IRAN: GROWING PROSPECTS FOR INSTABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000300090005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Iran: Growing Prospects
for Instability
Secret
NESA 84-10285
October 1984
Copy 3 1 9
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Iran: Growing Pros ects
for Instability ~ 7
Persian Gulf Division, NESA
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with a contribution from Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
This paper was prepared by
Secret
NESA 84-10285
October 1984
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Iran: Growing Pros ects
for Instability 25X1
Key Judgments \ Political instability in Iran is likely to increase significantly following
Information available Ayatollah Khomeini's death as clerical and lay factions compete for power.
as of 28 September 1984 Without Khomeini, there will be no one in Iran with the stature and
was used in this report.
charisma to capture the support of the masses or contain clerical infighting:
? Nearly six years after the revolution, the clerics have yet to agree on key
philosophical and theological guidelines for the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Even the issue of clerical control has not been resolved.
? The clerical regime has not developed the mechanisms to manage
domestic and foreign policy disputes without resort to Khomeini.
? The regime's popularity continues to decline because of growing official
corruption, economic stagnation, deteriorating public services, and the
financial and human costs of the war with Iraq.
We believe the Revolutionary Guard will be the key in determining the sta-
bility of post-Khomeini Iran. If, as is most likely, the Guard fragments, this
would raise the prospect of a violent power struggle. If, on the other hand,
most of the Guard backs one candidate or coalition, its arms and
widespread local power base would provide the winning margin and allow
for a smoother transition of power.
We do not see any likely alternatives to an Islamic-oriented regime with a
strong clerical influence in the aftermath of Khomeini's death. In our
judgment, neither the Shah's son nor any other Iranian exile leader
possesses the necessary domestic assets to gain control. The regular
military continues to be purged of officers suspected of antiregime
sentiments, and most regular Army units are at the front, well away from
the centers of power in Tehran and Qom. Iranian minorities have largely
parochial interests; they wish to be as far removed as possible from
Tehran's control.
We believe a successor government in Iran will espouse a policy of
nonalignment. Nevertheless, there are key interest groups in Iran that
would be willing to improve Tehran's relations with the United States or
the USSR:
? Conservative clerics, bazaar merchants, and some officers in the regular
military appear willing to reduce Iran's hostility toward the United
States. The need to show allegiance to the Islamic revolution, however,
probably would limit overt ties to Washington.
Secret
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October 1984
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? A government controlled by a Revolutionary Guard leader or a left-
leaning technocrat would be suspicious of the USSR but would be more
willing than the current regime to look to Moscow for both military and
economic aid. It also could be less hostile to Soviet foreign policy goals in
the region. The need to sell oil and to import.consumer goods, raw
materials, and equipment, however, probably would lead even a left-
leaning regime in Tehran to maintain economic ties with Western
Europe, Japan, Turkey, and Pakistan.
If Iran experienced a prolonged upheaval, the Soviets would enjoy
expanded opportunities for exploitation, particularly among Iran's minor-
ities near the lengthy border with the USSR. We believe, however, that
Moscow's ability to influence events in Iran would be limited-Moscow's
natural ally, the Tudeh party, has been suppressed and its leaders jailed or
executed. Other left-leaning groups have also been suppressed. Moscow
could provide support to the remnants of such groups during a period of
protracted instability, but we believe its willingness to act boldly would be
constrained by the risks of confrontation with the West. Alternatively, a
prolonged upheaval and a fragmented Revolutionary Guard could lead to a
more important role for the regular military, providing limited opportuni-
ties for the United States.
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Iran: Growing Prospects
for Instability
Six years after the removal of the Shah and three
years after the consolidation of clerical power, an
environment of uncertainty persists in Iran.
A simmering
succession struggle has already begun. Iran's costly
war with Iraq, a faltering, war-strained economy, and
the regime's brutal use of repression to stifle internal
dissent are causing popular discontent to grow. Al-
though this discontent poses no immediate threat to
the regime, it will provide fuel for the factional
einfighting we x ct to occur when Khomeini dies.
The Clerical Consolidation
Iran remained in turmoil for nearly three years
following the revolution as various components of the
anti-Shah coalition vied for power. Only by late 1981
did the clerics consolidate control over the govern-
ment. They then quickly increased oil exports by
lowering prices, seized the initiative in the war against
Iraq, and began planning for economic development.
