THE FACTIONAL FACTOR IN CHINESE POLITICS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00310R000200170003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ECPT
Intelligence
in Chinese Politics
The Factional Factor
-Seeret-
EA 84-10185
October 1984
copy 2 4 f
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in Chinese Politics
The Factional Factor
China Division, OEA,
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries
This paper was prepared by
Secret
EA 84-10185
October 1984
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Summary
Information available
as of 14 September 1984
was used in this report.
The Factional Factor
in Chinese Politics 25X1
The existence of factions within the Chinese Communist Party is clearly a
source of much of the political instability that has beset China for decades.
With deep roots in Chinese history and political culture, factions are a
traditional and proven part of political conflict. They emerge in times of
crisis and weak leadership, and have a paralyzing effect on the political
system until the effective distribution of power is resolved. China's
factional proclivities are exacerbated by a Leninist one-party system that
leaves no room for loyal opposition.
The Chinese recently have begun to address the issue of factionalism in
their political system. In the past few months, the official media have
discussed factionalism in detail, especially as it affects the lower levels of
China's various bureaucracies. Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang,
after several tours through the provinces, called on all areas to "eradicate"
factionalism, as part of the process of cleansing the party and reforming
the political system.
In response, many provinces have begun to publicize their factional
problems with unprecedented frankness. We believe that this new informa-
tion, when added to what we already know about high-level politics, now
provides sufficient grounds for making some judgments about the effect of
factionalism on the current leadership and its policies. Our conclusions are
necessarily speculative because the information is still fragmentary and
leaves much room for variant interpretations:
? We believe that factionalism-the propensity to divide into exclusive
groups loyal to specific individuals for the purpose of political conflict-
currently is a latent, not manifest problem in the Central Committee.
This is due to the political strength of Deng Xiaoping, the relative
homogeneity of the Politburo, and rough consensus at the top on general
policies and the rules of the political game.
? Factional considerations presently play a limited role in the formulation
of policies in China, particularly foreign policy. Foreign policy is
determined by a small group of the most senior leaders-dominated by
Deng-who consider China's foreign policy primarily in geopolitical
terms. In domestic policy, factionalism has been muted in part because
Deng has shifted decisionmaking to the smaller, younger party
Secretariat.
Secret
EA 84-10185
October 1984
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? US-China relations thus are somewhat insulated from the push and pull
of Chinese domestic politics, though not completely so. Some Chinese
occasionally have played on Western concerns about Politburo factional-
ism to gain advantage in working out bilateral problems.
? Factionalism may emerge in a post-Deng era, as survivors and successors
compete for his power. Deng has controlled factionalism but has not
eliminated its causes. General Secretary Hu Yaobang is gaining prestige
and authority, but there are still several other party veterans capable of
leading formidable factions to counter him.
? The current campaign against factionalism will probably score limited
success in overcoming local factional problems, but it will not resolve the
system's fundamental susceptibility to factional infighting.
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Contents
Factionalism and the Politburo-Image and Reality
3
Mitigating Conditions
4
Moving Up the Line-Factionalism in the Provinces
9
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Scope Note The behavior of political factions within the Chinese Communist Party has
long been a controversial subject among Western analysts and scholars of
China. Generally, the scarcity of reliable information on political interac-
tions in this secrecy-shrouded regime has made it difficult for the
intelligence and academic communities to develop a thorough understand-
ing of the dynamics of politics at the Central Committee and Politburo
level. Lacking clear definitions or conceptual precision, factionalism has
become a type of analytical "fudge factor": its relevance to the real
political process often is more assumed than analyzed, and it is frequently
held responsible for the occasional sudden shifts in Chinese foreign or
domestic policy that defy conventional analysis or confuse Western
observers.
China's tumultuous political history over the last three decades lends itself
easily to analysis along factional lines. Ever since Mao Zedong launched
the Great Leap Forward in 1958, China has been a country of sweeping
policy and personnel changes, of government by conspiracy and coup, of
intense political polarization and vicious infighting. Even though the
current situation, by comparison, is orderly and quiet, analytic habits
acquired over several years of observing political instability and fluidity
have disposed analysts to doubt official claims of a "new situation of
unprecedented unity and stability" in China, and to look for factionalism
beneath the surface tranquillity. This paper is an attempt to come to grips
with some of the analytical problems involved in defining and assessing
factionalism. It addresses questions of how pervasive factionalism is in
Chinese society, under what conditions factions develop, how they affect
policy decisions, and how they can be controlled.
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in Chinese Politics
The term "faction" (pai) is used commonly, but
somewhat loosely, in the Chinese language to describe
any identifiable group in a political context. It is
generally attached to the end of a descriptive term or
name. Thus the term has been used to define groups
of "reactionaries" (fandong pai), or the "left wing"
(zuo pai) of a larger party; one can be labeled a
"Dengist" (Deng pai) or a "capitalist roader" (zou zi
pai), or a member of the "whatever faction" (fan shi
pai) associated with former party Chairman Hua
Guofeng. Individuals so designated in this popular
form of political stereotyping may not agree with the
designation.
A more precise definition is needed, however, for the
purposes of analysis of factionalism as a factor in
current Chinese politics. In the discussion that fol-
lows, a faction is understood to be a group of individ-
uals bound by strong personal ties to a particular
leader, consciously engaged in competitive, goal-
oriented political action. Its primary goals are the
enhancement of power and security for constituent
members. Factional activity refers to conscious politi-
cal choices intended primarily for the benefit of one
faction or to damage other perceived factions. These
run the gamut from preferential appointments and
promotions to a wide variety of negative activities
directed at factional opponents, from minor harass-
ment to incarceration or murder.
Factions arise from, but are not equal to, the networks
of informal relationships and personal ties that are
referred to in China as guanxi.' Factions tend to arise
in situations of political uncertainty or irresolute
authority, either as a defense against attack by hostile
political forces, or as a means of acquiring political
' Guanxi means, literally, "relationship," but in a sociopolitical
context, it has extensive connotations. Guanxi refers to mutual
obligations between two individuals, based upon family, school,
work unit, region, or other association. It is the channel through
which things get done in China-it is "who you know." It is the
glue which binds factions together; guanxi can thrive without
power. Power in China accrues to individuals, not
offices, and a faction leader is one who is perceived to
have personal power sufficient to provide for his
supporters. Given its concentration on individuals,
rather than issues or offices, factional activity tends to
generate intense political animosities and lasting per-
sonal hatreds.
