SRI LANKA: THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNAL VIOLENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000200010004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Sri Lanka:
The Challenge of
Communal Violence
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
NESA 84-10201
June 1984
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ifE Directorate of Secret
Sri Lanka:
The Challenge of
Communal Violence
This paper was prepared b
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with contributions frond
Asia Division, NESA
Office of
Central Reference. Comments an queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, South
Secret
NESA 84-10201
June 1984
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Sri Lanka:
The Challenge of
Communal Violence
Key Judgments President Jayewardene's failure to deal with the demands of Sri Lanka's
Information available Tamil minority-18 percent of the population-has brought the Tamils to
as of 16 May 1984 the brink of open insurrection. In our judgment, Jayewardene, through his
was used in this report.
political maneuvering since his election in 1977, has contributed to the
deterioration of communal relations by:
? Failing to share political power with minority groups and reneging on
other campaign promises made to the Tamil community.
? Publicly announcing his commitment to his Sinhalese Buddhist constitu-
ency at the height of last. summer's communal riots.
? Implementing punitive antiterrorism measures and failing to discipline
security forces responsible for violence against Tamil civilians.
These actions have played into the hands of Tamil extremists. They have
reduced the influence of Tamil moderates and have converted what had
been a demand for limited autonomy into an insurgency calling for
complete separation from the Sinhalese majority.
Most Tamils are aware that an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka is
economically and politically untenable. Tamil demands probably would be
satisfied by a federal structure that would guarantee Tamils control over
security and economic development where they comprise the majority of
the population.
Relations between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamils are complicated
by the role of India. New Delhi probably will seek to exhaust its political
options before intervening militarily in Sri Lanka because of concern about
both Sinhalese retaliation against Tamils and its own international image.
Prime Minister Gandhi, however, has made clear to Jayewardene her
willingness to act forcefully if the situation in Sri Lanka deteriorates much
further. We believe the Indian military over the last several months has im-
proved its ability to mount operations against Sri Lanka. Moreover, New
Delhi continues to provide support to Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents based in
the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.
Indian military intervention probably would be aimed at reducing anti-
Tamil violence and forcing Colombo to accept a political settlement to the
Sinhalese-Tamil problem. We believe it highly unlikely that New Delhi
would seek long-term military involvement in Sri Lanka.
Secret
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President Jayewardene remains immensely popular with Sri Lanka's
Sinhalese Buddhist majority and probably would be returned to office in a
popular election. Moreover, the political opposition is in disarray. In the
event of the President's death during the remaining four years of his term,
his party can turn to several energetic and attractive young cabinet
ministers who have the experience and caste background needed to win a
national election, although they cannot expect to obtain the popular
support that has been given Jayewardene. None of Jayewardene's probable
successors would be likely to offer major concessions to the Tamils for fear
of losing Sinhalese support.
Jayewardene will attempt to portray a series of high-level exchanges and
programs with the United States as indications of US support for his
policies. His state visit to Washington in June will be the highlight of these
exchanges.
Colombo's failure to resolve the country's communal problems makes US
relations with all the countries of the region more difficult. New Delhi is
sensitive to any potential involvement by the United States in the affairs of
the region and will watch closely for the outcome of Jayewardene's trip to
Washington. Although the assertion has been officially denied several
times, Prime Minister Gandhi apparently continues to believe the United
States is seeking to gain port facilities at Trincomalee for the US Navy.
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Secret
Sri Lanka:
The Challenge of
Communal Violence
The ethnic violence between the Sinhalese majority
and the Tamil minority that raged throughout Sri
Lanka last summer reopened old communal wounds
and revealed new tension that threatens the stability
of President Jayewardene's government. Jayewardene
has made only halfhearted efforts to achieve commu-
nal reconciliation and increasingly has shown himself
ready to take repressive measures against the Tamils.
The increased violence has damaged relations be-
tween India and Sri Lanka and threatens to harm US
interests in the region.
