CHINA;S POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM: TIGHTENING THE SCREWS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00310R000200150002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Intelligence
China's Policy Toward Vietnam:
Tightening the Screws
Seeret
EA 84-10180
October 1984
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China's Policy Toward Vietnam:
Tightening the Screws
This paper was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
China Divison, OEA,
Secret
EA 84-10180
October 1984
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.~..
Summary
Information available
as of 10 September 1984
was used in this report.
China's Policy Toward Vietnam:
Tightening the Screws F__]
intentions toward the region.
Over the past five years Beijing has patiently and persistently pursued a
strategy designed to force a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea and
to weaken the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. To keep Vietnam from consoli-
dating its position, Beijing has exerted direct military pressure to tie down
Vietnam's best troops along the Sino-Vietnamese border and backed the
Khmer resistance. At the same time, Beijing has sought to isolate Hanoi
diplomatically and to deny the legitimacy of the Vietnamese-backed
government in Kampuchea. China has looked mainly to ASEAN to take
the lead in this effort, hoping in doing so to forge close ties with Thailand
and eventually to overcome other ASEAN states' fears of Chinese
policy.
In the short run, the Chinese acknowledge that pressure and isolation will
increase Hanoi's dependence on the Soviet Union and, in all likelihood,
draw the Soviet Union even deeper into Indochina. But Chinese officials
also argue that the growing Vietnamese dependency will eventually and
inevitably lead to serious strains in the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship.'
We have seen no concrete signs of the tension Beijing predicts-only signs
of growing cooperation between Hanoi and Moscow. But Beijing, in our
view, remains committed to a long-term policy that purposely increases
Vietnam's dependence on the Soviet Union as the best way of eventually
producing a rupture of that relationship and a reorientation of Vietnam's
to pursue it somewhat more aggressively.
We believe events over the past year have reinforced Beijing's determina-
tion to pursue this policy. In fact, modest gains by the Khmer insurgents as
well as increased Soviet and Vietnamese cooperation are prompting Beijing
The Chinese realize that sustaining this long-term strategy will require the
continued cooperation of the ASEAN states-some of which still regard
China as more of a long-term threat to their security than Vietnam.
ASEAN's strong opposition to Pol Pot regaining power complicates
China's efforts to ensure this cooperation. To assuage ASEAN, the
Chinese balance their strong support for Pol Pot's forces with a mix of po-
litical and military backing for the Sihanouk-led Coalition Government of
bout a change in Vietnamese policies.
' China rejects the argument that Vietnam could be weaned from the Soviets if the West
provided alternative sources of aid. Beijing contends that the relief of the Soviet burden
would actually serve the joint interests of Hanoi and Moscow without necessarily bringing
iii Secret
EA 84-10180
October 1984
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Democratic Kampuchea (DK). A dramatically stronger showing by DK
insurgents ironically could prove troublesome for China, if it leads to an
erosion in ASEAN solidarity that Hanoi could exploit.
Chinese policy could shift if Moscow decides to adopt a more accommodat-
ing position on Vietnam, if Thai support for the Khmer resistance
collapses, or if there is a dramatic leadership change in Beijing or Hanoi.
None of these scenarios, however, seems likely soon.
The record to date also suggests that the Chinese will need to keep
increasing the pressure on Vietnam over the next several years in order to
achieve their goals. If a process of escalation does develop, appeals from
ASEAN states and China for more direct US involvement are likely to
grow.
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China's Policy Toward Vietnam:
Tightening the Screws
Military Pressure
On the Border. Every year since 1980 the Chinese
have begun limited military action along the Sino-
Vietnamese border to coincide with Vietnam's dry-
season operations in Kampuchea (November-May).
For the 1983-84 dry season, however, China began
shelling Vietnamese positions well before the start of
Hanoi's campaign in Kampuchea and responded
promptly to Vietnamese incursions into Thai territory
in late March 1984. Then, in late April and May, the
Chinese increased their ground and air forces opposite
Vietnam to their highest level since the 1979 invasion
and seized several strategically located hilltops just
inside Vietnamese territory. Chinese naval forces also
held an unprecedented exercise in the South China
Sea in early May.
