SUDAN: TRANSPORTATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3
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RIPPUB
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C
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19
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December 22, 2016
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April 6, 2010
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4
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Publication Date: 
June 1, 1984
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REPORT
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 ewitideftmi- Directorate of Intelligence Sudan: Transportation and Economic Development A Research Paper NESA 84-10197 June 1984 : 348 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Intelligence Sudan: Transportation and Economic Development This paper was prepared by Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA, Confidential NESA 84-10197 June 1984 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Sudan: Transportation and Economic Development Summary Sudan's poor transportation system severely restricts its economic develop- Information available ment. The system must be improved if Sudan is to expand agricultural as of 22 April 1984 exports, increase foreign exchange earnings, and thereby manage its was used in this report. $9 billion external debt. Sudan has no significant overland transportation links with neighboring countries. It relies on shipping through Port Sudan for international trade and airlines for international movement of passengers. Poor management by the state-run transportation corporations has caused Sudan's internal river and rail networks to decline. These networks have lost many middle managers and technicians to higher paying jobs in the Persian Gulf states and are overstaffed with unskilled laborers. Unreliable service is the primary reason these systems have lost traffic to more expensive road transportation. The expansion of the paved road network since the mid-1970s has led to a limited improvement in internal transportation. We believe that further planned road improvements, particularly in the rain fed agricultural and livestock areas of western Sudan, will stimulate increased production for export. Sudan will have difficulty, however, meeting the large maintenance requirements of its highway system. A privately owned trucking industry now dominates Sudanese transporta- tion, using the road network financed by the government and foreign donors. This passably efficient alternative to state-run transportation gives farmers greater assurance that their produce will reach export markets and has lowered a major barrier to private investment. The Sudanese Government's decisions on the allocation and pricing of petroleum, however, still significantly hamper privately operated road transportation. Private fuel consumers have difficulty obtaining supplies at points distant from Port Sudan. The fuel situation particularly hinders economic development in the south. Sudan's transportation network is worst in the south, where southern dissidents have disrupted transportation links. This has created logistic problems for the Sudanese armed forces and prevented vital food and petroleum shipments from reaching the south. Banditry also hinders southern road transportation and is responsible for higher prices to compensate truckers for the added risk. iii Confidential NESA 84-10197 June 1984 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 a.uniiuenuai North-south transportation links have always been weak, contributing little to the economic integration or political unification of Sudan. Two major development projects, the Jonglei Canal and an oil pipeline, will improve transportation and trade ties, but construction has been suspended because of dissident attacks on the companies involved. Improvements in transportation would do more to develop the Sudanese economy if other, policy-related barriers to development also could be lowered. The principal barrier is the government's erratic tax and tariff policies, which have been underscored by its recent moves to Islamize the economy. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Confidential Sudan: Transportation and Economic Development Overview of the System Transportation problems are endemic to Sudan, which is sparsely populated, only slightly industrialized, and has the largest area of any African country (2.5 million square kilometers). Poor transportation hampers Sudan's economic development and must be improved if the country is to manage its $9 billion external debt. Additional foreign exchange earnings would come from an expansion of agricultural ex- ports, which could be induced by improvements in transportation. rivers are now feeder lines for the railroads, which generally run east-west from Port Sudan. The river and rail systems do not overlap and thus do not compete for traffic. Roads compete, but in many areas they become impassable during parts of the rainy season from May to August. The trains and steamers usually operate all year. Sudan has neither railroads nor paved roads connect- ing it with any of its eight neighbors. Transportation with the outside world is primarily by air for passen- gers and by ship for freight. Virtually all imports and Transportation also has been a target of the growing insurgency in southern Sudan. Dissidents have greatly curtailed ground transportation in the south since February 1984. This