Sri Lanka: Population by
Ethnic Group and Religion, 1981
Number of Percent of
Persons Population
Ethnic group 14,851,000 100.0
Sinhalese 10,986,000 74.0
Ceylon Tamil 1,872,000 12.6
Indian Tamil 825,000 5.6
Ethnic violence and antagonism are deeply rooted in
Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese and Tamils each think of
themselves as a minority community, according to
scholarly accounts. The Sinhalese, who constitute 74
percent of the population, view themselves as guard-
ians of a unique language and culture and as con-
stantly under threat of submersion by the massive
Indian presence on the subcontinent. They see Sri
Lankan Tamils, who comprise 18 percent of the
population, as fifth columnists for the 41 million
Tamils in India only 30 kilometers across the Palk
Strait. Sri Lankan Tamils, who note that their com-
munity has lived on the island for more than a
millenium, are proud of the evolution of their culture
and language. Although conscious of the Tamil com-
munity in south India, they view Sri Lanka as their
Ceylon Moor 1,057,000 7.1
111,000 0.7
Religion 14,851,000 100.0
Buddhist
Hindu
Muslim
2,296,000 15.5
1,135,000 7.6
1,010,000 6.8
Catholic
Christian
Other
102,000 0.7
15,000 0.1
Scholarly studies note that Sinhalese share a common
world view shaped by their perception of themselves
as the inheritors of a great classical tradition. This
view is marked by adherence to and respect for
Buddhism, preservation of the Sinhala language, and
resistance to foreign aggression-historically, Tamil
expansionism.
traditional homeland.
The Sinhala-speaking people of Sri Lanka have in-
habited the island for more than 2,500 years and are
an offshoot of the Indo-Aryan cultures that settled
north India. Nearly constant war with the Tamil
kingdoms of southern India, dynastic squabbling,
recurrent drought, and European expansion forced the
traditional culture from the coastal region to the
mountainous region centered on Kandy and its envi-
Ceylon Tamils migrated to Sri Lanka iin several waves
during the last 1,000 years and are concentrated
largely in the north and northeast parts of the island.
They are important in mercantile and financial activi-
ties throughout the country and form a large propor-
tion of the country's professional classes.
rons.
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Ethnic Groups and Religions in Sri Lanka
Palk
Strait
Galley
ISL'AIM) I
V
CHRISTIAN I
COLOMBO;
ISCA'Ai
Ceylon Tamil
Indian Tamil
Sinhalese
Ceylon Moor
Religion
Proposed boundary of
independent Tamil state
Bay
of
Bengal
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Buddhism and Buddhist Institutions
in Sri Lanka
Buddhism was introduced into Sri Lanka from India
in the third century BC and through the patronage of
ruling dynasties rapidly became the dominant reli-
gion of the country. The Theravada School became
the established religion of the court by the medieval
period. Theravada Buddhism also is practiced in
Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and parts of
Vietnam. Religious missions and visits over the cen-
turies have fostered warm relations among these
countries
Under colonial rule the country's Buddhist institu-
tions came under increasing attack. By the end of the
19th century the British had nearly destroyed the
traditional social structure that maintained the cler-
gy. Schools, lands, and other sources of revenue
passed into the hands of the Colonial Office.
Buddhism began to reestablish itself in the country in
the first decades of this century. Various nationalist
groups renounced the trappings of colonialism and
began to foster a resurgence of traditional Sinhalese
culture, including support to the Buddhist clergy and
the social institutions of the religion.
The Tamils' group identity is maintained through use
of Tamil as their mother tongue and by observing
certain distinctive features of caste and custom.
Scholars note that Ceylon Tamils, aware that they
share their language and customs with the much
larger Tamil community of south India and with the
substantial Tamil communities of Africa and south-
east Asia, lack the sense of isolation and insularity
exhibited by the Sinhalese. Ceylon Tamils are more
than 90 percent Hindu
The "Indian Tamils" form a distinct segment of Sri
Lanka's Tamil population. Most are descendants of
the agricultural laborers from south India recruited
during British rule to work on tea plantations in the
central highlands. Isolated physically from the rest of
With independence in 1948, Buddhismn started to
reassert its influence as the reservoir of Sinhalese
language and custom. The number of monks in the
country grew rapidly, the traditional system of monk-
teachers in the schools reappeared, and monks began
to enter new fields such as politics, medicine, and
government service. Monks began to be seen as
nationalist leaders and to gain fame fir their impas-
sioned public sermons callingfor the establishment of
Sinhala as the national language. The apex of Bud-
dhist monk involvement in national politics occurred
in 1959 when, at the height of the "Sinhala Only"
movement, a radical monk assassinated Prime Min-
ister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike.
