechanism." He also
appears to prefer a more clearly defined role for the
party in economic management for greater accountability.
? Regional Investment--Chernenko has defended the cause
of minority republicsn their struggle for investment
resources and he could continue to be an advocate. An
early political base for Chernenko's support has come from
these republics and he needs the support of regional
leaders to consolidate his political position.
Nonetheless, support for the regions cuts both ways
politically. While he could strengthen his support in the
republics, he could lose support at the center.
Current Status and Prospects
Soviets have already begun
Chernenko's new authority.
ublicizing the tra
example, Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov referred to Chernenko
as head of the Defense Council. The reference was made in the
presence of foreigners, but it has not appeared in the official
press. If and when the Soviet media mentions this other position
held by Chernenko, and how it is done, it will give some further
indication of his leadership status. Andropov's title was
mentioned by Ustinov in Pravda several months after he had become
party leader.
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Leadership speeches for the March elections to the Supreme
Soviet tended to build up General Secretary Chernenko's image,
but with differing degrees of support. Gorbachev spoke at great
length, but focused on Chernenko's "theoretical" contribution and
said nothing about his leadership qualities. Gromyko wa-s
particularly cool, and RSFSR Premier Vorotnikov was notably
perfunctory in his praise of Chernenko. Ustinov praised
Chernenko but stopped far short of Romanov and Moscow party chief
Grishin, who were the most effusive. Soviet media indicate that
the election meetings to which they spoke adopted resolutions
that described the Politburo as "headed by" Chernenko--an
honorific formulation that had been used sparingly under Brezhnev
and Andropov. The meeting that Premier Tikhonov addressed
An important indication of Chernenko's power will be his
ability to assume Andropov's post as Chairman of the Presidum of
the Supeme Soviet (Soviet president). Both Brezhnev and Andropov
added this title to that of party General Secretary, although it
took Brezhnev years rather than months to gain it. Should
someone other than Chernenko become Soviet president, it would be
a clear sign that Chernenko is sharing power to a greater denrep
this immediate predecessor did.
a Supreme Soviet session could be convened as early as A
ril
p
which would be the first opportunity for the selection of a
president. A party plenum is likely to precede the spring
Supreme Soviet session, which would be an early gauge of how
Chernenko is doing. We would look to how the Soviet media--and
other leaders--refer to Chernenko at these meetings. Moreover, a
shift of the responsibilities of the members of the Secretariat
and Politburo might be evident before the plenum. The addition
of a member to the Secretariat or to the Politburo would provide
further clues on the relative standing of Chernenko and others in
the leadership.
In terms of policy, Chernenko's Supreme Soviet election
speech relflectetd a commitment to the Soviet consumer and
nonpolemic approach to Soviet-US relations. Nevertheless,
Chernenko's views insofar as we can discern them, gives us at
best a general sense of the direction Soviet policy will take
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SUBJECT: Chernenko: A Preliminary Assessment of the Man and
His Policy Agenda
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1 - DDI Re
gistry 7
E 47
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1 - DDI/SA
7
E 44
HQ
1 - DDI/PE
S 7
F 24
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5 - OCPAS/
IDCD/CB 7
G 07
HQ
1 - NIO/US
SR 7
E 62
HO
1 - Chief
DDO/SE
4
D 01
19 HQ
1 - DDO
1 - S
OVA
1 - DD/SOV
1 - Chief,
1 - Chief,
1 - Chief,
I - Chief,
1 - Chief,
1 - Chief,
1 - Chief,
1 - Chief,
1 - Chief,
1 - Chief,
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SOYA/
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SOVA/ EA
SOVA/
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400410001-3
1 - Mr. Jeremy Azrael
Policy Planning Member, S/P
Office of Director of Political-and
Military Affairs
Department of State
Room 7317 NS
1 - Mr. Robert Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, INR/SEE
Department of State
Room 4758
1 - Mr. Stephen W. Bosworth
Director, Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State
Room 7311
1 - Mr. Richard Burt
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Rm 6226 NS
1 - Mr. Richard Combs
Director, Office of East European Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Room 4217 NS
i - Mr. John Danylyk
Chief, INR/EC/USSR
Department of State
Room 8662 NS
1 - Mr. Robert Dean
Deputy Director, Bureau of Political
and Military Affairs
Department of State
Room 7428
1 - Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Department of State
Room 7240
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400410001-3
1 Mr. Donald Graves
INR/SEE/ST
Department of State
Room 4844
1 - ADM John Howe
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
Rm 7327
1 - Ms. Martha C. Mautner
Deputy Director
Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe
Department of State
Room 4758
1 - Mr. Hugh Montgomery
Director/INR
Department of State
Room 6531 NS
1 - Mr. Mark Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Department of State
Room 6219 NS
1 - Mr. William A. Root
Director, Office of East-West Trade
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, EB/EWT
Department of State
Room 3819
1 - Mr. Stephen Sestanovich
Special Asst. to Director
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
Room 7330
1 - Mr. Thomas W. Simons, Jr.
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Room 4217 NS
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400410001-3
1 - Mr. Philip H. Stoddard
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Current Analysis, INR/CA
Department of State
Room 6535
1 - The Honorable Kenneth Adelman
Director
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 5930 NS Annex
t - Dr. Manfred Eimer
Assistant Director for Verification
and Intelligence
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 5443, NS Annex
1 - Ambassador Richard Ellis
US SCC Conmissioner
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 5534, NS Annex
1 Mr. Raymond Firehock
Chief, Intelligence Division
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 6510A, NS Annex
1 - Ambassador Paul'Nitze
US INF Negotiator
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 5923 NS Annex
1 - Ambassador Edward Rowny
US START Negotiator
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 4498, NS Annex
1 - The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)
Department of Defense
Room 4E808, Pentagon
1 Mr. William E. Hoehn, Jr.
PAASD/ISP
Department of Defense
Room 4 E 829, Pentagon
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400410001-3
1 - The Honorable Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Department of Defense
Room 4E830, Pentagon
1 - Mr. Ronald Lauder
Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defense
(ISP/European and NATO Policy)
Department of Defense
Room 4D822, Pentagon
1 - Dr. Andrew W. Marshall
Director, Net Assessments, OSD
Department of Defense
Room 3A930, Pentagon
1 - The Honorable Richard Perle
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Policy)
Department of Defense
Room 4E838, Pentagon
1 - General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy
Department of Defense
Room 2-E-812, The Pentagon
1 - Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO European and Soviet Political Affairs
Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 2C238, Pentagon
1 - Major General William Odom
HQDA (DAMI-ZA)
Department of the Army
Room 2E464, Pentagon
1 - Mr. David Peterson
Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison
Department of Commerce
Room 6854, Main Commerce
1 - COL Tyrus Cobb, USA
NSC Staff
Room 373, EOB
1 - Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
4
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400410001-3
1 - Ambassador Jack Matlock
Special Assistant to The President
for European and Soviet Affairs
Room 368 OEOB
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