IRAQ'S SHIAS: SADDAM BLUNTS A POTENTIAL THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000300110003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -Secret
Intelligence
Iraq's Shias:
Saddam Blunts
A Potential Threat
NESA 84-10294
November.1984
270
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Iraq's Shias:
Saddam Blunts
A Potential Threat
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
by the
the Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division,
Secret
NESA 84-10294
November 1984
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Iraq's Shias:
Saddam Blunts
A Potential Threat
Key Judgments The chances of a major Shia insurrection in Iraq appear remote during the
Information available next several years so long as the Iranians cannot win a decisive victory in
as of 18 October 1984 the war with Iraq and Iraqi President Saddam Husayn remains in power.
was used in this report.
Saddam appears to have built a strong base of support among Iraq's 8 mil-
lion Shias by employing an astute combination of force and ethnic politics
to counter Tehran's appeals for a Shia revolution. Sporadic Shia terrorist
activity against the Iraqi Government and the facilities and personnel of
other countries-including the United States-perceived as supporting
Baghdad will continue, but it is likely to have only a limited effect on inter-
nal Iraqi politics.
Previously oppressed or ignored by Iraq's Sunni ruling class, the Shias
under Saddam have begun to play a more important role in Iraqi society:
? Saddam has drawn large numbers of Shias into the ranks of the ruling
Ba'th Party, from which they were formerly excluded. For the first time
in 20 years, Shias constitute a majority of the party's governing body.
? Shias hold prominent positions in the government, and we believe 40
percent of the membership of Iraq's National Assembly is Shia.
? According to our estimates, economic policies adopted by Saddam have
improved the living standards of the Shias tenfold.
In addition, hundreds of thousands of Shias have been inducted into the
Army, and many others have risen to senior positions in the officer corps,
previously almost exclusively a Sunni preserve. Iraq could not continue the
war with Iran without the support of the Shias, who make up 80 percent of
the enlisted and noncommissioned officer ranks of Iraq's armed forces.
Baghdad has moved vigorously to co-opt Iraqi Shia clerics by making them
paid employees of the state. At the same time, Saddam continues to
ruthlessly repress Shia opposition. A massive security crackdown begun in
1980 and continuing to the present appears to have destroyed most
clandestine Shia opposition networks in Iraq, leaving only isolated terrorist
cells. Tens of thousands of Iranian Shias living in Iraq have been expelled
and potential Shia opposition leaders imprisoned or executed.
If Saddam survives the war, we believe that the Shias will become even
more fully integrated into Iraqi politics and society. A strong, stable Iraq
could act as a powerful magnet for Western economic investment and also
as a buffer against Iran's attempts to export its revolution-thus furthering
US objectives in the Persian Gulf.
Secret
NESA 84-10294
November 1984
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In the event of a successful military coup led by Sunni officers against Sad-
dam, we do not believe the Shias will automatically support his successor.
Unless Saddam's successor can reassure the Shias that the gains achieved
by them during Saddam's rule will be preserved, Shia discontent is likely to
threaten the central government.
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Employing the Stick Against Militant Shias
Extending Carrots to Moderate Shias
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Iraq: Distribution of Major Religious and Ethnic Groups
Sunni Arab and
Sunni Kurd
Sunni Arab and
Shia Arab
0 100
Kilometers
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Iraq's Shias:
Saddam Blunts
A Potential Threat
The longstanding hostility of Iraqi Shias toward the
government in Baghdad has been one of the more
serious problems President Saddam Husayn has had
to overcome during the war with Iran. Shias comprise
about 55 percent of Iraq's 15 million population and
are concentrated in southern Iraq near major oilfields
and along the major road and rail links to the Persian
Gulf. The Iraqi Government, however, is controlled
by Sunni Arabs from northwest Iraq who make up
only about 25 percent of the population.' Historically
the Shia majority has been discriminated against by
the powerful Sunni Muslims that have run the coun-
try. The Shias express their dissatisfaction in a popu-
lar saying, "The roads and mail are for the Sunnis,
the taxes for the Shias."
In the late 1970s Saddam faced what appeared to be
an incipient Shia revolt fueled by the revolution in
neighboring Iran. He defused this potentially destruc-
tive situation by launching a crackdown on militants
within the Shia community. Once the threat passed,
Saddam set about to reverse the pattern of discrimi-
nation against Iraqi Shias and to redress many of
their longstanding grievances against the central gov-
ernment. The conciliation phase, in our judgment, is
still going on.
Saddam's Shia policy has been called a successful
example of conflict management and ethnic politics
by US diplomats in Baghdad. The payoff has been an
increase in Shia allegiance toward his government.
