SOVIET VIEWS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE GROMYKO'S SEPTEMBER VISIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001400990001-0
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• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 26, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
26 October 1984
Soviet Views on US-Soviet Relations
Since romy o s Septem er Visit
Summary
Soviet leadership and media commentaries since Foreign
Minister Gromyko's visit to the United States, including
General Secretary Chernenko's interview with The Washin ton
Post, have stressed that the USSR sees no ind~cat on of a
positive" change in US policy but remains open to improved
dialogue if the United States backs up conciliatory words with
deeds. The commentaries imply the Soviets are not yet ready
to offer substantive concessions of their own although they
have toned down their criticism of the United States. There
are indications of a growing belief in Moscow that there are
different views within the administration that might be
exploited to obtain US concessions. There aTe also
indications of some differences among the Soviet leaders
themselves, although there is little political incentive for
any Soviet leader to advocate a more flexible approach to US-
Soviet relations than his colleagues.
T s memorandum was prepared by of the Office
of Soviet Analysis,. Comments may be directed to Chief, Policy
Analysis Division,
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The dominant tone of Soviet commentary has been one of
skepticism. A TASS report on Gromyko's first meeting with
Secretary of State Shultz and a press statement by Gromyko
following his meeting with the President asserted it was not
possible to conclude from these conversations that there had
been any "positive changes" in US policy. Gromyko's statement
said the USSR would continue to judge US intentions on the
basis of "practical deeds." ~~
Similarly, a Politburo communique of 4 October approving
the results of Gromyko's visit to the United States stated his
meetings with US officials had revealed no sign that the
United States intended to adjust its policy in a "realistic"
direction. The communique averred that declarations by the
United States that it favors more constructive relations with
the USSR were not backed by "concrete deeds." Gromyko, in a
speech in Berlin on 6 October, did not refer directly to his
talks in the United States, but he did reaffirm that Moscow
intended to judge US policy by its deeds. The speech also
accused US diplomacy of resorting to "all kinds of
maneuvers."
Soviet commentary has not been exclusively negative. A
TASS report on Gromyko's second meeting with Secretary Shultz
did not repeat the criticism of the first, and it noted that
agreement had been reached on the possibility of holding
future bilateral talks on regional issues. A statement by a
Foreign Ministry spokesman on 4 October characterized
Gromyko's meetings with US officials as "important and useful"
and repeated language in the Politburo communique proclaimi~cn
Soviet readiness for a "serious, businesslike dialogue."
General Secretary Chernenko made a similar affirmation in
an interview published in The Washin ton Post on 17 October.
He asserted that there are consi erab-Te possibilities" for
US-Soviet relations to develop positively, although he adhered
to the line that it is up to the United States to make the
first move and that so far the Soviets see no evidence of a
shift in US policy. A Soviet diplomat has claimed that
Chernenko's interview is part of a "new line" of rhetorical
moderation. (~
No Soviet Concessions
While maintaining that they are ready for a constructive
dialogue if the United States demonstrates its good intentions
by deeds, the Soviets have given no hint that they are
prepared to offer concessions of their own. In his speech to
the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September, Gromyko
asserted the United States must remove the "obstacles" that he
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said were blocking resumption of nuclear weapons talks in
Geneva. The absence of this formulation--which is an indirect
reference to new US missiles deployed in Europe--from earlier
statements by Soviet leaders had aroused speculation in the
West that Moscow was preparing to offer more flexible terms
for resuming the talks. Since Gromyko's speech, the condition
has been repeated by several Soviet officials, including the
deputy head of the Central Committee's International
Department, Vadim Zagladin, and the head of the Foreign
Ministry's International Organizations Department, Vladimir
Petrovskiy. Chernenko complained in his Post interview that
the United States has refused to "remove the obstacles" and
instead is proceeding with deployment. A Soviet Foreign
Ministry spokesman prompted renewed speculation in the Western
press that Moscow might be softening its terms when he denied
at a 19 October press conference that the USSR had set any
"preconditions" for resuming INF negotiations. His statement,
however, appears to have been merely a routine effort to
absolve the Soviets of any blame for hindering resumption of
talks. ~~
The Soviets also remain obdurate in their refusal to
begin bilateral negotiations on limiting space weapons, which
they themselves proposed on 29 June. The Foreign Ministry
spokesman on 4 October noted that US officials had expressed
concern over an arms race in outer space several times during
Gromyko's visit, but he asserted the US side had given no
concrete indication that it intended to start talks with a
view toward reaching agreement. In his Berlin speech, Gromyko
repeated the familiar Soviet charge that it -is the United
States that refuses to negotiate on space weapons. Chernenko
claimed in his interview that the USSR is waiting for the
United States to "respond." 0
The only sign of a possible modification in the Soviet
position has been varying formulations in recent weeks of
Moscow's demand for a moratorium on space weapons tests from
the outset of any talks. Gromyko in his UN speech expressed
"hope" that the United States would refrain from actions that
would "make irreversible" the conversion of outer space into
an arena of military rivalry. In a conversation with US
officials on 3 October, a deputy director of the Institute for
the USA and Canada who is active in Soviet efforts to promote
control of space weapons also failed to repeat the moratorium
demand, although he did assert that a US test of an
antisatellite weapon against a target would mean the end of
the unilateral Soviet moratorium on antisatellite testing.