The clerics' consolidation of power increased concerns
among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and in the
West that Iran would attempt to establish hegemony
over the entire Gulf area
These glowing prospects for the regime's institutional-
ization at home and expanding influence abroad have
not been fulfilled:
? The war and differences over strategy have blunted
Iran's efforts to export the revolution.
? After driving Iraqi forces from Iranian territory in
1982, the war has gone badly for Tehran as one
offensive after another into Iraq was defeated and
enormous casualties mounted. We estimate that
Iran has suffered at least 200,000 dead since the
Iraqi invasion began in September 1980.
? Iran's clerical community shared little more than a
hazy vision of how to return to the golden age of
Islam.
? The economy is stalled between differing clerical
philosophies over the role of the state in controlling
and directing the economy, as well as a continuing
lack of skilled managers.
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The clerical regime, moreover, has not yet developed
the mechanisms to manage domestic and foreign
policy disputes without resort to Khomeini. Nor, in
our judgment, do any of the other clerics in the
regime approach Khomeini's appeal to lower-class
Iranians. In short, the clerical regime has consolidated
its control but has failed to institutionalize its rule or
ensure its survival after its founder-creator leaves the 25X1
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Clerical Infighting
In May 1983 the US Intelligence Community agreed
that clerical factionalism had "emerged as the re-
gime's primary weakness." ' Indeed, so fundamental
are the divisions within the Iranian regime that the
central issue of the proper role of clerics in governing
remains unresolved.
the clergy are divided roughly into three groups. At
one extreme are activists such as Khomeini who
advocate strict clerical supervision of society under
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the leadership of a supreme religious jurisprudent
(velayat-efaqih). In the middle are clerical moderates
who argue for general clerical supervision, with less
direct intervention in the government. At the other
extreme are quietists who oppose any clerical involve-
ment in politics-and, hence, the whole structure of
Khomeini's Islamic Republic.
The activists and the moderates presently control the
regime. Although they agree on the general principle
of clerical rule they
dispute the degree to which clerics ought to govern
directly and the extent of government control over
social and economic life. The quietists are on the
sidelines. Included in the quietist group are Iran's
grand ayatollahs-those senior clerics who theoreti-
cally are Khomeini's religious equals.
Clerical leaders and their lay allies maintain influence
through a wide range of power centers, both within
and outside the formal government structure. Several
revolutionary organizations that sprang up during the
revolution, such as the komitehs, the Foundation for
the Oppressed, and the Revolutionary Guard, remain
largely autonomous. Moreover, clerical associations
and important individual clerics and laymen have
their own networks of followers-many of whom are
armed-and financing
The most important institutions and associations, both
in and out of government, have leaders who play key
roles in the current jockeying over how to share power
after Khomeini's departure
The Economy and War Heighten
Popular Discontent
Iran's economy continues to falter and is a serious
point of contention among the country's factions.
Official Iranian statistics reveal that unemployment
and underemployment remain high, rapid inflation
persists, and there is widespread inefficiency and
waste. Government industrial and agricultural plan-
ning has nearly ceased because of factional disagree-
ments within the regime. Those progressive clerics
and their supporters who favor land reform, national-
ization, and government control use Islamic teachings
to argue that everything belongs ultimately to Allah
and is to be used for the common good. Conservative
clerical opponents and their supporters, particularly
among the bazaar merchants, quote Koranic verses
demonstrating the right to own unlimited amounts of
Shiite Islam in Iran reveres the first 12 direct
descendants of Muhammad as divinely inspired
imams (leaders) and, therefore, rightful successors to
the Prophet to rule over Islam. Shias believe the last
of these 12 descendants went into hiding in the ninth
century A.D. but will return at the end of time to
establish the universal rule of justice. The dominant
Shia school in Iran has traditionally questioned the
legitimacy of any temporal government until the
return of the "hidden Imam, " and most clerics have
avoided open association with secular regimes. As a
result, the clergy came to be regarded as the protector
of the masses against government tyranny. This
association became even closer under the Pahlavi
dynasty when the impact of Westernization intensi-
fied and other avenues for the expression of political
grievances were suppressed.
