EQUITIES IN THE SOVIET-GUINEAN RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001400740001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 12, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Ca" In0eA7Fnoe Agency
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-snagon-nczaws
12 July 1984
EQUITIES IN THE SOVIET-GUINEAN RELATIONSHIP
Summary
Despite a general downturn in bilateral ties since the mid 1970s, both
Moscow and Conakry have a strong interest in sustaining a working
-r.1 ationship. The Q3ineans in particular have expressed a sense of
v"L=Lcwility in the event Moscow ended its involvement with Guinea's mining
and fishing industries. Similarly, the Guinean military, which is largely
equipped with Soviet weaponry, is dependent upon the USSR for spare parts and
* +vi r' 1 services. For its part, Moscow has become increasingly dependent
:Lrfield at Conakry for providing military support to the beleaguered
MPLA in Angola. Nonetheless, the USSR could find other, albeit less
convenient, means to maintain its support effort in Luanda.
Introduction
Soviet-Guinean relations date back to 1958, when the USSR quickly moved
to exploit the opportunities afforded by France's total cutoff of aid to the
leftist regime of the late President Sekou Toure. The relationship grew
closer in the 1970s, as Sekou Toure became increasingly concerned about
security threats to his regime. As security tensions subsided, however,the
Guinean leader became increasingly disenchanted with his Soviet benefactors,
who, he felt, were providing little economic assistance while pressing him for
additional concessions and access to facilities. Since Sekou Toure ended
Soviet TU-95 reconnaissance flights from Conakry in 1977 relations have been
generally cool but correct. This memorandum will discuss the current equities
in the Soviet-Ciinean relationship and assess the likelihood of a drastic
shift--positive or negative--in bilateral ties.
This paper was prepared by Office of Soviet Analysis in
response to a request from Edward Van Gilder, Chief, West Africa Bureau,
Department of State. It was coordinated with the Office of African and Latin
American Analysis. Carients and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief, Third World Division, SOYA,
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Guinean Equities and Vulnerabilities
Military Assistance: Moscow continues to be Guinea's primary source of
military equipment and training. Since 1958, the USSR has canitted some
$188.5 million in military aid, of which $60 million was free or discounted,
while credits were issued for the remainder. Most of this aid was dispersed
during the 1960s and 1970s and included MIG 21 fighter aircraft, tanks, MI-8
helicopters, transport aircraft, small arms, ammunition and radars. Some 200
Soviet military advisers provided maintenance assistance in support of this
equipment. In 1978, Sekou Toure ordered a reduction in the Soviet presence--
to sane two dozen--and the current number of advisers is about fifty.
While Conakry may attempt to diversify its arms inventory, it seems
unlikely that it will drastically reduce its dependence on Soviet arms.
Economic Assistance: On the economic front, Moscow has committed some $236
million in economic assistance since the late 1950s, of which $222 million has
been drawn. However, Moscow has made no new commitments since 1980. The
Soviet Union nonetheless continues to play a significant role in the Guinean
economy through its involvement in the Guinean bauxite and fishing
industries. In addition, Soviet doctors, teachers, scientists, and
technicians--numbering between 325 and 450--also make a valuable contribution
to the local infrastructure, and many students go to Soviet universities on
full scholarships.
Moscow's heaviest investment in the Guinean economy has been the Kindia
bauxite project--which represents almost half ($116 million) of Moscow's total
economic aid commitments to Guinea. Following their initial land surveys in
1968, the Soviets financed the entire project, including construction of the
mine, the railroad, port, terminal facilities to the coast, and related
infrastructure. Soviet technicians remain to assist in the operation and
training of locals, though most of the mine is staffed by Guinean. Under the
terms of a 12-year accord signed in 1976:
-- 40 percent of annual planned production of bauxite goes to the USSR as
a direct loan payment.
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-- 50 percent of the bauxite is sold to the USSR under contract. While
Moscow pays in hard currency, we believe most of these funds go
directly to repay its large debt to the USSR for military aid, and
other services.
-- 10 percent is available to Guinea for sale on the open market, though
there is little evidence that it has done so in the past.
