SUDAN: TRANSPORTATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000100140004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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ewitideftmi-
Directorate of
Intelligence
Sudan: Transportation
and Economic Development
A Research Paper
NESA 84-10197
June 1984 :
348
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Intelligence
Sudan: Transportation
and Economic Development
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Confidential
NESA 84-10197
June 1984
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Sudan: Transportation
and Economic Development
Summary Sudan's poor transportation system severely restricts its economic develop-
Information available ment. The system must be improved if Sudan is to expand agricultural
as of 22 April 1984 exports, increase foreign exchange earnings, and thereby manage its
was used in this report.
$9 billion external debt.
Sudan has no significant overland transportation links with neighboring
countries. It relies on shipping through Port Sudan for international trade
and airlines for international movement of passengers.
Poor management by the state-run transportation corporations has caused
Sudan's internal river and rail networks to decline. These networks have
lost many middle managers and technicians to higher paying jobs in the
Persian Gulf states and are overstaffed with unskilled laborers. Unreliable
service is the primary reason these systems have lost traffic to more
expensive road transportation.
The expansion of the paved road network since the mid-1970s has led to a
limited improvement in internal transportation. We believe that further
planned road improvements, particularly in the rain fed agricultural and
livestock areas of western Sudan, will stimulate increased production for
export. Sudan will have difficulty, however, meeting the large maintenance
requirements of its highway system.
A privately owned trucking industry now dominates Sudanese transporta-
tion, using the road network financed by the government and foreign
donors. This passably efficient alternative to state-run transportation gives
farmers greater assurance that their produce will reach export markets and
has lowered a major barrier to private investment.
The Sudanese Government's decisions on the allocation and pricing of
petroleum, however, still significantly hamper privately operated road
transportation. Private fuel consumers have difficulty obtaining supplies at
points distant from Port Sudan. The fuel situation particularly hinders
economic development in the south.
Sudan's transportation network is worst in the south, where southern
dissidents have disrupted transportation links. This has created logistic
problems for the Sudanese armed forces and prevented vital food and
petroleum shipments from reaching the south. Banditry also hinders
southern road transportation and is responsible for higher prices to
compensate truckers for the added risk.
iii Confidential
NESA 84-10197
June 1984
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a.uniiuenuai
North-south transportation links have always been weak, contributing little
to the economic integration or political unification of Sudan. Two major
development projects, the Jonglei Canal and an oil pipeline, will improve
transportation and trade ties, but construction has been suspended because
of dissident attacks on the companies involved.
Improvements in transportation would do more to develop the Sudanese
economy if other, policy-related barriers to development also could be
lowered. The principal barrier is the government's erratic tax and tariff
policies, which have been underscored by its recent moves to Islamize the
economy.
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Sudan: Transportation
and Economic Development
Overview of the System
Transportation problems are endemic to Sudan, which
is sparsely populated, only slightly industrialized, and
has the largest area of any African country (2.5
million square kilometers). Poor transportation
hampers Sudan's economic development and must be
improved if the country is to manage its $9 billion
external debt. Additional foreign exchange earnings
would come from an expansion of agricultural ex-
ports, which could be induced by improvements in
transportation.
rivers are now feeder lines for the railroads, which
generally run east-west from Port Sudan. The river
and rail systems do not overlap and thus do not
compete for traffic. Roads compete, but in many
areas they become impassable during parts of the
rainy season from May to August. The trains and
steamers usually operate all year.
Sudan has neither railroads nor paved roads connect-
ing it with any of its eight neighbors. Transportation
with the outside world is primarily by air for passen-
gers and by ship for freight. Virtually all imports and
Transportation also has been a target of the growing
insurgency in southern Sudan. Dissidents have greatly
curtailed ground transportation in the south since
February 1984. This has created logistic problems for
the Sudanese armed forces and prevented vital food
and petroleum shipments from reaching the south.