Khomeini was able to focus this mass sympathy. He
also obtained the support of many clerics and lay
politicians who believed the Shah's regime would
destroy their influence. Once in power, however,
Khomeini established a theocratic state that went far
beyond the dominant tradition separating clerics
from government involvement. Indeed, Khomeini's
two central concepts-the inextricable union of reli-
gion and politics and the need for a supreme religious
jurisprudent to provide strict guidance over a society
governed by clerics-are considered heretical by Shia
traditionalists, who
ajority of clerics in Iran.
Such theologically based arguments leave little room
for compromise. Thus, even when the Majles has
passed economic legislation after extensive debate-
such as the act to nationalize foreign trade-the
conservative Council of Guardians 2 has rejected the
legislation as "un-Islamic." A five-year economic
' The Council of Guardians is comprised of six clerics appointed by
Khomeini and six lay jurists nominated by the Supreme Judicial
Council and approved by the Majles. They are responsible for
ensuring that bills passed by the Majles conform with the constitu-
property.
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development plan, first proposed in 1982, still lan-
guishes in the Majles. Agriculture-the centerpiece of
the regime's economic propaganda-continues to
stagnate. Public statements by regime officials indi-
cate that land reform has come to a standstill. Eighty
percent of Iranian land remains in the hands of large
landowners, and rural inhabitants continue to flock to
the cities, reducing available manpower for agricul-
ture while increasing Iran's dependence on imported
Even if the regime could devise a coherent economic
program, we believe widespread corruption would
undermine its effectiveness. For example, Iran's offi-
cial media have criticized the Foundation for the
Oppressed, a multibillion-dollar conglomerate of com-
mercial and industrial enterprises, for its inept man-
agement and corrupt officials.' The foundation is
headed by a former hardware salesman loyal to the
regime. He appointed his brother-in-law, a former
truckdriver, as one of his two deputies
bribes are necessary to secure required government
approvals, that officials are paid off to approve un-
completed contracts, and that faulty workmanship is
rampant.
As a result, the economy is even more dependent on
oil for export earnings than under the Shah. Iran
reported its total nonoil export earnings amounted to
$340 million in 1983 just 2 percent of the $19 billion
it earned from petroleum earnings. With oil revenues
down because of the stepped-up war in the Gulf and
the slack oil market, the regime has clamped down on
imports
the resulting shortages
have renewed popular complaints about the economy
isfied with regime economic management financed
many successful candidates in the Majles elections of
April 1984 who are expected to reflect the bazaaris'
conservative interests.
' The Foundation for the Oppressed was created in 1979 when the
Khomeini regime inherited the holdings of the Shah's Pahlavi
Foundation. It owns thousands of businesses and buildings through-
out Iran. The profits are supposed to be used by the regime to aid
Iran's poor, but Tehran admits that corruption and mismanage-
The Grand Ayatollahs
A religious hierarchy exists within Shia Islam that
has no counterpart in orthodox Sunni practice. At the
top of this religious pyramid stand the "grand"
ayatollahs-those few whose scholarship and devo-
tion are so widely recognized that they are regarded
as legitimate independent interpreters of Islamic law.
In Iran today there are five men besides Khomeini
who have such recognition, all but one older than
Khomeini. They are theoretically Khomeini's equals,
but his preeminence since the revolution has over-
shadowed them.
none o the other grand ayatollahs
actively support Khomeini. In part, this reflects their
sense of diminished status, but also their long-held
belief in the quietist tradition of clerical noninterven-
tion in secular rule.
Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani, for example, believes
that the concept of velayat-e faqih has very limited
application. Such a jurisprudent has the right only to
dispose of lost property and administer the property
of lunatics and orphans. In his view, interference in
other spheres, political or military, is excluded in
canon law. He and the other grand ayatollahs oppose
government confiscation of property and regard na-
tionalization, land reform, and many taxes as con-
trary to the precepts of Islam.
