THE EMERGING NEW GOVERNMENT IN THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100020006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 14, 1974
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
The Emerging New Government in Thailand
Secret
February 14, 1974
No. 0921/74
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February 14, 1974
The Emerging New Government in Thailand
Summary
The spontaneous political upheaval of last October spawned a drive to achieve
civilian constitutional government in Thailand. A wide range of forces on the Thai
political scene helped break the preceding three decades of military rule:
-Fledgling student activists, whose stand against the Thanom regime's
corruption and its failure to meet the serious domestic problems of the country
drew a wave of sympathy from the people and the army.
-A broader force of intellectuals, bureaucratic elite, journalists, and like-
minded individuals bent on bringing political change to Thailand. This group
opposes a strong military role in government and seeks other institutional changes
posing a challenge to vested economic and political interests in the country.
-King Phumiphon, who has left his traditional position on the periphery of
Thai politics and placed his immense personal prestige and the institutional. au-
thority of the monarchy behind the development of a constitutional government
capable of dealing effectively with Thai domestic problems.
-The military, which though not a new force, is playing a new role. The
durability of the constitutional experiment depends basically on the army's willing-
ness to remain on the political sidelines. For now, the army, led by Krit Siwara, leas
acquiesced in the King's political role and in civilian management of the country.
The military recognizes the wide desire in Thailand for a more responsive govern-
ment and knows that a new set of military rulers would face the same difficult
domestic problems with which the civilians are now grappling. But unless the
civilians can establish a solid government that can make acceptable progress in
meeting Thai domestic problems, the military will not remain indefinitely on the
sidelines.
The political scene in Thailand is currently focused on the efforts of the
interim Sanya government to make a solid start in treating Thailand's ills. The
government's performance has been mixed:
Comments and ueries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to
of the Office of Current Intelligence,
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It has failed to restore law and order completely and has projected a
somewhat weak image, partly a reflection of Sanya's own personality. T11is has
caused the conservative military some concern as to its durability.
-On the other hand, the political fabric of the country has remained intact in
spite of student and labor unrest, and the government has launched a series of tax
reforms and economic controls that should help combat the inflation and corruption
that is fueling public dissatisfaction.
The government is also well down the road toward promulgating the new
constitution. It is trying to produce a document that meats the demands for more
responsive government, but stops short of violating the vital interests of conservative
elements-businessmen, the army, and the King-which have it in their power to
bring the experiment to a close. One key aspect of the new constitution will be the
permanent National Assembly. In the past, Thai experiments with parliamentary
democracy have quickly foundered on the venality and vested interests of the
legislators. There is a fair chance, however, that this parliament will be so balanced
between hand-picked supporters of the King, district and provincial officials, and
spokesmen for the old regime's special interest groups that it can function effec-
tively.
Current plans call for general elections and a new government by early summer.
There are several strong candidates for prime minister, including Sanya, who could
help to give needed stature to the new regime. Whoever holds the reins will still face
serious problems in maintaining public order and keeping inflation within reasonable
bounds. A government unable to make solid headway in social improvements and to
move toward a position of greater independence in its foreign policy will soon run
afoul of student activists and their mentors within the intellectual and bureaucratic
elite. A government unable to contain student-inspired public disorder or one that
moves precipitately against vested political and economic interests could push the
army's patience to the breaking point.
In sum, Thailand appears to be in for a considerable period of political
disequilibrium. Frequent and direct intervention by the King will probably be
required if the civilian government is to keep its feet. The result will bear little
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resemblance to parliamentary democracy as understood in the West. At best, it will
be a system heavily weighted in favor of palace direction and with a good deal of
behind-the-scene military influence. This alone would be a significant movement
toward a government more responsive to the interests of the people in a part of the
world that has experienced a strong trend toward authoritarianism and military
participation in government.
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The Present Forces on the Thai Scene
Since the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932, Bangkok's
periodic experiments in constitutions and democracy have been short-lived,
foundering on ineffective civilian leadership and the impatience and ambi-
tions of the arm .
n er e o s y e o ar po rtu.s, t o
rm ra rve or as c o er s upheaval would have come from the army
establishment. The fact that student demonstrations in Bangkok could bring
down an entrenched military regime is testimony to the emergence of new
political forces and attitudes that make a more democratic system of
government a stronger possibility than in the past.
