SOVIET LEADERS AND SUCCESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100050002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 13, 1974
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Soviet Leaders and Succession
Secret
81
May 13, 1974
No. 0958/74
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Summary
May 13, 1974
This memorandum contains articles on the Soviet leadership that were orig-
inally prepared to run serially in a daily publication. It begins with a discussion of
the generational problem in the Politburo and ends with a look at the environment
in which the Soviet leaders operate, with special attention to the bureaucratic and
institutional pressures on them. The memorandum examines those leaders who seem
to have a chance of succeeding to one of the top jobs, both in the near and longer
terms.
At present, men in their late 60s and early 70s occupy the key positions of
power. Held together by a balance of power and self-interest, they have been a force
for stabilization in leadership politics. They have restrained Brezhnev in his attempts
at self-aggrandizement, but they have also inhibited challenges to him that might
have threatened them all.
No one among the younger leaders has a strong claim to Brezhnev's job. Of the
senior leaders, Kirilenko, who is the same age as Brezhnev, probably has the best
chance of becoming General Secretary if Brezhnev were to leave the scene. At 67,
however, he could be no more than an interim choice for General Secretary, and his
prospects for moving up to the top party post will diminish with each additional
year that Brezhnev holds this position. As a successor to Brezhnev, Kirilenko would
stand as a fairly orthodox Marxist-Leninist. At least initially, he would be more
cautious about dealing with the West, but his approach probably would not deviate
sharply from the course that has been followed under Brezhnev. Whatever his
personal views on policy, as a compromise candidate he could not move any further
than his Politburo colleagues would allow. Any gradual shift in foreign policy would
probably be to de-emphasize detente rather than to expand it.
Among the "younger" Soviet leaders, First Deputy Premier Mazurov at 60 has
the clearest chance of one day assuming a top leadership post. Since 1965 he has
served as Premier Kosygin's top government assistant on industrial matters. His claim
to the premiership, whenever Kosygin relinquishes it, was considerably enhanced a
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. The may be directed to
f the Office of Current Intelligence
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year ago by the demotion of the other first deputy premier, Polyansky, to minister
of agriculture. Mazurov has gained the reputation of being one of the more
modern-minded members of the regime, while still hewing to traditional. ideas on
some aspects of domestic and foreign policy.
His avoidance of clear cut and controversial positions makes it difficult to give
him a political label, even in his principal area of responsibility as chief government
overseer of industry. On some issues, his approach to economic questions appears
designed to play both sides of the street. On the whole, however, he seems to have a
good grasp of the complexity and interdependence of most economic matters, and
he is receptive to innovative ideas. He has been ahead of other leaders in advocating
a systems approach to various economic problems.
As party boss of the important Moscow city apparatus, Politburo member
Viktor Grishin is in a good position to succeed ultimately to a top leadership post in
the CPSU. Grishin reportedly suffered a "serious" heart attack last summer, how-
ever, and how he fares politically from now on will depend in large measure on how
speedily and completely he recovers.
At 59, Grishin has a reputation as a competent if somewhat uninspiring
performer in the traditional apparatchik mold. He probably could be expected to
move along the center of the path on policy issues, avoiding controversy whenever
possible. His personal views on foreign affairs are difficult to identify because he
rarely addresses these matters. Like Kirilenko, he would probably be cautious in
dealing with the West.
Andropov, An Able Party Veteran, Directs KGB
Yury Vladimirovich Andropov, who runs the KGB, is more than an expert in
intelligence and internal security. He has, in fact, spent much of his long career in
straight party work, specializing in relations between the Soviet Communist Party
and other ruling parties. He could in the future return to full-time party work.
Andropov is a man of intellectual stature. Nevertheless, he has no better than
an outside chance of ever succeeding to the top party post. The KGB portfolio is a
severe handicap for anyone who aims for the top. Hiscolleagues would hesitate over
the dictatorial potential inherent in any direct jump from the KGB to party chief,
and the Soviet Union's image at home and abroad would suffer from too visible a
secret police aura around the country's top leader.