This is of crucial importance during the present war
with Iran. We estimate that 80 percent of Iraqi
enlisted men and noncommissioned officers are Shias.
Employing the Stick Against Militant Shias
The resentment of Iraqi Shias toward Baghdad ex-
ploded in serious internal disturbances before the war
with Iran. In February 1977 violent clashes with the
police occurred during a religious march by some
6,000 Shias between the holy cities of An Najaf and
The Shias are a minority sect of Islam that many
orthodox Sunnis consider heretical. The stronghold
of the Shia sect is Iran, where Shias compose 98
percent of the population. The largest Shia communi-
ty outside Iran is in Iraq, but Iraqi Shias are Arabs,
not Persians.
Under the rule of the Sunni Ottoman Turks in the
19th century, leading Shia clerics in Iraq-most of
them Persian-refused to cooperate with the Turkish
governor in Baghdad and instead looked to Iran for
support and guidance. When the British took over
Iraq following World War I and established a Sunni
monarchy, Shia religious leaders remained uncooper-
ative, and many were expelled to Iran. Thereafter,
Iraq's monarchy largely ignored the Shias. Up to the
end of World War II, only three Shias served in Iraqi
cabinets
Shias also were inhibited from participating in the
Iraqi Government by their lack of secular education.
Shia clerics forbade their followers from obtaining
schooling under the Turks and later the British.
Sunni Arabs, who did attend secular schools, re-
ceived most posts in the bureaucracy and held on to
these after the Iraqi republic was established in 1958.
Hence, Sunnis came to dominate the Iraqi Govern-
ment.
Shia political fortunes revived a bit in the early 1960s
because the first Iraqi President, Abd al-Karim Kas-
sem, had a Shia mother. In addition, when Kassem
legalized the Communist Party, its members concen-
trated their organizational activities in the Shia
slums. Kassem, however, was overthrown in 1963,
and the Shias'political fortunes fell. They did not
revive-in our judgment-until Saddam took over
the presidency in 1979.
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Karbala.) I a handful of
demonstrators were killed and an estimated 1,000
arrested. Saddam Husayn subsequently ordered the
execution of eight Shias held responsible for provok-
ing the unrest.'
In 1979, following Khomeini's successful revolution in
Iran, disturbances again broke out in the Shia areas of
Iraq. Antigovernment demonstrations started in An
Najaf and Karbala and this time spread to Baghdad.
The government hanged at least 56 Shia demonstra-
tors after crushing the outbursts, according to US
diplomats, but Shia dissidence continued. Iraqi securi-
ty forces discovered arms caches in several major
cities, including Baghdad, and Shia activists assassi-
nated Iraqi Government and security officials during
' During this period Saddam was the number-two man in the
government, behind President Ahmad Hasan Bakr. General Bakr,
however, left most of the day-to-day affairs to Saddam because of
illness. The two men complemented each other well. Bakr, as a
general, maintained the loyalty of the military, while Saddam
controlled the country's security apparatus. Bakr stepped down in
the spring and summer of 1980, according to reliable
sources. These incidents were highlighted by an assas-
sination attempt against now Foreign Minister Tariq
Aziz and attacks on government-sponsored demon-
strations in early May that resulted in civilian casual-
ties.
Saddam reacted ruthlessly. Baghdad's attitude was
summarized by a remark made by Tariq Aziz to a US
journalist following a series of violent Shia demon-
strations. According to US diplomats, Aziz said, "If
there are those in this country who seek martyrdom,
my government is prepared to accommodate them-
all of them." Saddam's actions against the Shias took
two forms: mass expulsions and widespread arrests
and executions.
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Expulsions. According to US diplomats, Iraqi securi-
ty forces determined through the interrogation of Shia
activists arrested for taking part in terrorist attacks
that Shias of Iranian descent living in Iraq were a
major cause of the Shia unrest. As a result, some
35,000 Shias of Iranian descent who had not obtained
Iraqi citizenship were expelled during the spring of
1980. This constituted approximately one-eighth of all
Iranian Shias then living in Iraq, according to US
diplomats.
The expulsions were handled very harshly,
with Iran.
Saddam had some 900 Shias executed and 2,000
others imprisoned in the spring of 1980 in response to
a spate of Dawa terrorist attacks. The crackdowns
were not random Security
officials deliberately directed their efforts against
actual or potential Iraqi Shia leaders such as teachers,
professional people, and students. In our judgment,
the regime was attempting to wipe out any home-
grown Iraqi Shia dissident movement before it could
gather momentum.