Chernenko, on the other hand, reaffirmed in his Post interview
that a mutual moratorium was part of the Soviet proposal. C
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I I
It is unlikely that the ambiguity in these statements
indicates more flexible Soviet conditions for holding space
weapons talks. Rather, US statements of willingness to
consider mutual restraints while talks proceed may have led
the Soviets to believe there is a possibility that the United
States will accommodate them somewhat on the moratorium issue,
and they may be muting their references too it while awaiting
further indications of the US position.
A further demonstration of Moscow's intention to hew to a
tough line was its harsh response to charges of Soviet
noncompliance with arms control agreements by the President's
General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. A
Foreign Ministry spokesman claimed on 19 October that the US
charges were a "political swindle" aimed at masking US
obstruction of arms control progress. The strength of his
remarks, echoed in a TASS statement the next day, was
underscored by the fact that they came the day after Secretary
Shultz had spoken publicly about how the United States
intended to pursue a closer dialogue with the USSR. Moreover,
the failure of the Soviets to respond promptly to the
Secretary's remarks appeared intended to underscore Moscow's
insistence that US intentions be demonstrated by deeds, not
words. ~~
At the same time, Moscow's mixture of intransigence with
muted expressions of hopefulness appears intended in part to
play to elements within the United States who believe that a
more flexible approach to US-Soviet relations would be to the
US advantage. Chernenko's interview, for example, appeared
timed in part to figure in the second debate between the
President and his challenger. Although the Soviets apparently
anticipate President Reagan's reelection, they may believe
that by professing skepticism about US intentions while
proclaiming their own readiness for dialogue if the US shows
'good faith," they can contribute to electoral pressures on
the administration to modify its positions in wavs that would
be difficult to reverse after the election.
Perception of Differences Within Administration
A number of recent statements suggest there may be a
growing belief by Soviet leaders that significant differences
of view exist within the administration regarding bilateral
and arms control policies. Gromyko referred in his UN speech
to~a "tug-of-war" between groups shaping US policy. Although
he said a "militaristically minded" group had won this
contest, he also asserted that there were "realistically
minded politicians and statesmen" in the United States. An
arms control specialist on the General Staff referred in a
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Soviet television program on 6 October to the "point of view
of the Pentagon," which he called "predominant" in Washington
on the issue of space weapons. Political observer Valentin
Zorin said on the same program that "some circles" in
Washington were seeking to learn from past failures. A number
of recent Soviet commentaries have attacked members of the
administration by name as proponents of a hard line on arms
control. ~~
Although Soviet references to alleged differences of view
within the US policymaking community invariably have concluded
that "extreme militarists" are dominant, the Soviets may
believe that divisions exist and afford them some leverage for
influencing US policy, and they may be tailoring their tactics
accordingly. Their repetition of the theme that the USSR is
ready for dialogue, even in speeches containing harsh
criticism of the United States, may in part be an effort to
appeal to what Moscow views as conciliatory elements in the
administration. The concurrent professions of skepticism
about US intentions may be both a reflection of doubt as to
the influence and durability of the less militant view and an
effort to prompt US concessions by maintaining a "show me"
attitude. A perception of differences among US policymakers
also may have increased the level of uncertainty in Moscow's
own estimates of the prospect for making some headway with the
United States on arms control and other outstanding issues.