By temperament, Andropov has seemed better suited to an important behind-
the-scenes influence than to public political leadership. If he is still KGB Chairman
when Brezhnev's successor is chosen, Andropov's support would be all but essential
to the winning candidate.
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Polyansky
Dmitry Polyansky was abruptly dropped from his post as first deputy premier
and named minister of agriculture in February 1973. Kremlin politics, as well as the
poor harvest in 1972, was an important factor in his demotion. The move seemed
designed to deflect from Brezhnev criticism for the almost disastrous crop failure.
Until this setback, Polyansky was one of the most influential and promising of
the junior members of the Politburo. His strength derived primarily from his key
position as first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, in which capacity he
coordinated the work of numerous agencies dealing with agriculture. Polyansky's
penchant for politicking and his tendency to generate rather than shun controversy
undoubtedly contributed to his demotion.
Polyansky's demotion left a considerable power vacuum that has still not been
filled. Fedor Kulakov, who is party secretary for agriculture, seems now to be the
ranking party man in agriculture. But Kulakov has played a cautious role, apparently
unsure whether Polyansky's star has fallen permanently.
Shelepin
Aleksandr Shelepin, once strong enough to appear a threat to General Secretary
Brezhnev, has in recent years been clinging to a precarious political existence.
Despite the marked decline in his status, Shelepin still bears watching. At 55, he is
the youngest full member of the Politburo, and his aspirations seem undiminished.
Shelepin's ability to survive many reverses indicates that he retains significant
support built up in a career as head of the Komsomol and of the KGB, and in other
top party and government posts. Sometime in the mid-1960s Shelepin ran afoul of
Brezhnev, and over the next few years Shelepin's offices and responsibilities were
gradually peeled away.
Over the years Shelepin has demonstrated an ability and a readiness to shift his
policy views to advance his political ambitions. Since Brezhnev unveiled his pro-
grams for consumer welfare at home and peace abroad at the 24th Party Congress in
197 1, Shelepin has become one of his warmest supporters. The shift to the Brezhnev
bandwagon suggests that Shelepin calculates that conspicuous support for the
General Secretary offers the best hope for survival into the post-Brezhnev era.
Three Regional Leaders Likely to Move Up
Of the 23 full and candidate members of the ruling Politburo, seven represent
regional or local interests. By usage or geographic importance, some Soviet regional
posts are now more important than others, and the incumbents are thus in a good
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position to advance in the Soviet hierarchy. In Brezhnev's administration the top
leaders in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Russian Republic seem especially im-
portant.
In May 1972, Vladimir Shcherbitsky became the first secretary in the Ukraine,
the largest of the non-Russian republics. He is a close protege of Brezhnev. Both
have political roots in the Dnepropetrovsk District of the Ukraine, and both
maneuvered to bring down the previous Ukrainian first secretary, Petr Shelest.
During this contest, Shcherbitsky adhered to a strong centrist, Moscow-oriented
stance. Once he feels more secure in his position, however, Shcherbitsky may
become more assertive with regard to Ukrainian interests.
Petr Masherov, first secretary of the party in Belorussia since 1965, has been an
effective champion of scientific and technological innovation as a means of achieving
economic and social progress. He has, at the same time, consistently stressed the
need for ideological purity. Under Masherov, who is a candidate member of the
Politburo, Belorussia is enjoying an economic boom. Masherov probably has an
important ally in Moscow in Politburo member Kirill Mazurov who, like Masherov, is
a native Belorussian. Mazurov, the odds-on favorite to succeed Premier Kosygin, is in
a good position to advance the interests of both Belorussia and Masherov.
In July 1971, Mikhail Solomentsev was named premier of the Russian Re-
public, by far the largest of the 15 Soviet republics. His position as a regional leader
is somewhat anomalous. The post of premier of the Russian Republic, with its
capital in Moscow, is in many ways a national office. On the other hand, because
party affairs for the republic are run from the national Central Committee and its
Secretariat, Solomentsev has no direct party authority in the area he supposedly
rules. Solomentsev's position entitles him to full membership on the Politburo, but
lie has been passed over several times. He may have high-level detractors or lack
strong allies in the party hierarchy.
