SUPREME SOVIET ELECTION SPEECHES: POLITICAL AND POLICY SIGNIFICANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001400550001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 2, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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% I 4;F5
Central Intelligence Agency
VlahmgA n. D 020505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
April 2, 1984
SUPREME SOVIET ELECTION SPEECHES:
POLITICAL AND POLICY SIGNIFICANCE
Summary
The recent Supreme Soviet election speeches, coming so
close to Andropov's death and Chernenko's selection as party
leader, provided a unique opportunity for making some
inferences-about the power and policy alignments within the
Kremlin hierarchy. Considerable caution must be used in
drawing any conclusions on the basis of-such evidence as we do
not know what politicking went into speech preparation and in
some cases do not have the complete text. Nonetheless, all
top leaders addressed a broad range of domestic and foreign
policy issues in their speeches and shed some light on their
These speeches suggest that no dramatic policy changes
are likely from the new Soviet leadership in the near term. and
that Chernenko's Politburo colleagues will be cautious in
support of his policy lead. It appears from the speeches that
Chernenko's principal supporters are Brezhnev's former
colleagues, Ustinov and some Politburo independents. Most of
Andropov's closest supporters and rote es seem less
enthusiastic about his selection.
This paper was prepare by
t e Policy Analysis Division, Office
of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Acting Chief, Policy Analysis Division, on
SOV-M84-10053
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Other recent evidence indicates that Chernenko is quickly
garnering both the titles and honorific references it took his
predecessors many months or even years to earn:
o Several of his colleagues have-used the formula
'Politburo headed by Chernenko" to designate his
position.
o The highlighting of Chernenko's remarks at the 25
February Politburo meeting departed from former
practice when remarks were reported without
attribution.
o Marshal Ogarkov indicated that Chernenko was the
Chairman of the Defense Council at a reception for
foreign diplomats.
leading candidate for the Presidency of the Supreme
Soviet, a decision that could be taken as early as next
h'
mont
s Supreme Soviet session.
,The effort to promote Chernenko's image seems to reflect
a trend toward institutionalizing the position of the General
Secretary as the Soviet Union's preeminent leader. This trend
is to Chernenko's advantage, but such symbols of personal
authority probably make him appear more powerful than he
actually is. The election speeches contained some striking
variations in praise of Chernenko indicating that the
political situation is still fluid and that he still has a
struggle on his hands. Moreover, the recent remarks of Soviet
Politburo members in India and Syria, in speaking for the new
leadership, placed emphasis on the collectiv' y of the new
team, especially in foreign affairs.
This situation suggests that Chernenko cannot count on a
coalition or even a stable majority to support his policy
agenda, but will have to deal with a fluid political situation
where support must be earned on a given issue. Given these
constraints, he may prove to be a leader in the consensual
mode promoting policies that emphasize continuity rather than-
sharp breaks with the past.
Beyond indicating some measure of Chernenko's political
progress, these speeches also reveal leadership thinking on
key policy questions.
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o US-Soviet 'relations: Resumption of the US-Soviet
dialogue is clearly a major issue on Chernenko's
agenda.
o The' 'Andro ov Tegac Most policies associated with
Andropov, such as labor discipline, the importance of
scientific/technological innovation, the ongoing
experiment in enterprise independence and the
anticorruption campaign received support. One effect
of Chernenko's support for Andropov's program is to
deprive his potential opposition, comprised of Andropov
allies, of a rallying point.
o Resource'al'locations: The need to maintain the
country's defense capabilities was acknowledged by all;
certain speakers chose to highli-ght consumer needs
while others gave it scant attention. Chernenk,o,
despite his past record as a consumer advocate, implied
that while consumption would not be cut, its share
would not increase.
o Economic reform: Soviet leaders stressed the need to
adopt reforms that would be fully operational by the
beginning of the 12th Five-Year Plan but they were
vague on specifics. Chernenko criticized ministries
that stifle initiative and called for greater autonomy
for regional/enterprise authorities.
The order of the election speeches also provide. a good
indication of rankings in the new. leadership.
o Gorbachev, ranking third after Chernenko and Tikhonov,
appears to be the party's unofficial "second secretary"
and is now well positioned to succeed Chernenko if he
can hold on to this spot.
o Romanov, Gorbachev's main rival at present, is still
back in the pack in seventh place..
o Party Control Committee Chairman Solomentsev, who was
just promoted to full membership in the Politburo in
December, ranks much higher than his junior status
would warrant, perhaps indicating that a further
promotion might be in the offing.