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The deportees' personal
possessions were confiscated, and they were allowed to
leave the country with only about $200 each. In one
instance, according to US diplomats, attendees at a
meeting of the Iraqi Chamber of Commerce in Bagh-
dad during April 1980 were divided into two groups,
Arab Iraqis and Iraqis of Iranian ancestry. The Iraqis
of Iranian origin then were placed on trucks and taken
to the border where they were expelled without
baggage, families, or recourse.'
Baghdad has continued to expel small groups of Iraqis
of Iranian descent throughout the war. The latest
sizable expulsion occurred in mid-July 1984 and
involved about 150 people, according to an Iranian
press report. The Shias of Iranian origin generally are
trucked to Kurdistan and then forced across the
border into Iran.
In part, the mass expulsions have been used to deprive
Shia activists of a friendly environment in which to
operate and find recruits. The deportations also serve
as a vivid reminder to other Shias of their fate should
the regime perceive them as a potential fifth column.
Moreover, we believe the expulsions are popular with
some members of the Arab Shia community who use
them to take over businesses and buy up houses, cars,
and goods at bargain prices.
Smashing Dawa. In addition to expelling Shias of
Iranian descent, Saddam has vigorously repressed the
main Shia opposition organization-Al Dawa-dur-
ing the past four years. The most savage phase of the
crackdown occurred during 1980 just before the war
A diplomatic source in Baghdad, assessing the sever-
ity of Iraq's crackdown during this period, claimed
that the government seized any Shia who might
possibly be involved in militant activity. Consequent-
ly, by 1980 a large proportion of the politically active
element of the Shia community had been crushed,
according to the diplomat.
Perhaps the most significant example of Iraqi deter-
mination to destroy the Shia opposition was the
execution on 7 April 1980 of Ayatollah Muhammad
Baqr Sadr, the "pope" of Iraq's Shias. The Shia
spiritual leader was strangled in prison, along with his
sister. Although the execution could have provided a
rallying point for Iraqi Shias, the regime apparently
decided that a dead Ayatollah was less a menace than
a potential Khomeini, according to US diplomats.
Baghdad
used the execution of Baqr Sadr to drive home to the
Iraqi Shias that the regime was prepared to use brute
force to control the situation. The execution also
demonstrated to Iraqi Shias that Iran could not
protect its supporters inside Iraq,
many Dawa activists
fled to northern Iraq in late 1980. Many of these
activists, we believe, have since moved on to Iran.
Other activists fled to Arab states in the Gulf, where
they have been vigorously pursued by Iraqi security
services.
fugitives have been apprehended by Iraqi security
teams in the Gulf states, then drugged and spirited
'Such mass expulsions of Iranians living in Iraq are not unusual. In
the early 1970s Iraq expelled some 60,000 Shias of Iranian origin
when relations between Baghdad and the Shah deteriorated.F_
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The Shia Opposition
The Dawa, or Islamic Call Party, the first organized
Shia political party in Iraq, came into being in the
1960s. The party sfounders included the late Ayatol-
lahs Muhammad Baqr Sadr and Muhsin al-Hakim.
The party is firmly opposed to the secular Ba'thist
government in Baghdad and claims up to 40,000
members, but this almost certainly is an exaggera-
tion. esti-
mate the party's membership at about 1,000.F---]
believed that only the al-Hakim name could attract
wide support among Iraqi Shias.
Khomeini's formation of the
Council split the Iraqi exile community. Elements of
the Iraqi opposition claimed the Council was too
subservient to Iran and that Muhammad Baqr had
sacrificed the autonomy of the Iraqi Shia opposition
movement by agreeing to become the Council's head.
In the early 1970s, Mahdi and Muhammad Baqr al-
Hakim, sons of Muhsin al-Hakim, dominated Dawa.
Mahdi.fled to Iran in 1970 after a harsh crackdown
on dissidence inside Iraq. The eldest al-Hakim broth-
er subsequently settled in London, where he founded
the Rabita al-Ahl al-Bayt (the People's Bond), a
group advocating Western-style parliamentary de-
mocracy in Iraq dominated by Shias, according to
diplomatic sources. This puts him in opposition to
Khomeini's plan of replacing the Bath with an
Iranian-controlled theocracy.
In December 1982, Khomeini established a Supreme
Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq to rule in
Baghdad once Saddam was defeated. Khomeini chose
Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim to lead the Council.
Khomeini
back to Iraq for trial and execution. As recently as
last year, the Iraqis tried unsuccessfully to force
Kuwait to hand over an Iraqi Shia dissident.