Adequate protection of the transportation lines is
beyond the capabilities of the Sudanese Government
because of the long distances involved and the remote-
ness of the south.
The private sector provides 65 percent of Sudan's
transportation, according to the Ministry of Finance.'
This figure, however, hides the true extent of govern-
mental control because public corporations own and
operate river, rail, and air transportation, as well as
Sudan's only seaport. Only road transport is operated
privately, but it carries most of the country's freight
and passengers. The government's investment in
transportation for fiscal year (July to June) 1983 was
$30 million, while foreign sources invested $55 mil-
lion.' More than half of all transportation spending
went toward road construction.
Sudan's main transportation routes were north-south
on the rivers before the railroads were built. The
' Unless otherwise indicated, the basic data about Sudan's transpor-
tation system have been drawn from unclassified Sudanese Govern-
ment publications, press reports, and direct observations by US
defense attaches and Embassy personnel.
exports pass through Port Sudan.
Internal transportation links become weaker with
increasing distance from Port Sudan and Khartoum.
The most primitive and least reliable transportation is
in the south, which has large areas of swampland
where the transportation network is difficult to main-
tain. Northern Sudan also lacks modern transporta-
tion away from the Nile, but this desert area is
virtually uninhabited.
Ports
Port Sudan is the country's only operational deepwa-
ter port. It is owned and operated by Sea Ports
Corporation (SPC), a public enterprise under the
Ministry of Transport. SPC is the only profitable
government transportation corporation. The 15-berth
harbor at Port Sudan is, naturally sheltered, and entry
is rarely affected by bad weather. The port has no
drydock facilities.
The tonnage handled by Port Sudan has risen from 3
million in 1974 to 4 million in 1983. Virtually all of
Sudan's foreign trade passes through Port Sudan,
with import volume exceeding export volume by as
much as 3 to 1. Petroleum products account for half
of import volume.
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Sudan: Transportation Statistics, 1975-82
30,921.0
2,719.0
9,316.0
10,221.0
18,289.0
22,385.0
Freight (thousand metric tons)
3,155.0
3,560.0
3,842.0
3,661.0
3,535.0
4,081.0
3,984.0
3,814.0
Export
852.0
1,311.0
1,363.0
1,154.0
1,006.0
1,259.0
1,103.0
989.0
Import
2,303.0
2,249.0
2,479.0
2,507.0
2,529.0
2,822.0
2,881.0
2,825.0
Railway
Freight (million tons/km)
2,175.0
2,620.0
2,415.0
1,555.0
1,456.0
1,966.0
1,506.0
1,512.0
Passengers (million passengerslkm)
1,101.0
1,166.0
1,294.0
1,192.0
1,057.0
1,061.0
1,033.0
900.0
Passengers/Port Sudan-Khartoum
(thousands)
444.1
474.5
499.9
330.4
214.1
244.9
215.8
Freight (million tonslkm)
82.5
89.5
94.0
88.6
64.9
71.3
88.3
95.3
Passengers (million passengers/km)
87.7
87.7
68.7
114.1
53.9
65.3
25.6
28.3
Roads
Freight (million tons/km)
3,270.0
3,570.0
3,900.0
Passengers (million passengerslkm)
6,500.0
7,200.0
Air
Congestion at Port Sudan became a serious problem
in the late 1970s. It was relieved temporarily when the
Port Sudan-Khartoum highway was completed, en-
abling half of Port Sudan's cargo to be trucked.
Congestion again has increased since June 1983, with
the port operating near capacity. Large quantities of
unclaimed goods are stored in warehouses. The slow
clearance of goods through customs encourages graft
as customers try to avoid delays.
The World Bank is sponsoring projects to mechanize
cargo handling and increase storage areas. Current
and planned projects probably will give the port a
capacity of 5 million tons per year by 1990. Improve-
ments include quay resurfacing, berth extensions,
dredging, and construction of roll-on/roll-off ramps.
