NORTH KOREA: JET FIGHTER PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00310R000100060006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
North Korea:
Jet Fighter Production
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
EA 84-10084
April 1984
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Directorate of
Intelligence
North Korea:
Jet Fighter Production
This paper was prepared by
of East Asian Analysis, and
Comments and queries are
Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 84-10084
April 1984
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North Korea:
Jet Fighter Production
Key Judgments We expect North Korea to begin assembling a few jet fighters by the end
Information available of 1985. The North Koreans are building plants for the production and as-
as of 30 March 1984 sembly of fixed-wing aircraft and jet engines at Panghyon, some 100
was used in this report.
kilometers north of P'yongyang.
Construction is proceeding rapidly, and we expect the plants to be ready for
series production of fighters by 1987. At first, aircraft will likely be
assembled primarily from foreign-supplied parts. The North should be-
come largely self-sufficient around 1990.
We believe that China is aiding the project, and that the North will
assemble and eventually produce the F-7, the Chinese version of the Soviet-
designed MIG-21:
? Despite repeated requests from P'yongyang for modern aircraft, Moscow
has not provided any fighters since 1974. Beijing has been the sole 25X1
supplier of jet fighters to North Korea since that time.
? The Chinese provided F-7s to the North in early 1982
? P'yongyang needs more modern fighters to replace the aging MIG-15s
and MIG-17s in its inventory. The F-7 appears to be the best aircraft
available and would provide a good match for the F-5E/Fs now being as-
sembled in South Korea.
North Korea's economic problems or any technological limitations are not
likely to prohibit the manufacture of jet fighters. The costs may not be se-
vere; foreign assistance may be available in the form of grant aid.
We do not believe P'yongyang's production of jet fighters will cause a shift
in the air balance in Korea during the rest of the 1980s:
? P'yongyang's numerical lead has been decreasing, and South Korea now
has a significant quality advantage over the North in fighter aircraft.
Seoul plans to acquire nearly 100 more fighters by 1989.
? Given the complexities of jet fighter production, we believe that North
Korea would be fortunate to achieve a rate of about 40 per year in series
manufacture. At this rate of production, Seoul would be able to maintain
an edge equal to its current advantage through this decade.
iii Secret
EA 84-10084
April 1984
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Gains anticipated by Seoul under its aircraft improvement program,
however, would be offset by the F-7s acquired by the North through
domestic production. We would expect the South then to accelerate its
efforts to acquire modern aircraft.
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Key Judgments
Economic and Technological Limitations 4
5
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North Korea:
Jet Fighter Production
a complex for the
construction of military aircraft is being built at
Panghyon, in North P'yongan Province, the site of
North Korea's major fighter repair base
Plants for the fabrication or assembly of fixed-wing
aircraft, jet engines, and helicopters' are all under
construction. The airframe plant is located in a valley
east of Panghyon, and the jet engine factory is west of
the town, adjacent to the airfield. New worker hous-
ing is near all the production facilities, and roads
throughout the complex are being improved.'
began at the fixed-wing airframe plant in August
1982. It is connected by road to the engine plant and
the airfield, and we expect that a rail link will be built
as well. Work at both sites is proceeding at a rapid
rate, and they could be ready for limited production
or assembly in 1985. If construction continues at the
current rapid pace, both plants probably will be fully
operational in 1987.
Although the jet engine and airframe facilities are
rather small compared with military aircraft plants in
more developed countries, they are designed for pro-
duction, not testing and repair. Engine test cells and
fabrication buildings already exist at the repair base,
and that facility is large enough to continue the major
maintenance of fighters that has been going on at
Panghyon for years.
Chinese Assistance. We believe that China is assisting
the North's incipient jet fighter industry:
? China has been the sole supplier of jet fighters to
the North since 1974, with the first F-7s delivered
to North Korea in early 1982.
Support for the production of jet fighters would be a
major change in Soviet policy toward the North.
Despite repeated requests from P'yongyang in recent
years for modern aircraft, Moscow has not responded
favorably. The last Soviet fighters were supplied in
1974. Moscow has provided communications equip-
ment and some assistance in ground arms manufac-
ture since then.
Type of Aircraft. We believe that North Korea will
produce copies of the supersonic F-7 fighter, the
Chinese version of the Soviet-designed MIG-2~
We doubt that North Korea would want to produce 25X1
an aircraft less advanced than the F-7, which is
comparable in many respects to the F-S-E/F models,
which the South is producing with US assistance.
North Korea needs more modern fighters to replace
the 269 aging MIG-15s and MIG-17s still in its
operational inventory. The comparative effectiveness
of these aircraft is declining as Seoul adds modern
fighters.
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China also supplied P'yongyang with 170 F-6s be-
tween 1972 and 1978. More of these less capable
aircraft probably were available if the North wanted
them. The F-6s are still flown back to China for
overhaul, but North Korea has a work force at
Panghyon skilled in major maintenance on the
MIG-21-nearly identical to the F-7.
Economic and Technological Limitations
Although an aircraft industry will tax the North
Korean economy, we do not believe the costs will
appear excessive to Pyongyang in terms of its willing-
ness to sacrifice growth in the civil sector to serve the
needs of the military. The expansion of North Korea's
defense industries since 1970 has been striking for a
developing nation of fewer than 20 million people.
If China is the principal source of assistance, Beijing
may be offering grant aid, as it usually does. The
Chinese may believe it more economical to assist the
North in establishing production facilities rather than
to provide aircraft, which Beijing can sell abroad.