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Introduction
Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet occur every five
years. Although the results are. predetermined, the regime
devotes considerable effort to the process. Each leader in.
the Politburo and Secretariat makes a speech in his assigned
electoral district. These speeches typically cover the broad
range of Soviet domestic and foreign policy and appear to
reflect the personal interest and stamp of the speaker.
Coming so close to Andropov's death and Chernenko's selection
as new party leader, the recent election speeches provide a
unique perspective on both policy and power relationships
within the new leadership. In this paper, we have used them
to':
o look at the relative support for Chernenko within the
leadership, 'focusin'g on accolades accorded him by his
colleagues;
o assess the relative standing of leaders within the
ruling elite;
o. examine signals of leadership thinking on a number of
key policy questions--economic priorities, economic
reform, the discipline and anticorruption campaign, and
US-So
i
t
l
v
e
re
ations, among others.
Considerable caution, of course, must be used in
analyzing these speeches. We do not know about the
politicking that went into their drafting or the review
process used to clear them for delivery. For some leaders
(those representing electoral districts in the provinces),
moreover, we do not have a complete version of the speech.
While Pravda provides an account of all speeches, portions of
the speeches --particularlythe foreign policy section--are
o f t e n s u
a
i
m m
r
z e d
Kremlin Politics
Tributes to Chernenko
The ground rules of Kremlin.politics require that the
General Secretary's colleagues give him a measure of praise.
In the past, such praise was usually meager early in the
General Secretary's tenure,' but bordered on sycophancy as he
consolidated power. For Andropov and now Chernenko, these
tributes have followed soon after their accession to power.
Nevertheless, there are obvious differences in the degree to
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which various leaders heaped praise on Chernenko suggesting
that the political situation is fluid and that room for
maneuver still exists (see chart).
Reservations About Chernenko. Those leaders most closely
associated with Andropov were coolest toward Chernenko. Such
treatment was particularly evident in the remarks of Foreign
Minister Gromyko and Party Secretary Ryzhkov and only slightly
less apparent in the comments of Party Secretary Gorbachev and
Chairman of the Russian Republic Council of Ministers
Vorotnikov. _
o Gromyko declared that Andropov's "name will live
forever" but said of Chernenko only that he "devoted his
organizational talents" to implementing party policy.
o Gorbachev described'Andropov as an "outstanding figure"
but suggested limits on Chernenko's authority by noting
his great contribution to the "collective activity" of
the Central Committee.
o Vorotnikov depicted Andropov's death in grief-stricken
terms, and coolly referred to Chernenko as a "talented
organizer of the'masses."
o Party Secretary Ryzhkov failed to ascribe a single
Two other leaders, First Deputy Premier Aliyev and Party
Secretary Romanov--who assumed key leadership posts in Moscow
during Andropov's rule--also appeared to have reservations
about Chernenko while warmly praising Andropov.
o Romanov characterized Chernenko only as a "name well
known in the country."
o Aliyev, although more positive about' Chernenko than
Romanov, did not elaborate on his leadership role--
saying only that he made a "weighty-contribution" to the
elaboration of party policy.
Chernenko's Supporters. Most leaders described Chernenko as
an outstan ing figure of*the party' and state" and found other
aspects of his personality, leadership role, or activity to
praise. For example:
o Moscow party leader Grishin described Chernenko as a
staunch Marxist-Leninist... and unshakeable fighter for
the implementation of CPSU policy."
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o Georgian party leader Shevardnadze and party secretary
Kapitonov emphasized Chernenko's leadership--
Shevardnadze saying he "headed" the Politburo and
Kapitonov noting he led the party's "combat
headquarters."
o Regional leaders Shcherbitskiy .(Ukraine) and-Kunayev
(Kazakhstan) pointed out that he was "a loyal colleague
ofd outstanding figures" as Brezhnev and Andropov.
Defense Minister Ustinov's remarks about Chernenko stand
out from the rest, as he alone among Andropov's closest
supporters effusively praised the new General Secretary during
:,;s election speech. He cited Chernenko's. organizational
talents, underscored his contribution both to Marxist-Leninist
theory and the formulation of foreign and domestic policy, and
mentioned his relationship to Brezhnev and Andropov. His
comments were much more laudatory than his lukewarm references
to Chernenko in his Armed Forces Day Speech on 23 February and
indicated that for now he is in Chernenko's camp.
Ustinov may have extracted a price for this support. He
has moved ahead of Gromyko in the leadership rankings and may
also have gotten some commitments from Chernenko about defense
allocations. Ustinov stressed in both his Supreme Soviet
speech and his remarks to the Ministry of Defense that
Chernenko is committed to improving the defense capability of
the Soviet Union. In a message directed perhaps as much at
Chernenko and the party leadership as at his own military
constituency, Ustinov stated: "we military men are well aware
of how much he [Chernenko] does for the strengthening of the
'
"
country
s defense
and combat. readiness.