One of the paradoxical,characteristics of factionalism
in China is that it is viewed with near-universal
opprobrium. As in any Leninist party, factionalism in
the Chinese Communist Party is considered a grave
violation of the "rules of the game," which call for
collective decisionmaking and discipline through
"democratic centralism." Equally important, faction-
alism has been anathema to Chinese political theorists
from Confucius to Mao. A consistent strain in Chi-
nese political philosophy is the idealization of a
harmonious and unified leadership, maintaining le-
gitimacy through commitment to and exemplary
practice of moral virtues. The idea of banding togeth-
er to compete for power or personal gain is abhorrent,
prima facie evidence that the individuals concerned
are evil and unworthy of leadership.
The accusation of factionalist behavior, then, carries
considerable pejorative weight, and this sharply limits
the scope for legitimate political conflict in modern
China. Factionalism is pure power politics, but since
that is considered improper, the losers of a political
struggle are usually accused of factionalism, as if that
alone were the cause of their downfall. Mao invari-
ably so charged his fallen opponents,' and even the
Gang of Four, despite abundant evidence of their
involvement in murder and vast abuse of power, were
tried and convicted primarily on charges of "leading a
counterrevolutionary clique."
2 A list of Mao's primary opponents and their "crimes" would
include: Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, purged in 1954 for forming
an antiparty alliance"; Peng Dehuai, Huang Kecheng, and others,
dismissed in 1959 for forming an "antiparty military clique"; and
Lin Biao and his General Staff, branded after their 1971 fall as "a
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Although its most violent phase ended 15 years ago,
and the entire era was declared over with the purge of
the Gang of Four in 1976, the Cultural Revolution
still permeates political life in China to a remarkable
degree. The leadership, and particularly Hu Yaobang,
seems obsessed with it: rectification is intended to
purge the party of its influence, and cadre are still
being charged with crimes committed during that era.
In many other cases, people are trying to recover
property, -reputations or family members lost during
the "10 years of chaos," or avenge themselves against
former persecutors.
Factionalism is in no small part responsible for the
perpetuation of the problems created during the Cul-
tural Revolution. In its most turbulent phase, 1967-
69, social order collapsed in many areas of the
country. A multitude of political factions, all claiming
allegiance to Chairman Mao, struggled for power at
every level with escalating ferocity. Thousands died in
sectarian violence that in some places involved heavy
artillery and armored vehicles stolen from military
arsenals. With the help of the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), order was finally restored, violent Red
Guard youth were shipped off to rural exile, and the
party began to reconstruct its shattered organizations.
But because no clear winners had emerged, the new
"revolutionary committees" often were composed of
roughly equal numbers from opposing factions, with
Beijing-designated PLA officers holding real power.
As the Army withdrew from political life over the
next few years, the factions continued their competi-
tion for power and revenge, though in a somewhat less
violent manner.
Factionalism in the Politburo exacerbated problems
below. Increasingly hostile groups in the Central
Committee jockeyed for power and intrigued against
each other, with the denouement occurring after
Mao's death in 1976. This turbulence was amply
reflected at lower levels; political change at the top
brought renewed struggle at lower levels, with direc-
tives and propaganda slogans serving as openings for
shifting power and arresting opponents. Moreover,
local factionalism took on a life of its own, persisting
in many areas without direct support from, and even
in defiance of, Beijing. Feuds dating from the Cultur-
al Revolution have delayed or distorted implementa-
tion of Deng's political and economic reforms, despite
massive personnel changes ordered by Beijing. It was
this linkage of low-level policy opposition to Cultural
Revolution factionalism that evidently led Deng and
Hu to confront the factionalism issue directly.
The party leadership, however, has been revising its
assessment of factionalism as it has begun to realize
how deeply the problem is rooted in society. Judging
by the "Decision on Consolidation," adopted by a
party plenum in October 1983, factionalism was
equated in practice with political opposition, and
factionalists were among the "three types of people"
to be removed from office during the party rectifica-
tion campaign.' According to the communique, those
afflicted by factionalism "use their faction as the line
of demarcation and appoint people by favoritism while
elbowing out of their way those who hold different
views; they form cliques to pursue selfish interests,
seriously impairing the unity and solidarity of the
party and hindering the party from carrying out its
line, principles, and policies." A product of the Cul-
tural Revolution and "leftist" ideology, factional be-
havior, in the view of Deng and his reformist support-
ers, was small group behavior in opposition to the
established goals of the regime.
More recently, the party seems to have recognized
that the association of factionalism with leftist opposi-
tion was not always accurate or helpful in carrying
out party rectification. Investigations of various prob-
lem-ridden leadership groups evidently showed that
factional animosities existed within the reformist wing
of the party itself, between the local party leadership
and the PLA, or even within the PLA itself-and in
IThe
other two "types" to be excluded from leadership positions are
those who rose dramatically during the Cultural Revolution on the
basis of "rebel" activities, and those who engaged in "beating,
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none of these cases was the charge of leftist opposi-
tionism appropriate. In late May, party leaders, and
especially Hu Yaobang, shifted gears somewhat, and
phased into party rectification work an education
campaign to portray factionalism as a consequence of
the Cultural Revolution that can afflict even officials
with the "correct" political orientation.
The logic of Hu's campaign is relatively simple:
factions are a product of the Cultural Revolution; the
Cultural Revolution was totally wrong; therefore, all
factions were wrong then, and are wrong now. No
faction can insist that it pursued a "correct" political
or ideological line, nor can the PLA claim its support
for one faction or another was correct. All should
recognize their errors, engage in self-criticism, hold
"heart-to-heart talks" with their adversaries, and let
bygones be bygones. Interestingly, the most thorough
and authoritative exposition of this approach to the
problem was contained in the 28 July issue of the
PLA newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao.
