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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000200060002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Threatens Stability
Middle East:
Rapid Urbanization
Seer-et
NESA 84-10220
July 1984
Copy 4 0 4
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Middle East:
Rapid Urbanization
Threatens Stability
This paper was prepared byl (Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.F-
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, on
Secret
NESA 84-10220
July 1984
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Middle East:
Rapid Urbanization
Threatens Stability[
Key Judgments Rapid urbanization in the Middle East, which presents an increasing
Information available challenge to the ability of governments to manage social change and meet
as of 22 June 1984 the demands of urban dwellers for goods and services, poses a long-term
was used in this report.
threat to many states in the region. Governments of poorer states find
themselves hard put to meet the backlog of demands from their rapidly ur-
banizing society, let alone satisfy new ones. Even the oil-rich states face
difficulties in controlling the social change that urbanization has set in
motion.
A declining standard of urban life caused by overcrowding and compound-
ed by slow or declining economic growth make several major cities prime
breeding grounds for opposition political activity during the rest of this
decade:
? The Governments of Egypt and Morocco face the most immediate threat
of major urban unrest as residents in Cairo and Casablanca increasingly
lose patience with the rising cost of living and lack of housing and jobs.
Unrest in Casablanca is likely to spread to other Moroccan cities and
could cause a widespread breakdown in law and order.
? The Government of Tunisia will face renewed unrest in Tunis unless it
can reduce urban unemployment.
? Algeria and Iraq so far have not experienced urban unrest in Algiers or
Baghdad despite the influx of migrants into these cities. In Algeria we
believe this is in large part prevented by the relatively healthy economy.
In Iraq the government has sought to forestall popular dissatisfaction
with the war with Iran by maintaining an artificially high standard of liv-
ing in the cities. Should either of these conditions change, pent-up urban
dissatisfaction is likely to break loose.
Over the longer term, the major cities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the
other Gulf states are likely to become battlegrounds between old and new
generations, traditional and modern elites, and native and expatriate
populations. If there is a marked economic decline that accentuates income
differences between these groups, we expect these governments will have
difficulty keeping social tensions in check.
The increasing likelihood of urban unrest will limit domestic policy options.
Countries like Egypt and Morocco will request more US economic aid and
expertise for urban management.
iii Secret
NESA 84-10220
July 1984
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In a worst case scenario, a serious breakdown of law and order in a major
Middle Eastern city could prompt intervention by neighboring countries
seeking to prevent the spread of unrest. Opposition elements assisted by
such external troublemakers as Libya, Iran, or the Soviet Union would be
tempted to exploit latent urban-based discontent, jeopardizing the US
interest in maintaining regional stability.
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Middle East:
Rapid Urbanization
Threatens Stability
According to recent academic studies, until the 1970s
government leaders in the Middle East-like leaders
in other developing regions-welcomed rapid urban-
ization as a sign that industrialization was taking root.
Using urbanization in the West as a model, they
believed that income growth rates in the cities would
eventually level off as the urban labor market became
saturated with migrants. They expected that agricul-
tural sector growth and the increasingly scarce rural
labor pool would raise rural incomes to levels roughly
equal to those in the cities, in turn checking the flow
of rural migrants to the cities.
By the 1970s, however, it was apparent that this self-
adjusting labor market was not developing. The in-
creasing numbers of migrants from the countryside
outstripped the ability of the cities to accommodate
them. Regime optimism about the expected advan-
tages of urbanization was replaced by concern about
overurbanization-the inability of local and national
governments to provide housing, basic services, and
job opportunities for their growing populations-in
most of the capital-poor states of the Middle East.
Even in the richer countries, we believe that leaders
are becoming increasingly worried about the rapid
social change and commensurate threat to political
stability that urbanization brings.
