THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES: CLERICAL CONTROL AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000300010003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of lop Secret
The Iranian Armed Forces:
Clerical Control and
Military Effectiveness
An Intelligence Assessment
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Directorate of Toy Secret
Clerical Control and
Military Effectiveness
The Iranian Armed Forces:
This paper was prepared by Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution by Office of Central
Reference. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf
Division, NESA,
Top Secret
NESA 84-10261 C
September 1984
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The Iranian Armed Forces:
Clerical Control and
Military Effectiveness
Key Judgments Five years after the Iranian revolution and the continuing purges of the
Information available military, Iran's clerical leadership remains suspicious of the loyalty of the
as of 15 August 1984 country's Army, Navy, and Air Force. To monitor the loyalty and
was used in this report.
performance of these services, Tehran has created a political control
apparatus attached to all regular armed forces units. Independent of the
Ministry of Defense, this Organization for Ideology is directed and staffed
by clerics loyal to the clerical government and Ayatollah Khomeini:
? The system of informers and political /ideological officers is so extensive
that we judge the regular Iranian armed forces cannot pose a serious
threat to the clerical regime.
The clerics also have attempted to counterbalance the regular forces by
transforming two irregular organizations-the Revolutionary Guard and
the Basij militia-into a major military force that is more loyal to the
regime:
? Clashes between the Army and the Guard-perhaps leading to a civil
war-are likely if a lengthy succession crisis occurs after Khomeini's
death.
? The regular armed forces are weakened, however, by divided loyalties
and indecisiveness and probably would have difficulty defeating the
500,000 or more Guard and Basij troops now under arms.
Although the creation of a political/ ideological apparatus has increased
Tehran's control over the armed services, we believe it also has contributed
to Iran's military ineffectiveness against Iraq. Clerical interference and
intimidation and the regular military's fear that the Revolutionary Guard
will eventually replace it have hindered operations and lowered morale.
Lack of cooperation between Army and irregular units has resulted in
heavy casualties and missed opportunities throughout the war.
Tehran probably believes that the enhanced security provided by the
control apparatus offsets the cost of reduced military effectiveness and that
surveillance of the military should be increased. Iranian clerics probably
believe that military effectiveness will increase as more personnel are
indoctrinated and trained.
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NESA 84-10261 C
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We believe the clerical regime will combine and reorganize the existing
armed forces and combat units of the Revolutionary Guard into new
military services after the war. The political/ ideological apparatus in the
new armed forces will help strengthen Iran's ability to defend itself against
foreign military threats by instilling loyalty and obedience throughout the
services. A sizable Revolutionary Guard organization will continue to exist,
however, to maintain internal security, operate abroad, and counterbalance
the regular Iranian military.
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The Iranian Armed Forces:
Clerical Control and
Military Effectiveness F_
Iran's clerical regime has consolidated its control over
the country and has resisted the Iraqi invasion, but it
continues to doubt the loyalty of the regular Iranian
armed forces. To deal with this problem, Tehran has
built an extensive organization to monitor the armed
forces' loyalty and increase their willingness to fight.
The regime has succeeded in controlling the armed
forces by establishing a broad network of informants
and by using the irregular forces to counterbalance
the regular services.
Controlling the Regular Armed Forces
Structure. The Iranian clerical leadership depends
primarily on the Organization for Ideology-Sazman-
e Ideolog-to monitor and promote the loyalty of the
regular armed forces. The Sazman has units and
personnel assigned to all levels within the Army,
Navy, and Air Force,
These political/ideological units are re=
sponsible for disseminating propaganda, propagating
Islamic tenets, and, most importantly, maintaining
"ideological security" and carrying out counterintelli-
gence operations,
Sazman units do not report to the Ministry
of Defense, their nominal superior, but go outside
military channels directly to a separate Sazman direc-
torate overseeing the armed forces. Mohammad Rey-
shahri heads the Organization for Ideology. He is also
Chief Justice of the Revolutionary Court system and
a confidant of Ayatollah Khomeini and probably
reports directly to him,
Sazman political/
ideological bureaus, units, or officers are attached to
all armed forces units down to the platoon or barracks
level. Airbases, for example, have a ratio of about 1
political official to 100 Air Force personnel,
A cleric appointed by Teh-
ran usually commands each Sazman office, although
trusted military officers sometimes head ideological
The political control officials appear to maintain close
liaison with Revolutionary Courts and Revolutionary
"Komitehs" to increase regime authority over the
military. The Revolutionary Courts and military po-
lice arrest, prosecute, try, and punish suspects,
The "Komitehs," made up 25X1
tions or can direct them to arrest offenders,
mostly of noncommissioned officers and enlisted men,
apparently have ideological and surveillance functions
over personnel. The chief of the political/ideological
unit sometimes is a member of these other organiza-
Enforcement. The Sazman units use an extensive
system of informers to provide information on disloyal
activity in the military,
Names are then turned over to the military police and
Revolutionary Courts for arrest and trial.