In Sri Lanka today Buddhism plays a profound role
in shaping the social and political thinking of the
Sinhalese. The resurgence of the religion in the last
few decades coupled with the political utility of
identifying the Sinhalese people, the Sinhala lan-
guage, and the Sinhalese homeland as a rallying
point are powerful factors increasing the polarization
of the Tamil and Sinhalese communities.
the country's Tamils, they are generally members of
low Hindu castes and do not identify with Ceylon
Tamils. Indian Tamils are represented in the govern-
ment by the head of their trade union. They have not
been actively involved in the country's communal
conflicts.
When the British turned the country over to an
elected government composed of Sinhalese, Tamil,
and Muslim representatives in 1948, the overriding
concern of all ethnic communities was to achieve a
unified and independent nation. The coalition that.
formed the first government agreed to postpone until
after independence nagging questions concerning rela-
tions between the communal groups.
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Tamil stores destroyed by Sin-
halese mobs, July 1983. Large
blocks of Tamil property in Co-
lombo and the surrounding
area were burned or looted dur-
ing the weeklong rampage.
Following independence, political constituencies
formed increasingly along ethnic lines. A party's
electoral success grew in proportion to its ability to
appeal to particular ethnic or religious groups. Each
succeeding election campaign was marked by progres-
sively more strident stands on communal issues and
more frequent outbreaks of communal violence.F_
By the general election of 1956-only eight years
after independence-Sinhalese-dominated parties had
gained control of the government and driven the small
Tamil parties out of the mainstream of political life.
Sporadic efforts to find political formulas to reduce
communal tensions have been largely unsuccessful, in
our view, because of mutual suspicions and continuing
appeals by most politicians to ethnic antagonisms to
build electoral support.
The increasing rigidity of communal politics and the
continuing failure of the central government to re-
spond to communal demands, in our view, have
fostered the growth of radicalism, terrorism, and
violence. Disaffected Tamil youths formed terrorist
"Tiger" organizations in the mid-1970s, which have
been responsible for bombings, robberies, and political
assassinations. Faced with the threat of personal
violence as well as their constituents' longstanding
distrust of the Sinhalese, many Tamil politicians have
been compelled to take an increasingly hard line in
communal negotiations. On the Sinhalese side,
youths, often encouraged by chauvinistic politicians,
have formed secret gangs to terrorize local Tamils and
organize communal riots.
national development projects.
The two communities have remained at loggerheads
over intertwined issues of federalism and access to the
benefits of modernization. The Tamils, according to
Embassy and scholarly reports, have become con-
vinced that they should have both an autonomous
homeland with control over security forces and access
to more economic development projects. The Sinha-
lese, in contrast, will allow no division of their island
homeland and do not want to cede control over
The ethnic animosity between the two groups burst to
the surface in July 1983, when the worst communal
riots in Sri Lanka's history left more than 400 Tamils
dead and thousands homeless. Gangs of Sinhalese,
sometimes assisted by Army troops and policemen,
attacked Tamils, their homes, and their businesses.
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Tamil terrorist groups have drawn most of their
active members from unemployed, frustrated univer-
sity students, a group that has most acutely felt the
effects of Colombo's discriminatory educational and
employment practices. Such students also have been
exposed to the international rhetoric of terrorism and
have characterized their movement as "People's Lib-
eration, " "Resistance to Genocide, " and other slo-
gans common to international terrorist groups.
Members of several groups have received training
with the PLO, the IRA, and West German terrorist
groups and are known to have camps in many parts of
India. The main source of support from abroad
comes from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, whose
41 million Tamils are in sympathy with the insurgent
movement and provide sanctuary and help not only to
the militants but to the large number of refugees who
flee Sri Lanka following each wave of ethnic violence.
Tigers, TSLT). Founded by Uma Maheshwaran.
Tamil Eelam Republican Army (TERA). Also led by
Uma Maheshwaran; considered to be the more radi-
cal wing of PLOTE.
organizations.