Chernenko's Status in the Leadership
'On balance,'the election speeches and related leadership'
activity have served to promote Chernenko's image as a capable'
leader and have clearly elevated him above his leadership
colleagues. The rapidity with which the honorific formula-- -
"Politburo headed by Chernenko"-=has gained currency is
particularly significant. Brezhnev waited five years for this
accolade, and Andropov needed seven months before the term
.,became commonly used. In Chernenko's case, the term was used
by several of his leadership colleagues almost immediately
after he assumed office. Soviet media accounts of the
electoral meetings at which Ustinov, Grishin, Romanov, Premier
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Tikhonov, Aliyev and KGB Chairman Chebrikov addressed their
constituencies, moreover, also indicated that an honorary -
Presidium was elected consisting of "the Politburo headed by
Events surrounding the Supreme Soviet nominating speeches
also point to an enhanced leadership role for Chernenko. At
the Armed Forces Day reception, Marshal 0-garkov, Chief of the
General Staff, referred to Chernenko as head of the Defense
Council, the country's top forum for national security
decision making. Chernenko's leading role was highlighted in
the Politburo meeting notes published on 25 February, which
identified him as speaking at the meeting and summarized his
remarks. (Since the practice of publishing Politburo
summaries was initiated in 1982, the views expressed have been
_udiously reported without attribution.). Chernenko's address
on 6 March to the party apparatus served to project a.vigorous
leadership style and'suggested he was moving fast to exercise
leadership over the apparatus. Finally, the communique on the
Politburo meeting held on 7 March referred to the
"propositions and conclusions" contained in Chernenko's recent
speeches.
While most indicators point to a growing consolidation of
support for the General Secretary, some signs of resistance
remain. Both Ustinov in India and Aliyev in Syria conveyed.
greetings to their hosts from Chernenko, Tikhonov and Gromyko-
-a formulation that suggests collectivity in the foreign
policy area at least. The Soviet media also has not reported
Ogarkov's reference to Chernenko's role on the Defense
Council. Pravda, moreover, did not report that a number of
election meetings for Politburo members elected "an honorary
Presidium consisting of the "Politburo headed by Chernenko".
Such omissions indicate that a formal Politburo decision
.requiring a uniform treatment of Chernenko has not yet been
taken and that there is some resistance to the trend.
Nonetheless, Chernenko has gotten off to a good start.
The line of march in highlighting his leading role seems clear
and suggests that he will gain the Presidency when the Supreme
Soviet convenes in April. Most Soviets who comment on this
subject have speculated that he will get the nod. Failure to
do so--and particularly the appointment of an Andropov
supporter, such as Gromyko, to the post--would signal major
political weakness on his part.
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Leadership 'Ranki'ngs
The electoral campaign also provides an opportunity to
gauge the political standing of the entire leadership.
Political status is measured by the order in which speeches
are given. The most junior members speak first while the
Politburo's most influential members are assigned speaking
slots close to election day. A decline in rank from one
election to the next, moreover, could signal political
vulnerability; Aleksandr Shelepin and Dmitriy Polyanskiy spoke
first in 1974 and were removed from the Politburo in 1975 and
1976 respectively..
On the other hand, an improved ranking in the order of
speakers points to enhanced political status. Gorbachev
- ;iwered his speech just before Tikhonov and Chernenko,
indicating that he'now ranks third in the Politburo and is the
party's unofficial "second secretary." As the ranking
secretary behind Chernenko at the time of Andropov's death and
probably the only serious rival to Chernenko's election,
Gorbachev's move-up probably stems from the political
bargaining that brought Chernenko to the-top. The substance
of Gorbachev's speech gave no indication that he had taken on
the ideological portfolio--a traditional preserve of the
"second secretary"--but stressed domestic economic issues,
which could indicate that his responsibilities for the
supervision of agriculture have been broadened. Romanov,
Gorbachev's likely rival in the next succession, was ranked
seventh within the Politburo, indicating that he still has
some political ground to cover.
Gorbachev's prefunctory references to Chernenko in his
election speech suggest that his rise in the rankings cannot
be accounted for by his support for Chernenko's candidacy, but
other leaders did appear to profit from their championing of
the General Secretary. Ustinov now ranks fourth above
Gromyko, who was cool in his treatment of-Chernenko.
Sheva.rdnadze moved up several notches among candidate members
and Grishin, whose. laudatory comments have also been noted,
now outranks other regional chiefs.
