THE COUP IN PORTUGAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100040012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 27, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
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Intelligence Memorandum
The Coup in Portugal
Secret
I"' 0
April 27, 1974
No. 0952/74
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The Coup in Portugal*
Page
Summary e . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
PORTUGAL IN AFRICA . . . . . . . . 1
Rationale ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.
Advantages o . . . . . . . . o . . . 1
Costs e _ . . . . . . . I 9 . . . . . 1
Pressures to Get Out . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Crisis . . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
CHANGING ATTITUDES . . a . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Military Divided . . . . . . . . . 3
The Oligarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Church . . ~ . . . . . . . . . o o . 5
Other Groups in Society . . . . . . . . . 6
Caetano's Past Role e . . . . . . 6
THE NEW QUESTIONS . . o . . . . . . . . 7
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of
the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe.
It was drafted by CIA'OCI)
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April 27, 1974
The Coup in Portugal
Summary
The virtually bloodless coup that toppled the
government of President Thomaz and Prime Minister
Caetano April 25th was triggered by Lisbon's African
policies and the divisions within the military to
which they gave rise. Superbly organized and well-
led, the insurrectionists took the government by sur-
prise. Loyalist forces offered only token resistance,
and after fleeing to the headquarters of the national
guard, Thomaz, Caetano, and several other ministers
agreed after a few hours of negotiation to go into
exile in the Madeira Islands. Thus far the new gov-
ernment appears to be in complete control.
The leaders of the rebellion, who called them-
selves the "armed forces movement," are almost un-
known, but they were almost certainly middle-level
officers devoted to General Antonio de Spinola.
After broadcasting an initial proclamation that called
for both a liberalization of Portugal's colonial
policies and a restoration of domestic liberties, the
rebel junta promptly called on General Spinola to
head their movement. Spinola accepted the call and
reportedly received an enthusiastic public welcome
in Lisbon. He was proclaimed head of the seven-man
Junta of National Salvation which was established to
run the new government.
In a speech after his designation, Spinola prom-
ised to work toward the early reestablishment of con-
stitutionality. He said a constituent assembly and
then a president of the republic will be chosen in
a free election. Spinola himself is a likely candi-
date for president.
Comments and queries on the contents of this publi-
the Office of Current InteZZigence,
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Spinoia's accession to power is a remarkable
demonstration of the power of both pen and sword.
Portugal's most decorated war hero, he is also the
author of a book that dared to say that a military
solution to the problem of insurgency in the African
territories is impossible and that a political solu-
tion must be found. Although perhaps not wholly out
of line with Caetano's own thinking, the book created
a sensation when it appeared last February,, It led to
a small but abortive "march on Lisbon" in March, and
left the country gripped in coup fever ever since.
Despite Lisbon's nervous moves earlier this month to
arrest various oppositionists, the government appar-
ently was unaware of the magnitude of the coup threat
it faced.,
As "head of government," Spinola appears to be
off to an auspicious start. His prestige is such
that, despite the divisions within the armed forces,
he may be able to keep them fully under control,
The country, despite the influence of the ruling
oligarchs and the radicalism of some of the opposi-
tion elements, may be ready for some modest movement,
toward change at home and abroad, Spinola can prob-
ably expect better relations with the rest of Europe,
his NATO allies, and international critics of Portu-
gal's overseas policies? He may be a less demanding
negotiator in the Azores base renewal talks.
However,. it is also very possible that Spinola's
victory may be the beginning of his troubles. Having
ridden into power on the African 'issue, it is very
doubtful that he has any real solution to it. The
kind of commonwealth he has in mind is not ultimately
acceptable to the African insurgents, and it is far
from certain that he can carry Portugal with him in
the long process of achieving an honorable escape for
the army from the African swamp.