In addition, Baghdad's security services use threats
against relatives still inside Iraq to influence Shia
activists abroad. For example, in April 1983 the Dawa
Party was implicated in two terrorist bombings in
Baghdad. In reaction, Saddam ordered the arrest of
70 members of the al-Hakim family and a month
later executed six of them. According to US diplomats
in Baghdad, the regime then sent the 75-year-old
father of two of the dead prisoners to Tehran to tell
Currently, the Iraqi Shia opposition is split three
ways. The conservative London group headed by
In Tehran, Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim continues to
work closely with Khomeini. Finally, remnants of the
Dawa Party who oppose Iranian domination of the
Iraqi Shia community largely are ignored by Iran's
mullahs.
We believe the present disarray within the Iraqi Shia
opposition is a major factor in the ineffectiveness of
the movement inside Iraq. There has not been a
significant sabotage operation inside Iraq tied to the
Iraqi Shia opposition since April 1983. Individual
Iraqi Dawa members, however, have been involved in
Shia terrorist attacks outside Iraq.
have been no major bombings since then.
the al-Hakim brothers that more family members
would be executed if additional bombings occurred.
This threat combined with the rigorous suppression of
'Dawa inside Iraq apparently has worked, as there
The Shia opposition appears not to have recovered
from the Iraqi crackdown. According to US diplomats
in Baghdad, the Shia opposition leadership and the
formal organization inside Iraq have been virtually
eliminated.
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Extending Carrots to Moderate Shias
While pursuing his ruthless crackdown on Shia mili-
tants, Saddam also sought to conciliate the Shia
community at large. Saddam's efforts, in our judg-
ment, are twofold: to co-opt Iraq's Shia clerics and to
provide opportunities for Shias to advance within
Iraq's political and economic systems.
Unlike the Shah, Saddam attempts to limit the
independent income of Iraqi clerics so they cannot
sponsor subversive activities. Following the Shia dem-
onstrations in 1977, Saddam took steps to make all
Shia religious leaders state employees
This status was formalized in law in
1981. Although presented as an act of government
benevolence to improve the lot of Shia clerics, the net
effect of Saddam's actions has been to make Iraqi
clerics partly dependent on the government for their
support. Most contributions to Shia clerics and
shrines become the property of the state to be doled
out by the government to various clerics and religious
institutions. This arrangement gives the government
immense power in dealing with the clerical leadership
and provides Iraqi clerics with a vested interest in the
survival of the regime.
Saddam also has made a major effort to buy clerical
loyalties over the past four years by upgrading and
improving mosques and shrines throughout the Shia
areas of the country. US diplomats who visited An
Najaf and Karbala in May 1983 noted a considerable
amount of restoration and construction activity under
way at shrines and mosques in both cities. Iraqi press
reports indicate that important tombs and the mina-
rets of major mosques are being gilded and courtyards
repaved with marble. Much of this is portrayed in the
Iraqi press as a direct result of the benevolence of
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, who often is pic-
tured at prayer in these mosques.
Whether or not Saddam's newfound piety and benev-
olence have convinced most Shias is impossible to
assess, but his control of Shia clerics has paid divi-
dends. Throughout the war, leading Iraqi Shia clerics
have sent him public telegrams of support. In addi-
tion, Saddam periodically has used Shia clerics to
organize international Islamic conferences to call for
peace and to excoriate Iran's intransigence as un-
Islamic.
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Economic Benefits. Saddam also has aimed a consid-
erable portion of Iraq's development program at the 25X1
Shias in an effort to sustain their loyalties. With
massive financial inflows from its Arab backers, Iraq
has been able to carry on major development projects,
even though the war with Iran has badly depleted
Iraq's cash reserves. Many of the showcase develop-
ment projects Saddam continues to push are in Shia
areas. According to press reports, Saddam has rebuilt
Baghdad's al Thawrah slums, where over a million
Shias live, and renamed it Saddam City. He also has
approved a $400 million water treatment facility in Al
Basrah, a major Shia city, according to press reports.
In An Najaf, Saddam has ordered the rebuilding of
the old market, the development of parks, and the
widening of streets. The Baghdad-Umm Qasr rail-
road that will pass through Shia areas and a large
irrigation project near An Nasiriyah are still slated to
go forward.
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Iran's appeals to Iraqi Shias have been successfully
blunted in part by Baghdad's own astute propaganda.