political/ideological offi-
cials have taken advantage of the traditional animos-
ity between officers, warrant officers, and enlisted
men to foment distrust and elicit information on
disloyalty. We estimate that the political units have
thousands of informers in the Iranian armed forces. In
larger Iranian Army units, the political/ideological
units command "strike groups" that follow regular
units into battle to prevent them from deserting,
the threat of reporting
suspect activity to Tehran gives political officials
control over the decisions of the regular military unit
commander. Political officials can influence an offi-
cer's actions by forwarding the findings of the "Komi-
tehs" in each unit that periodically meet to assess and
criticize the unit commander's performance.
clerics directing
political/ideological units were the real commanders
of the bases.
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Figure 1
Political Control Structure of the Iranian Armed Forces
qu
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COMPOOT000-
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The clerics were preparing to remove about
300 politically suspect officers and enlisted men from
combat positions in 1983,
We believe, however, that the number o
military personnel arrested or executed annually is
under a thousand-less than 1 percent of the 300,000
men in the regular forces.
The number probably
has declined in the last year because most officers
loyal to the old regime have been purged and replaced
by men who are careful to hide their political beliefs
or are neutral toward or support the Islamic republic.
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Molding a Loyal Military Command. Tehran also
has laid the foundation for a more loyal military
command by carefully controlling who is chosen for
the officer corps and who is promoted.
a cleric in each unit must approve all
officer candidates or applicants for the military acad-
emies and vouch for their political reliability. Six
months before an officer becomes eligible for promo-
tion, he must attend a three-month series of indoctri-
nation classes taught by clerics that stress sacrifice
and martyrdom for the regime,
The clerical leadership has been careful to assign
loyal or obedient officers to top military commands
and probably exploits disagreements between them to
increase the regime's security. Gen. Qasim
Zahirnejad owes his reinstatement in the postrevolu-
tion Army, his promotion to general, and his appoint-
ment as Chief of the Joint Armed Forces Staff to his
family ties with influential clerics,
Col. Ali Sayyed Shirazi was
appointed commander of the Iranian Ground Forces,
because of his devo-
tion to Islam and his relationship with Ayatollah
Montazeri, Khomeini's heir apparent.
Zahirnejad and Shirazi often are
at odds over the conduct of the war, but the clerical
leadership probably believes that disagreements
among top officers reduce the chances they will unite
in a military coup.
The regime also tries to buy the loyalty of some
servicemen, especially those in the Air Force with
critical skills,
Air Force officers have received gifts of land, scarce
consumer goods, fuel, and low-cost housing. These
privileges often go to people close to the clerics, while
others who have served the country well are ignored,
The Revolutionary Guard and Basij
The clerical leadership also has formed and maintains
the Revolutionary Guard Corps-Sepah-e
Pasdaran-and the Basij militia at least partly as an
alternative or counterbalancing military force to the
traditional armed forces. Unlike the Army, Navy, and
Air Force, whose loyalty is still largely questionable
because of their association with the Shah and West-
ern training, the Guard is manned by personnel
chosen for their loyalty to the new regime. The
Iranian leadership views the Revolutionary Guard as
an elite force that is the protector of the regime
against a military coup, according to press statements
Controlling the Guard. Tehran has developed an
extensive political control structure to oversee the
Revolutionary Guard and Basij that is similar to the
apparatus attached to the regular services. The Guard
is directly subordinate to Ayatollah Khomeini
through his personal representative to the Corps, the
cleric Fazlollah Mahallati, according to press reports.