Younger Generation -Skill in Economic Management
The Soviet leadership includes three men under 55 years of age. All three began
their careers in industry and later turned mostly to economic management. Their
experience in this field may have an important influence on the future course of
national policy.
Party secretary Konstantin Katushev, who is 46, spent his formative years in
the Gorky Oblast of the Russian Republic. Under Katushev's aegis in the early
1960s, a new system of quality control was adopted by factories in Gorky.
Experimentation with social development plans to go along with production plans at
enterprises was also begun during Katushev's tenure in Gorky. Since 1968, Katushcv
has been working on relations with ruling communist parties abroad, an assignment
he apparently owes largely to Brezhnev. As the focus of Soviet foreign policy has
shifted to the West and detente, Katushev seems to have lost some of his
prominence.
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Grigory V. Romanov, who is 5 1, is party chief of the Leningrad Oblast and a
candidate member of the Politburo. Leningrad has become the recognized leader in
amalgamating enterprises and scientific institutes into integrated industrial com-
plexes capable of dealing independently with many operational and planning matters
normally handled by Moscow. Last year, a party-government decree ordered the
nationwide formation of production associations on the Leningrad model. Under
Romanov, Leningrad officials have pushed for integrated economic and social
planning at the regional level. In late 1971 Brezhnev made a special trip to Leningrad
to give his endorsement to its work in regional planning.
Vladimir I. Dolgikh became Central Committee secretary for heavy industry in
December 1972 after only three years as a regional party secretary. During his
tenure as party boss of the sprawling Krasnoyarsk Kray in Western Siberia, Dolgikh
prepared a ten-year plan for the comprehensive development of the kray that was
singled out for praise by Brezhnev. Earlier, Dolgikh had been director of one of the
first large enterprises to adopt the progressive economic reform system announced in
1965. Dolgikh believes that Siberian development has been hampered by the
disjointed activities of central ministries, which fail to provide local services and
social amenities along with new production facilities.
Collective Leadership
Soviet leaders work within a system of power sharing that gives a voice at the
top policy-making level to all institutional and regional power centers. The system
has allowed party boss Brezhnev to emerge as the first among equals, but it still
imposes restraints upon his exercise of power. Brezhnev has been able to play off
one regional or bureaucratic faction against another, but in so doing he has had to
pay close heed to the views of the most powerful interest groups in order to advance
his own position. Anyone who hopes to succeed him will have to do likewise.
The need to reconcile the many different positions is probably greater in the
present Soviet regime than in previous ones. The result is a cautious, conservative
leadership. The system of committee rule-"collective leadership" in Soviet
parlance-has in general inhibited sudden or radical shifts in policy and has fostered
stability within the top ranks of the leadership.
Although the political standing of certain Politburo members has changed
sharply, removal of a Politburo member apparently requires wide consensus. There
has, therefore, been very little attrition in this key group.
Brezhnev may have a freer hand than before in the matter of ensuring that the
man who follows him, or who succeeds another senior leader, will be a man of his
own choosing who will continue in broad outline his domestic and foreign policies.
Unlike Khrushchev, who fretted about the succession question openly and endlessly,
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Brezhnev has not seemed to set out any clear line of succession. He may be content
to put the matter off or to leave it in the hands of the Politburo and the major
interest groups.
The senior members of the Politburo are getting on in years. Kosygin,
Podgorny, Suslov, and Grechko are all in their seventies, and Brezhnev is 67. None
of them enjoys robust health, and the chance of all of them leaving the political
scene in rapid succession increases with time. If this were to happen, it might be
difficult to achieve an orderly transfer of power.
Meanwhile, the most dynamic and outspoken younger members of the post-
Khrushchev groups-Shelepin, Polyansky, and Shelest-have fallen victim to pre-
mature political ambitions. In the system of collective leadership, which requires
caution and compromise, it is the more bureaucratic and self-effacing who flourish.