According to UN projections, the population of the
Middle East as a whole will be more than 60 percent
urban by the year 2000 (table 1).' More than three-
fourths of the countries of the Middle East have
already surpassed the 50-percent level. The West
became highly urbanized and developed the needed
social, political, and institutional skills to run the
' There is no internationally accepted definition of "urban." Most
countries in the Middle East define a settled place as urban if its
population exceeds 5,000 and it has a predominantly nonagricultur-
cities over the course of the Industrial Revolution-
about 150 years. In contrast, the Middle East will
have attained a high level of urbanization in only
about 40 years, giving it slightly more than one
generation to adapt to urban ways. Even the few
states that the United Nations expects to show rela-
tively low levels of urbanization by regional stand-
ards-Sudan, Oman, North Yemen-still will have
experienced rapid urban growth by the end of this
century
This urban explosion has been characterized by rapid
growth of the largest cities, where the concentration
of political power, goods and services, and industry
serve as powerful attractions for both industrial em-
ployers and rural migrants. In most states of the
Middle East, the urban population is concentrated in
one or two cities (table 2). Cairo's population, for
example, is about twice the combined populations of
Egypt's next three largest cities, while Casablanca's
population is about equal to the combined populations
of Morocco's next three largest cities.
We expect the large cities of the Middle East to
continue to grow, but most of them at a slightly slower
pace as the urban lifestyle-better education, female
labor force participation, and crowded housing condi-
tions, for example-is reflected in fertility declines. In
most of the Gulf states, however, we expect the major
cities to continue to show exceptionally high rates of
growth because these states began their urban explo-
sions only in the 1970s (table 3)
Economic, Political, and Military Conditions
In our judgment, changes in economic, political, and
military conditions have had a more pronounced
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Table 1
Middle East: UN Estimates and Projections
of Urbanization, 1950-2000
Total Country Population
(thousands)
Algeria
8,753
21,309
37,041
22
65
76
Egypt
20,461
47,153
64,421
32
47
57
Libya
1,029
3,677
6,077
19
58
72
3,530
14
Iraq
5,158
14,996
24,198
35
75
83
Israel
1,258
4,028
5,619
65
90
93
Jordan
1,237
2,754
4,772
35
59
69
3,495
10,076
18,677
31
53
64
United Arab Emirates
70
883
1,286
25
76
84
North Yemen
3,324
5,901
9,828
2
12
22
South Yemen
992
2,147
3,312
19
39
51
influence on urban growth in the Middle East than
elsewhere in the developing world:
? The oil boom has induced a flow of migrants,
natives as well as expatriates, to such centers as
Jidda, Riyadh, and Kuwait City.
? The Arab-Israeli conflicts have brought refugee
influxes into such cities as Amman, Cairo, and
Beirut. Between 1967 and 1980, according to a
recent academic study, an estimated 250,000 Pales-
tinians moved to Amman, while Egyptian census
data indicate that almost 500,000 Egyptians moved
into Cairo from the devastated settlements of the
Suez Canal zone following the 1973 war. Beirut has
received not only Palestinian refugees but also Shias
fleeing Israeli raids in southern Lebanon as well.
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Table 2
Middle East: UN Population Estimates
and Projections for Major Cities, 1950-2000
Algeria
Baghdad
579
6,269
11,037
Algiers
445
1,502
2,588
Al Basrah
116
1,097
1,990
Constantine
121
486
897
Mosul
144
583
970
Cairo
2,466
8,288
12,858
Tel Aviv-Yafo
359
1,359
1,763
Alexandria
1,037
3,012
4,747
Jerusalem
126
312
424
66
191
Tunis
481
1,133
1,734
Jidda
a
1,058
2,059
Sfax
324
493
Mecca
173
513
876
a No data, population less than 100,000.
e CIA estimates.
Note: City population may vary widely from these estimates and
projections developed from survey and census data because of
migration associated with current conflicts.