Mahallati sits on the Supreme Council of the Revolu-
tionary Guard and also heads the Guard's Supreme
Directorate of Ideological and Political Affairs, which
is responsible for monitoring the political reliability of
Guard personnel.
The Directorate appears to function in much the same
way as Sazman units in the regular armed forces.
Directorate officials are attached to all Revolutionary
Guard and Basij units to oversee propaganda, select
new recruits, and oversee the activities and decisions
of unit commanders. In mid-1984 in a press interview,
Mahallati stated that there were 250 clergy providing
ideological training in the Guard. We estimate that
there are thousands of officials and informers respon-
sible for political control in the Guard and Basij.
Even more than in the regular services, Tehran has
been careful to select men to command the Revolu-
tionary Guard who have proved their loyalty to the
revolution and have an interest in the survival of the
regime and its leaders. Mohsen Rafiq-Dust owes his
appointment as Minister of the Revolutionary Guard
to his close relationship with Majlis Speaker
Rafiq-Dust first came to the
attention and favor of Ayatollah Khomeini because of
his willingness to execute a number of the Shah's
senior military and police officials. Mohsen Rezai
became commander of the Revolutionary Guard when
he was friendly with Rafiq-Dust and because he may
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Figure 2
Revolutionary Guard and Basij Command Structure
Supreme Council
of the
Revolutionary Guard
(Pasdaran)
Supreme Directorate Central Command Ministry of
Ideological and Revolutionary Guard Revolutionary Guard
Political Affairs (Pasdaran)
Revolutionary Guard
and Basij Combat Units
Battalion
A Rival to the Armed Forces. The major role of the
Revolutionary Guard in the war against Iraq has
increased its stature and capabilities as a military
competitor to the Army. As a consequence, the
Guard's abilities to counter the regular Army in an
internal struggle have also grown.
Guard troops have often borne
Revolutionary Guard
and Basij Internal Units
District
the brunt of the fighting and, because of their aggres-
siveness, have helped win some major battles.
there are armed Revolutionary Guards.
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Estimated Iranian Military Manpower,
July 1984
Army 235,000
Air Force 50,000
Navy 15,000
Revolutionary Guard 100,000-150,000
Basij over 500,000
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officials attempted to gain control over the Navy 25X1
through a request to share naval facilities,
Guard personnel serve on 25X1
some regular Navy vessels, and
Revolutionary Guard naval units
assumed responsibility for the defense and patrol of
Iran's coasts in February 1983.
the Guard has
received new patrol boats in the last year.
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High-ranking Guard officials have claimed that the
Guard eventually will replace the traditional services,
and it has attempted to assume the functions and
capabilities of an army, navy, and air force over the
last four years. the Guard
formed an armored division in late 1981 and estab-
lished artillery and commando units in mid-1982.
Although the Army provides the Guard with logistic
support, the Guard
set up its own artillery ammunition factory near
Tehran in April 1984.
In late 1979 the Iranian regime created the Basij-
"Mobilization of the Oppressed"-in response to
Ayatollah Khomeini's call for a 20-million-man army 25X1
to defend against a possible US invasion and later to
fight Iraq, The Basij is a 25X1
lightly armed and poorly trained militia that has
provided the Revolutionary Guard with the masses of 25X1
fanatical but expendable manpower to launch "hu- 25X1
man wave" attacks. Revolutionary Guard cadres are
responsible for training, arming, and commanding 25X1
Basi' units 25X1
as of mid-
1984 there were 700,000 armed Basij troops, although 25X1
the Iranians generally claim publicly that the organi-
has been establishing its own air force and began
making proposals for a joint Revolutionary Guard/
Air Force command in early 1983.
Guards were learning to
fly jet fighter aircraft in Syria and that the Guard
wanted to establish its own flight school. The pilots
from this school were to make up the nucleus of the
future Revolutionary Guard Air Force.