As the two latest additions .to the Politburo, Solomentsev
and Vorotnikov should have-been ranked below all other
Politburo members in their speaking turns. Solomentsev,
however, was vaulted above several Politburo members senior to
'him, while Vorotnikov remained at the bottom. Such a sharp
departure from rank order suggests that Vorotnikov may no
lo'nger be a leading contender to replace Premier Tikho.nov, who
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has indicated to foreigners that he may soon retire
Conversely, Solomentsev's move raises the possibility
that he threw his support to Chernenko at a crucial moment in
succession maneuverings. Perhaps significantly, Solomentsev's
speech covered a broad sweep of Soviet domestic policy and not
merely the work of the Party Control Committee which he
heads. If Tikhonov does retire, Solomentsev might- be a strong
te +n
l
..
candi
a
a
rep
him
The International Situation
The round of.election speeches as +wel-l as Cher-nenko's
meetings with foreign heads of state after Andropov's funeral
indicates that he is already the regime's most authoritative
spokesman on international affairs. His speech contained the
most definitive treatment of East-West relations, and it
announced what amounted to the Kremlin's-..platform on foreign
aff
i nr
a
The attention given by Pravda and other central
newspapers to remarks by Ustino and Gromyko gave the
impression that they also will be major players on foreign
policy. Despite his ranking in leadership speeches, Gromyko's
new prominence in protocol messages to foreign governments
since Andropov's death suggests that his foreign policy role,
at least, may have been strengthened by the succession. While
the heads of the Central Committee's two foreign departments
also got extensive play in Pravda, the remarks on foreign
policy by other members of the leadership were given customary
short shrift. Even Gorbachev's remarks on foreign affairs
were reported only briefly, while his assessment of the state
f
o
the economy was reported at length.
Relations with the US
The speeches left no doubt that restarting the US-Soviet
dialogue is a dominant issue on Chernenko's agenda.
Chernenko's speech was addressed largely to the US-Soviet
impasse and dealt only cursorily with other international
issues. Gromyko touched briefly on the Middle East, calling
again for an international conference, but no other regional
crises were addressed in the leaders' remarks as reported in
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The speeches gave no indication that Moscow is less
determined to frustrate what it claims are the Reagan
Administration's efforts to shift the terms of reference in
US-Soviet negotiations in Washington's favor. Many leaders
underscored their insistence on a return to the past by posing
US embrace of "equality and equal security"--the guiding
principles written into-the 1974 Vladivostok accord and the
1979 SALT II treaty--as a necessary condition for renewing the
relationship. Soviet media commentaries on the election
speeches singled out what was said to be their message that
Moscow would not "bow to diktat" and agree to conduct
negotiations "on Mr. Reagan's terms."
Chernenko and Gorbachev, nonetheless, made a point of
expressing optimism that the status?quo ante could be
.2 stored. Chernenko cited' opposition to current US policy
among some Western leaders and a'"considerable segment" of the
US public in predicting that "developments will eventually be
turned around." Gorbachev--in one of the passages of his
speech disseminated abroad but not published in Soviet papers-
-predicted that "realism will take the upper hand in the
leading circles of Western countries," and "an aspiration for
reaching accords will emerge." Gromyko and Boris Ponomarev,
head of the Central Committee's International Department, were
even more explicit than Chernenko in suggesting that Moscow is
still counting on the pressures of Western public opinion'to
steer US policy in a more favorable direction. Gromyko
claimed that popular anti-war sentiment cannot now be
"
"
disregarded
by Western leaders.
Gromyko and Ustinov were the most critical of US policy
and seemingly the most rigid in their conditions for a
resumption of dialogue. Ustinov claimed that US expressions
of interest in serious negotiations were a "deception," and he
insisted that a "return to the former state of Soviet-US
relations was needed to open the way to a_resumption of
talks. Gromyko suggested that' the Administration renounce its.
"crusade" against the Soviet system as a first step toward
im
d
l
t
prove
re
a
Chernenko was relatively restrained in his rhetoric about'
the Administration and called for movement from Washington on
more specific issues. He evoked the prospect of a "dramatic
breakthrough" in the US-Soviet relationship if the US were to
"'act" on five secondary arms control fronts, including'the
unratified 1976 threshold nuclear test ban treaty, a
comprehensive test ban, a nuclear freeze, and an agreement
restricting weapons in outer space. He appeared to stress the
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prospects for a treaty limiting chemical weapons, suggesting
that the prerequisites for resolving outstanding differences
"
"
are
beginning to ripen.
By sidestepping the impasse on INF and START and calling
for movement on what might be less contentious issues,
Chernenko gave the impression of looking for areas where some
early progress could be made--an impression that Soviet media
commentaries on his address have attempted to foster.