has created logistic problems for the Sudanese armed forces and prevented vital food and petroleum shipments from reaching the south. Adequate protection of the transportation lines is beyond the capabilities of the Sudanese Government because of the long distances involved and the remote- ness of the south. The private sector provides 65 percent of Sudan's transportation, according to the Ministry of Finance.' This figure, however, hides the true extent of govern- mental control because public corporations own and operate river, rail, and air transportation, as well as Sudan's only seaport. Only road transport is operated privately, but it carries most of the country's freight and passengers. The government's investment in transportation for fiscal year (July to June) 1983 was $30 million, while foreign sources invested $55 mil- lion.' More than half of all transportation spending went toward road construction. Sudan's main transportation routes were north-south on the rivers before the railroads were built. The ' Unless otherwise indicated, the basic data about Sudan's transpor- tation system have been drawn from unclassified Sudanese Govern- ment publications, press reports, and direct observations by US defense attaches and Embassy personnel. exports pass through Port Sudan. Internal transportation links become weaker with increasing distance from Port Sudan and Khartoum. The most primitive and least reliable transportation is in the south, which has large areas of swampland where the transportation network is difficult to main- tain. Northern Sudan also lacks modern transporta- tion away from the Nile, but this desert area is virtually uninhabited. Ports Port Sudan is the country's only operational deepwa- ter port. It is owned and operated by Sea Ports Corporation (SPC), a public enterprise under the Ministry of Transport. SPC is the only profitable government transportation corporation. The 15-berth harbor at Port Sudan is, naturally sheltered, and entry is rarely affected by bad weather. The port has no drydock facilities. The tonnage handled by Port Sudan has risen from 3 million in 1974 to 4 million in 1983. Virtually all of Sudan's foreign trade passes through Port Sudan, with import volume exceeding export volume by as much as 3 to 1. Petroleum products account for half of import volume. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Confidential Sudan: Transportation Statistics, 1975-82 30,921.0 2,719.0 9,316.0 10,221.0 18,289.0 22,385.0 Freight (thousand metric tons) 3,155.0 3,560.0 3,842.0 3,661.0 3,535.0 4,081.0 3,984.0 3,814.0 Export 852.0 1,311.0 1,363.0 1,154.0 1,006.0 1,259.0 1,103.0 989.0 Import 2,303.0 2,249.0 2,479.0 2,507.0 2,529.0 2,822.0 2,881.0 2,825.0 Railway Freight (million tons/km) 2,175.0 2,620.0 2,415.0 1,555.0 1,456.0 1,966.0 1,506.0 1,512.0 Passengers (million passengerslkm) 1,101.0 1,166.0 1,294.0 1,192.0 1,057.0 1,061.0 1,033.0 900.0 Passengers/Port Sudan-Khartoum (thousands) 444.1 474.5 499.9 330.4 214.1 244.9 215.8 Freight (million tonslkm) 82.5 89.5 94.0 88.6 64.9 71.3 88.3 95.3 Passengers (million passengers/km) 87.7 87.7 68.7 114.1 53.9 65.3 25.6 28.3 Roads Freight (million tons/km) 3,270.0 3,570.0 3,900.0 Passengers (million passengerslkm) 6,500.0 7,200.0 Air Congestion at Port Sudan became a serious problem in the late 1970s. It was relieved temporarily when the Port Sudan-Khartoum highway was completed, en- abling half of Port Sudan's cargo to be trucked. Congestion again has increased since June 1983, with the port operating near capacity. Large quantities of unclaimed goods are stored in warehouses. The slow clearance of goods through customs encourages graft as customers try to avoid delays. The World Bank is sponsoring projects to mechanize cargo handling and increase storage areas. Current and planned projects probably will give the port a capacity of 5 million tons per year by 1990. Improve- ments include quay resurfacing, berth extensions, dredging, and construction of roll-on/roll-off ramps. Changes also are under way to make it even easier for trucks to use the port, which was originally designed as a rail terminus. Efforts to expand Port Sudan's capacity are limited, however, by the small size of the harbor, labor intensive cargo handling, and shortages of space. Confidential The World Bank estimates that future cargo-handling demands will require development of the unused port at Sawakin-50 kilometers south of Port Sudan-by the mid-1990s. A feasibility study has been completed for this project, but funds for construction are un- available. If the port is built, it would specialize in handling container and roll-on/roll-off ships, which are proving difficult to introduce in Port Sudan because of space limitations. Most of the cargo would be sent inland by truck because the Port Sudan- Khartoum highway passes through Sawakin. In May 1983 work began on Port Nimeiri, 20 kilome- ters south of Port Sudan. This oil terminal will serve the oil pipeline being built by the White Nile Petro- leum Company from oilfields in southern Sudan. The terminal and pipeline were expected to be completed by 1986 but probably will be delayed at least a year because of armed conflict in the south. 