We believe, however, that the campaign to "negate
the Cultural Revolution" and eliminate factionalism
is more than just a mild phase in the party's rectifica-
tion campaign. The evidence presented in the publici-
ty campaign indicates that factionalism is a serious
problem at every level of society, and that it presents a
clear danger to the party's ability to rule and refur-
bish its tarnished image. In our view, the national
campaign against factionalism also has implications
for politics at the center.
Factionalism in the Politburo-Image and Reality
Western analysts tend to disagree on the importance
of factionalism in current Politburo politics. There are
those who see factional alignments and infighting
everywhere, or who attribute any evidence of policy
disagreement within the leadership to a factional
fight. Taiwan's "China watchers" also appear to take
this approach.
We believe that the conceptual framework is crucial
to analyzing Chinese politics at the Central Commit-
tee level. As in any political system, the Chinese
leadership is subject to a variety of cleavages and
categorizations, some of which are regarded-errone-
ously, we believe-as the basis for factionalism. For
example, some observers see generational differences
as being paramount, and view Deng as head of an
"old cadres faction." Others see factions based on
attitudinal positions, such as a "pragmatist faction"
or an "opposition faction." Some analysts see factions
based on policy positions, such as a "heavy industry
faction" or "pro-Soviet faction," while others have
looked at past bureaucratic assignments as the basis
of factions like a "Third Field Army faction" or a
"China Youth League faction."
Although these are fruitful areas for investigation,
they are of limited value in explaining political dy-
namics at the upper levels of the Central Committee.
Interest groups, bureaucratic associates, and "old boy
networks" do exist in the Chinese political system and
do have an impact on the development of policy. They
often form the basis of "guanxi networks" that can
develop into factions under some circumstances. They
should not be confused with factions, however. Fac-
tions are cohesive, personalistic, and power oriented;
they are perceived as a threat to the political order;
they are political battle groups.
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We believe that available evidence supports the con-
clusion that factionalism is now a latent, not a
manifest, problem in the national party leadership.
Compared with those periods when factionalism was
clearly operating and was recognized by the Chinese
for what it was-that is, the 1972-76 period between
the death of Lin Biao and the purge of the Gang of
Four-the absence of evidence of factionalism in the
current Politburo is striking. Although there are
serious policy disputes within the Politburo, as well as
personal rivalries and scores to be settled, the situa-
tion, in our judgment, is well below the point where
any of the principals may feel obliged to draw togeth-
er a faction to do battle. Furthermore, we believe that
there are now specific institutional constraints against
factionalism, some of them attributable to actions and
policies undertaken by Deng Xiaoping.
Mitigating Conditions
Several characteristics of the current leadership make
it less prone to factionalization than any leadership
group in China since the 1950s. These act as con-
straints on the Chinese inclination toward
factionalism:
? Relative homogeneity of the Politburo. The purge
of the Gang of Four and the "winnowing" of the
Politburo since that time has resulted in the virtual
elimination of the extremist elements that precipi-
tated earlier factional struggles. The current Polit-
buro is a collection of moderate party bureaucrats
committed to economic progress and orderly poli-
tics. They are experienced in getting things done by
pulling the right bureaucratic strings. Although
claims of "unity and stability" need not be taken at
face value, it would appear that this Politburo has
less to fight about than most of its predecessors.
? Deng's domination. Deng Xiaoping's control of the
central decisionmaking apparatus is nearly unchal-
lenged. By virtue of his political skills, policy initia-
tives, and extensive bureaucratic contacts, he has
managed to sidestep, co-opt, or eliminate opposition
and establish himself as the ultimate authority
figure in the regime. He has prevented others from
taking collusive action against him, and he has
avoided the appearance of factionalism in confront-
ing his own opponents. In such an environment of
confident authority, careful attention to the opinions
of other party leaders, and fair allocation of power,
factionalism has not been able to flourish.
? Ideological/procedural consensus. Nearly all cur-
rent Politburo members share a revulsion against
the kind of cutthroat factional infighting that char-
acterized the Cultural Revolution. The leadership
seems committed to orderly rules of political inter-
action, especially the prohibition on factions. Deng
Xiaoping, although he thoroughly dominates the
political scene, has tended to avoid the appearance
of organizing a factional battle against his oppo-
nents and has eschewed subjecting them to extreme
humiliation or disgrace.
? Crosscutting loyalties and the distribution of pow-
er. Under Deng, the political process in China has
become somewhat more decentralized. Important
policy issues get decided at various levels of various
bureaucracies-power is more diffuse than it has
been previously. Moreover, the policymaking proc-
ess is more open. Alternative views can be aired and
disagreements can be expressed without one's politi-
cal loyalty or ideological standing being questioned.
This has helped reduce the interpersonal frictions
within the system. Furthermore, individuals within
the Politburo are subjected to crosscutting institu-
tional and personal loyalties.
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? Rough policy consensus. There appears to be a
general agreement among members of the Politburo
that the policy lines developed by Deng Xiaoping
are appropriate and correct. Reorientation of the
party's work to economic modernization (rather
than class struggle), party rectification and bureau-
cratic reorganization, pursuit of an "independent"
foreign policy, and increasing foreign trade are all
issues that have elicited both popular support and
elite agreement. Although there are marked differ-
ences of opinion and heated arguments over particu-
lar aspects of some policies, they have generally not
seriously damaged personal relations within the
leading group.
? Systemic loyalty. In any bureaucracy, the higher
one rises in the system, the stronger the loyalty to it.
This is clearly the case in the Politburo and other
Central Committee decisionmaking organs. Most of
their members have experienced the near collapse of
the political system, and are determined that it will
not happen again. Whatever their personal differ-
ences, Politburo members have a strong sense of
responsibility about their jobs and a commitment to
the survival and improvement of the political/
economic system that overrides other concerns.
This is not to say that political strife is absent from
the upper levels of the Central Committee. There are
fierce debates on economic, political, and ideological
issues, contention between those who favor accelerat-
ing economic reform and those who want to slow it,
and numerous bureaucratic battles over scarce re-
sources and budgetary priorities. In our view, how-
ever, these are fundamentally different from faction-
alism.
an interview with Premier Zhao
Ziyan tend to portray
the policy process as orderly and bureaucratically
logical. We believe basically accu-
rate, if somewhat flattering to the current regime.