12 Guards were sent to
East Germany for training on MIG-19 and MIG-21
fighter aircraft in early July. There is no other
evidence that Guards are being trained on fighter
aircraft, but Guard pilots already fly some prop and
small jet aircraft,
The Guard has tried to purchase
transports and helicopters,
Revolutionary Guard naval units have formed joint
commands with regular Navy forces for operations in
the Persian Gulf. In mid-December 1982, Guard
Impact on Military Effectiveness
Low Morale. The creation of an extensive political
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control organization in the armed forces has reduced 25X1
the threat of a military coup, but it has also hurt 25X1
military effectiveness and has not stopped an apparent
decline in the services' will to fight, 25X1
Army units
sent to the frontlines in June 1984 had little desire to
wage war and suffered a large number of desertions,
The Army's
reluctance to fight tends to be confirmed by casualty
statistics that indicate that the
Army suffered only 2,000 casualties in combat early
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Interference by clerics or political officials in the
conduct of military operations appears to be one of the
main causes of military ineffectiveness and the decline
in officer morale. In mid-February
there was widespread discontent
among middle-level and senior officers about the
clerical leadership's interference with planning and
combat. orders
from clerics mace little sense an are not enforceable
without disrupting operations. The undermining of
officers' authority by the clerics also has demoralized
middle-level commanders in the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, The presence of
clerical military "advisers" has disrupted the chain of
command because, when they have the backing of
political officials, junior and noncommissioned offi-
cers sometimes refuse to obey orders from more senior
officers.
Friction Between Regulars and Irregulars. The devel-
opment of the Revolutionary Guard and threats that
it will eventually replace the regular services have
further undermined Iranian military effectiveness.
Press statements by leading Iranian officials-includ-
ing Khomeini-promising that the regular services
will not be dissolved have not calmed fears among
cers believe the clerical regime is using the war to
weaken the armed forces so they will be easier to
disband once the conflict ends.
Animosity between the Revolutionary Guard and the
regular services occasionally erupts into clashes. In
June 1982, 20 Guards were killed in a shootout
between Guard and Army personnel at an Army base
in May 1984 Revolutionary
Guards in Shiraz were used to put down a mutiny by
an Army unit that refused to leave for the front.
Problems on the Battlefield. Tehran's attempts to
integrate Revolutionary Guard units with the regular
services in "joint commands" on the battlefield have
fostered only a surface unity and have not improved
coordination or military effectiveness.
about the Army's willingness to fight have caused the
Basij to refuse orders from the Army and led to
almost no communication between the two groups,
The integration of untrained and uneducated Revolu-
tionary Guard and Basij troops with armed forces
units has also helped reduce efficiency in some opera-
tions. A lack of training and discipline caused Basij
troops to p . and led to the failure of attacks in
early 1984,
Guard pilots lack even a high school education, they
are too ignorant to fly and crash many of the helicop-
ters they attempt to pilot. Revolutionary Guards
assigned to ships have extremely limited training,
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The Revolutionary Guard, in turn, has complained
that the Army's lack of support and a ressiveness
has undermined joint operations.
the Army withheld intelligence and artillery support
during attacks to cause Guards and Basij to die in
futile frontal assaults. Revolutionary Guard and Basij
troops also have been unhappy with Army logistic
support,
Guard commanders were complaining about short-
The regular armed forces probably would be drawn
into a conflict-perhaps leading to a civil war-if a
power struggle among clerics continued for at least
several months. Such a conflict could begin if one
clerical faction ordered Revolutionary Guards to neu-
tralize armed forces units and another ordered these
units to resist. Because of indecisiveness and divided
loyalty, the regular armed forces would have difficul-
ty winning such a conflict. Some ideologically com-
mitted Army commanders probably would lead their
units to side with the Guard, further reducing the
chance that the military would prevail. Although the
Guard is inferior in manpower and equipment to the
regular services, it probably would remain unified and
could mobilize hundreds of thousands of Basij troops
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ages of modern weapons last June.
Prospects
Regime Security. In our judgment, the extent of the
regime's political control apparatus makes it unlikely
that conspirators in the regular services could recruit
and organize a sufficient number of units to carry out
a successful coup. Moreover, we believe that no coup
could succeed without the complicity or acquiescence
of both Revolutionary Guard officers at Army com-
mands and large numbers of Revolutionary Guard
units. The Guard owes its existence and prosperity to
the clerical regime and will not support plots that
would replace its benefactors in Tehran with the
military.