The most vociferous of the new farces are the students; their impact an
future Thai political developments is one of the key uncertainties in the
present situation. The sudden collapse of the Thanom regime left the
fledgling student movement without an easily identifiable enemy or a clear
sense of purpose. The Sanya administration has had considerable success in
co-opting the great bulk of the basically conservative student population; the
principal national student organization has remained moderate and generally
responsive to the wishes of the government and the palace. Nonetheless, the
government has not been able to get the genie of student activism totally and
safely back into the bottle. The activities of radical splinter groups have kept
political tensions high in Bangkok. Other student activists are stumping the
countryside "educating" the Thai people on their rights in a democracy.
More recently, some student leaders have seized on external issues such as
US and Japanese "interference" in Thai affairs as a means of recapturing
some of the unity and momentum briefly enjoyed by the movement last
October.
On the face of things, the students' well-established potential for
effective mass action on the streets of Bangkok should discourage, rather
than encourage, overt restoration of military rule. The students obviously
consider the use of this potential to keep the army "honest" as their primary
mission. The students, however, could end up being hoist with their own
petard. The students' success against the Thanom regime has served to
legitimize public demonstrations as a means of correcting perceived. wrongs.
The result, a spontaneous outbreak of demonstrations throughout the coun-
try against corruption, inflation, and a host of more minor issues, has rattled
a conservative elite unaccustomed to this type of street dialogue. Further
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student activity on the order of the recent anti-US and anti-Japanese demon-
strations in Bangkok could lead a nervous government to call on the army to
"restore order" or could even precipitate a unilateral move by military
elements to reassert political control. Such a development would seriously
threaten the nascent political democratization in Thailand and could possi-
bly lead to a new upheaval.
The first signs of a shift in public opinion against the students have
already appeared on the editorial pages of the Bangkok press. The journal-
ists, sensing that the students could destroy the reforms they helped initiate,
have begun to speak out against student agitation and unruly behavior.
Should the students fail to heed these subtle reminders of the limits to their
power, they could quickly lose the widespread public support that sustained
their movement last year.
Intellectuals and Bureaucracy
The student movement is only the cutting edge of a broader force
comprised of intellectuals, members of the bureaucratic elite, journalists and
like-minded people bent on bringing political change to Thailand. Much of
what the student activists know about political protest they learned from
elements of this group-principally young university lecturers who had
studied in the West during the height of the student protests there in the late
1960s.
Alienated and stifled by the conservative policies of the Thanom
government, this group of young, well-educated civilians has been the prime
beneficiary of the changed political scene. Their newly gained influence is
already being felt in the Sanya cabinet, the National Assembly, and the
committee drafting the constitution. Dr. Puai Ungphakon, a respected
economist and long-time critic of former Thai regimes, probably best repre-
sents the general viewpoint of this amorphous group. He has recommended,
among other things, that the new constitution specify that the prime
minister be the "supreme master" of the armed forces and that the defense
minister be a civilian. This viewpoint does not make for a smooth working
relationship between would-be civilian rulers and the 1:'hai Army. If the
intellectuals are not reasonably patient in pushing for change in the face of
the conservative interests of the monarchy and the military, the military
could quickly move to bring the experiment in civilian rule to an end.
The King
The emergence of the students and intellectuals as operative political
forces would not have been possible without the support of King Phumi-
phon. His intrusion into the political arena is the single most significant
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King Phumiphon
factor in the new Thai political equation.
When the student movement began to
develop momentum last year, Phumi-
phon left no doubt as to which side he
was on. During the first major student
protests in June 1973, the palace set up
tents and. provided food for the demon-
strators. This action endeared the King
to the students : in particular and the
public in general. In retrospect, it set him
on a collision course with the Thanom
government. By his key role in arranging
the resignation of Thanom and Praphat
and by his personal selection of a new
prime minister and cabinet, the King put
his enormous prestige and popularity on
the line in support of civilian govern-
ment.
This is a new role for Phumiphon personally and for the monarchy,
which had been the virtual prisoner of the military since the absolute
monarch, King Prachathipok, was overthrown in 1932. It is a role that many
of the King's advisers have urged him to abandon in order to preserve the
apolitical sanctity of the throne. But it has become apparent that Phumi-
phon; intent on making civilian government work, has no thought of re-
moving himself from the political arena. Recently the King's public support
of Prime Minister Sanya forestalled a confrontation with the National
Assembly that threatened to bring down the three-month-old government.
