SOVIET-WEST EUROPEAN RELATIONS AFTER THE FIRST INF DEPLOYMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 15, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
Central Intelligerxe AgFncy
V1hsMn~fon.QCZOSOs
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Summary
The Soviets have not allowed relations with
those West European countries which accepted the
new US missiles to be adversely affected. Initial
signals following Chernenko's accession to the
Party leadership indicate that the Soviets will
continue this effort to maintain good relations.
Judging from their actions, they do not want to
risk serious damage to their larger equities in
Western Europe and are particularly solicitous of
economic ties. They have, nevertheless, dealt
some minor diplomatic snubs, presumably to appear
to make good on their public threats to retaliate
politically. Soviet leaders may believe that the
suspension of arms talks and announced military
countermeasures are sufficient demonstration of
their intent to respond firmly to ~tATO's
deployments.
SOVA ri 84-10041
Thfs memorandum was repared in the Office of Soviet
lrlnalysis Comments and queries are welcome and
may be a tease o e Current Support Division, telephone
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
Soviet Leaders Accentuate the Positive
1. There has been no downturn in bilateral political and
economic contacts with the USSR since West Germany, the UK, and
Italy decided last fall to proceed with INF deployment. West
European leaders--many of whom feel strong domestic pressure to 25X1
ameliorate the East-West atmosphere--possibly would try to put
the best face on Soviet diplomatic behavior, particularly when
characterizing it for US officials.
leads us to a ieve t e ovie 25X1
restraint and cordiality toward the West Europeans has been
accurately described by Western leaders. 25X1
2. The Soviets' uninterrupted dialogue with the West German
government is most noteworthy because the Soviets made it clear
that they saw last fall's Bundestag debate as opening the door to
NATO's deployments throughout Western Europe.
Soviet security expert
Daniil Proektor reportedly contended in early February
that deployment had affected the political climate
between the two countries, but economic and cultural
relations would not deteriorate.
3. Similarily, Soviet-British exchanges- which have
remained at a fairly low and infrequent level since the
Afghanistan invasion- have continued.
2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
-- An Izvestiya article marking the 60th anniversary of
diplomatic relations criticized the UK's support for
allegedly aggressive US policies, but emphasized the
USSR's desire for bilateral cooperation.
4. Soviet-Italian relations remain low-key but positive.
-- The Moscow meeting in mid-December of the Soviet-Italian
Mixed Economic and Scientific Commission was highlighted
favorably in the Soviet press, and the Italians assessed
the Soviets' forthcoming attitude as reflecting a desire
to end their diplomatic "isolation" following their
walk-out from the Geneva INF talks.
-- Gromyko discussed the possibility of a spring visit to
Rome with Foreign Minister Andreotti at the CDE
opening. Gromyko's sharply anti-US rhetoric during his
meetings in Stockholm with Andreotti and his other West
European counterparts reportedly did not dilute the
impression that the USSR wanted to maintain good
relations with US allies. Andreotti and Italian
President Pertini indicated to reporters that this
impression was confirmed by their talks with Chernenko
and Gromyko after Andropov's funeral.
Soviet Motives
5. The Soviets' conciliatory approach, in our view, almost
certainly is motivated in large part by hopes of influencing the
Allies' attitudes toward further deployments--including the West
German government's views on a moratorium--and of inducing the
Belgians and Dutch to decide against any deployments on their
soil.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
-- Gromyko has reaffirmed his intention to visit Brussels
early this year, and any such visit would be used to
lobby against deployment of the cruise missiles
scheduled to be operational in Belgium in March 1985.
-- The US Embassy in Moscow speculated that the fact that
the Belgians and Dutch sent lower level delgations to
Andropov's funeral than they sent to Brezhnev's might
spur Soviet efforts to reassure and cultivate the two
remaining INF basing countries.
6. The Soviets have said publicly that they are pleased
with and will be responsive to recent statements by West European
leaders advocating better relations with the East. Kohl,
Thatcher, and Andreotti all have expressed the desire for a more
positive dialogue with the USSR. Vadim Zagladin, depu 'ef
the Central Committee's International Department, told
that Thatcher's in eres in
e~i~=~ri~is re a ions was "important, " and recent
Soviet commentary on Kohl and Italian Prime Minister Craxi has
urged them to give substance to their professed desire to
ameliorate the East-West atmosphere.
Non-INF Countries
7. The USSR's relations with West European countries not
included in NATO's deployment plans have been particularly
active.
-- The French, for example, regarded Deputy Premier
Arkhipov's visit in late January to sign a major trade
protocol as a signal of Soviet interest in closer ties
despite Paris' strong opposition to Soviet efforts to
include French forces in an INF agreement.
-- The Soviets also welcomed a Spanish parliamentary
delegation in January, and recently praised political
and economic ties with Norway without mentioning the
repercussions of the Treholt spy scandal.