To offset the religious appeal of Iran's propaganda,
Baghdad has evoked themes of Arabness, stressing
the great Arab victories over the Persians in the early
days of Islam. For example, Iraq's Defense Minister
labels the Iranians "envious Shuubists" after a group
of Persian Muslims who disputed Arab leadership of
Islam following the death of the Prophet. Saddam
describes the war as the Battle of Qadisiyah after the
famous Arab Muslim victory over the Persians 1,300
years ago. Baghdad has also played up the theme
that it is fighting to prevent a Persian conquest of
Arab Iraq. At the beginning of Iran's most recent
major offensive, Saddam told a crowd of Iraqi Shias
that the Iranians want to place the `yoke of slavery
and captivity around the necks of your women,
daughters, sisters, and mothers.'I
These appeals have had a profound effect upon Iraqi
among many Iraqi Shia leaders that Iran sees the
war as a historic opportunity to take over all of Iraq.
this Iraqi fear of
Persian domination has even caused serious differ-
ences between Dawa and its Iranian supporters.
Iraq also has played on the fear of Iraqi Shia clerics
that they would be relegated to a secondary role if
Iran succeeds in overthrowing the Iraqi Government.
Khomeini contributed to the concerns of Iraqi clerics
and facilitated Iraqi propaganda by publicly arguing
in 1980 that the center of Shia religious authority
should be transferred from An Najaf in Iraq, where it
has resided for over a thousand years, to Iran.
Khomeini's assertion was publicly rejected by Iraqi
clerics as a blatant Iranian power grab and heresy.
Saddam also has raised the pay of the lowest ranking
civil servants and soldiers, most of whom are Shias.
He has instituted a welfare system for elderly and
disabled Iraqis and has imposed price controls and
Grand Ayatollah Abd al-Qasim Musavi-Khoi, who is
the senior Shia cleric in Iraq, is regarded by many
Shia scholars as the foremost religious authority of
the sect, senior even to Khomeini. Khoi, who is about
92 years old, does not believe that clerics should be
directly involved in politics. In our judgment, Khoi
probably regards Khomeini's insistence on the fusion
of religion and politics as heresy, and he generally
has been seen as at least tacitly supporting Baghdad.
This perception has greatly aided Saddam's regime
in its efforts to propagandize the Iraqi Shias. Kho-
meini sent Khoi a message of condolence this summer
on the occasion of his son's death, suggesting that the
Iranian leader has come to recognize his rival's
continued importance.
with the Iraqi clergy were not good. As early as 1968,
Although Khomeini spent 15 years in An Najaf and
studied for a time under Khoi, his personal relations
had lost much of his prestige among Iraqi Shias and
was regarded as inferior to Khoi and two other Iraqi
religious leaders. US diplomats in 1970 noted that
Khomeini had made numerous enemies among the
Iraqi Shia clergy who had experienced firsthand his
many personal foibles and intractable personality.
The misgivings of Khoi and other Iraqi clerics con-
cerning Khomeini almost certainly have been rein-
forced by the defection to Baghdad this year of Ali
Tehrani, a middle-level Iranian cleric and brother-in-
law of Iran's President. Tehrani's accusations of
Iranian clerical misconduct have received wide play
in Iraqi internal propaganda.
increased subsidies for basic goods and services. L
Iraqi Shia activists
believe these moves are aimed at undercutting Shia
opposition among the lower classes.
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Shia Political Gains. Besides economic benefits, Sad-
dam has provided the Shias with tangible political
gains. In 1979 he publicly announced plans to convert
the formerly elitist Ba'th Party into a mass movement
and called upon all Iraqis to join the organization.
Subsequently he has toured the country urging Iraqis
to become members. Although Saddam has not spe-
cifically appealed for Shia membership in the Ba'th,
his move has most affected the Shia community since
Sunni Arabs alread were heavily re resented in the
party. ntil
the early 1970s the Ba'th was 90-percent Sunni Arab
and that Sunnis held all leadership posts.'
Shias have been quick to take advantage of Saddam's
offer. A US diplomat in Baghdad noted in the late
1970s that lucrative careers were opening in the
bureaucracy because of the oil boom. The Shias, the
diplomat noted, equated party membership with ac-
cess to those careers. Several government bureaucra-
cies such as the diplomatic and security services, as
well as certain senior military schools and the College
of Education, are closed to candidates unless they are
members of the party. A Ba'th Party card is virtually
a ticket to the middle class, and, according to a US
diplomat, the Shias are determined to rise in the
system
Although there is no information on the exact per-
centage of Shias in the Ba'th Party,
since 1979 the party has recruited exten-
sively among the sect. the member-
ship of the party at as many as 1 million in mid-1983,
with Shias believed to be enrolled in proportion to
their numbers in the population.
mostly Sunnis, in the upper ranks.
we estimate that the party may have as many
as 500,000 Shia members, mostly concentrated in the
party's lower ranks
Perhaps in recognition of the increasing numbers of
Shias in the party, Saddam overhauled its Regional
Command-the party's governing body-in 1982 and
appointed seven new members, six of whom were
Shias. The positions of real power on the Regional
Command are still held by Sunnis, and the newly
appointed Shias are all technocrats, but for the first
time since 1963 Shias form a majority-eight out of
15-of Regional Command members.