In recent years, the USSR has been receiving some two million metric tons of
bauxite from Kindia. This represents about 14 percent of Guinea's total
exports (valued at $411 million in 1982.)
The Soviets have also played a key role in expanding Guinea's fish
industry. Since 1959, they have extended credits and services worth $11.8
million. This support has gone into the construction of cold storage plants,
dock and repair facilities, trawlers, port machinery and a hydrographic
research ship. According to the terms of the 1982 fishing accord--which has
been informally extended pending a renegotiation of terms--the USSR is
obligated to sell some 10,000 tons of its catch to Conakry for hard currency
which must be paid in advance in dollars This accord has been a frequent
source of bilateral frictions, as the Soviets have overfished ( putting same
50-70 ships fish in Guinean waters rather than the stipulated 10 ),
unilaterally raised their prices and frequently failed to fulfill
obligation to provide various technical services and repairs.
More important than the actual dollar amounts of Soviet aid to Guinea--
and the real source of Moscow's leverage over Guinean policy-is Conakry's
perception of its dependence on the USSR and the way the Soviets have
ensconced themselves in certain key sections of the economy. The Soviets have
not hesitated to exploit the Guinean' sense of vulnerability over the past
five years:
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-- In early 1984 when negotiations on renewing the Soviet-Guinean fishing
agreement reached an impasse, the Soviets stopped fish deliveries to
Conakry for several months. Given its dependence on these deliveries,
the Guinean government had little choice but to extend indefinitely the
old fishing agreement.
Thus, while Moscow gives very little "economic assistance" to Guinea
per se, the government would probably be reluctant to face the economic
consequences of a complete break with Moscow:
-z'do?,an--or possible halt--in the Kindia mine operation following a
cutoff of Soviet spare parts and machinery. (The USSR, at a minimum,
would threaten such a cutoff as a way of ensuring continued debt
payments from Guinea.)
-- A food shortage in Conakry following termination of Soviet fish
deliveries.
-- A possible decline in revenues from bauxite sales; even if the Kindia
operation were unaffected, Guinea would have to market the approximtely
2 million tons of bauxite sent to the USSR last year--a task
complicated by the fact that Kindia bauxite is a low-grade ore and is
much less desirable on world markets. Moscow for its part, is not
dependent on Guinean bauxite, as there are ample alternative sources;
the USSR signed a seven year bauxite purchase accord with Jamaica in
1982. In any event, the revenues would still be going largely to the
USSR for debt repayment.
Apart from economic considerations, Conakry could face new problems in
the military area if it broke with Moscow. Lack of spare parts and services
for Soviet hardware and aircraft might cause disgruntlement in some military
circles. Moscow presumably has some supporters in the military; some 920
Guinean have had military training in the USSR. Even if the military
believed the break with Moscow was necessary, it would be unlikely to find new
sources for military aid and equipment quickly. This, in turn, could lead to
charges that the defense and security of the country were not being
maintained.
4
SECRET NOFORN NOOONTRACT ORLON
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Moscow's Stake
During the early 1970s, the Soviets gained access to Guinean air and
naval facilities, largely because of their willingness to help Sekou Toure
fend off security threats. Following commando raids from neighboring
Portuguese Guinea in 1970, for example, Moscow deployed several ships to
Guinea in response to a request from Sekou Toure. This initial presence
became a near permanent Soviet West African naval patrol, supported by Soviet
auxiliary ships in Conakry. In July 1973, Soviet TU-95 reconnaissance
aircraft began periodic deployments to Conakry, allegedly to monitor nearby
Guinean exile camps, but actually to monitor US naval activities in the
Atlantic. Sekou Toure's decision to halt TU-95 access in 1977 limited--but
did not eliminate--Soviet reconnaissance capabilities near the mouth of the
Mediterranean; TU-95s currently deployed from Luanda can only cover that
region for about half the time--4 hours--that they could when based in
Conakry.