Despite their displeasure with the current regime,
these senior religious figures have spoken out against
it only rarely. Their many followers and students,
however, are well aware of their opposition to the
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The war has increasingly become a liability that the
regime seems unable to resolve. Tehran has been
unable to defeat the Iraqis, but Khomeini's insistence
on ousting Iraqi President Saddam Husayn prevents a
peace settlement. High casualties have cost the re-
gime popular support, apparently even among its most
ardent backers in the lower classes.
many Iranians increasingly view the financial drain of
the war as needless
Despite these complaints, public statements of Iranian
leaders reveal that many within the regime still are
worried about ending the war without clear victory.
Such leaders as Majles Speaker Rafsanjani and Presi-
dent Khamenei appear to fear this would call into
question both Tehran's claim of religious invincibility
and the wisdom of pursuing a war that has produced
so many deaths in vain.
The conflict has turned hundreds of thousands of
Iranians into refugees. Many have flocked to Iran's
major cities, aggravating an already serious strain on
public services. The Shah's inability to meet the needs
of Iran's urban areas in the last years of his reign was
a major contributing factor to the revolution. Since
the Shah's departure, Tehran's population has dou-
bled to over 8 million people
the influx has created a severe shortage o
housing, large numbers of unemployed, periodic water
shortages, power outages, inadequate medical facili-
ties and a shortage of doctors, and long lines to
purchase basic commodities. The Iranian Government
recently warned Tehran's residents that air pollution
in the city had become a serious health hazard.
Similar, if less drastic, reports have come in from
Iran's other major cities.
Other signs of disenchantment with the regime
abound. numerous and
apparently spontaneous antiregime demonstrations
throughout Iran over the past six months. Voter
turnout for the Majles elections held in April 1984
was uniformly reported as light and unenthusiastic,
despite the regime's campaign to get out the vote by
stamping identification cards at polling stations for
use in obtaining rations. low
morale among both students and faculty on college
campuses despite religious screening to weed out
malcontents. Many in Iran are paying bribes to have
their children's academic records falsified to gain
admission to foreign schools or to have doctors alter
medical records to avoid military service.F
Succession and the Struggle for Power
The political infighting revolving around the succes-
sion to Khomeini is adding to the divisions within
Iran. The Islamic Republic's constitution mandates
that the succession to Khomeini's post as supreme
political-religious authority be formally decided by a
cleric-dominated 60-man Assembly of Experts in
religious law. The constitution allows a choice be-
tween a sole heir or a leadership council of three or
five senior clerics
We expect the initial phase of succession to go
smoothly. Shia Islamic ritual calls for 40 days of
public mourning during which the regime's leaders
are likely to channel the highly charged emotions of
the population toward support for the government.
We expect that Ayatollah Montazeri will be con-
firmed as Khomeini's successor during this period. He
has long been considered Khomeini's preferred choice
as heir and has already taken on many of Khomeini's
duties and prerogatives. Majles Speaker Rafsanjani,
now second only to Khomeini in political power, has
endorsed Montazeri more than once, as has Khomei-
ni's son, Ahmad. Iran's government-controlled press
has been referring to Montazeri as a "Grand Ayatol-
lah" to raise his religious standing to the level appro-
priate for supreme religious jurisprudent.
Montazeri, however, lacks Khomeini's religious stat-
ure and his commanding presence. Without someone
of Khomeini's stature, we believe factional disputes
and rising discontent over the war and the economy
are likely to produce an extended period of political
instability._________________________ mutual suspi-
cions among the clerics and their lay associates are
already running high. We do not believe that any
single Iranian leader has sufficient power to emerge
quickly as a dominant leader. Rather, in the weeks
and months following Khomeini's death, we expect
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Iran's grand ayatollahs-who see Kho-
meinias junas junior to them-reject Montazeri because of
his inadequate religious credentials. Moreover, they
do not believe that the Assembly of Experts has the
right to name the supreme Shia cleric. Only they, as
legitimate interpreters of Islam, are proper arbiters
on this kind of issued
The abilities of heirs-in-waiting, however, often have
been underestimated before they have assumed top
leadership. Most observers dismissed President Sa-
dat of Egypt, for example, as only an interim succes-
sor to Gamal Abd al-Nasir.
he is more capa-
This image has been
deliberately undermined to prevent the consolidation
of clerical rule.
he is well connected to the
Revolutionary Guard. Montazeri has a reputation as
a hardliner on the war with Iraq and on the strict
observance of Islamic law, but in recent months he
has softened his public positions on such issues as the
war and on social policy. Such an attempt to broaden
his political base suggests his political savvy. F_
the struggle for power to increase as leaders of
competing governmental, religious, and revolutionary
organizations maneuver to secure more dominant
political positions.