Chernenko gave no signal, however, that Moscow was prepared to
move on its own part to resolve the substantial US-Soviet
differences remaining on the issues he raised.
Cuba, 'China
While relations with other Communi-st countries held the
usual pride of place in the published remarks of Soviet
leaders, their treatment was routine. Measured against the
passing mention given the bloc and the Third World, however,
Chernenko gave unusual attention to Cuba.. He criticized
American pressure on Havana and, although offering no new
commitments, promised that Moscow would be "on Cuba's side" in
"fair weather and in storm.". A Central Committee official in
effect confirmed on Soviet radio three days later that
Chernenko was trying to send a message, singling out the
passage on Cuba and predicting that its message would be
"easily deciphered by those to whom it is addressed.". The
remarks were probably designed to reassure Cuba in the wake of
Grenada and to ease frictions between Havana and Moscow
reportedly prompted by the coup against Maurice Bishop and the
uu -- i
- .. --- --
uub
i
seq
s
Only Chernenko and Gromyko--along with the head of the
Central Committee's socialist countries department--were
reported as commenting on China, suggesting that the effort to
improve relations with Beijing may be a sensitive question in
the Kremlin. Their remarks underscored the'impression that
Moscow is gratified by the progress that has been made in
expanding bilateral cultural and economic contacts but does
not anticipate any dramatic breakthroughs in the foreseeable
future. Chernenko's authoritative reaffirmation that Moscow
would not make any moves "to prejudice of third countries"
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Domestic Pol icy
General 'Economic 'Themes
There was general unanimity on many major economic
themes, with variations often due to the speaker's area of
responsibility. Most of the speakers directly attributed the
economic upturn last year to measures initiated at-the
November 1982 plenum, and Chernenko and others specifically
indentified the campaign for discipline and order as a key
factor. Criticism of specific economic sectors was generally
soft-pedaled. The most frequently mentioned laggards were the
construction and transportation sectors but several leaders
(including Aliyev who is responsible for this sec or)
contended that transport was improving.
Virtually all endorsed the .1984 campaign for over
fulfillment of targets for labor productivity and cost
reduction that Andropov advocated at the December plenum.
Chernenko, in his maiden speech as General Secretary in
February, gave this a new twist by proposing that the rubles
earned from this effort be directed toward "improving the
conditions of work and life of Soviet people, medical services
and housing construction." Only three of the election
speakers picked up on this theme.
Looking to the future, the leadership uniformly
recognized intensive growth as the economic imperative and
agreed that reforms in economic management and the
acceleration of scientific-technical progress were
prerequisites. All speakers agreed on the need for
comprehensive programs to attack problem areas that span
departmental lines. The food program was most frequently
mentioned, followed by the consumer and energy programs.
Resource Allocations
.Leadership remarks on resource allocations provided no
clear picture of how the new regime will resolve the demands
of competing claimants--consumption, investment, and defense--
in the next Five-Year Plan (1986-90). The range of apparent
differences over resource priorities, however, suggests that
this issue may become increasingly heated as the leadership
In Soviet parlence'intensive growth refers to more efficient use of economic
inputs such as labor and capital where as extensive growth results from using
more economic inputs.
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grapples with the task of preparing guidelines for the new
l a n
p
.
Defense. There was virtual- unanimity among the speakers
on the need to improve the country's defense capability, but
most described this as a longstanding concern--not one that
required any new diversion of resources. Ustinov said that
the Soviet Armed Forces already had "everything necessary" to
defend the country, and devoted considerable attention to
problems of the economy in general, noting that a stronger
economy would strengthen Soviet prestige in the international
arena
Chern
k T
.
en
onoted that the Soviet Union had-diverted
considerable resources to defense during the past five years
but "did not even thi
k
n
of curtailing social programs."
Romanov and Shcherbitskiy.appeared to stray somewhat from
the above formulations, possibly indicating a belief that
additional resources are needed for defense. Romanov said
that the Communist Party "will equip" the Army and Navy with
everything necessary--a slight deviation from the prevailing
line that the armed forces already have everything they
need. Shcherbitskiy's remark that the Soviets would return to
detente only when the defense might of the Soviet Union and
our allies is sufficient" could also be interpreted as a call
for increased res
ources.
Consumer Needs. There was a marked difference in the
treatment of consumer needs by various leaders, but no hint
that a significant increase was being contemplated in the
share of designated resources for the consumer sector.