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (also
known as Terros). Led by Velupillai Prabhakaran;
broke with the PLOTE. The leaders of both groups
are involved in a blood feud for control of the
Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA). Founded by
Kuttimani (killed in the Colombo prison riots of July
1983); then led by Kulasegaram Devasegaram (also
known as Oberoi Devan), who was assassinated by the
LTTE in August 1983
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO). As of
March 1983 led by Sri Sabaratnam (also known as
Tall Sri).
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We believe the insurgents are well financed and
maintain large stores of arms obtained from robber-
ies of security forces and police stations and through
contacts in the Middle East. The expatriate Sri
Lankan Tamil community is well organized and
remits substantial sums to the insurgents. Bank
robberies are another source offunding and have been
a special favorite of the PLOTE and LTTE groups.
The term "Tigers" came into use in Sri Lanka in the
mid-1970s to identify members of various Tamil
extremist separatist organizations representing a
wide range of terrorist sympathies. We believe none of
these groups consist of more than a few dozen
hardcore members at any one time. The most impor-
tant groups are listed below in order of prominence
and level of activity.
People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
(PLOTE) (also known as Tamil State Liberation
Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students
(EROS). Said to be led by "Annailingam. " Reported
to be the parent organization of the more militant
EPRLF.
Tamil Eelam Liberation Front (TELF). Broke with
the more moderate Tamil United Liberation Front
(TULF) in 1982; led by Kovi Mahesan and V.
Dharmalingam.
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front
(EPRLF). Led by U. Ranjan and V. Perumal; claims
to have more than 600 members training in India.
Refers to its action squads as the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), which claimed responsibility for kid-
naping two US AID workers in Jaffna in May 1984.
Cobras. Local Tamil group in the Batticaloa area;
said to represent local Tamil and Muslim interests
distinct from the Jaffna groups.
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Many local observers believe that government offi-
cials, perhaps including some cabinet ministers, aided
and encouraged the rampage.
The riots badly damaged the ability of President
Jayewardene to mediate ethnic demands. Jayewar-
dene had attracted a large number of Tamil voters in
the election in 1977 with promises to create a system
of regional development and administrative councils
in Tamil areas-a promise that was never fulfilled.
Faced with the evidence of the depth of Sinhalese
communal feelings during the riots, the President, in
our view, chose to save his own political position. He
did little during the first days of violence. Moreover,
according to press accounts, Jayewardene's initial
speech after the riots referred only to the needs of the
"Sinhalese people"-he failed to mention the suffer-
ing of the Tamil victims.
Following the riots, the President appeared to align
himself even more closely with the Sinhalese. Accord-
ing to press and Embassy reports, Jayewardene
pushed through Parliament constitutional changes
outlawing any political party calling for partition of
the country, in effect disenfranchising the Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF), which represents
the moderate Tamil view. The President and his
closest advisers in early August allowed Sinhalese
chauvinist groups to begin moving landless Sinhalese
farmers into the choice lands of the Mahaweli Irriga-
tion Project, an area traditionally claimed by Tamil
peasants. Following an outcry by Tamil leaders,
Jayewardene declared the land would again become
state property, but new apportionment schemes clear-
ly will give much of the land to the Sinhalese.F_~
The President's convening of an all-parties conference
in December 1983 was an obvious response to de-
mands from New Delhi and elsewhere that efforts be
made at communal reconciliation. The TULF was
excluded, however, and the effort has been plagued by
walkouts and boycotts staged by representatives of
both the Tamil and Sinhalese communities. The
conference has held intermittent meetings for more
than five months, but, in our view, it has served
primarily as a sounding board for venting ethnic
grievances
Jayewardene has carefully avoided identifying himself
or his party with any of the recommendations pro-
posed at the conference. He has effectively put dis-
tance between himself and any discussion hinting at
the creation of a regional or federal administrative
system for Tamil majority areas. According to US
Embassy reporting, both Jayewardene's United Na-
tional Party (UNP) and the major Sinhalese opposi-
tion party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) of
ex-Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, fear get-
ting too far ahead of their conservative Sinhalese
Buddhist constituencies. The SLFP walked out of the
talks in an apparent effort to portray itself as the
staunchest defender of the traditional Buddhist elec-
torate. Leaders of the three major Buddhist lay
organizations walked out a week later.
The failure of the conference was followed by a
resurgence in communal violence during the spring of
1984. Since February, Tamil Tiger attacks have
increased against isolated military outposts.
