ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN CHILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100030005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 21, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
permanently restructure their nation's political, economic,
and social systems before allowing a return to civilian rule.
Junta President Pinochet says this will take at least five
years.
Pinochet's emergence as the military government's
leader in fact as well as in name probably is the single
most important development of the junta's first half-year.
Some personal, interservice, and policy disputes have sur-
No. 1030/74
March 21, 1974
After six months in power the Chilean armed forces
and national police appear more determined than ever to
faced within the government but they have not been serious
enough to threaten its stability. Similar sources of fric-
tion undoubtedly will arise in the future without straining
the regime's cohesion.
Supporters of the late President Allende have been
unable to take much effective action against the new govern-
ment. The left has not been destroyed, however. Efforts
to reorganize and unite, both within Chile and abroad,
co7tinue. The regime probably is correct in its belief.
that incidents of anti-government violence will increase
u'fter university classes resume later this month. Security
measures recently have been eased somewhat, but the armed
forces and carabineros remain alert against such attacks
and are capable of taking effective counter-measures.
The military's firm belief that its cause is "just"
has begotten a self-righteousness that leaves little room
1t' 1 dissent and only a limited opportunity for
f
support for the regime from the political parties and risks
or po i %_
civilian counsel. This attitude has largely precluded 25X1
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alienating potentially supportive elements of the population.
If unmodified, it eventually will create serious problems for
the government and could cause the evaporation of the reservoir
of popular goodwill toward the armed forces.
Economic policy is a key area of controversy within
the regime. Some military men have taken issue with the
government's team of civilian economic advisers, and there
are real policy differences between the contending groups.
The struggle over economic policy is an important front in
the multifaceted maneuvering for influence and power.
The government has been the target of numerous charges
related to alleged violations of human rights. Many of the
accusations are merely politically inspired falsehoods or
gross. exaggerations--the junta has not been bloodthirsty.
The government has given first priority to repressing per-
ceived security threats, however, and respect for human
rights has been a secondary consideration.
Stability of the Junta
An intention to rotate the presidency was implicit
in statements made by the junta members in the period
immediately following the coup. A one-year term reportedly
was agreed on. Late last year, however, Pinochet apparently
had to fend off a bid by Admiral Merino, the navy commander
and a member of the junta, to advance the first rotation
date to January 1. Pinochet soon thereafter made a series
of statements on the presidency in which he appeared to be
declaring that it would not rotate at all, and a recent
report indicates that the junta now has a formal agreement
to this effect.
In any case, Pinochet and the army clearly intend to
retain their positions of dominance in the government. The
army looks upon itself.as the armed forces' premier service
and army officers consider permanent army control of the
junta presidency to be both natural and proper. The other
services, including the carabineros, will continue to seek
to increase their influence on government policy, but they
are unlikely to challenge the army's claim to "first among
equals" status or to force a showdown over the junta presi--
dency.
Pinochet has had disagreements with a number of generals.
One important general recently was eased into retirement
following a series of personal and policy disputes with the
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junta president.
Pinochet appears eterminec
to prevent the emergence from within the military of potential
rivals for power. His position now is firmly enough established
for him to deal forcefully with disgruntled officers, and
further changes in the high command and cabinet shifts probably
will take place. The fact that Pinochet left Chile to attend
Brazilian President Geisel's inauguration is an indication of
the growing strength of Pinochet's position.
opposition groups still are attempting to rebuild their
organizations, form an effective alliance, and-take action
against the junta, but the government's strict security
measures have severely retarded this effort within Chile.
Despite foreign assistance from Soviet, Cuban, and other
sources, parallel efforts in Moscow, Havana, Paris,.Rome,
and elsewhere are being hampered by long-standing tactical
and ideological differences among the various leftist groups.
Nevertheless,`,the government is concerned over the fact that
the left retains the wherewithal to harass through guerrilla
or terrorist attacks. The opposition's ability to mobilize
the masses and provoke strikes remains more questionable..
Much will depend on whether Chilean workers can be convinced
that the sacrifices they are making now really will pay off
with a better life in the not too distant future.
It appears that Pinochet's tenure in office will last
as long as he can avoid a serious falling-out among the
services and retain the confidence of the bulk of the army.
Concern over possible leftist opposition and Peruvian re-
vanchism will help Pinochet keep personal, inter-service,
and policy disputes within manageable proportions, and he
seems likely to retain his position indefinitely. .Ther.e
is still a danger that the armed forces' determination to
reconstruct Chile its own way will alienate potentially
supportive segments of the population. The enforced "recess"
of the non-Marxist political parties, for example, is serious-
ly straining the government's relations with the Christian
Democratic Party. The military has its own ideas about build-
ing a base of civilian support, however, and they do not in-
clude working closely with any organized political group.
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Differences Over Economic Policy
The government's implementation of an economic recovery
program prepared by a group of University of.Chicaao-trained
technocrats has disturbed some military men.
The junta's policy Advisory Committee, which is run by Colonel
Julio Canessa, has become the focal point of military dissent
from the programs advocated by the junta's team of civilian
economic advisers.