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Confidential Rail Transportation Sudan has 4,800 kilometers of narrow-gauge railroad track, extending from Port Sudan to Wadi Halfa' in the north, Nyala in the west, and Waw in the south. The southern regions of A`li an Nil (Upper Nile) and Al Istiwa'i (Equatoria) are the only areas of signifi- cant population not served by the rail system. The entire system is single tracked except for 200 kilome- ters between Port Sudan and Taqatu 'Hayya. The rail system is operated by the state-owned Sudan Rail- ways Corporation (SRC). The Port Sudan-Khartoum line carries the most traffic. The farther from Port Sudan, the less is the amount of cargo carried. The volume of exports entering Port Sudan by rail is typically 30 to 40 percent of the imports exiting by rail. The problem of empty eastbound trains is worse on the far reaches of the rail lines. Passenger traffic is more evenly distributed than freight and is heaviest at points close to Port Sudan and Khartoum. Passenger operations are subsidized by freight traffic and contribute only 20 percent of the railroad's revenue. SRC freight traffic has steadily declined from 2.7 billion ton-kilometers in 1970 to 1.4 billion in 1983. Most of this decrease is due to deteriorating service, the opening of an oil pipeline, and competition from road vehicles. Passenger traffic has declined less than freight, except for the Port Sudan-Khartoum route, which faces strong road competition. Road transpor- tation is about twice as expensive as the railroad but provides faster and more reliable service. Small loads are particularly difficult to ship on the railroad. An 815-kilometer oil pipeline from the Port Sudan refinery to Khartoum became operational in 1977. The oil had been carried by railroad tankers, and the pipeline has freed some of the tankers to carry petroleum to more distant markets. SRC's petroleum traffic-which is 40 percent of import volume-may decline again when the White Nile Petroleum Com- pany's pipeline is completed. The 1,500-kilometer pipeline will have a parallel return line to transport diluents (for the waxy crude) and some refined prod- ucts to the south. The profitability of SRC has suffered as its freight volume has declined. Its annual deficit recently has been about $15 million. World Bank experts claim the only profitable section of the Sudanese rail system is the Port Sudan-Khartoum line. Rates for "strategic" and export goods, such as petroleum products, sugar, and cotton, are kept low. The Ministry of Finance is supposed to compensate SRC for the subsidized rates, but payments are irregular and arbitrary. Periodic rate increases have not kept pace with inflation. SRC rates were raised substantially in 1983. The charge for petroleum tripled, and rates for export goods, general merchandise, and passengers increased 35 to 70 percent. The US Embassy believes these rates are still at subsidized levels, and another deficit for SRC is expected in 1984. Diesel locomotive service was introduced in Sudan in 1960. Diesels have declined from 80 percent of the locomotive fleet in the mid-1960s to 65 percent today. The main reason for the decline seems to be a lack of spare parts that affects diesels more than steam locomotives. Only 55 to 65 percent of the locomotive stock usually is operational. SRC is Sudan's largest employer with about 35,000 workers. Wages constitute 70 percent of its operating costs. The size of the labor force has not changed significantly, even though SRC's service has been declining for 10 years. SRC clearly is overstaffed. Many workers are unqual- ified for skilled work, and many lack motivation because of wages that are low and have been declining in real terms since 1970. The Sudan Railway Workers Union has had little collective bargaining power since its unsuccessful strike in 1981. Competition from the expanding road network probably will further erode the union's economic power. Sudanese railroad workers know that their counter- parts in the Persion Gulf states earn substantially more, but only skilled workers can obtain jobs there. The loss of skilled workers to higher paying jobs in the Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Confidential Sudanese Railway Traffic Density, 1982 (thousand net tons) 0 50 100 150 Kilometers II 0 50 100 150 Miles Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 uontuaennai Navigability of Sudan's Rivers Sudan's rivers contain significant, but not insur- mountable, physical barriers to navigation. five cataracts restrict travel on the Nile-between Khartoum and Wadi Haifa'. In addition, seasonally low waters and shift- ing sands restrict travel on the northern Nile. During the low water season in March, barge loads must be reduced and travel restricted to daylight hours. The Blue Nile from Ad Damazin to Khartoum is naviga- ble most of the year with no cataracts, but the Sennar and Roseires dams restrict continuous travel. There are no cataracts on the White Nile between Khartoum and Juba, and only one dam 40 kilometers south of Khartoum. The 50-year-old Jabal al Awliya' (Jebel Aulia Dam) has locks, but they are unreliable. Shallow stretches and sharp bends between Kusti and Khartoum make travel difficult. Water hyacinth cre- ates a problem on most of the White Nile, slowing barges and damaging propellers. Navigation markers are important because the water surface is often obscured by vegetation. Navigation aids are in place between Kusti and Bentiu, but not for any other portions of Sudan's rivers. The 40 kilometers of river between Mongalla and Juba are steep, with water velocity twice the White Nile average. In addition, low water areas and unsta- ble river banks hinder navigation. This section is often inaccessible in the dry season, when goods must be trucked to Juba. The river route from Juba to