In the first insurgent action against foreigners in Sri
Lanka, an American couple connected with a US
AID project in Jaffna was kidnaped for five days in
May before being released unharmed. Their abduc-
tors identified themselves as members of the People's
Liberation Army, the militant Marxist-Leninist fac-
tion of the most radical insurgent group. According to
the group's spokesman in Madras, the kidnaping was
an attempt to focus international attention on the
plight of the "oppressed Tamil people of Sri Lanka"
and to highlight their claim that US intelligence
forces were assisting Jayewardene in repressing Tam-
ils.
We believe current Tamil sentiment is that Jayewar-
dene has made no serious effort to meet moderate
Tamil demands for limited economic and political
autonomy for Tamil majority areas, equal use of
Tamil and Sinhala languages in national affairs, or
guarantees of equality of communal groups in govern-
mental hiring and education. Recent US travelers to
Tamil areas found wide support for the Tigers and no
optimism about a political settlement.
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We believe the frustrations of the last year have
convinced even moderate Tamils they must press for a
separate homeland with the hope of achieving at least
a federal relationship with Colombo. According to
Embassy reports, the ferocity of last summer's riots
and the continuing intransigence of Sinhalese repre-
sentatives at the bargaining table have pushed the
Tamils into a political corner. At the very least, we
assess that most Tamils believe they must have con-
trol of the security forces in Tamil majority areas and
management of national development programs that
affect Tamils.
Prime Minister Gandhi, in our view, believes ethnic
violence in Sri Lanka can have serious repercussions
for India as well as her own political future. Colom-
bo's handling of last summer's violence has height-
ened Indian concern about Sri Lanka's commitment
to protect its Tamil minority. We believe New Delhi
seeks stability in Sri Lanka and at the same time is
under pressure from the Tamils in the Indian state of
Tamil Nadu to protect Sri Lankan Tamils.
Although Prime Minister Gandhi has used her good
offices to bring together representatives of the Tamil
separatists and the central government
New Delhi is also granting sanc-
tuary to Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents in Tamil Nadu
and has permitted the creation of numerous training
camps near New Delhi, Madras, and elsewhere in the
We believe New Delhi's support for Sri Lanka's
Tamil separatists probably is an effort to control a
movement it cannot eradicate. Gandhi cannot move
against Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu without
risking the loss of Indian Tamil votes iin this election
year. Moreover, New Delhi sees its involvement with
Tamil insurgents as an important adjunct to India's
diplomatic and military options.
The specter of a trained force of Tamil insurgents in
Tamil Nadu responsive to New Delhi, however, com-
plicates Jayewardene's efforts to maintain a dialogue
between the two communities. In our judgment, Tam-
il separatists believe New Delhi backs their efforts
and are likely to raise the level of violence to bring
about a Sinhalese backlash.
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leaders believe a repetition of last summer's violence
would draw India into the struggle and secure parti-
tion of the country. 25X1
Gandhi wants to forestall intervention in Sri Lanka by 25X1
the superpowers. Indian officials reacted with dismay
last summer after hearing of Sri Lanka's thinly veiled
pleas for security help from several countries, includ-
ing Pakistan, Bangladesh, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Within days of the outbreak of
violence, Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister had asked for
US support for the Jayewardene government, includ-
ing weapons, training in antiguerrilla techniques, and
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Major Communal Disorders
Since Independence (1948)
June 1956-Crowds of more than 10,000 Sinhalese
attack peaceful Tamil demonstration callingfor lan-
guage equality with Sinhala.
Spring 1958-Failure of the Bandaranaike-Chelvan-
ayakam Agreement to create a Tamil state within a
national federal government results in mass riots and
the movement of thousands of Tamils to Jaffna. F_
April 1961-National emergency imposed to halt
riots following Tamil Federal Party's peaceful dem-
onstrations for language equality.
January 1966-Sinhalese in Colombo riot following
passage of Tamil Language Special Provisions Act;
large numbers of Tamils flee north.
July 1975-Assassination of mayor of Jaffna (a
Tamil) by Tamil terrorists for cooperating with the
predominantly Sinhalese central government pro-
vokes local rioting.
August 1977-Communal violence originating in
Jaffna spreads to urban areas of south Sri Lanka;
120 dead, 50,000 displaced, 5,000 Tamils move to
Jaffna.