-- The Soviets have also remained largely silent about the
Swedes' most recent highly publicized submarine hunt,
probably to avoid further damaging the USSR's image in
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
the Nordic re ion while the CDE is in session in
Stockholm. 25X1
Economic "Business As Usual"
8. Throughout this period the Soviets have appeared
particularly concerned--as they did even before deployments got
underway--about insulating their increasingly broad and diverse
economic relations with the West Europeans from the impact of
INF.
-- Soviet media portrayed the mid-November session of the
Soviet-West German Mixed Economic Commission as a useful
exchange promoting expanded economic relations, and made
no mention of INF. At this session, the Soviets
refrained from signing any contracts or holding
intensive discussions of specific projects perhaps to
send a more general economic and political message to
the West Germans. Nonetheless, the volume of Soviet-
West German trade has not apparently been affected since
deployment.
-- The Soviets told the Italians at their Economic
Commission meeting in December that they would sign $2
billion in contracts with Italian firms in 1984. The
Italians reportedly were surprised that the Soviets had
not demanded the quid pro quo of natural gas purchases,
leading them to conclude that the USSR wanted to build
diplomatic bridges to the West after the Geneva walk-
out.
-- Similarly, French officials reportedly regarded the
Soviets' forthcoming attitude in negotiating a trade
protocol on 3 February as a political signal of the
USSR's desire for better relations with France.
9. West European assistance is especially important at
present to the USSR's energy development plans--a critical matter
entirely independent of INF deployment. Mindful of the 1982
pipeline-related US sanctions, the Soviets almost certainly are
eager to ensure that West European equipment suppliers and energy
customers remain favorably inclined toward trade with the USSR.
-- The Soviets currently are negotiating with the West
Europeans for equipment and financing for "sour gas"
projects at Astrakhan and Tengiz in Soviet Central Asia
and for offshore oil and gas development efforts in the
Barents and Caspian Seas and off Sakhalin Island.
-- Preliminary discussions of such long term prospects as a
coal slurry pipeline and synthetic fuels development
indicate that the USSR hopes to profit by its economic
collaboration with Western Europe long into the
future .
5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
Minor Snubs
10. While seeking to protect its larger equities, the USSR
nevertheless apparently has felt compelled to give some substance
to warnings to the West Germans, British, and Italians that
proceeding with INF deployments would have consequences for
bilateral relations. Soviet press commentary on those
governments' security policies has remained sharply critical.
The Soviets continually remind West Germany that they regard it
as second only to the US in culpability for allegedly
accelerating the arms race. Italy and especially the UK are
being warned that their alleged slavish submission to US security
dictates deprives them of sovereignty and the good will of the
11. Beyond this press campaign, the Soviets have been
selective, cautious, and at times contradictory in their
retaliatory gestures.
the Soviet Foreign Ministry instructed its
em assy in onn not to issue visas to any conservative
West German politicians. The move was explained as
retaliation against the conservative parties, whose
representatives in the Bundestag had voted unanimously
to proceed with deployment.
-- The Soviets reportedly also ignored a West German
government request that Politburo member Grigoriy
Romanov call on officials in Bonn following his
attendance at the German Communist Party's congress in
early January.
officials in Romanov s e ega ion reporte y also ailed
to meet with West German Social Democrats, whose
opposition to the Kohl Government's INF stance the USSR
approves.
-- During the late January visit of the British Liberal
Parliamentarians, Politburo candidate-member Boris
Ponomarev- who has a reputation for irascibility--
reportedly dismissed Thatcher's efforts at East-West
conciliation as a "cosmetic operation." USA and Canada
Institute chief Georgiy Arbatov and other Soviet
officials, on the other hand, were encouraging about the
prospects for improved Soviet-British ties.
12. Initial Western concerns that new altitude restrictions
the Soviets imposed in late February on Allied flights in the
three Berlin air corridors might be a reaction to INF so far have
proven unfounded. The Soviets evidently do want to secure
permanent restrictions on Allied air activity in the corridors.
The new restrictions were applied, however, in response to Allied
complaints about the hazard posed by Soviet military aircraft
crossing the corridors, and do appear aimed, at least in part, at
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
improving air safety. Soviet officials have repeatedly insisted
that the USSR wants to maintain the status quo regarding Berlin,
suggesting that they appreciate the backfire potential of
exploiting Berlin to signal dissatisfaction to the West. The US
Mission in Berlin concluded in early March that the Soviets were
relying on the current improvement in inner-German relations and
on the difficulties of Allied coordination to qet the air regime
they want without risking a Berlin crisis.
The Dialogue on Security Issues
13. Having failed to forestall implementation of NATO's
1979 INF decision, the Soviets appear to be focusing on efforts
to limit the deployments. They may calculate that frequent
consultations and direct reassurances to the West Europeans of
the USSR's benign intentions could undermine NATO consensus for
full deployment as planned.
-- Soviet officials are trying to appeal to West European
overnments' sense of sovereignty, portraying INF ~~
25X1
as a da
ngerous pla
n forced on 25X1
extern Europe y e S. TAS
February of the arrival at Com
US cruise missiles, for exampl
Italian government but instead
S's announc
iso, Sicily
e, put no b
characteri
ement in early
of the first
lame on the
zed the weapons
as "Washington's 'dangerous gifts' which jeopardize the
security of (Italy itself)."
