ISRAEL: THE GOVERNMENT FALLS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100040004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 11, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100040004-8
CONFIDENTIAL
April 11, 1974
Prime Minister Meir's resignation on April 11 came barely
a month after she had laboriously managed to patch a cabinet
together. The decision to resign probably reflects her belief
that she no longer commands the political support within the
Labor Alignment necessary to govern effectively.
Mrs. Meir's decision was apparently based on her inabi-
lity to bridge intra-Alignment differences over the question
of assuming political responsibility for the military and
intelligence failures outlined by the Agranat Committee's
partial report issued last week on its inquiry into the govern-
ment's conduct of the war last October. Defense Minister
Dayan's critics seized on the Agranat report to revive their
efforts last week to force him to resign. Dayan's supporters
insisted that if the principle of ministerial accountability
for the October shortcomings is to be applied, then the entire
cabinet shares responsibility and must resign along with
Dayan. Labor Party leaders have asked Mrs. Meir to reconsider
her decision but they are not optimistic that she will. She
has, however, agreed to continue to head a caretaker govern-
ment until a new cabinet can be formed. This could take
several months.
Two possibilities exist to obtain a new cabinet. Presi-
dent Katzir, after consultations with the political parties,
can ask Mrs. Meir or someone else, presumably from the Align-
ment or the rightist Likud, to form a new cabinet, or the
Knesset can vote to call new elections on a date it specifies.
The Alignment leaders are likely to try for a new cabinet
first, opting for new elections only if they must. Whatever
.happens, the instability and uncertainty characterizing the
domestic political scene are likely to continue for some time
and to complicate even further the already difficult process
of achieving a Middle East peace settlement.
Labor Party leaders have now begun in earnest the oft-
postponed search for a successor to Mrs. Meir. Finance
Minister Pinhas Sapir--long considered Labor's "king maker" 25X1
and next in influence within party circles only to Mrs. Meir--
is being touted by some party leaders as the
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 Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100040004-8
CONFIDENTIAL
to take over. However, there are strong pressures from the
public and from within the Alignment for a completely new
leadership, preferably untainted by the controversy over the
government's conduct of the war last October and above inter-
necine party strife. These pressures tend to work against the
old, traditional frontrunners such as Sapir or Deputy Prime
Minister Alon, and favor men like the popular Yosef Almogi,
former minister of labor and recently elected mayor of Haifa.
Almogi has been spearheading efforts over the past week to
keep the Alignment together.
Should the Alignment manage to pull itself together
and agree on a new leader, the next major hurdle on the road
to a new cabinet will be to induce other parties, primarily
the National Religious and the Independent Liberal Party to
join an Alignment-led coalition. This may not be easy, par-
ticularly in the case of the NRP. The Alignment's present
coalition partners are plagued by internal difficulties some
of which, such as dissatisfaction on the part of the younger
members with the aging party leadership, are similar to those
bedeviling the Alignment. The NRP, already narrowly divided
on the question of participating in Mrs. Meir's government,
also favors a broad government of national unity including
the Likud.
Likud leader Menahem Begin announced that he will attempt
to mobilize support for a national unity government. The
Alignment, however, is highly unlikely to support such an
attempt, and Begin probably could not induce sufficient defec-
tions from the Alignment to form a government on his own,
even with NRP support.
Most Labor Party leaders do not favor new elections, fear-
ing that the party risks losing more voter support and needs
time to get its own house in order. However, should it prove
impossible to form a new coalition cabinet under Labor's
leadership, the Alignment factions would have no choice but
to face the electorate for the second time in less than a year.
The outlook for breakthroughs in the Middle East peace
negotiations is dim until the current political crisis is re-
solved. This could take months, particularly if new elections
eventually have to be called. A caretaker government could
still pursue the negotiations but would not be willing to com-
mit Israel to any binding arrangements beyond perhaps an initial
disengagement on the Syrian front pending the formation of a
new cabinet. The negotiation position of the caretaker govern-
ment is likely to harden, however, thus diminishing the pros-
pects for obtaining even the Syrian disengagement.
Approved For Release 2004/08/16 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100040004-8
CONFIDENTIAL