Malakal will be shortened if the 360-kilometer Jonglei Canal between Bor and Malakal is completed. The canal was sched- uled for completion in 1986, but. construction has been suspended since November 1983 because of armed attacks by rebels against the French construc- tion company. The canal would divert about 10 percent of the Nile water going into the swampy As Sudd. Navigability of the White Nile in the As Sudd could be reduced during the dry season if Persian Gulf states contributes to SRC's poor per- formance. The structure of job classifications also discourages unskilled workers from acquiring skills on the job. A promotion can disqualify a worker from overtime and reduce his pay. and shortages of spare parts. River Transportation Seventy percent of Sudanese live within 30 kilometers of a navigable river. The rivers appear to be vastly underutilized, however, moving only 2 percent of Sudan's freight and less than 1 percent of the passen- gers. River traffic has been declining since the early 1970s, primarily because of inefficient management, poor equipment, inadequate river transport facilities, The White Nile is an important link between north and south in terms of freight tonnage and the number of passengers carried, even though rivers carry only a small portion of Sudan's total traffic. Major rail and road terminals are located on the rivers to permit the transfer of goods and passengers. Scheduled commercial river service is provided by the government's River Transport Corporation (RTC) on two sections of the Nile: the 1,436-kilometer Southern Reach from Kusti to Juba and the 287-kilometer Northern Reach from Kuraymah to Dunqulah. RTC carries both freight and passengers. The Southern Reach handles roughly twice as many tons and pas- sengers as the Northern Reach and generates slightly more than twice the revenue. RTC uses less than 30 percent of its barge capacity. On the Southern Reach, barges are usually as full as conditions permit southbound but are largely empty on the return trip. Juba had an import-to-export ratio of 4 to 1 in fiscal year 1983. The mostly empty northbound barges make the per-ton-kilometer cost about twice as high downstream as upstream, al- though RTC charges the same freight rates for both directions. RTC is an independent government agency with a virtual monopoly on river transportation. As a result of several studies of Sudan's river transportation, the 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Confidential A steamer on the White Nile with surface vegetation in the government decided in 1979 to let private firms compete with RTC. The government is slowly imple- menting the decision, and as yet little effective compe- tition has developed. RTC will now rent its equipment and tied to the nearest stump. Manual labor is used to transfer most goods. Some ports have mechanical loading and unloading facilities, but they are often inoperative. to any firm it considers a qualified user. A few small, privately owned vessels provide local service on the rivers. Surveys have indicated that other possible entrants are willing to provide service but doubt the government's commitment to privatiza- tion. The only inland transportation connection between Egypt and Sudan is boat service over Lakes Nubia and Nasser, which connect Wadi Halfa' and Aswan. The service is operated by a joint Egypt-Sudan gov- ernmental organization, the Nile Valley Navigation Authority. Boats run twice weekly carrying both passengers and freight. freight traffic is minimal because Wadi Halfa' lac s adequate harbor facilities and mechanized load- ing and unloading. Most permanent port facilities on the White Nile were constructed before the 1950s and need major repairs after 30 years of neglect. RTC has recently obtained funds from the government, but little, if any, have been allocated to improve the primitive port facilities. Barges often are rammed into the river bank Kusti is the major river port. It is a collection point for goods from Port Sudan to the west and south. It also is a major rail and road transfer point. RTC has a shipyard there and in Khartoum. Poor management is causing the rivers to lose their comparative advantage over the highways, even though river transportation is more fuel efficient than road transportation. Trucks are becoming the pre- ferred method of transportation on the routes covered by RTC. Truck shipping costs exceed RTC rates, but speed and reliability allow private truckers to over- come their disadvantage in cost and seasonal opera- tion. The RTC provides no scheduled service on routes that compete with the government railroad. The Chevron Oil Company's involvement in river transportation highlights the untapped potential of Sudan's rivers. Chevron originally rented river craft from RTC to support its oil exploration activities in southern Sudan. Eventually, Chevron prepared a ship- yard at Rabak, where it built three tugs and nine 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 225X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Confidential Sudan: Distribution of Freight Traffic barges. Chevron's river service probably exceeds RTC in ton-kilometers hauled even though it has only one- third of RTC's capacity. Chevron has developed the first comprehensive navigation charts of the White Nile, cleared some channels, and installed navigation buoys from Kusti to Bentiu. Paved Road Transportation Highway construction as well as government policies that artificially lower prices for fuel and imported