The largest visible concentration of Shias in the
governmental structure is in the National Assembly.
Saddam created the Assembly in 1979, at the same
time that he announced the expansion of the Ba'th
Party, and specifically solicited Shia candidates for
the body.' A Western scholar estimates that some 40
percent of Assembly seats are held by Shias. The
same scholar estimates that 50 percent of those Shias
who ran for the Assembly did so as Ba'th Party
members. Although the Assembly is largely a rubber-
stamp organization, it provides Shias with a highly
visible symbol of their integration into Iraqi society. It
also provides individual Shias who are successful in
achieving Assembly seats with important sources of
patronage. Assembly elections are scheduled to be
6 In his appeal Saddam did not use the term Shias. Rather, he asked
for candidates from the tawa'if (sects). The largest sect in Iraq is
'The Kurds-the other significant minority-as non-Arabs have
not been encouraged to become members of the Ba'th Party. F_
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Saddam's Cult of Personality and the Shias
Before the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam initiated an in-
tense publicity campaign to personalize his rule. The
thrust of this continuing campaign is directed in large
part at the Shias. For example, Saddam visits Shia
slum quarters in Baghdad, prays at Shia mosques,
and has held a banquet for Shia religious leaders,
according to diplomatic sources in Baghdad~~
have tapped an instinctual response among the Shias,
a sect long noted for adulating its leaders. The
diplomats claim that the Shias respond to all aspects
of the personality cult, but in particular to Saddam's
apparently impromptu visits to their districts. During
these visits, Saddam mingles with the Shias, listens
to their complaints, embraces their children, and
generally behaves like a Western politician, according
The cult of personality has been intensified during to US diplomats.
the war. Saddam promotes himself as the ingenious
planner of Iraq's military victories, the inspiration to
troops at the front, and the mainstay of home front
morale. Western reporters claim that the cult is
pervasive-Saddam T-shirts and watches are on sale
throughout Iraq, and his portraits are seen every-
where.
Shia enthusiasm for Saddam continues despite the
hardships of war. A Western ambassador who visited
the Shia city of Najaf claimed to have witnessed 64
funerals of war dead in an hour and a half Yet, when
Saddam toured the streets of An Najaf shortly after
the ambassador's visit, the Shias greeted his motor-
Shias welcome the attention that Saddam bestows
upon them, according to diplomats in Baghdad. Ac-
cording to a Western scholar, Saddam appears to
cade with seemingly genuine enthusiasm.
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held sometime before the end of the year, which may
give the Shias an opportunity to increase further their
During the early stages of the conflict, how- 25X1
ever, only a few hundred military personnel had to be
arrested for refusing to fight Iran
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strength in the Assembly.'
Shias in the Military. The armed forces also have
proved to be a major vehicle for integrating the Shias
into the Iraqi mainstream. Before the war the military
services numbered approximately 390,000 men. The
war has caused their number to nearly double to over
700,000. Another 750,000 men and women serve
part-time in militia units, according to Iraqi press
reports.
The increase in military manpower has been possible
only because large numbers of Shia personnel are
being inducted into the services;
many Kurds have been
released from service as a political concession. Before
the war, US diplomats estimated that 60 percent of
enlisted men, 80 percent of noncommissioned officers,
and 40 percent of officers were Shias. We estimate
that about 70 percent of the current military is Shia-
approximately 80 percent of the enlisted men and
noncomissioned officers-meaning that approximate-
ly 500,000 Shias are serving in regular units with
perhaps another 140,000 on active duty at the front
with militia units.
Although Shias are underrepresented in the officer
ranks, some Shias hold key positions in the military.
Three of Saddam's top military advisers, Generals
Abd al-Jabar Asadi and Ismail Tayih Nu'aymi, mem-
bers of the President's Military Advisory Committee,
and Mahmud Shukr Shahin, head of the Directorate
of Military Intelligence, are Shias
Although we have no accurate
information on the religious affiliation of the com-
The military has experienced occasional problems
with its Shia military personnel. Before the war
several Shia officers were purged, and 30 to 40 Shia
officers and enlisted men suspected of opposing the
government were executed,
' The scholar also discovered that the Kurds did not send a single
Ba'th Party member to the Assembly. The three Kurdish provinces
The most trying period for the loyalty of Baghdad's
Shia troops occurred between March and July 1982.