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The Advisory Committee is wary of the civilians' ortho-
dox macroeconomic approach and has surmised that certain as-
pects of the recovery program are geared to benefit special
interest groups rather than the nation as a whole. The
committee fears that instead of stimulating output steeply
higher prices could restrict demand to. the point of inhibiting
production. It advocates a short-term softening of the recovery
program to avoid aggravating opposition to the junta among lower
income groups. The Advisory Committee's desire to give poli-
tical and social factors more weight reflects the fact that
segments of the Chilean armed forces and national police are
attracted to a populist/statist approach to government and
are not happy with the. free enterprise orientation of the
civilian advisory team.
The difference in outlook recently became apparent when
the government discussed the return of the textile industry
to private ownership. The Canessa committee's proposals
for state-worker control with limited owner participation
were rejected and the eventual outcome was a victory for the
civilian advisers. The government felt-it necessary to issue
a statement detailing the terms for the return, however, to
dispel any notion that private firms seized under Allende
were being returned to their owners unconditionally. Condi-
tions for such returns include a pledge by the owners to
abide by a yet to be issued regulation on a labor-management
relations.
The struggle between the civilian economic team and
the military Advisory Committee has not been definitively
resolved. Pinochet seems to be somewhat disenchanted with
the results of the recovery program,
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I I The military's inclination to seek counsel
wi in its own ranks is a plus for the Advisory Committee.
The civilian economic advisers' influence will almost cer-
tainly be reduced if Pinochet follows through on reported
plans. to integrate them into Canessa's group.
On the other hand, the economic portion of the statement
of goals issued by the junta after six months in power rein-
forces the government's policy of reliance on free market
.forces. Pinochet has expressed sympathy with the:, lower in-
come groups bearing the brunt of the economic recovery program
and promised that this generation of workers will "reap the
`fruits of their sacrifices", but he also has stressed that
further privations lie ahead.
The ongoing debate over economic policy is part of
maneuvering for power and influence in which personal, ideol-
ogical, policy, and inter-service factors are sometimes in-
distinguishable. It may thus be difficult to discern who
has won the contest, if and when the issue is decided. Over
the next several months the economic program probably will
continue to reflect the input of both groups, with the junta
listening to the proposals they put forth on a given topic
and making an ad hoc decision depending on the merits of the
case. Time appears to be on the side of the Canessa committee,
however, and eventual modification of the emphasis on free
enterprise is likely.
Alleged Violations of Human Rights
Many of the accusations regarding the military govern-
ment's lack of respect for human rights are traceable to a
,world-wide Communist-orchestrated campaign to discredit the
junta. Some of these claims are simply false, others are
exaggerations or distortions of reality. On the other hand,'
junta President Pinochet's blanket assertion that "human
rights have not been violated in Chile" overstates the junta's
case.
. The armed forces and police expected leftist para-
military brigades to offer significant resistance to the
coup, but widespread opposition failed to materialize. As
a result, more force than turned out to be absolutely neces-
sary was used to carry out and secure the coup and civilian
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casualties probably totaled about 2,000. In the hectic.
weeks immediately following the takeover some commanders
in the provinces appeared to be acting independently of
central authority and more than a hundred prisoners were
shot and killed while "trying to escape". In addition, about
170 persons have been executed since the coup. At present
there are over 5,000 political prisoners, including about
40 well-known detainees on Dawson Island in the remote
committed to an official policy of stern, but correct,
treatment of detainees.
and statutory provisions for a state of siege. A National
Executive Secretariat for Detainees was established in
January and was charged, among other things, with protecting
the rights of prisoners and their families. Security forces
have been ordered to conform to the standards of the Geneva
Conventions in their treatment of persons arrested on poli-
tical or national security grounds. Representatives of
international organizations concerned with human rights have
been allowed to visit Dawson Island and other detention
centers. Thus, in contrast to the confusion and emotion
.of the first weeks after the coup the government now is
.tions are being properly carried out under constitutional
The regime has regularized its security procedures
and now claims that arrests, detentions, trials,.and execu-
Whether this policy is being strictly followed in
the field is less certain. There does appear to be some
observer. Thus, it seems likely that the type of strong-
arm methods employed by many of .the world's police and
security forces will continue to be practiced in Chile.
The junta has a generally good record on the grant-
ing of safe-conduct passes to those seeking political
asylum. Thousands of Chileans and foreigners who took
refuge in various embassies in Santiago have been allowed
to leave the country. The number of "deferred" requests
for safe conducts has been shrinking steadily and now is
less than two hundred. Many of those remaining in the
Many officers do not regard techniques of physical coercion
or mental pressure to be "torture" so long as they cause
no permanent damage and are not apparent to the casual
abuse by.units engaged in active military or intelligence
operations.
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embassies are officials of the Allende regime or leftist
notables against whom the government is preparing formal
charges and extradition requests.
Court martials of military officers suspected of col-
laboration with the left have begun and some civilians also
are being tried. Trials for high-ranking Allende regime
officials and the other most prominent leftist prisoners
do not appear to be imminent, however. The government
says that it is still investigating the cases of these
leftist luminaries in order to determine what, if any,
charges will be brought them. There is no evidence of
a sense of urgency in this matter. Important jurisdictional
and procedural issues remain unresolved. A key question is
which tribunals, civilian or military, will have jurisdiction
over crimes committed prior to the coup.
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