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Table 3
Middle East: Average Annual Rates
of Growth for Total, National Urban, and
Major City Populations, 1980-85
Total Urban City Total Urban City
National National
North Africa
Iraq
3.4 4.6
Algeria 3.5 5.4
Baghdad
Algiers
3.5
Al Basrah
Constantine
4.4
Mosul
Egypt
Cairo
Morocco
3.2
4.8
Lebanon
Casablanca
3.8
Beirut a
Fez
4.1
Muscat
Marrakech
3.7
Qatar
Sudan
2.9
6.3
Doha
Tunis
3.1
Jidda
Sfax
2.6
Mecca
Western Sahara
2.8
3.1
Syria
Manama
3.0
United Arab Emirates
Iran
3.0
4.7
Dubayy
Tehran
4.4
North Yemen
Rai
10.4
Sanaa
-Mashhad _
4.5
South Yemen
2.7
4.2
Esfahan
4.4
Aden
Tabriz
3.9
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The building boom: construc-
tion in Abu Dhabi (top) and
Amman (bottom)F----]
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? We believe that Baghdad and Tehran are experienc-
ing rapid growth, partly as a result of an influx of
migrants fleeing battle zones.
The Rural Exodus
Urbanization in the Middle East has coincided with a
period of unprecedented overall population growth.
Rural population pressure has produced large-scale
rural-to-urban migration. Some Arab and Western
researchers attribute rapid urban growth in the Mid-
dle East mostly to high rates of natural increase-that
is, high-fertility levels among people already in the
city-rather than to an influx of rural migrants.
Although this analysis is correct statistically, it is
misleading: many studies have shown that the vast
majority of rural migrants to the cities are men and
women in their twenties, the age group most active in
forming families, who increase urban population by
producing children as well as migrating themselves.
Urban Bias in Government Policies
Most Middle Eastern governments have encouraged,
directly or indirectly, rural-to-urban migration by
implementing policies that favor cities over rural
areas:
? Incomes. Urban income levels are generally higher
than in the countryside and often are protected by
legislation. In the countryside all but the already
well-to-do farmers find it difficult to gain financing
for improving production and raising their incomes.
? Services. Most governments concentrate medical
and educational services in urban areas, often free
or very low in cost for the poorest residents.
? Subsidized Food. Subsidized food programs for the
poor often are extensive in urban areas and inade-
quate or absent in rural areas.
? Concentration of Government. The concentration of
government in the capital, usually the largest city,
provides substantial employment and induces major
employers to locate there.
? Transportation and Communication. Transporta-
tion and communication systems focus on the capi-
tal or a few large cities, thus lowering the cost of
production and distribution in those areas and mak-
ing the city more attractive for major employers.
In our judgment, the economic, social, and political
costs of rapid urban growth will increasingly test the
capabilities of Middle Eastern governments to man-
age their cities
Political Opposition
We believe that urban unrest-from Cairo in 1977, to
Tehran in 1979, to cities in Tunisia and Morocco in
1984-has shown national leaders that cities concen-
trate not only population but also economic and social
problems. The major cities not only are flashpoints for
spontaneous outbreaks of unrest but also fertile
ground for religious and political opposition.
We believe that disturbances sparked by the urban
poor are likely to increase, but the urban underclass is
only one potential source of unrest. In our view, if
urban conditions-crowding and congestion, noise
and air pollution, inadequate public utilities and
transportation-continue to deteriorate as we believe
they will, dissatisfaction among the urban middle
class will be an even more potent political threat
Housing Shortages
One of the most visible indications that the urban
populations of the Middle East are growing too large
too fast is the shortage of housing for all income
groups. Squatter settlements-the first and often
permanent destination for most poor rural migrants-
have sprung up in and around such cities as Algiers,
Baghdad, Cairo, Casablanca, Tehran, and Tunis, and
formerly middle-class neighborhoods in these cities
have deteriorated into slums.'
The inability of higher income groups to obtain
suitable housing is equally sensitive politically. In
Syria, for example, the US Embassy reports that the
urban middle class, especially in Damascus, cannot
afford appropriate housing despite the availability of
more than 35,000 vacant units. In Egypt, government
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Tehran: A Case Study in Urban Dynamics
and Political Instability
The revolution in Iran is a powerful example of the
impact of urban dynamics on national political sta-
bility. Tehran was the hothouse in which social,
economic, and political grievances against the Shah's
regime were transformed into radical action against
the government-the riots and demonstrations of
1978-79.