Premier Zhao Ziyang: Recently described Chi-
na's foreign policy decisionmaking process in
According to Zhao's remarkably frank comments, the
Politburo Standing Committee does not meet as a
group, and the Politburo does so only rarely, because
of the age and poor health of many Politburo mem-
bers. Only the weightiest issues-such as the overall
direction to be pursued in Sino-US relations-are
brought to the attention of China's most senior lead-
ers, and on those occasions, Deng Xiaoping's influ-
ence is decisive. In the formulation of foreign policy,
as described by Zhao proposals
come up through the foreign policy bureaucracy, with
critical inputs from quasi-governmental "think tanks"
and noted Chinese scholars. A special State Council
"small group" (presumably formally designated by
the leadership) coordinates foreign policy questions
and adjudicates interministerial disputes. If it cannot
resolve the issue, it is then passed up to the party's
Secretariat (headed by Hu) or the State Council
(under Zhao), or to both in joint conference. The party
has its own foreign policy "small group," chaired but
not dominated by President Li Xiannian, that ad-
dresses more sensitive foreign policy issues.
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Propaganda Department Director Deng Liqun:
Chief advocate of national campaign against
"spiritual pollution."
Deng, in our view, has established a decisionmaking
process that effectively bypasses the Politburo. In
addition to making the process more efficient, we
believe that these procedures also tend to reduce the
factional factor in decisionmaking. The Politburo is
prone to factionalism because it is composed of veter-
an party leaders who have risen on the basis of their
political power and administrative talents. They are
all, in a sense, potential faction leaders because of
their extensive personal ties and patron-client rela-
tionships within the party bureaucracy.
As far as factional activity is concerned, those in the
Politburo who have the prestige and guanxi to form
serious factions appear to lack the bureaucratic ac-
cess, the physical stamina, or the willpower to take on
Deng Xiaoping. They also have as negative examples
Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian, Wu De,
Ji Dengkui, and Wei Guoqing, Politburo leaders who
have sought to organize a challenge to Deng and paid
a heavy price. The Politburo's propensity for faction-
alism, but unwillingness to engage in it, can be seen in
the 1983 "campaign against spiritual pollution" (see
inset).
Despite the fact that Deng Xiaoping appears to have
latent factionalism under control within the Central
Committee leadership, it is clear from evidence the
party media recently have provided that the problem
permeates Chinese society. The campaign to publicize
factionalism suggests that the leadership is confident
enough about the results of its rectification campaign
to risk opening old wounds, but also that it recognizes
the hidden dangers of allowing factional animosities
to fester in the party bureaucracy.
Most of the recent articles on factionalism have been
carefully written to reflect Beijing's goals for party
reform. They generally describe factionalism in small
units or localities, link it clearly to the Cultural
Obviously, one must keep in mind when analyzing examples of
factionalism provided by the party media that the stories being
related are carefully chosen for their didactic value. In some cases,
they are written from the perspective of the winner of the factional
struggle. Nonetheless, they are useful in illustrating the scope and
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The Spiritual Pollution Campaign-
Factionalism Fizzles
The "campaign to eliminate spiritual pollution, "
which threw the Chinese political system into turmoil
in late 1983, had all the markings of a factional
struggle. The issue-the growing influence of modern
Western culture and philosophy on a Chinese popula-
tion long denied knowledge of them-was a highly
emotional and symbolic one, lacking in policy speci-
ficity. It was raised at a mid-October Central Com-
mittee plenum by Deng Xiaoping himself, in response
to problems emanating from the "liberal" wing of the
party. Deng did not, however, provide specific guid-
ance on the targets for the campaign, or the methods
to be used to carry it out, this opened the possibility
of competing for the favor of the party's ruling figure
by rushing to carry out his perceived wishes.
Propaganda Department head Deng Liqun charged
forward with the campaign, using it first as a means
to attack certain heterodox writers, and then, with
the support of the Politburo's chief theoretician, Hu
Qiaomu, to force the ouster of two "liberal" editors
of the People's Daily. By early November, the cam-
paign began to take on policy overtones, with People's
Daily articles implicitly attacking certain cherished
domestic policies, such as agricultural reform, and
possibly China's foreign policy tilt toward the United
States. At lower levels, the campaign evidently led to
retrenchment on "liberal" policies, persecution of
unconventional youth, and the reopening of factional
battles in various localities. Finally, it appeared that
the campaign was being used to undermine the status
of General Secretary Hu Yaobang. Some media
commentaries seemed obliquely critical of him, and
rumors began to circulate that Hu and Deng had
fallen out, and even that Deng had begun looking for
another successor. Hong Kong's Zhengming maga-
zine eventually claimed Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu
were involved in an attempt to weaken Hu Yaobang.
Hu Yaobang reportedly called a Politburo meeting
prior to his 23 November visit to Japan, at which the
negative results of the campaign were brought to
Deng Xiaoping s attention. Deng ordered that the
campaign be limited to literary and theoretical areas,
and that it be strictly separated from practical policy.
In late November and early December, Deng Liqun
and the head of the military commissariat set out
strict guidelines limiting the campaign.
But although spiritual pollution receded from the
main policy arenas by the beginning of 1984, the
campaign continued with great intensity in the theo-
retical realm so closely watched by China's intellec-
tuals. In mid-January, Hu Qiaomu wrote a long
theoretical exposition refuting liberal interpretations
of Marxism. Despite the regime's intent that Hu's
article be the final word on the subject, it aroused
more protest and criticism of its theoretical incon-
sistencies and perpetuated the bitterness that the
campaign had injected into the political atmosphere.
Deng Xiaoping had finally had enough.
he retracted the portions of his
October speech dealing with spiritual pollution
(which had never been published, in any case) and
criticized the propaganda apparatus for its clumsy
execution of the campaign. It was expected that Deng
Liqun would be fired as Propaganda Department
Director, but he held on to his job, probably because
the party leadership did not want to project an image
of disarray. In June, Zhao Ziyang declared the
"spiritual pollution" issue to have been "successful-
ly" concluded. Since then, the "reformist" line asso-
ciated with Hu and Zhao has advanced strongly,
controversial new economic and social policies have
been adopted, and propaganda units have been specif-
ically instructed that their work is to support the
reforms.