Summer 1979-Following terrorist attacks and riots,
state of emergency declared in Jaffna.
a show of force by the US Navy. Each of these
suggestions was rejected by Washington, and
Jayewardene subsequently denied ever having made
them.
New Delhi is preparing for the possibility of direct
military intervention. In the aftermath of the ethnic
violence in Sri Lanka last summer, India's Defense
Council, chaired by Prime Minister Gandhi, consid-
ered various military options for dealing with another
serious outbreak of rioting on the island.
November 1979-Sinhalese security forces clash
with Tamil demonstrators, burn the rare Tamil
manuscript collection of the Jaffna Library. 0
Spring 1983-More than a dozen separate terrorist
incidents leave over 30 dead, 100 wounded, several
hundred arrested, and the imposition of an island-
wide curfew.
July 1983-Following increased terrorist attacks in
the northern part of the island, Sinhalese mobs in
Colombo and other southern cities riot, leaving more
than 400 dead and 130,000 Tamils displaced.F_
March 1984-Widespread terrorist attacks through-
out Tamil areas in the north.
March 1984-Lalith Athulathmudali made Minister
for National Security; initiates "Surveillance Zone"
around the northern coastline.
April 1984-Sri Lankan Navy fires on alleged terror-
ist craft in Surveillance Zone, capturing five Tamil
suspects and killing 13 others.
May 1984-Two US AID workers kidnaped by the
EPRLF; held five days and released unharmed.
We judge that Gandhi considers any one of the
following possible scenarios as serious enough to
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This cartoon illustrates the
common Sinhalese belief that
Tamils from the south Indian
state of Tamil Nadu are active-
ly supporting the efforts of the
Sri Lankan Tamil separatists
in an attempt to divide the
country.
justify increased Indian diplomatic pressure on Co-
lombo and, if unsuccessful, direct military
intervention:
? Large numbers of Tamil refugees leaving Sri Lanka
for sanctuary in Tamil Nadu, thereby destabilizing
the state and straining relations between Madras
and New Delhi.
? Large-scale internal disorders that would threaten
to attract foreign intervention from within or out-
side South Asia.
? Human rights abuses by the government that would
increase pressure from Indian Tamils on New Delhi.
? Increasingly large numbers of Sri Lankan Tamils
receiving foreign terrorist support (PLO, Libya) and
then transiting or basing in south India.
? Any sign that Sri Lankan Tamil separatism would
trigger a resurgence of separatism in Tamil Nadu.
The Indian Navy, in our view, can launch a small
amphibious assault force against Sri Lanka on short
notice. We estimate that the Navy's six modern Soviet
landing ships and four Indian-produced utility landing
craft can move, in a single lift, one fully equipped
infantry battalion and some supporting armor.
Sri Lanka's 25,000-man military (active duty and
reserve personnel combined), in our view, could offer
only token resistance to an amphibious invasion by
India. They are primarily an internal security force,
understaffed and ill equipped. The Army has few
armored personnel carriers; the Navy has only small
patrol craft; the Air Force has no combat aircraft.
In our opinion, the likelihood of a peaceful resolution
of the tensions that divide Sri Lankan society is
rapidly diminishing. Younger and more militant com-
munal leaders of both communities, raised in a post-
colonial atmosphere emphasizing ethnic differences,
are less ready to compromise and more prone to 25X1
violence. We believe Jayewardene's June visit to the
United States will most likely trigger a new round of
Tamil insurgent activity and Sinhalese retaliation and
again raise the possibility of Indian intervention.
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Jayewardene, faced with the intransigence of his
Sinhalese constituency, will make no real concessions.
The government may offer a new form of district
development councils to give the appearance of concil-
iation, but we believe the Tamil politicians will not
accept any proposal that does not include substantial
local autonomy, including control of police and securi-
ty forces in predominantly Tamil areas.
We see no evidence that Jayewardene's rule is threat-
ened or that any of his potential successors have
actively challenged his authority as a result of last
summer's disturbances. Although several members of
the President's United National Party have been
building political constituencies, in our view none has
the wide range of caste and community support that
Jayewardene can still call upon. Moreover, none of
the President's potential successors is likely to risk loss
of Sinhalese support by advocating a change in com-
munal policy sufficient to satisfy even moderate Tam-
ils.