During that period Iran pushed Iraq out of
Khuzestan, inflicting two major defeats on Iraqi
forces and capturing some 45,000 Iraqi prisoners,
many of whom probably were Shias
signs of war weariness in Iraqi
ranks, and there were several instances of mass
surrenders. When the Iranians invaded east of Basrah
in July 1982, however, Iraq's Shia troops fighting on
their own soil refused to crack. Moreover, General
Sa'di Tu'ma al-Jabburi, the Iraqi commander who
defeated the Iranians at Al Basrah in Jul 1982, is
himself a Shia Jabburi
now commands Iraqi forces along the Shatt al Arab.
Outlook
A major Shia revolt appears remote as long as the
Iranians cannot win a decisive victory and Saddam
remains alive. The Iraqi Shia opposition is disorga-
nized, and diplomatic sources suggest that its leaders
fear that their organizations have been extensively
penetrated by the Iraqi security services. Baghdad's
ability this spring to round up a network of Shia
dissidents who were planning to attack the Foreign
Ministry and several diplomatic missions in Baghdad,
its rapid discovery in February of eight arms caches
smuggled into Iraq by Shia dissidents operating out of
Syria, and its apparent foreknowledge of the Dawa
bombings in Kuwait in December 1983 suggest that
Iraqi security has good sources in the Shia opposition.
The evidence also suggests that Dawa has been unable
to rebuild its extensive network inside Iraq because of
the continuing security crackdown. As a result, the
Iraqi Shia opposition probably will be unable to carry
out more than isolated bombings and assassinations
during the next few years.
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In June 1982 the ninth congress of Iraq's Bath Party
appointed seven new members, six Shias and one
Sunni, to the Regional Command. All were longtime
members of the Bath and had been imprisoned at
least once for Ba'thist activities. Five of them had
subsequently distinguished themselves in mass mobi-
lization work among the Shias.
The Sunni, Samir Muhammad Abd al-Wahab al-
Shaykhli, is viewed as a hero by the over 1 million
Shias of Baghdad's al Thawrah quarter, once consid-
ered to be both the worst slum in the Middle East
and a center of antigovernment sentiment. During
Shaykhli's tenure as mayor of Baghdad (1980-82),
the area was redeveloped, upgrading the living stand-
ards of the Shia residents. US diplomats say that his
administrative talents, success in al Thawrah, and
history of party activity-he has been a member since
he was 19-led to his appointment to the Regional
Command.
In describing the Shias appointed to the Regional
Command, diplomatic sources indicated that Mu-
hammad Hamza al-Zubaydi played an important
role in containing Dawa in the Shia-dominated south-
ern provinces. As secretary of the Southern Organiza-
tion Bureau of the Bath from 1979 until 1982, he
devised a successful propaganda campaign against
the Dawa and used security services ruthlessly in
suspect areas. As of 1983 Zubaydi was secretary of
the Central Peasants and Central Vocational Bu-
reaus in the Regional Command. Abd al-Hasin Rahi
Fir'awn and Mazban Kadr Hadi belong to the power-
ful Fatlah tribe of Shias and have effectively gov-
erned Shia populated regions on the military front
with Iran. Diplomatic sources report that Abd al-
Ghani Abd al-Ghafur is a rising star in the Bath
Party. As secretary of the Basrah Branch Command
of the Bath (1978-82) and Minister of Awqaf and
Religious Affairs (1982), he gained considerable ex-
perience in dealing with Shias. He currently is secre-
tary of the Southern Organization Bureau of the
party.
Sa'dun Hammadi has been Minister of State in the
Presidential Office since January 1983. Minister of
Oil and Minerals (1969-74) and of Foreign Affairs
(1975-83), he is valued by the President for his past
service and insight into international affairs, accord-
ing to US diplomats. They add that he is devoutly
religious. Sa di Mahdi Salih, secretary of the North-
ern Organization Bureau, is from Saddam's home-
town of Tikrit. We know little about him.
Other highly visible Shias in Saddam's government
are Hasan Ali, Minister of Trade (since 1977); Na'im
Hamid Haddad, Speaker of the National Assembly
(since 1980); and Ahmad Husayn Samarra'i, Chief of
the President's Cabinet (since January 1984). The
three men are close associates of Saddam, and Ali
and Haddad are longtime members of the Revolu-
tionary Command Council, Iraq's highest government
body, and of the Regional Command. US diplomats
in Baghdad report that in recent years Saddam has
given them greater prominence and responsibilities.