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Soviet Leaders and Succession
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GENERATIONS OF SOVIET LEADERS
Members, Politburo
Candidate members, Politburo
Members, Politburo
Candidate members, Politburo
Secretary
Candidate member, Politburo
Secretaries
Age 65 and over
Brezhnev
Podgorny
Kosygin
Suslov
Kirilenko
Pelshe
G rech ko
Ustinov
Ponomarev
Age 55-64
Mazurov
Polyansky
Shelepin
Grishin
Kunayev
Shcherbitsky
Kulakov
Andropov
Gromyko
Demichev
Rashidov
Masherov
Solomentsev
Kapitonov
Age under 55
Romanov
Katushev
Dolgikh
67
71
70
71
67
75
70
65
69
60
56
55
59
62
56
56
59
64
56
56
56
60
59
51
46
49
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SOVIET SUCCESSION AND GENERATIONAL POLITICS
The Soviet leadership headed by Leonid 1. Brezhnev will be a decade
old this year. The coalition of leaders who deposed Khrushchev in October
1964 and redivided political power among themselves has remained remark-
ably stable. At the same time, the Politburo has grown unusually large, and
the average age of its members is greater than ever before. Although there are
no strong signs that the collective leadership is about to fall apart, its very
longevity raises questions and creates problems concerning succession.
Past patterns of change in Soviet regimes suggest the rejuvenation of the
top leadership may soon become an increasingly pressing matter. General
Secretary Brezhnev is now 67. The leadership includes a number of younger
officials who are in their late 50s or early 60s, but they hold offices of
secondary importance (see chart). Time for them to have their turn at higher
posts is beginning to run out. It was leaders in this age group who assumed
power in 1953, when Stalin died at age 73, and in 1964 when Khrushchev
was ousted at age 70.
Brezhnev Regime Unique
The generational problem is made more acute by an important differ-
ence between the composition of the Politburo today and that in 1953 or
1964. Stalin and Khrushchev, in their drive for power, expelled from the
leadership most public figures of their own generation. They tended to rely
politically on younger leaders whom they helped promote and who, there-
fore, owed them some loyalty.
As a result, under Stalin and Khrushchev the younger generation
occupied more important posts and constituted a larger proportion of the
Politburo than today. Thus younger leaders were already largely in place in
1953 and 1964, and succession involved, at least in the short term, little
more than replacing the man at the top.
In the more collective atmosphere of the present regime, however,
Brezhnev's contemporaries have held on to the top posts and preserved their
numerical strength on the Politburo. At present, men in their late 60s and
early 70s hold the party's top position (Brezhnev), two unofficial party
positions of "second" secretary (Suslov and Kirilenko), the premiership
(Kosygin), the presidency (Podgorny), as well as lesser offices represented on
the Politburo.
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The Old Guard in charge...Suslov (71), Brezhnev (67), Podgorny (71) and Kosygin (70)
The next generation in waiting...Solomentsev (60), Kulakov (56), Shcherbitsky (56),
Andropov (59), Grishin (59), Demichev (56), Kunayev (62) and Masherov (56)
This clique of older men, held together by a balance of power and
self-interest, has been a great stabilizing factor in leadership politics. It has
restrained Brezhnev in his attempts at self-aggrandizement, on the one hand,
and, on the other, it has inhibited challenges to his position, which would
threaten them all.
Although rivalry between Brezhnev and other senior leaders has sur-
faced periodically, the most serious challenge to his leadership came early in
his tenure from one of the youthful leaders, Shelepin. Brezhnev relied
heavily on senior leaders to deflect this threat. Brezhnev has advanced
younger proteges like Shcherbitsky and Kunayev as chiefs of the Ukrainian
and Kazakh parties, but they remain distant from the center of power.
Moreover, Polyansky, another of Brezhnev's younger allies in the past, was
demoted last year from his strategic post of first deputy premier to minister
of agriculture. Among the officials promoted to the Politburo last year,
Brezhnev's closest ally is Defense Minister Grechko, now 70.
In these circumstances, probable lines of succession are difficult to
discern. It is true that Polyansky's demotion seems to clear the way for First
Deputy Premier Mazurov eventually to succeed Kosygin, if he wishes. No
one among the younger leaders, however, has a very strong claim to
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Brezhnev's job. The most prominent contenders, such as Shelepin and
Polyansky, must overcome the political setbacks they have received. Those
with less controversial careers, such as Kulakov and Grishin, suffer from lack
of public exposure or narrowness of responsibility.