The shelling in February and March probably was
intended to reassure the Thai, who had complained
about the belated Chinese response to Vietnamese
military pressure along the Thai border last year. But
the unusually large ground and naval deployments in
April and early May appear to have been prompted by
a joint Soviet-Vietnamese amphibious operation in
mid-April-which coincided with a major Vietnamese
push against Kampuchean resistance camps on the
Thai-Kampuchean border.
A senior Chinese naval officer told the US defense
attache in Beijing that China recognized the message
the USSR was sending and would not give in to such
intimidation. We believe Beijing wanted to demon-
strate that its threat of a second lesson was still very
much alive, in spite of the substantial improvements
in Vietnamese forces opposite China and growing
Soviet-Vietnamese military cooperation.
Support for the Kampuchean Resistance. The in-
creased Chinese pressure on the border may have
been influenced in part by the change in Hanoi's
tactics against the insurgents in Kampuchea. The
insurgents were notably more successful last year and
early this year in expanding their operations. The
Communist Democratic Kampuchea (DK) resistance
in particular has boosted its capabilities and activity,
allowing it to move additional guerrillas into the
interior provinces and to step up attacks. As a result,
during this wet season (May to November) the Viet-
namese have kept pressure on the resistance's major
bases along the Thai-Kampuchean border instead of
withdrawing to the interior as they usually do. This
has prevented the resistance from regaining its cus-
tomary rainy season tactical advantage.
The DK's improved performance is largely due to
generous Chinese support. Since 1979, China has
provided the DK with an estimated $100 million
worth of arms, ammunition, food, and medicine.
The Chinese clearly regard the Communists as the
most militarily effective resistance element and are 25X1
doing their best to bolster Pol Pot's military capabili-
ty. More important, the Chinese for over a decade
have considered, and in our view continue to consider,
the Khmer Communists as a primary vehicle for
blunting Vietnamese influence and extending the
Chinese role in Kampuchea. 25X1
This year's fighting along the Sino-Vietnamese border
seems likely to persist for some time, in contrast to the
seasonal cycles of hostility in previous years. Vietnam-
ese leaders are determined to retake the hilltops
China seized in April, and the Chinese are just as
determined to hang on.
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The unwillingness of the ASEAN states to see the DK
and Pol Pot regain power in Kampuchea and their
effort to build up the non-Communist coalition ele-
ments to a point where the Communists are eclipsed
represent at least a potential dilemma for Beijing. But
whether Beijing will ever be forced to abandon Pol
Pot in favor of a non-Communist alternative re-
mains-fortunately for the Chinese-an academic
question. For the time being, the disparity between
Communist and non-Communist coalition capabilities
provides plenty of latitude for the Chinese to finesse
the contradictory elements of their policy and, in
effect, to work both sides of the street.
In addition to maintaining its strong material and
political backing for the Khmer Communists, Beijing
has been able to assuage the concerns of its Thai allies
and the other ASEAN countries by providing materi-
al aid to the non-Communist groups as well.' China
has provided the majority of the arms and ammuni-
tion now in the hands of the non-Communists. F_
Beijing also has sought to allay ASEAN fears by
giving its full diplomatic backing to the Sihanouk-led
clearly intended to please ASEAN, China also for the
first time endorsed ASEAN's joint proposal for a
government of national reconciliation in Kampu-
chea-after Vietnam withdraws-which would in-
clude the Heng Samrin faction.
Isolating Vietnam
Beijing realizes, of course, that it needs ASEAN
support to keep Hanoi and the Heng Samrin regime
in Phnom Penh diplomatically isolated. ASEAN has
been instrumental year after year in rallying opposi-
tion at the United Nations to Vietnam's challenge to
the credentials of the Coalition Government of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea. The votes have been so lopsided
that Vietnam did not even try last year.