The Arrny
King Phumiphon's intervention has made possible Thailand's experi-
rnent in civilian rule, but the durability of that experiment depends primarily
on the army's continued willingness to remain on the political sidelines. The
downfall of the Thanom-Praphat government leas clearly left the military on
the defensive. The Sanya government includes far fewer people with military
backgrounds than its predecessor, and except for the defense ministry, all
cabinet portfolios are held by civilians. This by no means indicates that the
army is abandoning politics. Feeling is widespread within the military estab-
lishment that the civilians will falter and the army will be called upon to take
over the reins, a conviction strengthened daily by the Sanya government's
failure to restore "law and order." While it remains the only force in
Thailand capable of seizing power or imposing its will, for the time being the
army, under General Krit Siwara, appears more than willing to remain in the
background and support the King in his new political role. The King recently
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asked Krit to participate more directly in the political process-and Krit has
responded by planning to establish a political party organization--but it is
doubtful that Krit will soon become openly involved in politics.
The emerging understanding between the King and Krit is neither
abnormal nor particularly unstable. Both have more to gain than to lose by
staying in step. Krit recognizes the
popular desire for an effort at civilian
rule and appears genuinely committed to
giving the new government a fair and fiall
chance to succeed. But in any case he
cannot afford to be seen to move against
civilian rule prematurely, or to be viewed
as opposing the desires of an immensely
popular king. As long as he remains the
chief military supporter of the King, Krit
also preserves his own stature. 1'~1ot the
least consideration, of course, is that any
regime instituted by Krit, be it civil or
military, would have the same tough
domestic problems to face. Krit cannot
be very eager to take up such a challenge
with his own prestige directly on the
line.
Both the monarchy and the military are inherently conservative institu-
tions, and both Phumiphon and Krit hold public order and political stability
as a high ideal. Krit knows that the King would acquiesce in-perhaps more
likely request-the army's intervention rather than. tolerate a high level of
public disorder or the adoption of radical government policies running
against the grain of the King's and the army's conservative instincts. But as
things stand now, any such move is more likely to be taken under the
authority of the King and the existing government than by an old-style
military take-over.
Although army forbearance is being severely tested by student rebel-
liousness and disorder, the palace-military understanding appears sufficiently
durable to get Thailand and the Sanya government through to the promulga-
tion "of a new constitution and national elections-probably sometime in the
early summer. The result will not be a full-blown working democracy, but a
system weighted heavily in favor of palace direction and a good deal of
behind-the-scenes military influence. It would nevertheless represent a
notable achievement in a part of the world where the. unmistakable trend has
been toward greater authoritarianism and military participation in govern-
ment.
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The Sanya Government
The Sanya Thammasak government's record of concrete accomplish-
ments is not very impressive-especially if measured against the heady
reformist expectations in Bangkok of last
October. But as a caretaker government
designed to serve until a more permanent
political solution can be found, it is fulfill-
ing its basic mission. Prime Minister Sanya
has maintained his credibility with the
Thai public, and his government is still
probably the most genuinely popular in
modern Thai history. The sum of Sanya's
personal credentials-a highly respected
Buddhist, academician, and jurist-and a
reputation for honesty and integrity mark
him in the public's mind as the personal
and political antithesis of the rejected
Thanom/Praphat regime. To many Thai,
Sanya represents along-needed breath of
fresh air. _ _ _ .... __
Premier Sanya Thammasak
The failure to restore law and order fully has so far been the most
significant shortcoming of the government. The weak image the government
has projected, much to the dismay of the military, has been primarily a
reflection of Sanya's own personality. Perhaps in keeping with his strong
Buddhist orientation, he backs away from confrontation and the pressures
and decision-making that go with the job of prime minister.. But the fact
remains that Sanya has kept the Thai political fabric intact in the face of a
level of student and labor unrest unknown in Thailand's recent history.
While riding out the storm, Sanya has initiated an unprecedented series of
bi-weekly national television programs in which he and his ministers discuss
their policies.
Sanya's popularity and the positive effects of his policies could be
offset by two overriding economic problems not of his own making-the oil
crisis and inflation. To cope with the oil crisis, he has obtained wider
reaching powers, including authority to institute rationing, raise the price of
fuel oils, and limit the hours of private business. To forestall a major
disruption of the economy, the government worked diligently behind the
scenes during the recent spate of strikes to persuade both sides to settle for
terms that would not be significantly inflationary. Tf Sanya can keep rice
prices down-and this year's good harvest suggests he can-he should be in a
strong position to keep domestic inflation within politically acceptable
bounds. A significant deterioration in the supply of oil could, of course,
upset this judgment.
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On the domestic front, Sanya has in his own quiet way accomplished
about as much as could be reasonably expected in his first 90 days. For
example, under the direction of Finance Minister Burma Wongsawan, the
government has launched two tax reforms which, if implemented, will shift
the burden of taxation to those most able to pay and will increase govern-
ment revenues. Among several other less dramatic actions has been the
freeing of parts of the trade sector of the economy, particularly rice, from
government controls and the ending of protection for Thailand's grossly
inefficient domestic fertilizer industry-moves that over the long term are
certain to lead to increased-rice production and higher rural income.