Prospects
Prolonged immobility in the top ranks increases the chances that
change, when it comes, will involve many leaders. The illness or death of a
senior leader, an ever-present possibility given their age and infirmities, could
easily touch off a chain reaction.
Brezhnev is the youngest member of the senior group of leaders. This
fact, and his strong political position, may encourage him to hope that he
can survive a generational turnover within the leadership. If he considers
such a turnover highly likely in the near future, he could build alliances with
younger leaders and perhaps join them in an effort to case out some of his
senior colleagues. In the process he might even be able to add to his own
titles either Podgorny's presidency or Kosygin's premiership, a frequently
rumored ambition. In other words, Brezhnev might belatedly try to do what
Stalin and Khrushchev did much earlier in their careers. This course, how-
ever, would be risky and would go against Brezhnev's conservative nature
and style. It also would require repairing some personal and organizational
relationships with the younger group of leaders.
The other senior leaders seem generally to have little ambition beyond
preserving their own status. Kirilenko, who is the same age as Brezhnev, is
probably the only one who entertains even a flicker of hope of ever
becoming General Secretary. This kind of defensive outlook on the part of
the senior leaders means that they probably are not eager to break ranks and,
in collaboration with junior colleagues, to initiate a shake-up that would
rend the fabric of their generational hegemony. They are likely to be spurred
to such action only by a discernible threat to their individual and collective
positions.
The problem for the younger leaders of today is not, as it was for
Brezhnev and company in 1964, combining together to topple the party
leader. The best they can hope for in the short run is simply to begin to pick
away at the phalanx of aging superiors. Given Brezhnev's predominant
position, the most realistic and logical course would be an alliance between
Brezhnev and the younger officials against some of the older senior leaders.
Indeed, such an alliance could be mutually beneficial. Political divisions
among the younger leaders and various ties with the seniors, however, would
be complicating factors.
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In the end, illness or death may help to break up the logjam at the top
of the Soviet hierarchy. In this event, the particular circumstances and chain
of events would greatly influence how the leaders survive and rearrange
themselves.
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ANDREY KIRILENKO: THE MAN MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED
Party Secretary Andrey Kirilenko is the best bet to succeed Brezhnev if
the General Secretary leaves office in the not-too-distant future. Kirilenko is
67 years old, however, and the prospects of his moving up into the top party
post will diminish with each additional year that Brezhnev, also 67, remains
on the scene.
The son of a Russian artisan, Kirilenko was born in the southwestern
part of the Russian Republic near the Ukraine. He completed a rural school
at age 16, studied at a trade school, and worked for four years as a fitter and
electrician. He graduated from an aircraft design institute in 1936, and
worked as an aircraft design engineer for two years. He switched to political
work as a local party secretary in the Ukraine in 1938. That same year,
Brezhnev became party secretary in a nearby district and Khrushchev
assumed the party leadership of the
republic.
Kirilenko spent the first year
of the war as a political officer on
the southern front before moving to
Moscow to supervise an aircraft fac-
tory. He resumed political work in
the Ukraine in late 1944, after its
liberation, and succeeded Brezhnev
as party boss of Dnepropetrovsk in
1950. He transferred to a party post
in the Russian Republic in 1955,
gained Central Committee member-
ship in 1956, and became a candi-
date member of the Politburo in
mid-1957. Kirilenko's career suf-
fered an unexpected setback in
1961 .when he lost his Politburo
seat, but he bounced back six
months later, becoming a full Polit-
buro member and the number-two
man in the Russian Republic's party
organization.
Kirilenko is not known to have
played an active role in Khrush-
chev's ouster in 1964, and his
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standing in the newly ordered leadership was relatively low. His general
administrative competence, the absence of any display of dangerous political
ambitions, and his past relationship with Brezhnev may have contributed to
an improvement in his political position. He became a CPSU Secretary in
1966 and since then has steadily increased his real power and authority in
the leadership.
Kirilenko has considerable say in personnel appointments within the
party and has been in a position to build some personal political support. His
record is relatively well-rounded, although focused more on industry than on
agriculture. In recent years lie has had quite a bit of experience in dealing
with leaders of ruling and non-ruling foreign communist parties, but his
contacts with other foreigners have been fairly limited.