China knows North Korea is not a good cash
customer.
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A domestic aluminum industry is being developed on
about the same schedule as the aircraft complex. An
aluminum plant-built with Soviet aid-is now in
limited production, and an alumina plant, which will
provide raw material, is now in the late stages of
construction. We believe these factories are being
built to support the aircraft industry as well as
produce goods for the civil sector.
Technology should not be a major problem in the
manufacture of an aircraft such as the F-7. P'yong-
yang produces most specialty steels and is capable of
hard-chrome plating. Metalworking is fairly advanced
in North Korea; the North already produces tank
turrets, artillery barrels, turbines for hydroelectric
plants, locomotive engines, and some basic machine
tools. Precision machine tools have been imported
from Western countries in the past, and China might
supply some of the forms and dies necessary for
aircraft manufacture. Complete domestic manufac-
ture of airframes and engines, however, is not likely
until about 1990, and P'yongyang will import many
aircraft electronics for years to come.
P'yongyang has experience in some facets of aero-
space production and assembly in addition to the skills
gained from years of jet aircraft repair. Examination
of a North Korean Air Force MIG- 15 has shown that
P'yongyang has been manufacturing some small air-
craft parts since at least 1970
Impact on the Air Balance
Current Forces. North Korea's numerical lead in
fighters has been shrinking steadily since the mid-
1970s as P'yongyang's imports have not kept pace
with deliveries to the South. Moreover, South Korea
has achieved a significant edge in quality that was
only partially eroded by the delivery of 40 Chinese
F-7s in early 1982 (see table). South Korea's F-4s are
superior to the North's best fighters in air-to-air
combat, and the F-5E/Fs are a near-even match with
P'yongyang's F-7s and MIG-21s. The South's F-4s
are the only Korean fighters with a true all-weather
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Fighter Inventories in North and South Korea, March 1984 a
Quality of Number Type Armament
Aircraft
Guns, infrared missiles
Guns, infrared and radar-hom-
ing missiles
capability, because they are armed with radar-homing
missiles. The MIG-21s and F-7s in P'yongyang's
inventory perform better at supersonic speeds and
high altitude than the F-5E/Fs, but at typical combat
speeds the late-model F-5s are about equal in
performance. Seoul's older F-5A/B fighters have
infrared missiles; only a few of the North's F-6s are
25X1 similarly armed
these aircraft are no match for the South's more Considering the complexities involved in the manufac-
modern fighters. Superior training and tactics add to ture of jet aircraft, a more likely production rate
the South's qualitative advantage. would be about 40 fighters per year when full series
Moreover, the US-supplied missiles in
the South's inventory probably will be more effective
in combat than the missiles that the Chinese and
Soviets provide to North Korea. North Korea's nu-
merical edge comes from the large number of 1950s-
vintage MIG-15s and MIG-17s still in its force, but
facilities accurately
Force Projections. Predicting the size and composi-
tion of the North's fighter force through the end of
the 1980s is difficult because at this time we are
unable to estimate production rates at the unfinished
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Figure 6. First F-5F assembled
in South Korea
production is under way. P'yongyang's lack of experi-
ence in any type of aircraft production could com-
pound the difficulties most nations encounter when
they move into jet fighter manufacture. If the North
achieved a rate of 40 per year, it would be doing well
compared with other small nations engaged in aircraft
manufacture or assembly. Facilities and production
systems differ markedly among countries, but South
Korea and Taiwan, for example, produce or assemble
less than 30 aircraft per year.
South Korea is assembling F-5E/Fs with US assist-
ance and expects to turn out 16 this year (see figure
6). It will add 44 more to the force before production
terminates at the end of 1986. Seoul plans to use the
new F-5E/Fs to replace its vintage F-86s. South
Korea also ordered 36 F-16s for delivery between
1986 and 1989; these are scheduled to replace an
equal number of older model F-5A/Bs.
If the South acquires fighters as planned, and P'yong-
yang enters series production of the F-7 in 1987, we
would expect both forces to remain at about their
current size through the rest of this decade. P'yong-
yang probably will retain its F-6s because all have
been imported since 1972 as newly manufactured
aircraft. The North would also keep its MIG-17s, but
probably replace most of its MIG-15s with newly
produced or assembled F-7s.
With additional Chinese assistance, North Korea
could supplement initial F-7 production with fighters
assembled from imported parts at the Panghyon
repair base. This would speed up the pace of acquisi-
tion, while giving the appearance of high production
in keeping with demands from P'yongyang for accel-
erated "war preparations." The North's leadership
continually exhorts its work force to increase produc-
tion using the "war preparations" theme.
In either case, we do not expect to see a shift in the air
balance through the 1980s. Seoul probably will main-
tain a quality edge roughly equal to its current
advantage. The planned influx of firstline aircraft
(F-16s and F-5E/Fs) would counter the North's ac-
quisition of F-7 fighters. Gains projected under
Seoul's aircraft improvement program, however,
would be offset by the F-7s acquired by the North
through domestic production.
As the North's Air Force increases its quality with
F-7s from the domestic production facilities, we ex-
pect Seoul will accelerate its efforts to acquire modern
aircraft. South Korea might seek to increase its order
for F-16s, or attempt to acquire F-I5s or F-18s,
although these options would be prohibitively expen-
sive. For the near term, Seoul might consider a
coproduction effort for the F-20, using much of the
machinery and facilities now used in the F-5E/F
program.
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