Montazeri will have to convince these other leaders
that unbridled infighting threatens their collective
hold on power. If important regime figures, such as
Majles Speaker Rafsanjani and President Kha-
menei-who as junior clerics are not candidates to
succeed Khomeini-steadfastly line up behind Mon-
tazeri, he probably will have time to attempt to
would increase Rafsanjani's power.
consolidate his rule. 25X1
such support for oiiiis unlikely. Kha- 25X1
menei, for example, does not wish to see Montazeri 25X6
become Khomeini's sole heir because he believes that
The Revolutionary Guard will be central to the
regime's ability to maneuver during this period and is 25X6
likely to play a key role. Only half the Guard is at the
front; the remainder is maintained as a security force
in nearly every town and village throughout Iran.
the Guard remains strong and inde-
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pendent despite government attempts to gain control
over it. Guard policy is 25X1
set by a shadowy Command Council of about 30 men,
each of whom probably controls a sizable armed 25X1
group. We do not know the identities of all the
members, but we believe the Council includes Minis-
ter of Heavy Industries Behzad Nabavi, Commerce
Minister Hasan Abedi-Jafari, and Deputy Foreign
Minister Javad Mansuri, the former Deputy Opera-
tions Commander of the Guard and a leader of street
toughs known as hezbollahi (Party of God followers).
Guard Minister Mohsen Rafiq-Dust has admitted
publicly that the Command Council exercises more
authority over the Guard than either he or its Com-
mander, Mohsen Rezai. Both obtained their Guard
jobs originally because of their close relationships
with senior regime leaders rather than from their
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strength within the Guard itself. Individual leaders of
the Guard, moreover, act without government sanc-
tion. The hijacking of an Air France airliner in July
1984, for example, was the work of an element within 25X1
the Guard, not approved in advance by the govern- 25X1
ment. We believe that Guard leaders emphasize their
loyalty to Khomeini, in part because this allows them
to act independently in the absence of explicit guid-
ance from him 25X1
Ayatollah Khomeini in recent weeks has repeatedly 25X1
warned the Guard to stay out of politics, probably
reflecting the regime's concern over Guard independ-
ence. In the unlikely event that the Guard stayed out
of succession politics and remained basically intact,
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Members of the Iranian Revo-
lutionary GuardF__~
its use as a tool of repression over the population
would give factional leaders more time to work out
their differences. Alternatively, if the Guard backed
one candidate or coalition, its support probably would
be decisive. Such a move would ensure clerical rule
while further increasing the influence of the Guard.
In a climate of distrust and increasing competition,
however, we believe it is more likely that various
regime leaders will seek to strengthen and expand
their contacts among the leaders of the Guard-
especially if its loose structure of independent war-
lords remains. We also believe that factions at the far
right and left within the regime's political spectrum
are most likely to resort to force to avoid being
squeezed out of power. The breakup of the Guard into
warring factions ultimately could lead to anarchy and
civil war. There are unconfirmed stories that a cleric
close to Montazeri, for example, has been developing
a loyal Guard cadre and arms caches near Esfahan
for just such an eventuality
We doubt that the regular military will play a
significant role in shapin the power struggle follow-
ing. Khomeini's death. the
regime remains suspicious of its loyalty and maintains
extremely tight supervision over it. Clerics have been
inserted at all levels as political-ideological commis-
sars. Moreover, the regime has advanced its loyalists
into positions of command, and there have been
repeated purges; any officer suspected of antiregime
sentiment is immediately removed.
the resulting diffi-
culties of organizing against the regime. Even if that
were possible, we believe that officers would be unsure
of their ability to command the loyalty of their troops.
Most soldiers are drafted from the lower classes, the
regime's power base. Almost all the regular military,
moreover, is stationed at the front alone the border
with Iraq.