Kirilenko's chances for succeeding Brezhnev depend primarily on his
support among other members of the Politburo, particularly the "Ukrai-
nians" who served together under Khrushchev in the Ukrainian party ap-
paratus. One of these is President Nikolay Podgorny, who has shown a
special interest in preserving the "old-school" ties with Kirilenko and the rest
of the group, and probably would support Kirilenko. Minister of Agriculture
Dmitry Polyansky, however, might withhold his support, particularly if
Kirilenko had a hand in Polyansky's demotion from first deputy premier a
year ago.
Kirilenko probably would have the support of Ukrainian First Secretary
Vladimir Shcherbitsky and Soviet Defense Minister Audrey Greckho-the
two Ukrainians added to the Politburo since Khrushchcv's ouster. Shcher-
bitsky worked under Kirilenko during the early 1950s, and their association
has probably remained a close one. Grechko, whose ties with Brezhnev and
Kirilenko date from the early days of the war, seems to have remained on
good terms with both men.
Trade union chairman Aleksandr Shelepin seems to share Kirilenko's
views on many policy problems. First Deputy Premier Kirill Mazurov has
worked closely with Kirilenko since 1965 in supervising industrial manage-
ment, and the two men appear to have similar views in this area as well as in
foreign policy.
It seems likely that, Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and Kirilenko
have, at a minimum, different perspectives and priorities at times-for
example, in situations requiring a weighing of foreign policy equities against
the stability of the Soviet political system. Nevertheless, Gromyko might
prefer Kirilenko over other potential successors to Brezhnev, if only as a
compromise candidate.
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Premier Aleksey Kosygin, one of two "independents" on the Politburo
with sufficient seniority and prestige to avoid long-lived factional commit-
ment in the internal power struggle, seems to have had little direct contact
with Kirilenko. Kirilenko's responsibilities present the potential for friction
with Kosygin, however, and he has differed with the premier on a number of
questions-for example, by emphasizing moral rather than material in,
centives in spurring labor productivity, and by favoring a more militant
approach toward "imperialist' countries. The two men have, however,
arrived at a consensus of sorts on industrial management policy and eco-
nomic planning. Both have endorsed production associations, and Kirilenko
has supported the creation of a business management school-the Institute of
National-Economic Management-which is another component of Kosygin's
economic reform program.
Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov, the senior secretary who serves as
Brezhnev's unofficial deputy, is the other "independent." With almost 27
years of continuous service in the Secretariat, Suslov has enormous prestige
and considerable power. There is some evidence that he and Kirilenko have
been competing for position and power, without necessarily opposing each
other on policy matters. In fact, the two appear to be in general agreement
on many domestic and foreign policy questions. Suslov, already 71 years old,
probably would not put in a claim for the top post in a succession crisis, but
he might use his influence to block Kirilenko's bid, if only to put a
"Russian" at the head of the party for the first time since Lenin.
Arvid Pelshe, Chairman of the Party Control Committee, would prob-
ably play a minor role in a succession crisis because of his advanced age (he is
75), low political seniority, and weak personal power. He was party boss in
Latvia until the 23rd Party Congress in 1.966, when he was given his present
party post and co-opted into the Politburo, apparently because of his status
as an Old Bolshevik and as a token representative of the Baltic republics. His
vote in a succession crisis would probably reflect the attitude of Suslov, with
whom he apparently has a common outlook on many policy matters and to
whom he reportedly is related. by marriage.
Kazakhstan first secretary Dinmukhamed Kunayev, one of Brezhnev's
most loyal boosters on the Politburo, seems to share Kirilenko's viewpoint
on several issues and probably sees him as the most attractive candidate for
the top party post. Party Secretary Fedor Kulakov, the regime's top-ranking
agricultural expert since Polyansky's demotion, would probably prefer some-
one more sympathetic to the nation's farm lobby, but he might come to see
Kirilenko as the least objectionable choice.