vehicles have moved roads to the dominant position in Sudanese transportation. Road transportation grew rapidly in the 1970s while rail and river transport were declining. The private sector dominates road transport, although the government and foreign aid finance road construction. The country's paved roads are concentrated in the agricultural areas of central Sudan and generally run westward from Port Sudan. The government shifted its emphasis from rails to road in the mid-1970s. The relatively new road system is part of a six-year development program. This effort to build a 2,800-kilometer network of surfaced roads has received substantial support from foreign donors. Some 1,200 kilometers are still under construction, and more roads are in the planning stage. Sudan's paved roads are constructed with double bitumen surface treatment or asphalt concrete and are designed to last 15 to 20 years. Road life will be shortened, however, if trucks continue to travel with excessive loads. A spot survey in 1981 showed that vehicles exceeded maximum axle capacity 50 percent of the time, and weight limits are not enforced on any of Sudan's roads. foreign donors. The Port Sudan-Khartoum highway is the most heavily traveled road in Sudan. This 1,250-kilometer, two-lane road passes through a major irrigated farm- ing area along the Blue Nile and connects major population centers. Paving was completed in October 1980. The road is of fairly uniform quality despite the involvement of several construction companies and The highway has permitted the movement of goods from Port Sudan that the railroad could not handle. Completion of the paved road has increased fuel efficiency and reduced travel time. A trip that took three to six days in 1979 now takes only 20 hours by truck and 15 hours by car. These advantages will decline, however, as the road deteriorates because of overloaded vehicles and insufficient maintenance The private sector has responded to the opportunities provided by the new paved roads. Most truckers are small operators who own their trucks. Competition is intense, as shown by reduced rates for the return trip to Port Sudan, especially during the slow summer months. Larger trucking companies that use tractor- trailer rigs and operate only on paved roads are becoming more common. Most of these companies are based in Port Sudan, where fuel is readily available. Two major trucking firms are not privately owned: the Sudanese-Kuwait Road Transport Company and the 25X1 Military Transport Company (MTC), an affiliate of the Military Economic Corporation. Both firms offer truck and bus service between Port Sudan and Khartoum. MTC also provides bus service within Khartoum and between Khartoum and Al Ubayyid. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Confidential The Port Sudan-Khartoum highway in the Red Sea hills In February 1984 President Nimeiri ordered MTC to take over the Khartoum Province Public Transport Company, which was having trouble keeping its aging bus fleet operational. MTC recently purchased new buses to serve its monopoly on public transportation in the capital area. The Military Economic Corporation also owns a truck and Land-Rover assembly plant in Port Sudan and probably will begin assembling buses within two years. Most Sudanese motorists lack access to reliable and reasonably priced fuel and lubricants. The govern- ment's General Petroleum Corporation (GPC) con- trols the pricing and allocation of petroleum products. Marketers operating in the official market obtain the same price per gallon of fuel regardless of where it is sold. Consequently, supplies are readily available in Port Sudan and become more difficult to obtain-and the black-market price rises-as the distance from Port Sudan increases. Since July 1981 gasoline has been rationed by vehicle registration, allowing private vehicles 30 to 50 liters per week, depending on availability. Black-market prices of three to five times the official price are common. Periodic rises in the official price of fuel have not kept pace with inflation. Registration of private passenger cars has been in- creasing at a 10-percent annual rate since 1970, but fuel per registered vehicle has fallen by about 50 percent during the same period. The government banned private import of cars and pickup trucks in August 1983 in an attempt to narrow the trade deficit. Import licenses are still available for larger commercial vehicles. The Roads and Bridges Public Corporation (RBPC), a division in the Ministry of Construction and Public Works, is responsible for construction and mainte- nance of primary roads. In RBPC's FY 1983 budget of $35 million, $31 million went to new project construction, $1.5 million to administration, and $2.5 million to maintenance. Road user charges-primari- ly vehicle import duties and fuel taxes-exceed the RBPC budget by $15-20 million per year. The gov- ernment could easily finance its required road mainte- nance if these revenues were earmarked for RBPC, but instead they go into the general treasury. Because the paved road network is relatively new, maintenance requirements will grow as the roads age. The post- ponement of repairs and maintenance will increase the eventual cost. Unpaved Road Transportation in the North and West The most heavily used unpaved northern roads are Khartoum-Dunqulah and `Atbarah-Dunqulah. Road transport to Dunqulah is faster and more reliable, albeit more expensive, than rail and river service. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3