Vorotnikov took the lead in promoting the consumers' cause,'
noting that the party "strictly holds to task those who
consider this to be a secondary objective of economic
activity." Each industrial enterprise, he said, "regardless
of its departmental jurisdiction," must be involved in the
production of-goods for the people. Tikhonov and Gorbachev
also
a
t
g
-ve s
rong emphasis to fulfilling consumer needs.
Others were-more restrained. Chernenko said that "we did
not even think of" diverting funds from social programs to the
defense effort, but did not suggest a need to increase
resources in the consumer-area. Romanov joined Aliyev,
Demichev and Solomentsev in calling-for the development of
"sensible" patterns of consumption--remarks reminiscent of
concerns once voiced by former Partv Se cretary Suslov about
t h 'M e x c e s C.
-- ..
o f "
e s
c o n s -
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Chernenko's scant attention to the consumer sector
relative to that of some of his colleagues appears to be a
departure from his previous stand on this issue. During the
Brezhnev years, he was generally-regarded as the regime's
leading consumer advocate and had warned of grave consequences
if this sector was slighted. His new rhetoric may stem from
the broader responsibility he now has as General Secretary,
his need to consolidate support among.Politburo members who
might oppose diversion of funds from defense or investment, or
a pragmatic judgment that the workers must be made to realize
that the only source for increased "well-being" is a boost in
Invest ment. Although virtually every leader picked up on
the party's ca to accelerate scientific and technical
ogress, only a few seemed to see any investment implications
in adopting such a'course. Georgian party leader Shevardnadze
said that an increase in industrial potential required the
preferential development of sectors that determine scientific
and technical progress: electrical engineering, instrument
making, the chemical industry, and others. Tikhonov--putting
in a plug for a sector he has favored in-the past--observed
that in the conditions of a scientific and technical
revolution, machine building was becoming "more than ever
before a powerful accelerator" of economic growth. Gorbachev,
too, declared that the development of machine building "must
be made a priority matter." This remark is consistent with
the new investment priorities of the food program but may also
have been intended to broaden his support by appealing to
representatives of the industrial sector--a natural
constituency of his likely rival, Romanov. As the champion of
the consumer sector, however, Vorotnikov seemed determined to
dampen such notions and endorsed the fuller utilization of the
'
country
s scientific and technical potential as a means of
boosting the economy--"without any additional investment."
Economic' Reform
Andropov did -not make much headway on economic reform,
but. he did take some action in this area, and the election
speeches-indicate that his approach is going forward
In
.
general, the new leadership is in-agreement with Andropov over
the urgent need to adopt reforms that will be fully
operational by the beginning of the 12th Five-Year Plan period
,(1986). They also uniformly endorsed the economic experiment
proposed last July--Andropov's major initiative that attempted
to increase the economic independence of five ministries. The
leaders were, however, even more vague than Andropoy had been
about the form that future changes.will take.
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Andropov consistently had said that perfecting the
economic system involved changes in three distinct areas--the
organizational structure, the planning process, and the
"economic mechanism" or the system of economic levers and
incentives. None of the election kers picked up on the
The speeches did indicate, however, that some decisions
about changing the economic mechanism have been or are about
to be made. Vorotnikov, -Romanov and Tikhonov noted that the
Central Committee -was working on a "program for the
comprehensive improvement of the entire management mechanism
to bring it fully into line with the economy of developed
socialism and the nature of the tasks being resolved today."
Tikhonov said that this work would be completed "in the very
future," and,Chernenko indicated that the main. guidelines
for improving economic machinery "have been defined." 'Romanov.
provided the only specifics on the program, saying that it was
aimed at "improving the structure of ministries and
departments."
This last point appears to be consistent with Chernenko's
publicly stated view that the over-bureaucratized ministerial
system stifles change in the economic mechanism. The desire
to break the hold of the ministerial bureaucracy, in fact, may
have been one of the motivations behind Chernenko's strong
endorsement of Andropov's call for giving greater initiative
and independence to regional or enterprise authorities. He
called on "national level economic bodies" to hand over "some
of their present duties" to subordinate organizations claiming
that "local initiative is fettered-under the pretext of
curbing parochialism." This message would appeal to
provincial authorities, Chernenko's main power base. As
Andropov before him, however, Chernenko made it clear that
this process will not go too far and that there will be no
significant transfer of control over key economic decisions
such as new investment or price formation.
Labor Discipline 7Anticorr6ption Campaign
Chernenko's speech appeared to endorse Andropov's
campaign to make workers work harder, make management more
efficient and halt the waste and theft of state property.
Andropov evidently viewed this as a long term policy option
designed to restore personal accountability in all sectors of
Soviet society.