The Sanya government's preoccupation with domestic affairs has left it
little time to devote to foreign affairs. Moreover, Sanya's lack of expertise
and his narrow interpretation of his political mandate rule out any signif-
icant foreign policy departures under his administration. As a result, Sanya
has done little more than pursue policies begun under the Thanom leader-
ship. The dialogue with Peking has been resumed; steps have been taken to
improve relations with Burma; and statements have been made calling for a
re-examination of relations with the US.
The New Constitutional Framework
The most pressing and sensitive task for the Sanya government has been
the writing of a new constitution. To be viable, the document produced
must meet the popular desire for more responsive government, but must stop
short of threatening the vital interests of more conservative elements, in-
cluding the army, which have it in their power to bring an end to the
democratic experiment. The new constitution must also provide for more
effective political institutions than did the short-lived democratic constitu-
tion of 1968. The 1968 venture foundered on the venality and special
interests of its parliamentarians, many of whom were essentiall tools of the
militar and most of whom were Basil corru tible.
Under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, the new constitution is
being drafted by a committee of jurists, political scientists, bureaucrats, and
army officers. A draft has been submitted to the cabinet, and the final
product will eventually go to the National Assembly for approval. The need
to balance competing political interests, while correcting the defects of the
past, may produce a constitution that is as much "royalist" as "democratic."
[n its present draft, the new constitution reportedly will call fora parliamen-
tary system with a bicameral National Assembly. The lower house will be
popularly elected, but the upper house will be elected by the lower house
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from a list of nominees submitted by the King-a process that ensures the
palace a significant voice in the new legislature.
The King has already moved to build his influence on the new political
process by hand-picking the candidates for the interim National Assembly
elected on December 19. This new body is drawn from a broad cross-section
of Thai society-from civil servants to farmers. Most of its members have
never before held public office; about the only thing the new legislators have
in common is an indebtedness to the King. Although the new body shifts the
focus of representation away from the military to a broader constituency,
most members appear to be receptive to direction from the palace. The
interim assembly will be dismissed when the new constitution is promul-
gated. Nonetheless, the future of the 299 "King's men" seems reasonably
bright. Those who choose to run in the general election will have a head start
on the field, and a good many of the others may be appointed to the upper
house.
Despite the King's intervention to influence the makeup of the new
legislature, there is considerable doubt in Bangkok that the coming elections
will produce a body substantially more responsible than the disastrous 1969
assembly. Nevertheless, probably in a move to improve matters, the constitu-
tion as now drafted will require all candidates for the National Assembly to
belong to a political party. In 1969 many candidates ran as independents and
after the elections aligned with the party most in their political and financial
interests. This practice seriously disrupted internal party discipline and
clearly contributed to the ineffectiveness of the previous assembly.
Because of the reluctance to make firm political commitments no new
parties have yet been organized. General Krit has held some preliminary
discussions on the formation of a political party that would represent the
military's viewpoint, but no concrete steps have so far been taken. The only
party apparatus still intact from the previous elections is the Democrat
Party, which carried the Bangkok area handily in the 1969 election, but
failed to maintain its cohesion or to build on its.initial popular appeal.
Although a new round of confrontation tactics by students could cause
the King to revise the timetable for new elections and to ask the caretaker
Sanya government to stay on, current plans call for general elections and the
formation of a new government by early summer.
At this point, there is no specific provision in the draft constitution for
the selection of a prime minister and his government ministers. It has not
been decided whether the next prime minister will be selected from among
the elected parliamentarians or will be appointed by the King in response to
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the consensus view of the winning political party or coalition group. The
King has expressed enthusiasm in private for two merr--Sanya and Khukrit
Pramot, an urbane, highly popular and widely read journalist with close ties
to the palace.
Khukrit received the highest number of votes in last month's election of
the interim National Assembly and appears to be an individual who by
political philosophy and ima e could satisf both the conservative elite and
the young intellectuals.
rt rs not at all cer a~n e wou re.rs t e rrgars o t e ~o .
The intellectuals and some of the Bangkok press are backing Dr. Puai
Ungphakon for prime minister. Although he had been abroad for twa years,
Puai ran second to Khukrit in the number of votes received in the interim
assembly elections. Puai is currently being wooed by various factions to form
a political party. For the moment, however, he appears to be leaning toward
the formation of a broad-based non-partisan organization made up of stu-
dents, trade unions, and other elements that would serve as a check on
military influence within government and give him a forum to press his views
on economic reform.