Then, as now, Tehran completely dominated urban
life in Iran. It accounted for about 29 percent of the
country's urban population and was more than six
times as large as the country's second-largest city,
Isfahan. The formation and coalescence of opposition
groups in the capital was facilitated by:
? A large and rapid influx of rural migrants. Census
data indicate that Tehran grew by 5 percent annual-
ly during the period 1966-76, from 2.7 million to
4.5 million. By 1970 more than half of the city's
residents were rural migrants.
? Housing shortages. Slums and squatter settlements
sprang up throughout the city, particularly on its
southern fringes. In 1977, according to one survey,
less than 20 percent of rural migrants owned their
own houses.
? High urban unemployment. The credit squeeze that
began in 1976 created a slowdown in the construc-
tion industry that severely limited migrants' em-
ployment opportunities.
? Declining standard of living for the urban poor. An
annual inflation rate of 30 percent by the late 1970s
affected the price of all commodities, including
most basic food items. Nonsquatting poor migrants
were also affected by the rapid increase in the cost
of renting rooms or other housing.
? Conflict between the modern urban elite, aligned
with the Shah's regime, and the traditional urban
elite.
? Political activism by the traditional elite and
city-born residents. Survey data indicate that
second-generation urbanites (those whose parents
were rural migrants) were more aware of the
most important national political events and
issues than new migrants.
? Government actions against the urban poor. The
government evicted residents from squatter set-
tlements in late 1977 and 1978 and made no
attempt to relocate the squatters. As word of the
government's action spread, squatters mobilized
and prepared to defend their homes.
? Exploitation of dissatisfaction among the urban
poor. Prerevolutionary surveys indicate that the
primary concern of the urban poor was to make
ends meet in a costly city with inadequate hous-
ing, transportation, and social services. They
were not politically active because they did not
perceive the regime's actions as the cause of their
condition or saw little hope in gaining redress.
The Shia clergy and the secular National Front
had the organization and leadership required to
give focus to the grievances of the urban poor
and to convince them to act against the regime.
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? In Egypt, the Ministry of Housing estimates that
1.4 million new units will be needed during 1981-
2000 simply to house Cairo's population increase.
Nationwide, the Ministry estimates that about 3.6
million housing units must be built during 1981-
2000 to fill the backlog of demand nationwide,
replace deteriorated units, and keep up with popu-
lation growth. In Cairo as many as 1.5 million
people, or nearly one-fifth of the city's population,
live in rooftop shacks throughout the city or in the
tomb cities.
? In Algeria, the Ministry of Housing and Urban
Planning has set a goal of 100,000 units per year in
the 1980s and 200,000 per year in the 1990s to keep
up with the demand for urban housing.
? In Morocco, according to a newspaper account
citing government figures, the urban housing short-
fall increased from 624,000 units in 1977 to over 1
million units in 1980. According to some estimates,
with present rates of construction the urban housing
shortage will reach 2.2 million units by 1992 and
nearly 4.3 million units by the year 2000. In
Morocco, nearly 70 percent of rural migrants and
policies such as rent control have worsened the hous-
ing shortage by discouraging the turnover of existing
units. The World Bank reports a similar situation in
Jordan, especially in Amman.
Rising Demands for Urban Services
Under present rapid rates of city growth, governments
must allot increasingly large amounts of money to the
largest cities just to keep their infrastructures from
deteriorating.' For example, government security
forces were detailed to an older section of Cairo in
July 1982 when a broken sewer main that flooded the
neighborhood caused angry public demonstrations.
The disproportionate urban spending reflects physical
20 percent of urban dwellers live in shantytowns,
according to a recent press account. In Casa-
blanca, more than 450,000-about one fifth of
the city's population, according to the most
recent census-live in the three squatter settle-
ments on the eastern edge of the city that date
from the French Protectorate (1912-66).
? In Tunisia, an estimated 60,000 urban housing
units were needed during the Fourth Five-Year
Plan (1975-80), but only 17,000 units were pro-
vided for in the budget. The Fifth Five-Year Plan
(1980-85) allocates funding for only 25,000 units
annually.
? In Jordan, the World Bank estimates that only
about 7 percent of the urban population now
lives in squatter settlements but reports the rapid
spread of squatter settlements on government-
owned land near Amman.