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Bazaar merchants played a supporting role in bring-
ing Khomeini to power by providing money and other
resources. They have since become increasingly disaf-
fected by the strict implementation of Islamic law, the
violent repression practiced by the government, and
the economic stagnation under the current regime, 25X1
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Bazaaris have never been the leading political force in
Iran, always preferring to provide support from the
sidelines. We doubt that they will become a driving
force in post-Khomeini Iran. Commerce remains their
prime focus. We believe the strong business competi-
tion that exists in the bazaar and the bazaaris' close
personal ties within various political factions impede
the development of a unified organization. Although
the bazaaris have some shared political goals-pri-
marily a secure business environment and minimal
government interference-historically, they have not
wanted to rule Iran.
have remained in Iran
even those who _U
r
monarchy are unlikely to seek a restoration of the
discredited Pahlavi dynasty. Any future kings and
kingmakers are more likely to emerge from those who
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Although any post-Khomeini regime is likely to
espouse nonalignment, we believe there are groups
who would be willing to lessen Iran's hostility toward
one or the other superpower.
the majority of members on the
Revolutionary Guard Command Council are left lean-
ing and favor the radical restructuring of Iranian
society along "Islamic socialist" lines. Public pro-
nouncements indicate
that this view is echoed among lay technocrats, some
clerics, and many students. Many lay technocrats,
now in their late thirties and early forties, were
educated in the United States during the 1960s and
reflect the student political activism that character-
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Implications for the United States
Whatever successor regime eventually emerges-
short of an unlikely Communist takeover-we believe
that certain general imperatives will guide Iranian
policy:
? Islam is likely to remain a key component of any
successor regime. Even secularists would be forced
to recognize its political force.
? No regime will want to be seen as dominated by
either superpower. "Neither East nor West" is, in
our judgment, a genuinely popular slogan in Iran.
The image of the US "ratan" will be an important
symbol of continuity. Moscow's military support for
Iraq, the occupation of Afghanistan, and Iranian
suspicions of Moscow's intentions, as well as hostil-
ity to Communist ideology, will limit Soviet pros-
pects. Any Iranian regime is likely to hew closely to
a policy of nonalignment.
? The need to sell oil, import consumer goods, and
generate some economic development is likely to
foster relatively good economic relations between
Iran and industrial nations, as well as neighboring
Turkey and Pakistan.
its rivalries with Iraq and Saudi Arabia will persist.
ized that era.
"Islamic socialism" remains very popular among Ira-
nian students, although regime repression has cowed
these students into silence. These groups tend to be
well organized and well armed.
A regime dominated by Revolutionary Guard leaders
and other associated left-leaning groups would be
suspicious of the USSR, but their deep ideological
hatred of the United States would probably cause
them to be more willing than the current regime to
seek increased economic and military aid from Mos-
cow. Such a regime would provide Moscow with its 25X1
best opportunity in Iran. It could also be less hostile to
Soviet foreign policy goals in the region.
Those groups who favor less hostile relations with the
United States currently are either less active and less
organized than the others or are not accustomed to
political leadership roles. These groups include bazaar
merchants, the conservative clergy including the
grand ayatollahs, elements in the regular military,
and the middle and upper classes. With the exception
of the military, which is predominantly located at the
front, these groups are not well armed and are likely
to remain intimidated by the Revolutionary Guard.
For these groups to gain dominance, the strength of
the Guard would have to be exhausted in an extended
period of violence between warring factions. The
ability of the bazaaris to provide financial support to
various factions could then become a crucial variable.
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Although a prolonged period of upheaval would en-
hance chances that groups less hostile to the United
States might gain power, it also would provide the
Soviets with expanded opportunities in Iran, especial-
ly among Iran's ethnic minorities along their common
border. Twice in this century the USSR has sponsored
short-lived socialist republics inside Iran.
Soviet willingness to intervene militarily would be
constrained, in our judgment, by the possibility of
superpower confrontation.` We continue to believe
that the Soviets take seriously declarations by the
United States that it would respond to overt Soviet
moves against Iran.
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25X1
25X1
25X1
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 Secret
Approved For Release 2009/02/12 : CIA-RDP85TOO314R000300090005-6
Secret
Approved For Release 2009/02/12 : CIA-RDP85TOO314R000300090005-6