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Did Deng Liqun, thinking he had the support of other
party elders, such as Chen Yun, Wang Zhen, and
Peng Zhen, attempt to weaken Hu Yaobang? Did a
"reformist faction" of Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang,
Wan Li, and Hu Qili counterattack in late Novem-
ber? The evidence is inconclusive and fully illustrates
the difficulty of analyzing factional activity. One
point is very clear, however: Deng Xiaoping decided 25X1
the outcome of the campaign. He set it in motion, and
he ended it. His unchallengeable authority put a stop
to whatever factionalization was taking place in the
Politburo. He appears to have protected both Hu
Yaobang and Deng Liqun from each other. We believe
that the seeds of factionalism personal animosities,
teaming up for defense, and emotional treatment of
obscure issues-were sown but that Deng 's interven-
tion prevented growth. Party unity was preserved,
factionalism withered. 25X1
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According to a 6 April article in Renmin Ribao, the
Xian City Cement Factory was a sorely troubled unit.
Established in 1970, its leadership had been changed
eight times by 1979, yet it still could not produce
enough cement to turn a profit. The fault lay with one
Li Naiheng, a "cement specialist " who evidently knew
little about cement. In 1980, the Xian City party
committee placed a vacancy notice for Li's job, and
hired a university graduate named Hu Zhaoming to
help get the plant in operation. Hu did so by appoint-
ing seven other technical specialists to management
positions, and they oversaw the repair of facilities
and supervised production. The plant soon began
producing high-quality cement and earning profits for
the state.
Li Naiheng, however, was part of an important local
faction. Taking advantage of his connections above
and below, he spread rumors on the shop floor, got a
friend in the local press to spike a commendatory
article about the new factory management, colluded
with quality inspectors to declare the plant's output
substandard, and ultimately persuaded the city party
committee to recall Hu Zhaoming. After Hu's depar-
ture, his fellow technicians were dismissed or idled.
In their place, several people who had risen to
prominence during the Cultural Revolution were
appointed to direct the factory's operations, despite
their lack of technical qualifications. The result, of
course, was disastrous. By 1983, output was down,
losses topped a million yuan, and the plant faced
bankruptcy. Despite their failure, the "leftist" man-
agers were protected by a bureau chief in the Xian
municipal party committee, crony of Li Naiheng and
himself a Cultural Revolution star. At the time of
writing, despite exposes written by local and national
magazines and newspapers, the problem had not been
resolved. Hu Yaobang subsequently commented on
the article, and, although we do not yet know the
outcome in the Xian City Cement Factory, the munic-
ipal party committee has come in for more than its
share of central criticism in the party press.
Revolution, and show how it prevents the effective
implementation of economic or political reform poli-
cies. The articles have strong "good vs. evil" over-
tones, and make the point that factionalism is a
product of weak leadership by implying that higher
party authorities often do not attend to the problem
until investigative journalists bring it to their atten-
tion. Despite the "official expose" aspect and clear
central guidance for discussing such problems, the
articles are a rich source of information on factional-
ism and, by careful reading, permit "nonofficial"
conclusions to be drawn (see insets).
Several characteristics of local factionalism seem to
stand out in an analysis of these recent official
accounts:
? Factions are joined by deliberate choice. Members
are known to each other, as well as to interested
political observers on the scene.
? Power is the goal; the issues over which factional
battles are fought usually are personnel issues,
unrelated to policy. Although purported factional-
ists are routinely accused of policy-related short-
comings, these are usually secondary concerns,
though Beijing gives them propaganda priority.
? Factions depend for their survival on strong ties to
higher levels of party leadership. The winners of a
factional struggle are invariably those who have the
more powerful backing at higher levels. The higher
the "guanxi networks" of faction leaders extend, the
stronger the factional unit.
? Factionalism is pervasive in society and is remark-
ably resistant to cleanup efforts. Officials tasked
with eliminating it often end up victims of factional
intrigues. Beijing's preferred method for solving
factional problems at local levels is to transfer
factional leaders to other areas, thus disrupting
their guanxi networks, although there is no report-
ing on the overall success of this method. Punish-
ment for factional activity is usually light, despite
the evidence of related crimes.
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Rats in the Grain Bureau-Shuangya City,
Heilongjiang
A February Renmin Ribao expose by a well-known
reformist journalist gave a detailed look at factional-
ism in a small unit. Chief malefactors in the case
were Yin Haijiang, secretary of the party committee
of the Shuangya municipal grain bureau, and Duan
Lianxi, head of the organization (personnel) section of
the bureau. In 1978, Duan had been accused of
Cultural Revolution crimes, including murder, but
Yin protected him from investigation. Both had been
members of the "upstairs faction" during the Cultur-
al Revolution. Described as 'political and personnel
specialists, " the upstairs faction had easily and thor-
oughly defeated the technical experts of the "down-
stairs faction. "
After the Cultural Revolution, the Yin and Duan
faction maintained and augmented their power
through bribery and extortion. Their abuse of privi-
lege became well known throughout the city. Extrav-
agant dinner parties, gift-giving, and other forms of
corruption proliferated. Investigations were done by
various party organs, but Duan and Yin were protect-
ed by a deputy secretary of the Shuangya City party
committee, whose brother had been given a job by
Duan. Over time, Duan and Yin ruined the careers of
many of their political enemies and set back both the
quality and quantity of flour production. Although
they drew the attention of the Central Discipline
Inspection Commission, the investigation dragged on
for several years, during which time the chief investi-
gator found himself under attack by other factional
elements in Heilongjiang Province. The article ended
with the implication that the case had not been
resolved.
? Blatant factionalism diminishes with proximity to
and opposition from superior authority. It also
appears to be more prevalent and more intense at
lower levels of bureaucracy.