? Kuwait City is flanked by clusters of shanty-
towns that are ghettos for Iraqi, Palestinian,
Syrian, Egyptian, Indian, and Pakistani expatri-
ate workers.
reality: most major cities of the Middle East are not
suited for the modern transportation and utility sys-
tems or the large populations presently crammed into
them.
The Burden of Subsidies
The subsidies on basic food commodities that many
Middle Eastern governments have instituted probably
have dampened urban unrest. They help to meet
middle-class expectations, provide minimum con-
sumption levels for the poor, and serve as a palliative
for other economic problems such as unemployment.
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In several countries the inadequacy of urban irt/ra-
structures is a potentially serious political issue. For
example:
? In Egypt, Cairenes must cope with inadequate
sewerage and trash disposal systems, an antiquated
telephone system, frequent power outages, an over-
used public transportation network, traffic jams,
and noise pollution. The government, keenly aware
that the declining quality of life in the city could
spark further, more serious unrest particularly
among the middle and upper classes-is taking
steps to overhaul Cairo's infrastructure. We believe
conditions are likely to get worse before they
improve; subway construction, for example, has
torn up the central business district, resulted in
broken water and sewerage mains, and intensified
traffic congestion.
? In Jordan, water supply in the cities is a critical
problem; the government levies progressive tariffs in
urban areas to economize on the use of this scarce
resource. According to the 1979 census, only 23
percent of urban households were connected to
sewerage systems, and the World Bank identified
the disposal of garbage as a major urban problem.
Urban transport systems have not kept pace with
the rapid population growth since the 1970s. In
Amman, according to the World Bank, doubling of
private vehicle registration between 1976 and 1979
led to increasing congestion in the city center; the
existing public transportation system is overused
and, being laid out radially, forces riders to travel
to the center of Amman to reach another part of the
city.
? In Sudan, clogged sewers and the inability of the
government to maintain a garbage disposal system
is creating health problems in Khartoum, according
to a critical account in an emigre Sudanese newspa-
per
Whatever stability has been gained through food
subsidies, however, has been at high economic cost.
Price controls on agricultural goods have helped to
hold down production, which in turn has depressed
rural incomes and encouraged the flow of rural
migrants to the cities. The decline in production has
forced a number of countries with agriculturally
based economies to import increasing amounts of
food. According to US Embassy estimates, Egypt,
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia now must import
about 50 percent of their food requirements.`
In Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia in particular, subsi-
dies on basic foods, fuel, and utilities have added to
budget and balance-of-payments deficits. These gov-
ernments now face the task of holding down popular
unrest while raising prices to improve their financial
situation and qualify for international financing. Re-
cent experience in Tunisia and Morocco shows that
higher prices court urban violence.
Loss of Agricultural Production
The loss of much of the rural labor force to the cities
has had serious economic consequences in countries
like Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, and Syria. Significant agri-
cultural resources in these nations are not fully ex-
ploited because rural areas suffer manpower short-
ages. In Iraq and Jordan, jobs in the agricultural
sector are increasingly filled by unskilled laborers
from other Arab countries, especially Egypt. In
Jordan, for example, the US Embassy estimates that
Egyptians comprise 60 to 75 percent of the expatriate
labor force, many of whom replace rural Jordanians
who have migrated to the cities or abroad
We believe that rural-to-urban migration has generat-
ed a domestic brain drain in which the most talented,
most ambitious, and best educated-in addition to
peasants living on the margin-have deserted the
rural areas and small urban communities for the big
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Informal housing, without water or sewer service, in Giza district Strain on public transportation. According to the World Bank, 63
of Cairo. The informal sector accounts for about three-fourths of percent of all trips to Cairo are made by bus or taxi. One-third of
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Housing conditions in a traditional, low-income quarter of Cairo
(above). Addition to an apartment building in an upper-class
district. Additions frequently are constructed without authoriza-
tion or regard to structural considerations. As a result, every year
more Cairenes die in collapsing buildings than in automobile
accidents (top right). Midday traffic in the central business district.