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Portugal in Africa
Rationale
For more than a decade Portugal has been fight-
ing insurgencies in Angola,, Portuguese Guinea, and
Mozambique. Lisbon bases its commitment on its pres-
ence for some 500 years in the African territories
and its treatment of them as integral parts of Portu-
gal in the Portuguese constitution. Lisbon believes
that it has built a multi-raclal society which is
quite different from that of the former colonial pow-
ers and from the white minority governments of the
Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia, The Portu-
guese stress that the overseas territories are a na-
tional heritage which they cannot honorably relin-
quish. The Portuguese also believe that they need
the overseas provinces and their potential wealth
and strategic location to maintain Portugal?s inter-
national status and its economy,
Advantages
Except for Portuguese Guinea, the African prov-
inces do in fact offer significant immediate and
long-term economic returns to certain economic groups
in Portugal, Large corporations in the metropole,
owned by a few powerful families, control virtually
all. aspects of the territories? modern economic sec-
tors? including local industry, commerce, banking,
and plantation agriculture, The me'tropole receives
preferential, trade treatment, and it controls the
'territories' sizable foreign exchange receipts,
. Costs
Thus far, however, the over-all returns have
not been sufficient to offset the expense of economic
development and of fighting -the insurgents. Only
Angola comes close to paying its own way and may now
be contributing as much as 60 percent to its develop-
ment and war costs o
Military operations have been costly in manpower
and in money. When the rebellion began in 1961,
Portugal's armed forces numbered 84,000 men, of who
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less than 30,000 were stationed in Africa, As the
insurgencies spread, the total figure rose accordingly
and leveled off at around 216,000 in 1973 with more
than 150,000 serving in Africa. Although some 60
percent of these forces are from the territories--
many of them black--military service has caused a
manpower shortage, aggravated by the emigration of
young workers from the metropole to Western Europe.
But the situation has been bearable because the num-
ber of soldiers killed in action has been relatively
low in recent years, amounting to about 400 in 1973,
The military effort has also been a heavy finan-
cial burden. In 1960 Portuguese defense spending
totaled only $105 million. By 1973, the figure had
increased almost five-fold, amounting to more than
$521 million, As a percentage of the Portuguese na-
tional budget, these defense expenditures represented
27 percent in 1960, 45 percent in 1966-1968, and 30
percent in 1973. As a percentage of GNP, defense
costs have increased from 4.2 percent in 1960 to a
high of 7.4 percent in 1968, leveling off at around
6 percent since 1970. This is almost twice the fig-
ure for the principal NATO countries.
These costs have been high enough to raise seri-
ous doubts about Lisbon's long-term chances of re-
taining the provinces. An upsurge of attacks by
black insurgents in Mozambique last January and Feb-
ruary caused concern in Lisbon that the internal
security problem there might be getting out of hand.
But the real concern is over the stalemate in Portu-
guese Guinea, There the Portuguese control the towns
and principal roads, but the guerrillas control much
of the hinterland with neither side able to oust the
other. The situation is discouraging enough to have
led some military leaders, such as General Spinola,
to declare that a military victory is impossible and
to urge a political solution, such as a plan for fed-
eration. But such alternatives appeal neither to the
far right, nor to the insurgents who of course want
immediate freedom.
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The Crisis
The crisis that led to the coup dates from Feb-
ruary 22 when General Spinola, then vice chief of
staff of the armed forces and former governor and
commander in chief in Portuguese Guinea, published
his book Portugal and the Future. Spinola called
for a new Portuguese constitution to provide civil
liberties and democratic institutions in all areas
administered by Portugal and to create a federation
of sovereign states between Portugal and its overseas
possessions, Plebiscites to determine if the Africans
want to remain with Portugal would be allowed.
Spinola acknowledged that this policy would risk the
eventual severance of all ties between Portugal and
its overseas territories, but he accepted this risk
in the belief that continuation of past policies
would virtually guarantee such an outcome anyway.
Rightists were outraged by the public airing of
such views and demanded Spinola's removal along with
that of his chief, General Costa Gomes, who supported
Spinola. Prime Minister Caetano, who initially re-
sisted this pressure, gave in and removed Spinola and
his chief. The very conservative General Luz Cunha.
was appointed to Costa Gomes' post and some officers
sympathetic to Spinola were reassigned. In response,
some petitions were circulated in favor of Spinola,
and on March 16 a 200-man army unit near Lisbon, led
by young officers sympathetic to Spinola and Costa
Gomes, attempted to march on the capital, However,
they were intercepted and arrested by troops loyal
to the government.
Changing Attitudes
The military was deeply divided by these events.
Most of the senior officers, led by the then-new chief
of staff of the armed forces, General Luz Cunha, are
opposed to General Spinola's ideas which, in their
opinion, would lead to the loss of the African cprov-
public ath
inces, These officers participated in a
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of loyalty to the government, and the refusal of Costa
Gomes and Spinola to participate--on the grounds that
the military were not supposed to be involved in
politics--was the ostensible reason for their being
sacked. -
On the other hand, some high-ranking officers
supported General Spinola, especially his thesis that
a military victory is impossible. They do not want
the army to become a scapegoat for giving up in Africa
and saw Spinola's proposals as an honorable way out.