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The emphasis on eliminating corrupt practices,
particularly among the party elite, was an important component
of the campaign. Andropov's removal of some Brezhnev clients
sent a strong signal that party members were not above the law
and that the abuse of privilege tolerated by his predecessor
Although Chernenko's past ties to the Brezhnev?machine
might have given him good reason to deemphasize this aspect of
Andropov's policy., he has chosen for the present,not to do
so. Instead, in his election speech, he strongly endorsed it
as a line "which will be pursued permanently and
undeviatingly. There will be no indulgence to anybody in this
respect." These remarks were followed on 7 March by a Tass
report that the Party Control Committee has expelled the
0) i,,;uty Minister of Tractor and' Agricultural. Machine Building
from the party for abuse of office. The expulsion serves to
underscore Chernenko's pledge to continue the anticorruption
Because so many higher officials are themselves
vulnerable to charges of corruption, they would probably
resist the expansion of the campaign. Indeed, most of the
leadership failed to discuss this issue and were much more at
ease in treating labor discipline as one of the keys to
increased labor productivity. Only Gorbachev, Chebrikov, and
Zimyanin endorsed the effort to attack corruption, with
Gorbachev emphasizing that "the demands of social discipline
and the norms of morality are the same for everyone."
Chernenko's motives for supporting the anticorruption
effort are not clear. Possibly he felt it would not be
politically wise to sound a retreat so soon after Andropov's
death. The pervasiveness of corruption within the system,
moreover, may have led him to believe that hp an use the
campaign for his own political ends.
Politics and P6lfty: Systemic Implications
Chernenko has already received more tribute from his
colleagues than his predecessors did in a comparable time.
Unless he makes serious pol-itical?mistakes or becomes
seriously ill, this trend will probably continue and his
stature and authority within, the leadership could grow.
Nevertheless, his success in attaining the trappings of power
may be attributable to the trend toward institutionalizing the
position of General Secretary as the Soviet Union's preeminent
leader. Based on the two recent successions, the Politburo
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seems increasingly inclined to vest the trappings of authority
in the party leader from the beginning. Neither Andropov nor
Chernenko had to fight as hard as Khrushchev or Brezhnev to
net t hem ~~
This recent practice is not irreversible and does not
make Chernenko less vulnerable to maneuvering against him. In
fact, Chernenko may not be as powerful as.many of the public
indications would suggest. He may have gotten these tributes
and titles because he is the leader rather than because of the
power he has. Even so Chernenko, like Andropov before him,
clearly benefits from this process. The period of
consolidation has been shortened, and he has less ground to
cover. He can concentrate on achieving more lasting political
victories
n th
o
e personnel and policy fronts.
It is not yet clear, 'however, whether he will be 'able to
place his personal stamp on the direction of Soviet domestic
and foreign policy. Although warm words of praise for
Chernenko were offered by most of the leadership, those that
most profusely praised him did not alway. appear to follow his
policy lead. In fact, there appeared to be little correlation
in the election speeches between support for Chernenko and
individual policy preferences. On particular issues, former
Andropov loyalists and Chernenko boosters lined up on the same
side.
o On US-Soviet relations both Chernenko and Gorbachev, who
gives no indication of being a strong Chernenko backer,
were somewhat optimistic about the prospect for positive
developments in the future. In contrast Ustinov, who
apparently supports Chernenko, appeared more skeptical.
o Regarding the anticorruption campaign Chernenko echoed
the views of Andropov's closest supporters on the need
to fight corruption, while his own supporters were
silent on the issue.
o On consumer issues, Chernenko seemed. to take a more
moderate position than he has taken in the past, while
his supporters and opponents were on both sides of the
issue.
o Concerning the need to trim the bloated ministerial
system, Chernenko seemed to be at odds with a key
supporter, Tikhonov, but probably in tune with regional
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These examples suggest that Chernenko does not have
policy support across the board--even from his backers. He will
have to deal with fluid political coalitions whose support for
particular policy initiatives must be earned. He will need
considerable political skill to frame a policy approach that
garners sufficient support, addresses the principal problems
facing the Soviet Union, and placates opponents. Chernenko
will have to proceed cautiously, moreover, to avoid creating
an issue around which a broad based opposition might form.
Such political facts of life argue for a "consensual"
leadership style and increase the likelihood of policy
continuity rather than sharp breaks with past practices.