Traffic congestion is compounded by the parking problem. Accord-
ing to the World Bank, there are only about 5,000 parking spaces
for the estimated 17,000 cars that park in the downtown area every
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Se,.'eral key Middle Eastern countries find them-
selves in a subsidies trap: economically they can ill
afford to maintain the subsidies, but attempts to
rescind or modify them carry political risks. For
example:
? In Tunisia, violence in Tunis in early January
1984-the culmination of widespread rioting
throughout the country prompted President Bour-
guiba to rescind the announced price increase on
bread and to lower prices on grains.
? In Morocco, rioting broke out in northern cities in
mid-January over actual and expected prices for
basic foodstuffs and cooking gas. The government
hastily revised its program of price increases, dis-
patched Army troops to the northern cities, and
alerted police in Casablanca, where a rumored
general strike could have disrupted the Islamic
Summit conference.
? In Egypt, the urban unrest in Tunisia and Morocco
as well as memories of the Cairo bread riots in
January 1977 make the government wary of price
hikes-whether for food, bus fares, or electricity.
? In Sudan, the 1982 decision to lower sugar subsi-
dies by more than half led to demonstrations in
Khartoum and several provincial towns
city. In our judgment, the loss of the most innovative
rural dwellers portends a continued decline in the
rural standard of living, in turn stimulating even more
migration from the countryside.
Urban Unemployment
In several Middle Eastern states, the continued
growth of the urban labor pool (a result of both rural
migration and high population growth in the cities),
coupled with economic stagnation, has made urban
unemployment and underemployment a political and
potentially regime-threatening issue. We believe that
underemployment, reflected in the bloated services or
"informal" sectors of many Middle Eastern econo-
mies, is a more serious problem than unemployment.
Urban unemployment has become an important polit-
ical issue in several key Middle Eastern countries,
including:
? Tunisia, where we estimate that about one-fourth of
the labor force is unemployed-many of them in
Tunis, where more than 15 percent of the popula-
tion lives. Labor agitation centered in Tunis chal-
lenged the Bourguiba regime in 1978 and again this
year.
? Morocco, where unemployment in northern cities
has risen because returning workers squeezed out
by the contraction of the French labor market have
been unable to find jobs in a sluggish domestic
economy. Rising unemployment in the cities of the
south, particularly Casablanca, reflects not only
declining economic performance but also the effects
of a two-year drought that has pushed farmworkers
off the land. The regime was forced to take extraor-
dinary security measures to prevent the rioting that
began in the northern cities in January 1984 from
spreading to Casablanca, where labor unrest had
broken out in 1981.
unemployed youth in the northern cities of Tetouan
and Nador played a key role in the rioting there.
? Algeria, where about 20 percent of the nonagricul-
tural labor force is unemployed, according to US
Embassy estimates. Although government emphasis
on the production of still scarce consumer goods
and housing will help to forestall discontent in the
short term, we believe that urban unemployment
and discontent will increase if the contraction of the
French labor market continues, forcing the return
of an estimated 1 million Algerian workers.
Few rural migrants are openly unemployed, but many
of those who are employed make only a subsistence
wage or even below this level.
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? In Algeria, US Embassy reporting suggests that
urbanization and its concomitant Westernized life-
style have caused tension between the emerging
working class and the traditional bazaaris, that the
new working class is beginning to question tradi-
tional male and female social roles, and that there
is broad-based frustration at the government's fail-
ure to deliver the promised economic and social
benefits that were to flow from industrialization.
We believe these social tensions have contributed to
the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism, especially
among Algerian students and urban youth who
believe that a Muslim state would offer more social
equity.
? In Jordan, urbanization has contributed to in-
creased tension between Jordanian bedouins and
Palestinians who migrated from the West Bank.
According to the US Embassy in Amman, some
bedouin leaders worry that the migration of youn-
ger tribesmen to the Amman area in search of work
undermines bedouin society and the foundations of
the Hashemite regime.
the Palestinians believe that urbanization
while depressing the status of the bedouins.