Given the party's desire to portray factionalism as a
discipline problem left over from the Cultural Revolu-
tion, Beijing has been considerably more circumspect
A County Takeover in Shandong
In February, Xinhua announced that Shandong Prov-
ince had decided to reorganize the party committee of
Chengwu County, which had been "controlled by a
few people with serious factionalist influence and
lawbreakers, who used their power to form factions
and cliques, seek personal gains and violate law and
discipline." Three individuals were singled out as the
worst violators: Ai Fuhua, Lu Maijun and Cai
Xiangcun. Cultural Revolution beneficiaries, they
were transferred to Chengwu in 1978 and immediate-
ly began to organize and expand a factional network.
By 1980, when the county elected a new party com-
mittee, they had gained enough support to be elected
to leading positions, defeating 'four conscientious
and honest candidates.'
Once in office, they "abused their power to seek
personal gains and willfully squandered and embez-
zled state resources. " They also proceeded to ignore
important central policy decisions, particularly in the
area of agriculture. As a result, production suffered,
per capita income declined, and valuable forest lands
were destroyed. For three years, the province sent
investigation teams to the county in response to local
complaints, but not until the Central Discipline In-
spection Commission investigated in late 1983 did
anything get done. With pressure from Beijing, the
provincial and prefectural authorities decided to
crack down. In the end, the county magistrate, four
members of the county party committee, and a vice
chairman of the local people's congress were dis-
missed from office. Only one, however, was expelled
from the party.
in discussing factionalism within provincial party
committees. Provincial party committees have been
reorganized several times since 1976, with Beijing
always having the final word on important appoint-
ments. The most recent reorganizations took place in
early 1983 and brought to prominence a number of
younger, well-educated technocrats with strong re-
formist credentials, reportedly handpicked by Deng.
For Beijing to admit that these new leading bodies
had factional problems would be tantamount to adver-
tising its own lack of influence.
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Guangxi Province: Local Factions and Central
Support
Scene of some of the Cultural Revolution's bloodiest
fighting, with Red Guards stealing munitions from
trains bound for North Vietnam, Guangxi has never
fully recovered from its violent past. Members of the
rival "April 22" and "headquarters"factions have
preserved their animosities over the years. Wei
Guoqing, a conservative Guangxi native, generally
sided with the "headquarters"faction, but actually
ran the province with an iron PLA hand. As he moved
on to higher office in the party and army, ultimately
becoming head of the PLA commissariat-the Gener-
al Political Department, Wei appointed cronies to run
Guangxi. Although an early Deng supporter, Wei
reportedly grew increasingly unhappy with Deng's
reforms. Like-minded supporters in Guangxi, believ-
ing they had Wei's support, appear to have stymied
the implementation of reformist economic and educa-
tion policies in the province.
Evidently concerned with Wei's dual support base in
the PLA General Political Department and Guangxi,
Deng removed Wei from his military job in late 1982,
and reorganized the Guangxi provincial party com-
mittee in early 1983, leaving First Secretary Qiao
Xiaoguang as the sole surviving Wei appointee. New-
ly appointed Deputy Secretary Wei Chunshu was put
Provincial response to Beijing's call to publicize fac-
tional problems has been mixed. Several provinces
have been relatively silent, giving little publicity to
factional problems at any level. Others, such as
Shandong, Henan, and Shanxi, have taken specific
steps to correct factional abuses at lower levels,
including the mass transfers of county-level officials.
Still others, most notably Guangxi and Hunan, have
"gone public" with their factional problems, although
they have been very careful to avoid mentioning
names or directly implicating current leaders. Gener-
ally, the provinces that have discussed their factional
problems most openly have been those whose party
committees are documented as containing "leftist"
supporters of Politburo members now in disgrace.F_
in charge of party rectification in the province, with
the additional task of resolving `problems left over
from the Cultural Revolution. " In the face of opposi-
tion from both factions, Wei proved unequal to the
tasks, despite help from a large workteam dispatched
by Beijing.
In January 1984, Hu Yaobang visited the province for
several weeks, and delivered direct guidance on re-
solving the problems. In short order, the Guangxi
party committee gave more power to Wei Chunshu,
began criticizing its own shortcomings in rectification
and reform, and denounced the errors of
';former party committees" (without directly men-
tioning Wei Guoqing). The province's progress was
carefully monitored in the pages of People's Daily,
which carried reports of the arrest of several promi-
nent Cultural Revolution leaders in March, critical
commentaries on the province's factionalism in May,
and finally, Qiao Xiaoguang's mild self-criticism in
August. As this campaign progressed, Wei Guoqing
dropped out of sight. It would not be surprising to see
him removed from the Politburo at a future Central
Committee meeting.
The contrast between Guangxi Province and Fujian
provides a striking example of Beijing's selective
approach to exposing factional problems (see insets).
Guangxi's party first secretary is a follower of Polit-
buro member Wei Guoqing, whose star is currently
declining due to his opposition to some elements of
Deng's reform program. Guangxi's factional problems
are discussed frequently in local and national media.
Fujian's first secretary is a protege of General Secre-
tary Hu Yaobang and may be slated for higher
national office. Fujian's factional problems, no less
serious than Guangxi's, have received very little na-
tional media attention.
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necrei
Guangxi's power brokers: (left to right) Politburo member Wei Guoqing, Provincial Party First
Given its organizational structure and personnel poli-
cies, the PLA is particularly susceptible to factional-
ism. Promotion patterns within the army would al-
most seem to guarantee high degrees of cronyism:
typically, an individual will stay within the same army
corps throughout his entire career. There are numer-
ous documented examples of commanders promoting
their staffs along with them as they rise through the
hierarchy. In contrast to local party units, however,
the army until recently has staunchly rejected charges
that it was factionalized. With regard to the Cultural
Revolution, PLA commentaries tended to maintain
the fiction that the army was aloof from Cultural
Revolution struggles, that its participation in "support
the left" activities in local areas during that period
was ordered by Beijing, and that army officers usually
played the role of neutral arbiter, not active partici-
pant.
More recent articles in PLA newspapers have admit-
ted that the PLA's facts as well as attitudes were
incorrect, and that the army was as immersed in
factionalism and as guilty of serious political errors
during the Cultural Revolution as any other group.