Changes also are under way to make it even easier for
trucks to use the port, which was originally designed
as a rail terminus. Efforts to expand Port Sudan's
capacity are limited, however, by the small size of the
harbor, labor intensive cargo handling, and shortages
of space.
Confidential
The World Bank estimates that future cargo-handling
demands will require development of the unused port
at Sawakin-50 kilometers south of Port Sudan-by
the mid-1990s. A feasibility study has been completed
for this project, but funds for construction are un-
available. If the port is built, it would specialize in
handling container and roll-on/roll-off ships, which
are proving difficult to introduce in Port Sudan
because of space limitations. Most of the cargo would
be sent inland by truck because the Port Sudan-
Khartoum highway passes through Sawakin.
In May 1983 work began on Port Nimeiri, 20 kilome-
ters south of Port Sudan. This oil terminal will serve
the oil pipeline being built by the White Nile Petro-
leum Company from oilfields in southern Sudan. The
terminal and pipeline were expected to be completed
by 1986 but probably will be delayed at least a year
because of armed conflict in the south.
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Rail Transportation
Sudan has 4,800 kilometers of narrow-gauge railroad
track, extending from Port Sudan to Wadi Halfa' in
the north, Nyala in the west, and Waw in the south.
The southern regions of A`li an Nil (Upper Nile) and
Al Istiwa'i (Equatoria) are the only areas of signifi-
cant population not served by the rail system. The
entire system is single tracked except for 200 kilome-
ters between Port Sudan and Taqatu 'Hayya. The rail
system is operated by the state-owned Sudan Rail-
ways Corporation (SRC).
The Port Sudan-Khartoum line carries the most
traffic. The farther from Port Sudan, the less is the
amount of cargo carried. The volume of exports
entering Port Sudan by rail is typically 30 to 40
percent of the imports exiting by rail. The problem of
empty eastbound trains is worse on the far reaches of
the rail lines.
Passenger traffic is more evenly distributed than
freight and is heaviest at points close to Port Sudan
and Khartoum. Passenger operations are subsidized
by freight traffic and contribute only 20 percent of the
railroad's revenue.
SRC freight traffic has steadily declined from 2.7
billion ton-kilometers in 1970 to 1.4 billion in 1983.
Most of this decrease is due to deteriorating service,
the opening of an oil pipeline, and competition from
road vehicles. Passenger traffic has declined less than
freight, except for the Port Sudan-Khartoum route,
which faces strong road competition. Road transpor-
tation is about twice as expensive as the railroad but
provides faster and more reliable service. Small loads
are particularly difficult to ship on the railroad.
An 815-kilometer oil pipeline from the Port Sudan
refinery to Khartoum became operational in 1977.
The oil had been carried by railroad tankers, and the
pipeline has freed some of the tankers to carry
petroleum to more distant markets. SRC's petroleum
traffic-which is 40 percent of import volume-may
decline again when the White Nile Petroleum Com-
pany's pipeline is completed. The 1,500-kilometer
pipeline will have a parallel return line to transport
diluents (for the waxy crude) and some refined prod-
ucts to the south.
The profitability of SRC has suffered as its freight
volume has declined. Its annual deficit recently has
been about $15 million. World Bank experts claim the
only profitable section of the Sudanese rail system is
the Port Sudan-Khartoum line. Rates for "strategic"
and export goods, such as petroleum products, sugar,
and cotton, are kept low. The Ministry of Finance is
supposed to compensate SRC for the subsidized rates,
but payments are irregular and arbitrary. Periodic
rate increases have not kept pace with inflation.
SRC rates were raised substantially in 1983. The
charge for petroleum tripled, and rates for export
goods, general merchandise, and passengers increased
35 to 70 percent. The US Embassy believes these
rates are still at subsidized levels, and another deficit
for SRC is expected in 1984.
Diesel locomotive service was introduced in Sudan in
1960. Diesels have declined from 80 percent of the
locomotive fleet in the mid-1960s to 65 percent today.
