DETENTE AND THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION: THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100040006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 20, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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April 20, 1974
SUBJECT: Detente and the President's Position:
The View From Moscow
The Soviets are beginning to provide more details
in public on the scope and seriousness of President
Nixon's domestic difficulties. They are also be-
ginning to suggest that the President's problems
could affect US-Soviet relations, including the US
and Soviet bargaining positions at the forthcoming
summit. Moscow is nonetheless maintaining its public
display of strong support for the President and con-
tinues to signal its backing for him in his present
situation.
The Soviets have believed since the outset of
the Watergate affair that it was being used by the
President's political opposition to get him. As the
President's difficulties have grown, so have Moscow's
suspicions. Now the Soviets profess to see the
"enemies of detente" behind the President's problems.
These conspirators have joined ranks with other po-
litical opportunists to form what one public lecturer
in Moscow recently called an "ill-intentioned coali-
tion," with the objective of overturning the Presi-
dent and detente with the USSR. Evidently this in-
terpretation of the Watergate affair is believed by
some in the Kremlin hierarchy. Several weeks ago,
Yury Arbatov told Ambassador Stoessel that in his
briefings on the Washington situation, he has encoun-
tered a tendency among the Soviet leaders to explain
Watergate as an anti-Soviet plot.
Despite Moscow's concern about the nature of the
forces arrayed against the President, the Soviets
have, until very recently, tended to play down the
strength of the President's opposition. The line,
both publicly and privately, has been that the Presi-
dent was far stronger than his enemies and would
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surmount his difficulties with detente intact. Lately,
however, the Soviets have begun to imply that the
President's problems are greater than they initially
surmised, and that detente as well as the President
may be in jeopardy.
Two public lecturers, one in Leningrad and the
other in Moscow, recently described the President's
situation as very serious. As supporting evidence,
they cited the President's drop in US polls, his tax
problems, and the trials of former aides. The Len-
ingrad lecturer went a step further, specifically
raising the impeachment possibility and asserting
that US-Soviet relations were tangled in the Presi-
dent's current predicament. He also cited Western
press reports to the effect that the President needs
a strong showing in the international arena to offset
his domestic problems.
As the Soviets have become more concerned about
the President's political situation, they have shown
increased interest in what it means for Soviet policy
toward the US. For example, a Soviet journalist re-
cently asked whether it
might not be best to hold off with detente for the
time being. Last week, Gromyko told
that Moscow intends to pursue detente
with the US, but it is not going to be "taken for
a ride." Gromyko indicated that Moscow has confi-
dence in the President and Secretary Kissinger, but
that the Kremlin is going to pursue a tougher policy
toward the US to show such "right-wing hardliners"
as Senator Jackson that they cannot dictate Soviet
policy.
The Soviets doubtless calculated that the sub-
stance would reach the US
Administration. If so, the message that Moscow evi-
dently wanted to convey was that the Soviets could
not be expected to pull the President's chestnuts
out of the fire, and that further progress in rela-
tions now depends on Washington's actions. Of
course, this may be no more than pre-summit posturing,
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i.e., Moscow's way of saying that the advantage lies
with the USSR, and that Washington cannot use the
President's problems as a way of wheedling more out
of the Soviet Union.
There have been other signs of a toughened Soviet
attitude in dealings with the US. Moscow's decision
to reduce the pace of Jewish emigration since the
beginning of this year is the most important. More-
over, Moscow's claim that exit applications have de-
creased by 50 percent since January as compared with
the same month last year suggests that it is making
a rationale for further substantial reductions in
emigration between now and the end of the year.
There have also been some signs of a de-emphasis in
Soviet propaganda on the value of bilateral relations
with the US.
Brezhnev himself has a personal stake in detente
and in cultivating relations with the II-q- T. In k_6L__n
month,
that ele-
ments-67-the Soviet "military-industrial complex"
who are disenchanted with detente and concerned
about recent foreign policy setbacks would use a
Nixon impeachment to try to oust party leader
Brezhnev.
This is clearly overdrawn, but it illustrates
that insofar as detente is thought to be in trouble,
then Brezhnev himself is under some pressure to
demonstrate either that it is not so, or that he is
moving to adjust Soviet policy interests to changing
circumstances. Since it is becoming harder for the
Soviets to argue that the President and detente are
not in some difficulty, then Brezhnev is forced
toward the latter option. While finding it necessary
to appear tougher, he may hope that he can talk and
act tough enough to protect his domestic flanks
without doing any serious damage to US-Soviet rela-
tions or the essentials of detente.
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