Until the coup, however, it did not appear that these
moderates were interested in an attempt to overthrow
the government on African policy. Indeed it was not
clear that Spinola and Costa Gomes wanted to do that
either. Neither had any known contact with the military
regiment that marched on Lisbon, and Spinola said that
he was awaiting another military assignment.
A number of junior and middle grade officers
also supported Spinola's ideas. Some of these were
angered enough over his firing and the arrests and
reassignments of his supporters to circulate protest
petitions, and some participated in the small-scale
march on Lisbon. There were also reports in March
and April of dissent among the military in the
African provinces that apparently aroused the con-
cern of the Directorate General of Security.
The oligarchy
In the context of the authoritarian system that
has prevailed so long, these stirrings of dissent
were, of course, unusual. Since Salazar's time a
group of perhaps 40 families who control most of the
country's wealth have played a decisive role in the
exercise of political power. Their position is de-
rived from their control of the economy, ownership
of news media, representation in the legislative
bodies, and their close connection with top govern-
ment officials. Consequently, government policy has
reflected the conservative political, economic, and
social views of this group. Their business interests
in Portuguese Africa are immensely profitable, and
hence they have long opposed any loosening of Portu-
gal's overseas ties even though this has meant the
continuation of a large and expensive military force
to combat the African insurgents.
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The Portuguese oligarchs are nevertheless astute
businessmen, and probably would in time adjust to a
new Portuguese relationship with the African prov-
inceso Many of them favor more rapid economic growth
and closer association with Europe, and most have
already diversified their investments so that their
wealth is not dependent on their. African holdings
Portugal'?s economic ties with western Europe,
which in recent years have developed more rapidly
than its economic links with the African territories,
provide an alternative to the African Lies, This
factor would make it easier than before for Portu-
g?uese commercial interests to consider alternatives
in Africa if the cost of fighting the dissidents
became too great., Thus if the oligarchy came to feel
,that Portugal?s cause in Africa were lost, its mem-
bers probably would opt to get out. and cut their
losses? 'thereby protecting their larger interests.in
the metropole and world -wideo There have in fact
been reports that some of the influential families
were impressed by Spinola?s thesis that the present
overseas policy is unrealistic.
The Church
The church has been circumspect about criticizing
the Caetano government., but in recent years individual
priests---speaking against the lack of civil rights--
have strained relations between church and state,
A peace vigil held in a Lisbon churchh on New Year?s
Day last year in which a priest read a strong state-
went condemning Portugal?s wars in Africa led to the
arrest of several. priests and militant. Catholics,
The episode increased public awareness of internal
opposition to the African wars, and the arrest of
the priests almost caused a church-state clash,
Last July the Portuguese bishops issued a pas.-
toral letter which called for greater personal free-
dom and increased political participation by the
laity, Although they avoided the question of the
war in Africa, the Conference of Bishops in the
metropole in October expressed solidarity with the
bishops of Mozambique-??an action indirectly critical
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of the government's restriction of civil rights there.
Last month a petition circulated in Nampula diocese
in Mozambique that was critical of the church hier-
archy for collaborating with Lisbon in maintaining
a repressive system in Mozambique, The government
responded by ousting the bishop and six of the priests
who signed the petition. Prospects, therefore, are
that should yesterday's insurrection lead to a more
liberal-minded government, it would find a substan-
tial number of allies in the church.
Other Groups in Societe
Labor, intellectuals, students, and illegal
opposition groups have had little or no voice in
Portuguese policy for years, Some small terrorist
groups have set off occasional protest bombs, but
these have been of no consequence to the government,
Nevertheless, the unrest in the military that sur-
faced after the firing of Spinola and Costa Gomes
last month apparently worried the government that
dissident groups would use the resulting situation
to demonstrate. Premier Caetano warned in a speech
that any such demonstrations would only lead to a
crackdown, and in early April, the police arrested
some 50 oppositionists, most of whom were attending
a meeting to form a consumer cooperative,
Caetano', Past Role
Although sparked by the Spinola book, the under-
lying causes of crisis were therefore building for
some time, During the past four or five years Caetano
had explored--or at least tried to open a dialogue
on--the possibility of a loosening of Portugal's
tight grip on its African territories, During the
1969 legislative elections, Caetano proposed a debate
on the overseas policy. When the opposition candi-
dates responded, however, the military took alarm
and forced a ban on the subject. Caetano', constitu-
tional amendments approved in 1971--which provided
for local autonomy in domestic affairs--were permit-
ted only after he gave assurances to the ultras that
he had no intention of weakening Lisbon's control.