The main reason for the decline seems to be a lack of
spare parts that affects diesels more than steam
locomotives. Only 55 to 65 percent of the locomotive
stock usually is operational.
SRC is Sudan's largest employer with about 35,000
workers. Wages constitute 70 percent of its operating
costs. The size of the labor force has not changed
significantly, even though SRC's service has been
declining for 10 years.
SRC clearly is overstaffed. Many workers are unqual-
ified for skilled work, and many lack motivation
because of wages that are low and have been declining
in real terms since 1970. The Sudan Railway Workers
Union has had little collective bargaining power since
its unsuccessful strike in 1981. Competition from the
expanding road network probably will further erode
the union's economic power.
Sudanese railroad workers know that their counter-
parts in the Persion Gulf states earn substantially
more, but only skilled workers can obtain jobs there.
The loss of skilled workers to higher paying jobs in the
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Sudanese Railway Traffic Density, 1982
(thousand net tons)
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
II
0 50 100 150 Miles
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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uontuaennai
Navigability of Sudan's Rivers
Sudan's rivers contain significant, but not insur-
mountable, physical barriers to navigation.
five cataracts restrict
travel on the Nile-between Khartoum and Wadi
Haifa'. In addition, seasonally low waters and shift-
ing sands restrict travel on the northern Nile. During
the low water season in March, barge loads must be
reduced and travel restricted to daylight hours. The
Blue Nile from Ad Damazin to Khartoum is naviga-
ble most of the year with no cataracts, but the Sennar
and Roseires dams restrict continuous travel.
There are no cataracts on the White Nile between
Khartoum and Juba, and only one dam 40 kilometers
south of Khartoum. The 50-year-old Jabal al Awliya'
(Jebel Aulia Dam) has locks, but they are unreliable.
Shallow stretches and sharp bends between Kusti and
Khartoum make travel difficult. Water hyacinth cre-
ates a problem on most of the White Nile, slowing
barges and damaging propellers. Navigation markers
are important because the water surface is often
obscured by vegetation. Navigation aids are in place
between Kusti and Bentiu, but not for any other
portions of Sudan's rivers.
The 40 kilometers of river between Mongalla and
Juba are steep, with water velocity twice the White
Nile average. In addition, low water areas and unsta-
ble river banks hinder navigation. This section is
often inaccessible in the dry season, when goods must
be trucked to Juba.
The river route from Juba to Malakal will be
shortened if the 360-kilometer Jonglei Canal between
Bor and Malakal is completed. The canal was sched-
uled for completion in 1986, but. construction has
been suspended since November 1983 because of
armed attacks by rebels against the French construc-
tion company. The canal would divert about 10
percent of the Nile water going into the swampy
As Sudd. Navigability of the White Nile in the
As Sudd could be reduced during the dry season if
Persian Gulf states contributes to SRC's poor per-
formance. The structure of job classifications also
discourages unskilled workers from acquiring skills on
the job. A promotion can disqualify a worker from
overtime and reduce his pay.
and shortages of spare parts.
River Transportation
Seventy percent of Sudanese live within 30 kilometers
of a navigable river. The rivers appear to be vastly
underutilized, however, moving only 2 percent of
Sudan's freight and less than 1 percent of the passen-
gers. River traffic has been declining since the early
1970s, primarily because of inefficient management,
poor equipment, inadequate river transport facilities,
The White Nile is an important link between north
and south in terms of freight tonnage and the number
of passengers carried, even though rivers carry only a
small portion of Sudan's total traffic. Major rail and
road terminals are located on the rivers to permit the
transfer of goods and passengers.
Scheduled commercial river service is provided by the
government's River Transport Corporation (RTC) on
two sections of the Nile: the 1,436-kilometer Southern
Reach from Kusti to Juba and the 287-kilometer
Northern Reach from Kuraymah to Dunqulah. RTC
carries both freight and passengers. The Southern
Reach handles roughly twice as many tons and pas-
sengers as the Northern Reach and generates slightly
more than twice the revenue.