' The two non-Communist insurgent, groups are the Khmer People's
National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the Sihanoukist National
Army (ANS), under Son Sann and Prince Norodom Sihanouk,
respectively
ASEAN solidarity, therefore, remains a constant
source of concern to China-especially since Indone-
sia and Malaysia in particular continue to distrust
China and favor a compromise settlement that would
accommodate at least some of Vietnam's security
concerns. Not surprisingly, Chinese Foreign Ministry
officials were upset last fall when ASEAN first issued
its proposal for a government of national reconcilia-
tion in Kampuchea, complaining it smacked too much
of a compromise. Beijing undoubtedly was also irritat-
ed and disturbed when the Indonesian Armed Forces
Commander visited Hanoi in February and was
quoted by the Vietnamese media as saying China-
not Vietnam-posed a military threat to the region.
Beijing has made it very clear that it opposes any
compromise that does not conform with the provisions
of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations and
the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) in
1981:
? Complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from
Kampuchea.
? Free elections under international supervision. F_
To underscore its position, Beijing has rebuffed Ha-
noi's calls for Sino-Vietnamese talks until Hanoi
accepts these conditions and has also opposed third-
party mediation efforts that might legitimize Viet-
nam's hold on Kampuchea by compromising the
UN/ICK formulas. Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang,
for example, headed off French and Australian com-
promise proposals in 1982 and 1983 by warning both
countries about the negative effects their proposals
would have on relations with China.
To counter Vietnamese charges last year of intransi-
gence, Beijing did publicize a "new" five-point pro-
posal for the solution of the Kampuchean issue. But
that proposal deviated from China's standard formula
only in stating that Beijing would resume the Sino-
Vietnamese dialogue after Vietnam began a phased
withdrawal from Kampuchea. Beijing had previously
insisted on full Vietnamese withdrawal prior to re-
suming the talks.
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Fortunately for the Chinese, their own rigidity has
been matched by the Vietnamese. For example, Viet-
namese Foreign Minister Thatch last March rejected
offhand Indonesian President Soeharto's compromise
proposals on the Kampuchea issue, which tried to
accommodate some of Vietnam's basic security con-
cerns. This persuaded the Indonesians-the most
accommodationist of the ASEAN countries-that
pressure must be maintained on Hanoi.
Closer Cooperation With Thailand and ASEAN
The Chinese regard Thailand's cooperation as espe-
cially crucial to their overall regional strategy. With-
out sanctuaries in Thailand, the Khmer insurgents
could not operate effectively. Nor could China easily
resupply the guerrillas without Thai help. Any soften-
ing of Thailand's hard line toward Vietnam, more-
over, would probably be immediately adopted by
Imports
500
I I I I I I
0 1978 79 80 81 82 83
ASEAN as a whole.
As a result, the Chinese have sought to-forge particu-
larly close ties with Thai leaders since the mid-
1970s-with some success. Sino-Thai cooperation has
increased as the fighting in Kampuchea has intensi-
fied. Over the past year in particular, there has been a
flurry of visits by Thai and Chinese military and
political leaders designed to underscore China's com-
mitment to Thailand's security and the growing close-
ness of the relationship:
? Foreign Minister Wu visited Bangkok in August
1983 and again in February 1984.
? In late July 1984, Foreign Minister Siddhi and the
head of Thai intelligence visited Beijing.
? In May and June, the chiefs of staff of all three
Thai military branches, including Supreme Military
Commander Athit, visited Beijing.
According to Thai officials, the Chinese have offered
to sell Thailand heavy military equipment including
aircraft, submarines, and armor. If accepted, it would
mark a new phase in Sino-Thai relations. The Thai
military's preference for US weapons and its unwill-
ingness to become dependent on Beijing will limit the
purchase of Chinese weapons. Nevertheless, accord-
ing to Thai officials, Bangkok is considering these
By capitalizing on a common interest in resisting the
Vietnamese, the Chinese are seeking to establish a
firmer basis for relations with other ASEAN nations
through trade, diplomacy, and the exchange of high-
level visitors. Malaysian Foreign Minister Ghazali
held talks in Beijing with Chinese leaders in late May
and early June. Although differences persist between
Beijing and Kuala Lumpur-especially over China's
refusal to sever all ties with the Communist Party of
Malaysia-the fact that the visit took place at all is
an indication of Malaysian interest in improving the
relationship.