Differences Among Soviet Leaders
Although evidence of disagreement within the Soviet
leadership is sparse, there are indications of differing views
(there are differences of view in
Moscow on the value of arms control negotiations and dialogue
with the United States. Public statements by Soviet officials
lend some support to these reports. In recent weeks, for
example, Gromyko and Politburo member Romanov have delivered
speeches notably harsher in tone than the Politburo
communique of 4 October and Chernenko's Post interview.
These differences could reflect conflicting views within
the Soviet leadership over US intentions toward the USSR and
the future course of US policy. Authoritative Soviet
publications, including the major Central Committee journal
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Kommunist, have attributed the current policies of the United
tates and its allies to longterm trends in the West that
favor "anti-Soviet" and "militarist" forces. Other
commentators, including Arbatov and members of his institute,
have argued that US-Soviet relations are cyclical, with
periods of tension giving way to periods of cooperation, and
that US policy is subject to political and economic influences
that will exert increasing pressure for "moderation." Leaders
who subscribe to the former view might argue that any display
of Soviet flexibility would be interpreted as weakness, would
appear to reward the United States for pursuing a tough
policy, and would not alter US policy. Leaders inclined
toward the alternative interpretation of US policy might
advocate a less militant approach in order to create
atmosphere more conducive to constructive dialogue.
Neither the extent of disagreement among Soviet leaders
nor its potential impact on Soviet policies should be
exaggerated. An established practice of Soviet spokesmen,
including Arbatov and members of his institute, is to portray
Kremlin politics as a contest between moderate and hardline
factions in the hope of eliciting US concessions aimed at
strengthening the former. Moreover, the collegial nature of
Soviet decisionmaking and the requirement that all party
members conform to the prevailing line place effective limits
on the extent of any public airing of leadership
differences. The Politburo communique of 4 October, in
expressing approval of the results of Gromyko's visit to the
United States, accorded the Foreign Minister unusual personal
praise, implying that the policies he articulated Burin his
US visit enjoyed full backing from the leadership.
Impact of Leadership Politics
There is little incentive, in terms of domestic politics,
for any Soviet leader to identify himself with a significantly
more flexible approach to US-Soviet relations than that of his
colleagues. Since resuming public appearances in September,
Chernenko has gone out of his way to stress his commitment to
continue Andropov's foreign policy and to strengthen Soviet
defense. He probably is making sure he stays aligned with his
powerful colleagues Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov,
leaders whose support he apparently sees as essential to his
continued tenure in office.
Party Secretary Gorbachev, reputedly the most flexible
and pragmatic Soviet leader, has little reason to break ranks
with his colleagues on sensitive political issues since he no
doubt wishes to remain a contender to succeed Chernenko as
party leader. In fact, he echoed the Kremlin's generally
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harsh rhetoric toward the United States in his September visit
to Bulgaria. Secretary Romanov, his putative rival, might
have an incentive to make risky political moves in an effort
to improve his succession prospects. In a speech in Helsinki
on 14 October, Romanov mixed harsh criticism of the United
States and assertions that the danger of nuclear war is
increasing with professions of Soviet willingness to pursue a
serious dialogue with Washington. Romanov has historically
been associated with a less flexible approach to US-Soviet
relations, however, and his reference to Moscow's seriousness
was probably intended to emphasize his unity with his
Politburo colleagues, not to signal any real shift in his
position.
Chernenko's political prominence at the October Central
Committee plenum, coming only days after his Post interview,
raises the possibility that a politically and physically
healthy Chernenko may seek increasingly to impart his own
personal stamp to the conduct of relations with Washington.
So far, however, even his most positive statements--his
election speech of 2 March and his Pravda interview of 2
September--have been limited to sugges~ons, like that in the
Post interview, that a US move to satisfy the Soviets in one
or more areas could lead to progress on other issues. At the
moment, neither Chernenko nor his would-be successors seem
inclined to go any further than this in signaling possible
Soviet flexibility. n
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