Despite the downturn in bilateral relations since 1977, Moscow still
derives important military and economic benefits from its dealings with
Guinea. As the security situation in Angola has deteriorated over the past
two years, the Soviets have become more dependent on Conakry airfield to
support their military presence in Luanda. Loss of access to Guinea would
complicate such resupply, as it would take time for Moscow to upgrade
facilities in other states such as Mali, Benin, or Ghana-assuming they are
willing to grant such rights. In the short-term, the Soviets would have to
run supply flights to Angola down the east coast of Africa. This route,
however, raises possible overflight problems, as it passes over either Turkey
or Pakistan--both of which have denied such such clearances on some occasions
in the past. Nonetheless, this would be the most likely alternative route if
Guinea refused to grant Moscow continued access in Conakry.
Moscow also derives financial benefits from its involvement in Guinea's
fish and bauxite industries. While we cannot calculate how much fishing is
done by the flotilla of Soviet ships in Guinean waters, much of the catch goes
directly to Soviet consumers, and the surplus is sold for foreign exchange.
Moreover, the fishing enterprise gives the Soviets access to Guinean onshore
facilities for their fishing fleet.
The Kindia bauxite operation produces about one-eighth of Moscow's annual
bauxite needs, primarily for aluminum production and its related defense
applications. The Soviets recognize that Guinea's debt payments will have to
came largely through these deliveries of bauxite, as well as some diamonds.
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Overview
Moscow has little interest in altering the present state of relations
with Guinea. Given Moscow's increased dependence on Conakry for air access to
support the regime in Luanda, it is unlikely that the Soviets would press any
contentious issues to the point of wrecking their relationship with Guinea.
The USSR's main concern is to retain its air and naval access to ensure a
rapid air delivery capability for military transports en route to Angola.
Moscow also wants to continue receiving Guinean bauxite, both to recover its
debt and to stockpile this important mineral for use in Soviet industry.
For its part, Conakry probably fears the potential economic and social
dislocation following a Soviet pullout from Guinea. Grumbling in the
military, fish shortages in Conakry, and a slow-down of the bauxite operation
at Kindia could create political instability and new opportunities for
civilian coup-plotting or a military takeover. Unless assured of the
immediate military, economic, technical and food support to overcame the
potential problems that could develop in the wake of a Soviet pullout,
Conakry, as it did in the recent fish renegotiations, would presumably back
away from any situation which could prompt a complete break in ties with the
USSR.
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SUBJECT: E3uities in the Soviet-Guinean Relationship
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
C1 - Executive Director
2 - Executive Registry
3 - DDI
4 - ADDI
5 - NIO/AF
6 - C/bDOQ
7 - PDB Staff
8 - NIC/AG
9 - C/DDI/PES
10 - Montgomery Rogers, NIO/AF
1.L - Fritz W. Ermarth, NIO/USSR-EE
12 - Dir/Office of African and Latin American Analysis
13 - Dir/Office of Global Issues
COI/CPAS/ILS
_ _ _ ?11S/IMD/CB
20 - SOVA/TWA
21-22 - D/SOVA
23 - C/SOVA/TWA
24 - C/SOVA/SA/TWA
25 - C/SOVA/CS/ME
26 - C/SOVA/ZWA/ME,
27 - C/SOVA/7WA/ME/Chrono
DDI/SOVA/TW/ME (12 July 1984)
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SUBJECT: Equities in the Soviet-Guinean Relationship
External Distribution
Cy 28 - Chester Crocker
Assistant Secretary, African Affairs
Department of State
29 - Robert Cabelly
Bureau of African Affairs
Room 6234
Department of State
30 - Hugh Montgomery
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Imam 6531, Department of State
31 - Admiral Jonathan Howe
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
32 - Jeremy Azrael
Council Member, Policy Planning Council
Room 7315, Department of State
33 - Karen Puschel
INR/SEE
Roan 4843
Department of State
34 - Robert Bruce
Director, West African Affairs
Bureau of African Affairs
Department of State
35 - Thomas W. Simons
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
36 - Leonardo Neher
Director, Office of Analysis for Africa, INR/RAF
Department of State
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SUBJECT: Dguities in the Soviet-Guinean Relationship
External Distribution (continued)
37 - Fred Wettering
Senior Staff Member
NSC/Africa
38 - Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet
Political/Military Affairs, DIA
39 - Peter Spicer
DIO, Africa, DIA
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