RTC uses less than 30 percent of its barge capacity.
On the Southern Reach, barges are usually as full as
conditions permit southbound but are largely empty
on the return trip. Juba had an import-to-export ratio
of 4 to 1 in fiscal year 1983. The mostly empty
northbound barges make the per-ton-kilometer cost
about twice as high downstream as upstream, al-
though RTC charges the same freight rates for both
directions.
RTC is an independent government agency with a
virtual monopoly on river transportation. As a result
of several studies of Sudan's river transportation, the
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A steamer on the White Nile
with surface vegetation in the
government decided in 1979 to let private firms
compete with RTC. The government is slowly imple-
menting the decision, and as yet little effective compe-
tition has developed. RTC will now rent its equipment
and tied to the nearest stump. Manual labor is used to
transfer most goods. Some ports have mechanical
loading and unloading facilities, but they are often
inoperative.
to any firm it considers a qualified user.
A few small, privately owned vessels provide local
service on the rivers. Surveys have indicated that
other possible entrants are willing to provide service
but doubt the government's commitment to privatiza-
tion.
The only inland transportation connection between
Egypt and Sudan is boat service over Lakes Nubia
and Nasser, which connect Wadi Halfa' and Aswan.
The service is operated by a joint Egypt-Sudan gov-
ernmental organization, the Nile Valley Navigation
Authority. Boats run twice weekly carrying both
passengers and freight.
freight traffic is minimal because Wadi Halfa'
lac s adequate harbor facilities and mechanized load-
ing and unloading.
Most permanent port facilities on the White Nile
were constructed before the 1950s and need major
repairs after 30 years of neglect. RTC has recently
obtained funds from the government, but little, if any,
have been allocated to improve the primitive port
facilities. Barges often are rammed into the river bank
Kusti is the major river port. It is a collection point for
goods from Port Sudan to the west and south. It also
is a major rail and road transfer point. RTC has a
shipyard there and in Khartoum.
Poor management is causing the rivers to lose their
comparative advantage over the highways, even
though river transportation is more fuel efficient than
road transportation. Trucks are becoming the pre-
ferred method of transportation on the routes covered
by RTC. Truck shipping costs exceed RTC rates, but
speed and reliability allow private truckers to over-
come their disadvantage in cost and seasonal opera-
tion. The RTC provides no scheduled service on routes
that compete with the government railroad.
The Chevron Oil Company's involvement in river
transportation highlights the untapped potential of
Sudan's rivers. Chevron originally rented river craft
from RTC to support its oil exploration activities in
southern Sudan. Eventually, Chevron prepared a ship-
yard at Rabak, where it built three tugs and nine
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Sudan: Distribution of Freight Traffic
barges. Chevron's river service probably exceeds RTC
in ton-kilometers hauled even though it has only one-
third of RTC's capacity. Chevron has developed the
first comprehensive navigation charts of the White
Nile, cleared some channels, and installed navigation
buoys from Kusti to Bentiu.
Paved Road Transportation
Highway construction as well as government policies
that artificially lower prices for fuel and imported
vehicles have moved roads to the dominant position in
Sudanese transportation. Road transportation grew
rapidly in the 1970s while rail and river transport
were declining. The private sector dominates road
transport, although the government and foreign aid
finance road construction. The country's paved roads
are concentrated in the agricultural areas of central
Sudan and generally run westward from Port Sudan.
The government shifted its emphasis from rails to
road in the mid-1970s. The relatively new road system
is part of a six-year development program. This effort
to build a 2,800-kilometer network of surfaced roads
has received substantial support from foreign donors.
Some 1,200 kilometers are still under construction,
and more roads are in the planning stage.
Sudan's paved roads are constructed with double
bitumen surface treatment or asphalt concrete and
are designed to last 15 to 20 years. Road life will be
shortened, however, if trucks continue to travel with
excessive loads. A spot survey in 1981 showed that
vehicles exceeded maximum axle capacity 50 percent
of the time, and weight limits are not enforced on any
of Sudan's roads.
foreign donors.