On the economic side, two-way trade with Singapore
topped $1 billion in the last two years. Singapore is
also playing an increased role in China's search for
petroleum in the South China Sea. The Philippines
recently signed a new trade protocol with China
aimed at increasing the markets for its nontraditional
exports. Even Indonesia, which severed ties with
China in 1967, has substantial unofficial trade with
China-over $400 million last year-much of it
through Hong Kong (see figure 1).
Chinese offers.
China probably hopes that improved relations with
Thailand will serve as a bridge to the rest of ASEAN.
China: Trade With ASEAN
Countries, 1978-83 a
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Superpower Involvement
Beijing's initial attempt to use the Sino-Soviet talks in
1982 to sow distrust between Hanoi and Moscow did
not produce the desired results. If anything, Soviet-
Vietnamese relations appear to have grown closer, as
illustrated by their joint amphibious exercise last
spring. The Soviets, in fact, have repeatedly reassured
Hanoi that Moscow would not sacrifice Vietnamese
interests in Kampuchea in order to improve relations
with Beijing. Moscow
even canceled the Arkhipov visit to China last May, in
part, to avoid appearing to acquiesce to Chinese
military attacks on its ally. Hanoi in turn has allowed
Moscow greater access to Vietnamese military facili-
ties in Cam Ranh Bay-a move noted with concern in
the Chinese media.
Growing Soviet-Vietnamese military cooperation may
have been one factor, among many, that influenced
Beijing's decision last year to improve relations with
the United States. Beijing has privately expressed
support for the US military buildup in the region as a
counterweight to the Soviet presence and probably
hopes that the United States will stiffen ASEAN
resolve to oppose Vietnam's continued occupation of
Kampuchea. The Chinese also probably hope that
improved Sino-US relations will make it easier for
Beijing to portray its regional posture-both for
ASEAN and for Soviet and Vietnamese consump-
tion-as having US backing. It is no accident-in our
judgment-that China timed its escalation of the
fighting along the Sino-Vietnamese border last spring
to coincide with President Reagan's state visit. In
doing so, we believe, Beijing also hoped to remind US
officials of the common security interests of the
United States and China.
Continued Stalemate
The Chinese remain committed to the long haul and
do not expect Vietnam's economy, political will, and
morale to crack soon. Party Chairman Hu Yaobang
told Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi in July that he
expected the fighting to continue in Kampuchea for
another seven to 10 years. The Chinese Ambassador
in Bangkok also recently indicated that the Chinese
do not believe the insurgents will ever be able to
defeat Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea. At most,
Beijing hopes to make their occupation so costly that
the Vietnamese will agree to negotiate a political
This Chinese assessment of Vietnamese determina-
tion, to us, seems on the mark. The Vietnamese, for
their part, believe a friendly regime in Phnom Penh is
essential for their security. Vietnam recognizes that
an outright victory is beyond its reach and has
apparently settled on a strategy aimed at minimizing
the gains of the Kampuchean resistance. Although
Hanoi has been unsuccessful thus far on the diplomat-
ic front, it has demonstrated increased tactical flexi-
bility on political issues and may believe ASEAN will
eventually accept the status quo in Kampuchea. The
Soviets seem willing, in turn, to continue to foot the
bill-currently about $5 million a day in military and
economic aid to Vietnam-to ensure their continued
access to Vietnamese military facilities.
ASEAN also seems prepared to wait patiently for
Vietnam to show greater flexibility. We believe that
despite differences over tactics the other ASEAN
capitals will continue to defer to Bangkok on the issue,
with slight modifications, to prevent a split between
ASEAN hardliners and moderates.
Alternate Scenarios
Although we expect no fundamental change in the
situation over the next year or so, events could take an
unexpected turn if one or more of the key factors in
the present equation change.
ASEAN Seeks a Compromise. The weakest link in
Beijing's strategy of pressure against Hanoi remains
its dependence on ASEAN, and especially Thailand.