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Among the Politburo's candidate members, possible Kirilenko sup-
porters include the following: Party Secretary Dmitry Ustinov, a quasi-
"independent" who oversees defense-related industry; Russian Republic
Premier Mikhail Solomentsev, Kirilenko's neighbor in the Urals during the
late 1950s and a fellow supervisor of heavy industry; and Leningrad party
boss Grigory Romanov, perhaps the regime's most enthusiastic booster of
production associations.
As a successor to Brezhnev, Kirilenko would stand as a fairly orthodox
Marxist-Leninist, and at least initially, he would be more cautious about
dealing with the West. Kirilenko's public support of detente is infrequent
and often conditional, and he has been in the forefront of those who
champion the "Brezhnev Doctrine' of limited sovereignty. He was widely
reported to have urged the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia despite the
doubts expressed by Suslov, among others.
In his public statements, Kirilenko has come as close as any other top
Soviet leader to advocate explicitly a dynamic foreign policy. He has termed
aid to the Vietnamese and Arabs not only a "revolutionary duty," but also a
requirement of Soviet security. He has strongly criticized the Communist
Chinese leadership and has defended the Soviet policy of attacking Peking's
political and ideological positions, but he has not shut the door on an
eventual reconciliation with China.
Kirilenko's relative militancy in foreign policy statements has its corol-
lary in domestic policies, especially in the cultural and social spheres. On the
question of improving labor productivity he puts greater emphasis on exhor-
tation and persuasion than on material incentives. Kirilenko has revealed
something of a pragmatic attitude toward economic management. His
speeches on this theme have consistently promoted less dogmatic solutions
to managerial problems.
Little is known about Kirilenko's real views on defense and strategic
questions. His only public statement on SALT to date was a strictly pro
forma assertion in April 1970 that the talks can produce results "if the
United States makes an honest attempt to solve the problem at hand and
does not try to achieve one-sided gains." This cautious remark was consistent
with Kirilenko's generally wary attitude toward the US. Such reservations no
doubt underlie Kirilenko's repeatedly expressed opinion that a "dangerous"
international situation makes it necessary to increase the USSR's defense
capabilities.
Against this background, Kirilenko as General Secretary would prob-
ably be somewhat more imaginative in the field of domestic affairs than
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Brezhnev has been. In foreign affairs, Kirilenko's regime probably would not
undertake any sharp departures from the course that has been followed
under Brezhnev. Whatever his personal views on policy, as a compromise
candidate, he could not move any further than his Politburo colleagues
would allow. Any gradual shift in foreign policy under his leadership would
probably be away from detente rather than toward it. Kirilenko's style of
leadership would probably be less colorful and exuberant than Brezhnev's.
Kirilenko gives the appearance of a modest, efficient administrator, not a
politician who enjoys being on the hustings. The alteration in style would be
in step with the regime's probable return to a more collective style of
leadership following a change at the top.
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Among the relatively younger Soviet leaders, First Deputy Premier
Mazurov at 60 has the clearest chance of one day assuming a top leadership
post. Since 1965, Mazurov has served as Premier Kosygin's top government
assistant on industrial matters. His claim to the premiership, whenever
Kosygin relinquishes it, was considerably enhanced a year ago by the
demotion of the other first deputy premier, Polyansky, to minister of
agriculture.
Other recent signs also point to Mazurov's good standing. In November
1972, he delivered the Revolution Day speech for the second time in five
years-putting him ahead of some peers who have never given it and of some
senior leaders who have had the honor only once. Moreover, last July
Mazurov read the main report on education at a session of the Supreme
Soviet, an unusual public platform for a Politburo member.
Mazurov's well-rounded background and political acumen contribute to
his prospects. Before assuming his present government post in March 1965,
he was for many years party chief
in Belorussia. He has gained the rep-
utation of being one of the more
modern-minded members of this
regime while still hewing to tradi-
tional ideas on some aspects of
domestic and foreign policy. In his
public statements, Mazurov seems
to try to avoid polemics with his
colleagues and to suggest innova-
tions that can accommodate many
interests. He has managed to be his
own man among the leadership, on
friendly terms with some but seem-
ingly beholden to no individual or
faction.