Furthermore, by refusing to admit their errors, PLA
units have tended to perpetuate them, and factional-
ism has remained a deep-rooted problem. Army lead-
ers have also been forced to recognize that their
attitude won them few friends among civilians, many
of whom suffered career or personal setbacks while
the army was in charge.
Most articles about factionalism in the military have
discussed the problem in generic terms, rather than in
detail. have been unable to 25X1
provide much further information on the nature of
factional struggles within the armed forces. Some
local military units have admitted that they had taken
part in "miscarriages of justice," or incorrectly sup-
ported leftists in local governments, and have apolo-
gized to their civilian counterparts in public meetings.
As far as factionalism within units is concerned, the
most explicit description of a problem has been that of 25X1
the General Logistics Department (GLD). In late
August, People's Daily reported that the GLD had
resolved "conspicuous differences" and serious orga-
nizational and interpersonal problems in the course of
"negating the Cultural Revolution." After holding
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Fujian Province: The Persistence of Factional Feuds
Although the Cultural Revolution in Fujian was not
as violent as in Guangxi, the factional rivalries were
equally intense, and considerably more complex. In
addition to the two primary Cultural Revolution-
generated factions, the "red faction" and the "black
.faction"-(which ultimately dominated), the provincial
leadership has long been divided between the "Shanxi
faction, " consisting of Shanxi-born officials who
transferred to Fujian in the late 1940s, and the
"underground faction" of native Fujianese revolu-
tionaries. To complicate matters, Fujian is a Military
Region (MR) headquarters, and successive MR lead-
ers have dominated or dabbled in local politics to
varying degrees.
vicious factional
infighting down to the county level; local leaders
taking advantage of a leadership change in Beijing to
jail opponents on trumped-up charges; fighting over
control of economic bureaucracies to the point that
they are immobilized. Fujian's former provincial. first
secretary, weakened by poor health, finally quit
trying to resolve factional difficulties after repeated
failures.
extensive meetings and "heart-to-heart talks" with
division leaders, animosities and factional viewpoints
that dated to the early part of the Cultural Revolution
were reportedly dispelled. A People's Daily commen-
tator praised the GLD's method of handling old
problems as a model for the party to follow. In our
judgment, however, most PLA participants in the
political strife of the Cultural Revolution remain
reluctant to admit their mistakes, and the party is
giving the army great credit for small progress.
Fujian's current party leader, Xiang Nan, reportedly
has made some progress in straightening out faction-
al squabbles. The new party committee put in place in
early 1983 seems to have been designed to mollify the
existing factions, while giving more power to Xiang
and other new leaders untainted by old battles.
Nonetheless, Xiang 's own son told US officials in
Hong Kong that the province is still plagued by
factionalism. The `Shanxi faction," which has resist-
ed economic and political reform efforts, is still
strongly represented on the provincial party commit-
tee, and continues to hamper Xiang 's efforts to run
the province efficiently. At the lower levels, "red" and
"black "faction members continue to vie for power
and privilege. Perhaps not surprisingly, Fujian's eco-
nomic performance is not cited as a national model,
and Xiang has publicly criticized his own perform-
ance in economic reform. Fujian's record, however,
has not been criticized by Beijing in the way
Guangxi's has. Hu Yaobang, Premier Zhao Ziyang
and other central leaders have visited the province in
the past two years, but Xiang's performance has won
nothing but praise.
factional problems nationwide, media attention has
focused on the Ministry of Coal Industry and the
Ministry of Railways, which were claimed to have
successfully addressed their Cultural Revolution
problems and eliminated residual factional bitterness.
Although in their study sessions the ministries dis-
cussed factional problems in great detail, no accurate
accounts have been published in the party press.
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Although incomplete and vague, there is substantial
evidence that factionalism occasionally is a serious
problem within State Council ministries and Central
Committee departments. In the recent drive to resolve
Among the central units that appear to be
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bring the factions under control.
most seriously affected by factional problems are the
party Propaganda Department, the Ministry of For-
eign Economic Relations and Trade, the Ministry of
State Security, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(see inset).
Although we believe that Deng Xiaoping has effec-
tively contained the centrifugal forces that exist with-
in the Central Committee, and has set China on a
course that steers clear of the social and political
excesses that polarized the society under Mao, we do
not believe that he has solved the problem of faction-
alism. He has not institutionalized effective channels
of conflict resolution, nor has he dispersed power to a
degree that will preclude some form of power struggle
from emerging after his death.
In our judgment, Hu Yaobang is making important
progress in preparing to succeed to Deng's power from
his strong position as General Secretary. He is taking
bold policy initiatives that enhance his reputation for
leadership without jeopardizing his relationship with
Deng. Hu also seems to be strengthening his own
power base. He has placed people reputed to be his
proteges (based on career associations in the Chinese
Youth League) into important positions within the
party's Secretariat, Organization Department, and
General Office. He is strengthening his influence in
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National De-
fense through appointments of supporters to key
positions. Although these actions improve his power
position in the long run, they also create tensions.
They leave him vulnerable to charges that he is
engaging in factionalism, and, without Deng's sup-
port, Hu might find himself faced with a Politburo
determined to limit his powers by destroying his
"faction."
Hu Yaobang's power thus far has been conferred
upon him. He has enhanced and expanded it some-
what, but he has faced no serious challenge to his
authority without Deng's power behind him. Hu's
uncertain personal power base, his reputation as a
rather impulsive leader, his association with the par-
ty's controversial "liberal" wing, and the continued
influence of several other senior party veterans may
permit a reemergence of factionalism in a post-Deng
era.
Given our limited access to the Chinese leadership,
and the necessary secrecy in which factions cloak
their activity, it is unlikely that we will be able to
develop a clear picture of post-Deng factional align-
ments. Because factions are based on interpersonal
relationships and guanxi networks, they can emerge
for any number of reasons. Hu's use of his powers
may cause an opposition faction to coalesce around
another leader of his generation or around a party
veteran who believes Hu to be unsuited for power.' Or
it may involve Hu himself engaging in more obvious
factional activity as a defense against a potential
challenge. Another possibility is an escalation of a
struggle between two other members of the Politburo
that Hu was unable or unwilling to resolve, resulting
in the polarization of the leadership.