Palestinians believe that urban-
In Saudi Arabia, a 6-percent annual rate of
urbanization has helped to sharpen the tradition-
al cleavages between bedouins, the social foun-
dation of the kingdom, and other rural dwellers
on the one hand and urbanites on the other. The
urban centers have benefited far more than the
rural areas from the country's oil wealth. Urban
dwellers have gained greater direct benefits from
available economic opportunities, basic com-
modities, and Western-style goods, as well as
indirect benefits from social and health services,
educational opportunities, public utilities, trans-
portation, and communication.
Rapid urbanization also is giving rise to a new
generation of increasingly better educated and
Westernized but lower-class city-born Saudis, who
are likely to make increased demands on the
Saudi Government for better economic and em-
ployment opportunities. To a large degree, the
ability of the government to meet these demands
will depend on the willingness of the younger
generation to accept more manual jobs that have
traditionally been taken by foreign laborers. if the
economic expectations of lower-class young urban-
ites are not fulfilled, we believe that they could in
time pose a political threat to the government.
ization will ultimately make them the key group in
Jordanian society.
Rapid Social Change
We believe that rapid urbanization has produced
social dislocations and cleavages that could eventually
threaten regime stability in several Middle Eastern
countries. The rapid transition from a traditional to
an urban society creates stress on deeply held social
values and institutions-especially the family struc-
ture and definitions of male and female roles-and
accentuates differences between generations and
ethnic groups in urban areas. Sociologists and US
Embassy reporting suggest increasing social tensions
in countries such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia, which
may eventually escape government control.
We believe that social tensions also will be reflected in
rising rates of urban crime. Although the limited
statistics available do not indicate that urban crime is
a widespread problem in the Middle East, we believe
that crowded urban conditions are weakening the
family structure, the underpinning of traditional
society, and that the loss of parental authority is
reflected in low-level juvenile crime. A recent article
in the Algerian press, for example, implies that urban
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juvenile delinquency reflects both the abdication of
parental responsibility and the failure of the govern-
ment's social programs, making the cities places of
tension and conflict.
We believe that Middle Eastern governments face a
dilemma in coping with urban growth. Deteriorating
conditions compel the government to take corrective
measures, but these measures tend to aggravate the
situation by raising expectations even more and by
attracting more newcomers. Many governments, rec-
ognizing this, have turned to strategies designed to
slow urbanization and to stop the growth of the
biggest cities by dispersing the urban population and
by placing new emphasis on the rural sector. In our
judgment, neither approach is likely to succeed, at
least not in the short term.
Decentralization Strategies
A number of countries-including Egypt, Morocco,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates-have
formal decentralization programs designed to redis-
tribute urban growth by creating new centers of
employment. We believe, however, that decentraliza-
tion is an expensive remedy with limited potential,
particularly in the poorer states:
? A dispersed settlement pattern is much more expen-
sive to initiate and maintain than a concentrated
one.
Egypt's costs for infrastructure and
job creation could be up to one and a third times
higher in a decentralization program than in a
strategy focused on cities with proven economic
potential.
? The success of decentralization hinges on the ability
of the government to persuade both industry and
workers to relocate.
In our estimation, the capital-poor regimes that pro-
mote decentralization are unlikely to be able to offer
the incentives to accomplish it. Egypt, for example,
has made little progress in its efforts to disperse urban
growth to new towns. Tenth of Ramadan, a satellite
town in the desert northeast of Cairo, is targeted to
have a population of 150,000 by 1985. According to
the town's master plan, its population in 1981 was
only 5,000. We believe that government efforts to
persuade Egyptians to settle in the towns of the Sinai
are similarly doomed to failure. In Morocco, well-
established new towns founded during the French
Protectorate have not proved attractive alternative
destinations for rural migrants. Rabat's efforts to
divert the flow of migrants away from the larger
cities, particularly Casablanca, by underbudgeting for
urban housing construction have not worked and
probably have contributed greatly to the frustration of
both newly arrived urban migrants and city-born
residents.