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Relative Political Standings as Revealed in Speech Schedule
Date Leader Comment
2 March 'Chernenko Topmost slot, as expected
1 March Tikhonov Traditional for Premier
29 February Gorbachev Senior Secretary under Chernenko
28 February Ustinov Defense Minister... gained in rankings since last
election, 1979
27 February Gromyko Foreign Minister...preceded Ustinov in last
election
25 February
25 February
24 February
24 February
24 February
23 February
23 February
21 February
21 February
20 February
Grishin Moscow party chief...now precedes other regional.
chiefs
Romanov Secretary... shows he is not even close second in
rank to Gorbachev
S-hcherbitskiy Ukrainian party chief...preceded Grishin in 1979
Solomentsev Heads party discipline unit. ..has high standing
for new full member of Politburo
Ponomarev Secretary, a-nd senior among candidate members of
Politburo
Kurfayev Kazakh party chief and full Politburo
member...under Brezhnev, outranked other
regional party chiefs
Aliyev Aliyev is a First Deputy Premier, Vorotnikov
Vorotnikov the RSFSR Premier...are in proper rank as new
full Politburo members
Kuznetsoy Candidate Politburo Member
Dolgikh Candidate Politburo Member
Shevardnadze Candidate Politburo Member
Candidate Politburo Member
20 February. Demichev Candidate Politburo Member
18 February
18 February
10 February
9 February
Ryzhkov
Kapitonov
Zimyanin
Rusakov
Ligachev
CPSU Secretary
CPSU Secretary
CPSU Secretary
CPSU -Secretary
CPSU Secretary
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IJAI>t]{ 1t]C~1(i- IN-AIIv
FIGUU OF (1 n PUl.rnlUI) (TF RIIF7IPIEV &
PARTY & STM1 ANIU)PUN
A l i yev (M)
Gorbachev (M, S)
Grishin (M) XXX )00(3 xxx
XXX
Granyko (M) xxx
Kunayev (M) X100 XXX XXX
Romanov (M, S) xxx
Shcherbitskiy (M) XXX4 XXX XXX
Solanentsev (M) XXX
Tikhonov (M) 7000 X)OC
Us t i nov (PM XXX )000 XXX
Vorotnikov (M) XXX
Chebr i kov (C) xxx xxx
(J4ANIM111,SIY (IJI:%TANDIPlt 1JTIP i FI.FTIM)
FA.IT7111) P171914A1. I INllt l lfl PItIS l l )I1M
A9'IRIIIUIiS (1F 1".1M fl) "IIEAD1.7Y
BY iIF)tNE11 O
XXX5
I)ani chev (C) )000 OO( xxx
Iblgikh (C, S) X)00 xxx
Kuznetsov (C) )000 XXX
Ponanarev (C, S). XID(
Shevardnadze (C) )XX
'Limyanin (S) XXX XXX
Kapitonov (S) XXX XXX2 XXX
Ryzhkov (S)
ILlFaehev and Rusakov spoke before Chernenko's election.
2l leads "our partv's cafint henequarters."
3l)sed this phrase in address tc ti1ose City Party Plenum on 20 Feb.
4Uscd this phrase in address tc Ukrnninn Central (',annittee Piennm 7 Nmrch.
Sch,ly reference of this type reoorte(l in Pravda.
. I
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.Distribution:
Copy #:
5 - DDI
6 - DDI Registry
7 - DDI/SA
8 - DDI/PES
9-13 - OCPAS/IDCD/CB
14 Chairman/NIC
15 - NIO/USSR
16 - NIO/SP
17 - Chief DD
18 - DD0/DCD
D/SOVA
20 - DD/SOVA
21 - Chief, SOYA/CS
22 - Chief, SOVA/DI
23 - Chief,-SOVA/EA
24 - Chief, SOYA/SE
25 - Chief, SOYA/SF
26 - Chief, SOVA/TF
27 - Chief, SOVA/PA
28 - Chief, PA/D
29 - Chief, PA/F
30 - Chief, PA/S
31 - DDS&T/FBIS/Ac
F -7
7 E 44 HQ
7 E 47 HQ
7 E 44 HQ
7 F 24 HQ
7 G 07 HQ
7 E 62 HQ
7 E 62 HQ
2 E 49 HQ
119 HQ
210 'Ke
3 N 37
3 N '37
GS 30
2 N 13
2 N 37
2 N 30
1 N 26
1 N 37
3 N 06
3 N 17
3 N 22
3 N 06
B1dg.
212 Key
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Distribution:
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Policy Planning Member, S/P
Office of Director of Political-an.d
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Department of State
Room 7317 NS
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Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union
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Department of State
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Director, Policy Planning Staff,
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Room 7311
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Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Rm 6226 NS
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Department of State
Room 7430, State
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Director, Office of East European Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Room 4217 NS ?
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PM/SNP
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
Room 7317 State
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Chief, INR/EC/USSR
Department of State
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Department of State
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INR/SEE/ST
Department of State
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