We believe that India will seek to exhaust political
options before taking military action. Prime Minister
Gandhi has not yet raised the issue of human rights
for Sri Lanka's Tamil minority in the meetings of the
Nonaligned Movement or the United Nations, nor has
New Delhi responded to the demands by the govern-
ment of Tamil Nadu to mount an investigation into
Sri Lanka's communal affairs. We judge that Gandhi
is aware that military intervention might provoke
widespread attacks by Sinhalese against Tamils be-
fore Indian forces could consolidate control. An Indi-
an military move also would blemish New Delhi's
credentials in the Nonaligned Movement and damage
relations with Pakistan, which would see the interven-
tion as yet another example of India's determination
to exercise hegemony in the region.
Implications for the United States
Jayewardene has been trying to embroil the United
States in Sri Lanka's affairs. During last summer's
riots Colombo requested US security assistance, in-
cluding weapons, small river craft, and advisers.
(Some of these weapons would have been useful
beyond immediate internal security needs.) According
to the US Embassy, the initial request has been
followed by several suggestions from Jayewardene
that a friendship treaty would be to the advantage of
both countries
Jayewardene also is attempting to portray a series of
high-level visits and programs as support for his
government. Jayewardene will make a state visit to
the United States in June. He also has welcomed the
US Peace Corps back to the country and supported an
increase in Voice of America activities on the island.
Increased identification with Jayewardene at this
time could damage US prestige in the region and in
parts of the Third World. It could be perceived by
other small ethnic groups as acceptance by the United
States of the use of repression against minorities.
Moreover, elements of the highly politicized Tamil
minority in Sri Lanka might even turn to the Soviet
Union for support. The terrorists who abducted two
American citizens in Jaffna in May 1984 invoked
leftist rhetoric in their public statements. Finally,
Tamil-speaking minorities are politically active in
several countries-Singapore, Canada, Malaysia, and
the United States-and might attempt to bring politi-
cal pressure to bear against the United States as well
as Sri Lanka in international forums.
Ironically, both the Tamil and Sinhalese communities
seek to control the harbor at Trincomalee because
they believe that the port will provide a bargaining
chip in dealing with the United States. Despite re-
peated denials by prominent US officials, both the
Tamil and Sinhala press have frequently reported that
the United States wants to use Trincomalee as a naval
station.
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Secret
Appendix B
The Sri Lankan Military
The Sri Lankan military is plagued with mismanage-
ment, favoritism, and other administrative problems.
Although the Army has not been involved in political
affairs to the extent evident in other parts of the Third
World, scholarly studies reveal a history of inept coup
planning by the military. Political maneuvering by
members of the government to assure control of the
armed forces has sapped morale and commitment.
Initial appointment to all branches is dependent upon
patronage by a member of Parliament, and all subse-
quent opportunities for training, advancement, and
other perquisites are as much a function of political
alliances as talent and achievement.
The military is overwhelmingly Sinhalese, a factor
that seriously hinders the military's ability to deal
with ethnic affairs. Indeed, soldiers participated in the
Colombo riots of July 1983. The President-who is
also Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces-has
not disciplined soldiers found guilty of reprisal raids
against Tamil civilians.
We believe the military's repressive tactics have fur-
ther radicalized the Tamil citizenry and destroyed
any rapport that might have existed between Colombo
and the Tamil population. According to press ac-
counts, Sinhalese soldiers pulled Tamil youths off
buses at random and executed them beside the road at
several places in Jaffna during April 1984. During
that same month, Sinhalese soldiers opened fire on a
crowd of women and children in a crowded market
outside Jaffna, wounding and killing more than 20
civilians. Although the Army has claimed that such
incidents are necessary to maintain control over a
hostile population that supports the militant Tamil
insurgents, we believe these reprisals illustrate the
failure of Colombo to control the military and use it
effectively.
Understaffed and ill equipped, we judge that the Sri
Lankan forces will be hard pressed to cope with
increasing Tamil separatist attacks in the north. Even
given the strategic advantages of home terrain, popu-
lation sympathy, and perhaps even initial numerical
advantage, the Sri Lankan forces are no match for an
invasion by a modern force.
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