14. Beyond INF, the USSR's long-range objective of
undermining US-West European solidarity on the full range of
security issues adds to Moscow's incentive to keep the Soviet-
West European dialogue alive.
-- Soviet officials take every opportunity to try to
persuade their West European counterparts that the arms
control impasse and the general deterioration of the
East-West climate is due not to Soviet, but to US
intransigence and belligerence.
-- By having set a date for resumption of the MBFR talks
and by taking an active role in the CDE--both of which
are important to Europeans because they are multilateral
rather than superpower negotiations--the Soviets
evidently hope to ensure that the West Europeans remain
receptive to the USSR's security proposals and
arguments. For example, Soviet officials--including
General Secretary Chernenko in his meeting with the
Canadian Prime Minister after Andropov's funeral--
continue to express interest in Trudeau's peace
initiative without committing the USSR to active
support. Similarly, the Warsaw Pact's 10 January
chemical weapons proposal probably was intended in part
to play upon West German interest in the issue.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
15. The Soviets' shift of focus to direct discussions and
appeals to West European leaders in part reflects an awareness
that the dispirited and divided peace movement is no longer able
to help the USSR accomplish its objectives, if indeed it ever
16. This does not mean that the Soviets have any intention
of ignoring the peace movement.
-- They are continuing to support and counsel elements of
it, and to cultivate other groups and parties in Western
Europe who do not now support NATO's INF deployment
plans--notably the West German Social Democrats--to
maintain pressure on NATO governments regarding INF and
other security policies.
-- At a public lecture in Leningrad in early February, a
Soviet academic intimated, in fact, that the USSR's
propaganda effort might have to be strengthened to
contend with the possibility that the peace movement's
focus might shift to Warsaw Pact countermeasures.
17. The Soviets' willingness to maintain normal political
relations suggests they believe military countermeasures such as
basing new missiles in Eastern Europe and their suspension of the
INF talks and START are sufficient to demonstrate the Warsaw
Pact's intent to match NATO's deployments with military
strength. A forceful military response also could strengthen the
Soviets' political hand with the West Europeans, although it
could also backfire by proving that the "Soviet threat" used to'
justify NATO's INF plans is indeed real.
Outlook
18. We believe the Soviets will continue to deal closely
and positively with the West Europeans, despite the recent
tension over security issues. This was apparently the course
under Andropov, and initial signals from Chernenko indicate that
the USSR will continue and possibly augment its efforts to ensure
an uninterrupted and mutually advantageous dialogue with Western
Europe. Should the Chernenko regime seek improved relations with
the US, the Soviets' West European contacts could promote an even
broader dialogue. The MBFR talks and the CDE could provide the
means for sending such signals to the West.
19. The Soviets nevertheless have not foresworn any of the
tactics they used in an effort to stop the INF deployments in the
first place. While maintaining a productive dialogue with the
8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
West European regimes the USSR will continue, in our view, to
encourage opposition elements to undercut popular support for
NATO. Although the Soviets are putting a positive face on
relations with the Hague and Brussels, Soviet warnings probably
will again increase in volume as the deadlines approach for
Belgium and the Netherlands to make deployment decisions.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
SUBJECT: Soviet West European Relations After the First INF
Deployments
Distribution:
DDI
SA DCI
SA DDC I
Senior Review
OCPAS/IMD/CB
NIO/USSR/EE
NIO/WE
NIO/GPF
D/BONA
DD/BONA
C/ PA
C/TF
C/SE
C/SF
C/DI
C/EA
C/PA/F
C/TF/N
C/NSD/OSWR
D/EURA
C/NE/WE~
C/CS Chrono
C/CS/E
SOVA/CS/E~
SOVA/CS/E
ED/DCI
SOVA/CS/E/ 15 March 1984
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2
1 - State/PM/OD (Jeremy Azrael)
1 - State, D/EUR/SOV (Thomas W. Simons)
2 - State/INR/SEE (Robert Baraz)
1 - State, D/INR (Hugh Montgomery)
1 - State/INR/LAR (Eric Willenz)
1 - State/INR/WEA (Alan Lukens)
1 - State/EUR/SOV (Alexander Vershbow)
1 - State/INR/PMA (Robert Strand)
1 - DIA/JSI/2C
1 - DIA/JSI-4
1 - DIA/DIO/GPF & MBFR
1 - DIA/DIO/Euro & Sov Pol/Mil Affairs
1 - DIA/DE-1
1 - DIA/DB-lE
1 - DIA/DB-1B
1 - DIA/DB-3
1 - JCS/SAGA
1 - JCS/US Rep NATO Military Committee Liaison
1 - JCS/Vice Admiral Moreau
1 - DOD/DAS/ISP-European & NATO Policy
1 - DOD/DAS/ISP-Strategic Theater Nuclear Forces
1 - DOD/DAS/ISP-Negotiations Policy
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
SOVA/CS/E/
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/15: CIA-RDP85T00287R001400510001-2