Ali has recently participated in numerous trade mis-
sions to Europe, Asia, and South America. In 1983
the diplomats reported that Haddad was considered
to be the senior Shia in the ruling hierarchy. The
diplomats claimed that, although he has little irtflu-
ence in the government, he has been mentioned as a
possible successor to the Deputy Prime Minister.
Since 1980 Samarra'i has risen quickly from Under
Secretary in the Foreign Ministry to his current
position.
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Wahab al-Shaykhli
Baghdad Observer
Muhammad Hamza a!- Abd al-Hasin Rahi Fir'aw~
Zubaydi
Baghdad Observer ?
Mazban Kadr Hadi
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Ahmad Husayn Samarra'i
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Baghdad's willingness to assimilate the Shias into
both the Ba'th Party and the military also augurs well
for the regime's stability. Saddam's opening to the
Shias, in our judgment, has wrought something of a
revolution in Iraq's political life. Many Iraqi Shias
now have an important stake in the present regime
and probably hope to preserve it from an Iranian
takeover and ensure that it is not replaced by a more
repressive Sunni regime. In essence, Saddam has used
the Shias to broaden the base of his regime, thus
freeing himself from heavy dependence on the mili-
tary. Saddam can now count on the mass of the Shia
community in addition to the 25 percent of the
population that is Sunni Arab.
A key to the regime's continued success in courting
the Shias probably will be the country's economic
situation. The regime needs to increase oil exports so
that it can continue economic development projects
and avoid an adverse economic impact in the Shia
community that could provide Dawa with new re-
cruits. The recent agreement to build a pipeline that
will enable Iraq to export oil through Saudi Arabia
should provide Baghdad with sufficient revenues to
head off economic discontent. Moreover, the induc-
tion of large numbers of Shias into the military
provides additional money to the Shia community.
We believe that when the war ends-assuming that
the Iraqi President survives-Saddam will continue
his efforts to cultivate ties with the Shias. Both
Saddam and the Shias share a common postwar goal.
Saddam has stated in numerous speeches that he
seeks to rebuild Iraq as soon as possible after the
conflict. As the country's blue-collar workers and
peasants, the Shias will be needed to assist in the
country's recovery. The Shias, too, according to diplo-
matic sources, are eager to see prosperity return to
Iraq.
On the other hand, if Saddam is assassinated or
overthrown in a coup, we believe the Shias will not
automatically support his successor. In our view, the
Shias have something of a personal compact with
Saddam. It is his charisma that they respect and his
economic policies that they have benefited from so
far
We believe it would be particularly difficult for a
Sunni military successor to legitimize his rule over the
Shias. The worst period for the Shias in modern Iraq
occurred after the death of Kassem in 1963 when a
succession of military rulers governed Iraq and ig-
nored the Shia masses. Shias probably would remem-
ber that all of Iraq's previous military rulers tried to
form unions with neighboring Arab states. We believe
the Shias view pan-Arabism as anti-Shia because in
any such scheme they would be submerged in a sea of
Sunnis. Iraqi Shias, therefore, probably would resent
the return of Army rule to Iraq and would be more
susceptible to Iranian subversion.
Implications
The Iraqi experience suggests that Iran's ability to
successfully export its revolution is limited. Saddam's
ruthless use of power combined with astute ethnic
politics have succeeded in countering radical appeals
from Tehran for a Shia revolution. At the same time,
Iraqi tactics are probably not transferable to the
Gulf-none of the Gulf regimes has an internal
security service as ruthless or effective as Iraq. A
strong Iraq, however, will serve as a check on Iranian
ambitions, thus furthering US objectives in the Gulf
so long as a radical clerical regime is in power in Iran.
Following the war, Saddam will need stability to
ensure that Western investment will flow to Iraq.
Western bankers and industrial firms almost certainly
would be wary of investing in a country torn by civil
strife. We believe the Shias also desire stability when
the war ends, since they have suffered much from the
fighting. Similarly, the Shias are not likely to support
an aggressive Iraqi policy toward the moderate Arab
states of the Gulf, since many Iraqi Shia merchants
have ties to Shia merchants in the Gulf, with whom
they robabl hoe to ex and trade when the war
ends.
Immediately after the war-and probably for at least
a few years-Iraq, with Saddam in control and
backed by the Shias, should be a stabilizing force in
the Gulf region. Nonetheless, as Iraq grows stronger,
its neighbors almost certainly will come to fear it, and
this could lead to increased regional tensions.
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Secret
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