Most ASEAN countries harbor deep suspicions about
Chinese intentions and are concerned that prolonga-
tion of the conflict in Kampuchea will increase Chi-
nese and Soviet opportunities to expand their influ-
ence in the region. Indonesia in particular appears
more concerned about the long-term Chinese threat
than the danger of Soviet-backed Vietnamese expan-
sion.
It is possible-but not likely soon-that Indonesia
and some of the other ASEAN states could seek a
compromise settlement. Such a shift would be most
likely to occur if the DK were to score unexpected
settlement.
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gains on the battlefield and seek to weaken its non-
Communist coalition partners. Nervous at the pros-
pect of a return of a Chinese-supported Pol Pot
regime, some in ASEAN might seek to work out an
agreement with Hanoi that sought to cut the DK out
of a power-sharing formula.
Such a split in ASEAN ranks would seriously weaken
China's diplomatic efforts to keep Vietnam isolated,
but, in our view, China's strategy would not be
irreparably damaged as long as Thailand continued
its confrontational policies toward Vietnam. Thai
policy, however, is closely associated with a few senior
officials. A change in government in Bangkok could,
therefore, affect the Thai stand.
If a new government opted to cut off Chinese supplies
to the Kampuchean resistance and to seek a compro-
mise with Hanoi, Beijing's options would be limited.
In our view, China would find it impossible to main-
tain its current level of support to the resistance. F_
With
current stockpiles and whatever assistance China
managed to get to the rebels, the resistance could hold
on for a while. But without Thai sanctuaries the
resistance would be dangerously exposed to Vietnam-
ese attacks and its effectiveness, in our view, would
gradually erode.
Leadership Changes. China's hardline approach to
Vietnam is closely associated with Deng Xiaoping,
who personally crafted the policy after his return to
power in the late 1970s. A post-Deng leadership in
Beijing might calculate that the present strategy has
been counterproductive-pushing the Vietnamese
closer to the Soviets without producing the frictions
intended-and opt for a soft approach designed to
wean Hanoi away from Moscow. Thus far, however,
there is no evidence of leadership differences on this
point.
Vietnamese interests in the region will survive any
leadership changes in Beijing or Hanoi. Vietnamese
dominance over Indochina represents one of Hanoi's
few accomplishments since reunifying the country,
making it that much more difficult to give up. It is
precisely Vietnam's insistence on maintaining its posi-
tion in Indochina that the Chinese oppose, prompting
Hanoi to rely on Moscow as a counterweight.
Given Moscow's growing strategic interest in close
ties to Vietnam, we believe a change in leadership in
Moscow would be even less likely to produce a more
accommodating Soviet approach to China on Kampu-
chea.
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The Longer Term
Whether Beijing's strategy will succeed in the longer 25X1
term remains an open question at this juncture. The
record of events to date, however, suggests that the
Chinese will need to up the ante-perhaps several
times-in the coming years if the intended rift be-
tween the Soviets and Vietnamese is to materialize.
And until that rift occurs, Moscow's military involve- 25X1
ment and presence in Vietnam is likely to grow,
thereby adding to the stakes involved for both sides. 25X1
There are inherent dangers in such a process of
escalation. For one thing, the increasing dimensions of
the struggle will sorely test ASEAN's current re-
solve-probably well before any basic policy change
in Hanoi or Beijing. The Thai, for example, may one
day question the wisdom of supporting ever larger
resistance forces, especially if they are unable to
extend their bases of operation throughout Kampu-
chea and remain tied to enclaves along the Thai-
Kampuchean border. Forces concentrated in this area
would be a potential threat to Thai security and would
probably draw additional Vietnamese forces to the
border as well. However it came about, a reappraisal
of ASEAN strategy would almost certainly entail
strong appeals from the ASEAN states for more US
assistance and direct involvement. In view of the 25X1
larger stakes, Beijing also could be expected to urge
the United States in the same direction.
We believe, moreover, that the history of ill will and
the fundamental differences between Chinese and
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