Puai's public standing and impressive economic credentials will almost
certainly make him a major political force in the months ahead. But it is by
no means certain that these assets will propel hirn into the prime minister-
ship or even into the government. Ilis outspoken proposals for bringing the
military under tight civilian control, his links with the former anti-royalist
prime minister Pridi Phanomyong during the 1940s, and the support he has
received from radical Thai political elements have earned him the distrust of
both the King and the army. One possible compromise would be to appoint
an individual more acceptable to the King and the military as prime minister,
with Puai becoming the deputy prime minister.
If for some reason Khukrit is not given the top post, it is possible that
Sanya will be asked to stay on. While he makes no secret of his distaste for
the demands of political office, his deference to the King would require him
to obey a royal command. A sharp deterioration in public order could force
the King to look to the military for the next prime minister. Defense
Minister Thawi and Army Chief Krit, both of whom have expressed interest
in becoming involved in politics at some future date, would be leading
candidates. In an attempt to make such a move tolerable to the public, the
officer would probably resign from the army before taking the post.
The success of Prime Minister Sanya's successor will rest initially on his
ability to maintain public order and keep inflation within politically accept-
able bounds. Government economists are particularly concerned that unless
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the inflationary spiral is checked soon, gains from the wage increases re-
cently granted labor will be erased. This could precipitate a new and more
costly round of strikes that would be certain to have unsettling effects on the
political scene. The two key factors in fighting inflation are the prices of rice
and public transportation in the politically powerful Bangkok area.
Over the longer term, the success of civilian government will depend on
whether it can reconcile the interests of the new and the old orders. The
intellectuals believe that priority should be given to reversing the growing
urban-rural disparity in income, education, public health, investment, trans-
portation, and services. They emphasize that although most of the Thai
people are farmers and the agricultural sector is the mainstay of the
economy, rural areas have received the least developmental assistance. The
intellectuals propose that as a first step the Ministry of Agriculture's budget,
which today .accounts for only eight percent of total budget appropriations,
be sharply increased. They also contend that the government could make
better use of its disproportionately large reserves by reinvesting at least a
third of them in national development-a move that would a7ot step on any
politically powerful toes.
The conservative elite-particularly the King and the army-are more
concerned with maintaining political stability and internal security than with
agriculture. The new government will have to have a much tighter rein on
student activists than does the Sonya government. This task may not be as
difficult six months from now as it is today since large-scale student
demonstrations are losing favor with the public. The King's fears of Commu-
nist infiltration of the student movement will be played upon by the military
to press for a tough approach to public dissent and disorder. If the govern-
ment cannot or will not clamp down on student-instigated disorder, it will
run the risk of losing the support of the palace and the acceptance of the
army.
It remains to be seen whether the Communist insurgency, for the most
part played down by the Thanom regime, wi1L require a major commitment
by a new civilian government. The insurgency continues to grow numerically
but has not expanded beyond its traditional strongholds. A civilian govern-
ment will be glad to leave this problem in the laps of the generals. Because of
the new and less restrictive Thai political atmosphere, the Communists might
attempt to couple their armed campaign in the hinterlands with a major
campaign of political subversion in urban areas.. The penetration of newly
formed political parties, student groups, a.nd labor organizations-if success-
ful-would present a far more immediate threat to political stability and the
developing democratic process in Thailand than insurgency in the country-
side. Fearful of such activity, the army has begun to investigate student
leaders, politicians, and professors suspected of leftist leanings.
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If the conservative elements, the King, the military, and the business
establishment come to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the experiment in
civilian rule is opening the way to the successful spread of urban Communist
subversion, the army could quickly decide to end the civilian experiment and
establish a more authoritarian regime.
Thailand, for centuries a remarkably stable society, is facing an ex-
tended period of political disequilibrium. King Phumiphon appears prepared
for his crucial role, but whether others can handle the unaccustomed stresses
equally well is still in doubt.
A government unable to make solid headway in the area of social
improvements and move toward a position of greater independence in its
foreign policy will soon run afoul of student activists and their mentors
within the intellectual and bureaucratic elite. A government unable to
contain student-inspired public disorder or one that moves incautiously
against vested political and economic interests could push the army's pa-
tience to the breaking point. A new round of ill-advised confrontation
politics by students could end the experiment in civilian rule almost before it
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begins. The possibility of some dramatic and upsetting action by disaffected
elements of the military will be present. But with the King now playing the
role of "national ombudsman and court of last resort," Thai politics has a
balancing factor that could allow the civilian government to take root and, in
time, become more than a facade.
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