The Port Sudan-Khartoum highway is the most
heavily traveled road in Sudan. This 1,250-kilometer,
two-lane road passes through a major irrigated farm-
ing area along the Blue Nile and connects major
population centers. Paving was completed in October
1980. The road is of fairly uniform quality despite the
involvement of several construction companies and
The highway has permitted the movement of goods
from Port Sudan that the railroad could not handle.
Completion of the paved road has increased fuel
efficiency and reduced travel time. A trip that took
three to six days in 1979 now takes only 20 hours by
truck and 15 hours by car. These advantages will
decline, however, as the road deteriorates because of
overloaded vehicles and insufficient maintenance
The private sector has responded to the opportunities
provided by the new paved roads. Most truckers are
small operators who own their trucks. Competition is
intense, as shown by reduced rates for the return trip
to Port Sudan, especially during the slow summer
months. Larger trucking companies that use tractor-
trailer rigs and operate only on paved roads are
becoming more common. Most of these companies are
based in Port Sudan, where fuel is readily available.
Two major trucking firms are not privately owned: the
Sudanese-Kuwait Road Transport Company and the 25X1
Military Transport Company (MTC), an affiliate of
the Military Economic Corporation. Both firms offer
truck and bus service between Port Sudan and
Khartoum. MTC also provides bus service within
Khartoum and between Khartoum and Al Ubayyid.
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The Port Sudan-Khartoum
highway in the Red Sea hills
In February 1984 President Nimeiri ordered MTC to
take over the Khartoum Province Public Transport
Company, which was having trouble keeping its aging
bus fleet operational. MTC recently purchased new
buses to serve its monopoly on public transportation in
the capital area. The Military Economic Corporation
also owns a truck and Land-Rover assembly plant in
Port Sudan and probably will begin assembling buses
within two years.
Most Sudanese motorists lack access to reliable and
reasonably priced fuel and lubricants. The govern-
ment's General Petroleum Corporation (GPC) con-
trols the pricing and allocation of petroleum products.
Marketers operating in the official market obtain the
same price per gallon of fuel regardless of where it is
sold. Consequently, supplies are readily available in
Port Sudan and become more difficult to obtain-and
the black-market price rises-as the distance from
Port Sudan increases. Since July 1981 gasoline has
been rationed by vehicle registration, allowing private
vehicles 30 to 50 liters per week, depending on
availability. Black-market prices of three to five times
the official price are common. Periodic rises in the
official price of fuel have not kept pace with inflation.
Registration of private passenger cars has been in-
creasing at a 10-percent annual rate since 1970, but
fuel per registered vehicle has fallen by about 50
percent during the same period. The government
banned private import of cars and pickup trucks in
August 1983 in an attempt to narrow the trade
deficit. Import licenses are still available for larger
commercial vehicles.
The Roads and Bridges Public Corporation (RBPC), a
division in the Ministry of Construction and Public
Works, is responsible for construction and mainte-
nance of primary roads. In RBPC's FY 1983 budget
of $35 million, $31 million went to new project
construction, $1.5 million to administration, and $2.5
million to maintenance. Road user charges-primari-
ly vehicle import duties and fuel taxes-exceed the
RBPC budget by $15-20 million per year. The gov-
ernment could easily finance its required road mainte-
nance if these revenues were earmarked for RBPC,
but instead they go into the general treasury. Because
the paved road network is relatively new, maintenance
requirements will grow as the roads age. The post-
ponement of repairs and maintenance will increase
the eventual cost.
Unpaved Road Transportation
in the North and West
The most heavily used unpaved northern roads are
Khartoum-Dunqulah and `Atbarah-Dunqulah. Road
transport to Dunqulah is faster and more reliable,
albeit more expensive, than rail and river service.
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