EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION, MBFR, AND THE SOVIETS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100010002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 5, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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5 January 1974
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: European Defense Cooperation,
MBFR; and the Soviets
NOTE : This memo, prepared in CIA, briefly
assesses the stance of the West Europeans
on MBFR and its relation to European defense
cooperation. It then addresses Soviet
attitudes toward the same question.
1.. The West European Posture: With the advent of
MBFR negotiations, the question of future European defense
cooperation has seized the members of the EC with some
urgency. This question now seems likely to add con-
siderably to the complications of the talks. During the
first round of the negotiations, most of the EC members
made it a point to emphasize to the Warsaw Pact participants
that any possible agreements should not restrict the
possibility of future ventures in European defense
cooperation. Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Great
Britian put so much emphasis on this point that the US
delegation drew the conclusion that the EC participants
were perhaps more interested in limiting the possible
damage to West European interests than in achieving the
goals of the MBFR negotiations.
2. In mid-December the EC participants provided
the US delegation copies of a paper which spelled out
precisely what they wish to avoid in MBFR. The paper
had already been approved by the foreign ministries of
Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, West Germany, and
Luxembourg, and, interestingly enough, France, which is
not participating in the MBFR exercise. (The British
presumably approved the paper later.)
3. In general, the EC paper recommended that
possible MBFR agreements: F_
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--should not prejudice the already decided develop-
ment of the European Community into a European
Union;
--should avoid giving the Western area of reduction
(West Germany and the Benelux) a special status
that would hinder the unifying process; (that is,
an agreement should not create a geographical area
in which special arms control measures apply)
--and should not preclude the possibility that a future
European Union might take over the implementation
and verification of possible agreements.
In particular',-the EC participants said they wished to avoid:
--the establishment of "ceilings" or "subceilings"
for the national forces of the EC Nine;
--provisions which would limit movements of their
armed forces;
--the designation of the armed forces of a country
of the Nine stationed in another member country,
such as the British Army on the Rhine, as "foreign
forces."
4. Although the French have only posed questions
and supplied no answers concerning what Paris describes
as the need for an "increasingly distinct character of
European defense," their recent sallies have piqued the
interest of their European neighbors. Among these over-
tures have been Foreign Minister Jobert's recent hints
that the Western European Union might serve as the forum
for discussion and reflection of Europe's defense. These
French balloons have stimulated the hope among the other
Europeans that Paris may. at long last be willing to make
concessions to the eventual creation of an effective
European defense organization.
5. The West Europeans' desire to preserve their defense
options is a genuine one even though their individual
motivations are complex. Bonn, London, Rome, and several
other capitals fully accept the need for closer cooperation
among themselves as a way of rationalizing their defense
expenditures. They all see an eventual defense organization
as a natural consequence of the European unity movement,
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and they clearly expect that Europe will ultimately have
to shoulder a larger share of the Atlantic defense burden.
France to a considerable degree shares these views, but
its motives in raising the European defense issue, at this
time are more ambiguous. Genuinely fearing the consequences
of a US force reduction, Paris would not mind raising
issues that could complicate the MBFR negotiations. Nor
does Paris mind alluding to the alleged risk that in the
course of the MBFR negotiations the US will make bilateral
"deals" with Moscow that would further weaken the US
security commitment.
6. It should be noted that no West European government
has any firm blueprint for defense cooperation; each has
different perspectives and fears; all are feeling the way.
Much will depend on their perception of the evolving US role.
In general, however, they are already disposed to think
that the US will decide--or be forced--to cut its com-
mitments in Europe, and they are very apprehensive lest this
be done in ways, or at a pace, in which they are not given
a true consultative role. Any US moves which pointed toward
bilateral US-Soviet understandings on MBFR issues would
add to these apprehensions; the more so since they are
already sensitive about not being consulted in the recent
Middle East crisis. MBFR will greatly affect vital European
security interests and the allies would be particularly
sensitive to anything suggesting they were being excluded.
Their irritation would be the greater in light of recent
US promises to consult more fully.
7. The Soviet View: While Soviet opposition to
West European integration as such is of long standing,
recent developments have had the effect of arousing Moscow.
Over the past year or so Moscow has shown signs of learning
to live with economic integration, but political integration
makes it nervous and the fear of military integration is
traceable at least back to the European Defense Community
proposal of 1954 and perhaps to the Locarno agreement in
1925. Freely expressed Chinese support for improved
West European defense capabilities has only added to
these fears.
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8. Soviet fears focus on the prospect that a West
European defense grouping will have a nuclear capability
and that West Germany will come to dominate that rou ing.
Even without nuclear weapons there is concern. 25X1C
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a "school of thought"
in the Soviet Union that believes a unified Western
Europe will become increasingly aggressive, seek to
regain control of East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia,
but at the same time remain psychologically and ideologically
pro-American and anti-Soviet. How widely this view is
held we cannot say, but the fear of a German-dominated
Western Europe is deeply engrained in the Soviet psyche.
9. Soviet behavior on MBFR may in fact owe much
to this concern over the prospect of a European defense
grouping. Moscow has not behaved as though it was urgently
concerned with getting US forces out of Europe. In May
1971 Brezhnev publicly signalled an interest in negotiating
force reductions, thereby helping to scuttle the Mansfield
resolution at that time. Later, the agreement to open
MBFR talks took some steam out of the demands for uni-
lateral US troop withdrawals. Finally, the Soviet force
reduction offer put forward at Vienna on 8 November
seems aimed at avoiding a precipitate departure of US
troops. It emphasizes the phased reduction of both
stationed and national forces, and Soviet officials have
made it clear in subsequent comments that reduction of
West German armed forces is a primary Soviet concern.
10. There are obviously other reasons for the Soviet
interest in force reduction--the linkage with CSCE, the
prospect of weakening NATO, and even some marginal
economic savings--but the possibility of heading off a
European defense grouping may be near the top of the list.
A breakdown in the talks that led to a unilateral US
withdrawal and gave new impetus to the West European
defense effort might well be regarded in Moscow as the
worst of the possible outcomes. A phased withdrawal
of US troops, accompanied by substantial reduction of
European forces and accomplished in a climate of detente,
might be regarded as the best. This gives Moscow an
additional incentive to compromise.to keep up the
momentum of the talks.
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