We believe that the capital-rich states will also experi-
ence difficulties in persuading migrants to settle
outside the established cities. We believe that new
towns in the oil states, such as Yanbu and Jubail in
Saudi Arabia and Jebel Ali in the United Arab
Emirates, could become foreign enclaves-a develop-
ment that would raise the political sensitivities of the
leadership and the native population-if natives can-
not be persuaded to settle there. In Qatar the new
town of Umm Said was established in part to relieve
congestion in Doha, but Western studies show that it
has attracted primarily unmarried male workers, sug-
gesting that permanent settlement outside the capital
is undesirable.
Some governments have tried to disperse the urban
poor, whom they perceive as the most serious threat to
political stability. In Algeria, for example, the govern-
ment bulldozed shantytowns around Algiers and other
coastal cities last summer and forcibly moved resi-
dents back to their former homes in the interior.
Estimates of displaced persons range from 150,000 to
I million. In Iraq, the government has announced
plans to create two satellite suburbs with populations
of 350,OOQ each about 40 kilometers northwest of
Baghdad,
Revitalizing the Rural Sector
In the short run, we believe that a renewed emphasis
on the development of rural infrastructure may actu-
ally stimulate rural outmigration even though, in the
long run, it could bring urbanization under control.
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Since the late 1970s most Middle Eastern govern-
ments have increased investment in rural housing,
electrification and other services, water supply,
schools, jobs, and agricultural technology to keep
would-be migrants down on the farm and raise agri-
cultural productivity.
In the short run, Western researchers agree that:
? Mechanization of agriculture may actually elimi-
nate jobs in the rural sector.
? Education, especially vocational training, can give
peasants skills that may be more profitably market-
ed in the city.
? Higher rural incomes may stimulate demand for
goods and services more available in the cities.
We do not believe that any Middle Eastern govern-
ment will be able both to implement a comprehensive
urban policy that will allow it to meet demands
generated by past rapid urban growth and to control
future growth. We expect governments to continue
their commitment to decentralization strategies to
protect already heavy investments in new towns, but
we do not expect them to succeed in substantially
redistributing urban populations
Rural development schemes are likely to succeed in
upgrading agricultural performance over the long run,
but, in our judgment, rural-to-urban migration will
continue unless cities simultaneously are made less
attractive destinations. We do not expect any govern-
ment to eliminate policies-such as food subsidies and
protected modern sector wage and salary scales-that
have generated the higher standard of living in the
cities that attracts rural migrants, because this would
adversely affect the status and interests of the upper
and middle classes who form the base of political
support for most governments.
In our view, some governments will increasingly apply
quick fixes to urban growth-such as unenforceable
measures to restrict rural-to-urban migration-
spurred by the perception that the urban underclass
poses a threat to political stability. We anticipate that
some governments will turn to forcible dispersion of
the urban poor from the largest cities, as has already
been done in Algeria. Control of the urban land
market, housing subsidies, and income redistribution
would be more likely to defuse urban unrest, but we
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Implications for the United States
We believe that the continuing inability of Middle
Eastern governments friendly to the United States to
control urban growth will prompt them to request US
assistance to catch up with demands for housing,
transportation, and services in their largest cities. As
Arab leaders become increasingly aware of the eco-
nomic and political drawbacks of rapid city growth,
we also expect the United States to be called upon to
provide more expertise in urban policy formulation.
We expect US urban assistance to become increasing-
ly politicized. The Arab countries most likely to need
US assistance, such as Egypt and Morocco, already
have major aid relationships with the United States
because of their political importance, and we believe
that they will seek to exercise some leverage to elicit
additional US financial assistance. Although we be-
lieve that US aid in rehabilitating Arab cities could
garner some good will, we fear that a prominent US
role in the cities would increase the risk that Wash-
ington would be blamed either for failing to solve
major urban problems or for exerting too much
influence in domestic policies.
Demonstrations in the cities over economic conditions
or dissatisfaction with the quality of urban life could
complicate US efforts to promote political stability in
the region. Since urban growth in the Middle East is
concentrated in the major cities--particularly the
capitals-widespread disruptions in law and order
would have serious implications for regime stability.
We believe that mounting urban-based problems
would be an open invitation for meddling by countries
such as Libya or Iran-who promote ideologies that
appeal to much of the urban underclass-or by the
Soviet Union.
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