If a power struggle develops, the Revolutionary Guard
is likely to play a more important role than the armed
forces in determining a successor to Khomeini in the
short term. The Guard maintains extensive internal
security forces inside Iran-particularly in the capital
and other major cities-while almost all Army units
are at the front. The Guard also can call up Basij
militia in any area of the country. A faction control-
ling Revolutionary Guard units probably would use
them to seize key power centers quickly after Khomei-
ni's death to solidify its control. At the same time,
political control officials in the services would try to
keep regular armed forces units in garrison to prevent
a coup during a succession crisis. Moreover, because
they fear being charged with disloyalty by political
officials, Army commanders probably would be reluc-
tant to favor one contending faction in Tehran over
Military Effectiveness. Rivalry and mistrust between
the regular armed services and the Revolutionary
Guard will continue to limit Iranian military effec-
tiveness against Iraq and other military opponents for
the foreseeable future. The regime's political control
measures will impose an outward appearance of loyal-
ty or acquiescence in the Army, Navy, and Air Force
but will not cause them to fight more effectively or
vigorously against Iraq. Because of its fear of a
takeover by the Revolutionary Guard and a desire to
limit its own losses, the Army will delay attacks,
withhold assistance, and attempt to force the Guard
to bear the burden of fighting. Revolutionary Guard
suspicion of the regular military's loyalty and the
Guard's unwillingness to subordinate its troops com-
pletely to the regular military command will lead to
additional missed o rtunities and heavy casualties.
The Iranian regime, however, appears to believe that
the control gained by both the political apparatus in
the military and the use of the Revolutionary Guard
as a counterbalance to the regulars is worth the
present military ineffectiveness. Moreover, Tehran
probably believes that overall Iranian military effec-
tiveness will eventually improve. The Revolutionary
Guard will gain additional military expertise in com-
bat and will grow stronger as it expands into a force
that includes artillery, armor, air, and naval units.
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Through combat attrition, control of promotions and
assignments, and officer selection, the regime also will
reman the Army, Navy, and Air Force with personnel
who will work with the Guards.
A New Iranian Armed Force. In our judgment, after
the war Tehran will combine the armed forces and
combat units of the Revolutionary Guard and reorga-
nize them into new, more loyal military services. The
new military probably will be staffed primarily by
personnel from the existing Guard, although some
men from the old armed forces who had proved their
loyalty would be included. Most of the present regular
forces personnel are likely to be retired immediately
after the war-those needed in technical positions
would be retained only until politically loyal replace-
ments are trained. The clerical leadership understands
the need for competent personnel to fight Iraq, howev-
er, and does not want to further weaken Iran's war
effort by launching a destabilizing reorganization
during the conflict
In any event, we believe Tehran will continue to
maintain a Revolutionary Guard organization-inde-
pendent of the Ministry of Defense-as a possible
hedge against future disloyalty, even in the new,
reformed Iranian armed forces. The Guard will be an
elite force primarily responsible for internal security
and for covert operations abroad. Moreover, the
Guard probably would retain control over a Basij
militia organization as a large-scale source of man-
power outside the regular services' influence.
Implications for the United States
For the foreseeable future the clerical regime will
continue to believe that the United States and other
Western countries are attempting to foment sedition
within the armed forces. The purging of regular
servicemen associated with the West has reduced
significantly the number of officers who support a
more favorable relationship with the United States.
Moreover, we believe the political control organiza-
tions probably will be fairly effective in discovering
and eliminating efforts by any country to influence
Iranian military personnel in Iran or abroad.
In the long term, especially after the postwar re-
formation of the armed forces, we believe the
political/ideological organization in the military will
help strengthen Iran's ability to defend itself against
foreign military threats. The new unified armed
forces will eliminate some coordination problems.
Continuing indoctrination will help instill a fanati-
cism, similar to that seen in Revolutionary Guard and
Basij units, among Iranian enlisted men that would
stiffen efforts to defend Iran against any attacker. A
new, loyal officer corps will slowly emerge from the
reorganized Iranian military academies. They will
bring greater professionalism to the military and will
replace incompetent "political" commanders appoint-
ed during the war with Iraq.
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