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Caet.ano?s strength heretofore had been his abil-
ity to balance pressures from ultra-rightists and
moderates, and to know when to draw back. As the
rebellion dragged on with no end in sight, Caetano
continued to make cautious moves to reopen the sub-
ject of more local autonomy for the Africans, These
moves reportedly caused a right-wing group to make
an effort last December to pressure President Thomaz
to replace the Prime Minister with an uLtraconserva-
tiveo But their plan was thwarted when some high
military officers who supported Caetano brought
counter-pressure to save him. When Spinola?s book
was published-,-evidently with Gaetano?s-approval--
this was too much for the ultras, however, Caetano
was unable to resist their demands that the general
be fired, and in doing so the Prime Minister made
his survival more dependent on the ultra right than
before. This upset the political balance Caetano
had tried to maintain, and since mid-March Caetano
had seemed at pains to try to redress it.
In his speech to the nation on March 28 after
the abortive military revolt, Caetano reassured the
rightists by pledging that Portugal would never aban-
don the African provinces. But he also sought to re-
assure the moderates by dealing gently with the rebels
who marched in Lisbon, and by refraining from crit-
i.c.izing Spinola and his federal solution, The
Spinola book continued to be sold in Lisbon.
The New Questions
Whatever Caetano?s intentions, his failure to
achieve them has in any event left a great many un-
answered questions. Foremost among them is of course
the further evolution of the political situation in
Portugal itself, The coup has thus far come remark-
ably close to being a peaceful change of government,
The rebel forces appear to have been exceedingly
well organized and competently led, while the forces
loyal to the government have chosen-,-so far at least---
not to resist, General Spinola, having accepted the
call to leadership., commands a respect that might be
sufficient to keep the situation within the armed
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forces fully under control, In due course they could
possibly begin to put into effect the domestic and
overseas policy reforms that they and the insurrec-
tionists espouse,
Working against this scenario of essentially
peaceful change, however, will be a number of haz-
ards, The divisions that had developed within the
armed forces are real and deep, and the new regime
will thus have to move with some caution. Although
the Portuguese oligarchy has been looking more toward
the future, they remain for the most part rigidly
conservative in their views of society, Some of the
opposition elements that have been operating more or
less sub rosa in Portugal will be willing to operate
within a liberalized governmental machinery, but some
of the more radical ones may not. With President
Thomaz apparently exiled by force, some question of
the government's legitimacy will linger,
By far the greater hazard to the new government,
however, will be what now happens in the overseas
territories. The basic insurgency problem remains,
the wait-and-see attitude that civilian and military
elements in the territories have taken may be short-
lived, and the insurgents may take heart from Lisbon's
disarray, General Spinola's ideas of increased auton-
omy within a Lusitanian commonwealth do not meet the
insurgents' requirements, and any movement in that
direction will perforce require time and the continued
Portuguese military presence. The colonial forces
might be willing to accept a fairly prolonged period
of transition if such a policy seems to have some
chance of extricating the army with its self-image
intact, But if the policy falters, Spinola will be
in trouble. Meanwhile, Rhodesia and South Africa--
never sure of Portugal's staying power--will likely
feel they have no choice but to increase their mili-
tary establishment.
So far as Portugal's external relations are
otherwise concerned, there is good reason to believe
that a new and more reformist regime in Lisbon would
in several ways be helpful, Portugal's African pol-
icies have made it a pariah among its European allies
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and a target of ants.-colonialist criticism in the
international community at large, its prospects for
closer relations with the European Communities would
be considerably improved if its overseas policies
seemed to be moving in a new direction---ands, looking
much farther to the futures, the colonies themselves
might find a closer association with the EC an advan-
tageous prospect, The Portuguese events will of
course be watched with intense interest in Spain,
but. Madrid is not likely to take any action against
a fait accompli-,-particularly one perpetrated by the
essentially conservative elements of the establishment
associated with Spinola; only in the remote event
that the ousted leaders tried a counter-coup or civil
hostilities otherwise broke out might the Spanish
consider the possibility of some kind of intervention.
Finally, since the modern weapons that Portugal has
been seeking from the US in the Azores base negotia-
tions have been largely tied to the insurgency prob-
lem, it is quite probable that the new government
will moderate its demands,
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