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We do not foresee the Politburo inevitably breaking
up into competing factions upon Deng's death. The
policymaking process that has emerged recently
seems to be effective and satisfactory to most of the
Factionalization can be a slow process, a progressive
deterioration of the cohesiveness and competence of
the leadership over time. It appears to go through
several stages, some of which have observable
characteristics:
? Concentration on ideological or symbolic issues.
Such issues lend themselves more easily to factional
manipulation intended to weaken perceived oppo-
nents. Examples could include constantly shifting
the discussion of US-China textile disagreements to
the question of "national dignity," or transforming a
debate on economic reform policy into an issue of
"socialism versus capitalism."
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? Heightened personalization of political discourse.
Policies become associated with particular leaders,
and support for those policies equates to support for
the leader. The success or failure of the policy
reflects less on the correctness of the policy than on
the abilities of the leader who proposed it. Indicators
in this phase are usually negative ones, such as
media articles extolling the "unity and stability" of
the central leadership in the face of rumors to the
contrary. Historical allegories about leaders of past
dynasties may also appear.
? Polarization of the leadership. Opposition becomes
programmatic-a "two-line struggle;" interpersonal
tensions are beyond mediation or meaningful coop-
eration between two factions; neutral leaders are put
under increasing pressure to choose sides. Factions
become more open in this phase and may be given
descriptive names. Policies become more cautious;
important personnel decisions may be delayed.
? Plots and intrigues. Personnel issues become dead-
locked; bureaucratic vacancies cannot be filled.
Factions are clearly known. All parties try to ensure
some form of physical security, either through pub-
lic security or military forces. Political activity
increases in all bureaucracies, as factional networks
spread downward. The entire decisionmaking proc-
ess becomes paralyzed pending the outcome of the
struggle.
? Denouement. The battle is joined when one faction
is convinced it has the power necessary to defeat its
opposition. This usually takes place at a Politburo or
expanded Politburo meeting. The losers suffer some
form of political disgrace, including being charged
with factionalism.
The party's current effort to "eradicate" factionalism
is indicative of the scope and seriousness of the
problem at all levels of China's bureaucracies. Beijing
is clearly aware that factions have done enormous
damage to the political system since the Cultural
Revolution by:
? Obstructing policy implementation.
? Blocking effective communication upward in the
bureaucracy.
? Promoting corrupt and incompetent personnel while
preventing better educated persons from becoming
cadre.
? Engaging in flagrant abuse of power and corruption,
thereby damaging the party's prestige.
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has, or will he face a factional challenge?
Given the tendency of factionalism to recede in the
face of power exerted from above and the shaming
effect of national publicity, we believe Beijing's anti
factionalism campaign will achieve a measure of
success in improving bureaucratic performance at
lower levels. To the degree that deep animosities left
over from the Cultural Revolution are ameliorated,
the party's purposes will also be well served. In our
judgment, however, factionalism is too pervasive in
society to be quickly eliminated by a party publicity
campaign.
Despite its prevalence in the society at large, faction-
alism does not appear to be a serious problem within
the current Politburo leadership. Deng Xiaoping has
established workable, stable policymaking procedures
that have reduced interpersonal tensions within the
system by dispersing power to several bureaucracies.
He has also shifted more authority away from the
Politburo to the younger, more activist and cohesive
party Secretariat. By virtue of his own political
strength, Deng has quelled the emergence of power-
seeking factions at the top.
Hu's prospects for maintaining a leadership group in
which factionalism plays a limited role will depend
upon political changes still to be accomplished by the
Deng reform coalition. If Hu can bring more of his
supporters and fellow reformists into the Secretariat
and Politburo (that is, strengthen his own potential
faction) and succeed to Deng's real power position, he
may be able to prevent opposition from coalescing. If
current reformist policies continue to achieve satisfac-
tory results, the regime may be able to dampen the
kinds of recriminations and blame-laying that accom-
pany failed policies and sometimes degenerate into
factionalism. If Deng can bring about the true retire-
ment of a significant number of the aged veterans who
still dominate the Politburo, potential post-Deng fac-
tional networks will be diminished in strength. These
are formidable challenges for Deng and Hu, and are
the essence of their political reform program. The
more successful they are in achieving their political
goals, the more likely the regime will be able to
contain the impulse to factionalism that has hampered
China's political and economic development in the
past.
The linkage between factional politics and any partic-
ular policy issue is often difficult to draw. Factions
tend to coalesce over power and personnel questions,
rather than specific issue areas. Differences over
specific policies can contribute to the factionalization
process, as disagreements among Chinese leaders tend
to get personalized readily, but a single policy issue is
unlikely to precipitate a full-scale factional battle.
This is particularly true of foreign policy issues, which
are handled by a smaller number of senior officials
who think in geopolitical terms and generally seek to
insulate foreign policy from the push and pull of
domestic politics.
The Chinese, in fact, have played occasionally on
Western concerns about their factionalism to gain
tactical advantages in dealing with bilateral problems.
An example of this sort of manipulation occurred in
1982, when Chinese diplomats hinted that Deng's
position would be jeopardized if the United States
decided to sell advanced fighters to Taiwan. We also
believe that hints from Chinese officials that "faction-
al infighting" was the cause of a policy position
unfavorable to the United States should be viewed
with skepticism.
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This is not to say that foreign policy questions are
immune to factional considerations. The handling of
China's foreign policy could become part of factional
infighting, particularly as a leader under pressure for
other reasons might be blamed for perceived failings
in the management of China's foreign relations. Given
their high emotional content, some aspects of Sino-US
relations could get drawn into an ongoing factional
squabble, with accompanying rhetorical excess on the
part of the Chinese. We believe, however, that this
need not be cause for great concern. Even if factional-
ism within the Politburo shifts the balance of power
among the leaders, this will not inevitably affect
Chinese leaders' perceptions of their national interest,
or of the nature and direction of their relationship
with the United States. In the past, major factional
changes have taken place without any great shifts in
Chinese foreign policy, and, conversely, major
changes in Chinese foreign policy have been made
without any factional realignment.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T0031OR000200170003-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T0031OR000200170003-4
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T0031OR000200170003-4