As a junior member of the Pol-
itburo, Mazurov has not played an
important role in the formulation
of foreign policy. His speeches usu-
ally follow the current party line,
and indications of his personal
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views are scanty. In his most recent speech on December 19, Mazurov
appropriately endorsed detente policies, pegging his support both to the
prevention of nuclear war and to the establishment of "constructive business
links" with the US and other capitalist states. More than most other leaders
who have spoken recently, however, Mazurov dwelt long and vigorously on
the inadmissibility of ideological and political concessions to the West. Ile
was notably specific in supporting the CPSU's current "broad ideological
offensive."
Mazurov has traveled widely outside the Soviet Union. In addition to
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Mongolia, he has also
visited the United Kingdom, Sweden, the UN General Assembly in New
York, Belgium, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, and Finland.
In a conversation with a senior US official during the Moscow summit
in May 1972, Mazurov recalled as "extremely interesting" his 20-day visit to
New York in 1961 to attend the UNGA. He also remarked that he was in
favor of more frequent informal visits to the US by Politburo members,
noting that since these men are heavily involved in managing the Soviet
economy, they would be interested in visiting American factories and observ-
ing industrial management practices. The few Westerners who have met him
have also found him easy to talk to, with an attractive sense of humor.
A Systems Advocate
Mazurov's avoidance of extremes and simplification make it difficult to
give him a political label even in his principal area of responsibility as chief
government overseer of industry. On some issues, his approach to economic
questions appears designed to play both sides of the street. On the whole,
however, he seems to be acting on a genuine appreciation of the complexity
and interdependence of most economic matters. He has been ahead of other
leaders in advocating a "systems approach" to various economic problems.
Mazurov's major task when he arrived in Moscow was to help Kosygin
launch the 1965 economic reorganization. That reorganization involved the
re-establishment of central ministries, including more than 40 production
ministries. At the same time, more emphasis was to be given to worker
incentives and to enterprise initiative in management. As the latter aspect of
the program was compromised over the years, Mazurov, along with Kosygin,
continued to defend it but not in an overly narrow or bureaucratic manner.
Indeed, his penchant for a comprehensive approach to problems suggests
some reservations about both the fragmentation of authority in specialized
branch ministries and the efficacy of purely economic mechanisms. In recent
years, he has supported the amalgamation of enterprises into production
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associations and the creation of agroindustrial complexes as ways to broaden
the application of reform principles and to restructure management along
more rational lines.
Although wedded to industry, and especially heavy industry, Mazurov
has recognized the need for the "proportional development of the econ-
omy," that is, striking a better balance among heavy industry, light industry,
and agriculture. In fact, his proposals over the years for developing con-
sumer-oriented production and foodstuffs reveal his comprehensive approach
to problems.
During Mazurov's leadership of the Belorussian party in the early
1960s, the republic was in the forefront of an attempt to popularize-under
the rubric NOT (scientific organization of labor)-the concept of a team
approach to problem-solving in the economy. During those years, an effort
was made in the republic to employ this approach in the development of
rural areas. As originally conceived, population centers destined for future
development were to be selected according to economic criteria. These
centers were to be provided with the infrastructure and social amenities
found in urban areas-all in addition to modernizing agricultural production
per se. The program never got fully under way, but echoes of it have
reappeared in Mazurov's statements as first deputy premier.
Speaking in Leningrad in March 1967, Mazurov became the first and,
for many years, the only Politburo member publicly to endorse a similar
scheme-the Leningraders' social development plans in the industrial sphere.
As he paraphrased their proposal, made at the party congress the year
before, "each enterprise should, in addition to its production plan, have a
unified complex plan for the comprehensive social development of the
collective." These plans usually encompass such categories as job training,
safety measures, housing, social amenities, and ideological education. The
scheme attempts to break down the traditional barriers between segments of
the economy. It also reflects, however, an orthodox belief in the efficacy of
planning all things, even on a local level, and skepticism that "the unity of
personal interests and the collective would be established spontaneously and
automatically."
In a speech in Minsk in June 1970, Mazurov also became the first
Politburo member to use publicly the term "systems approach." He cited the
"inter-branch approach to management" (emphasis his) as a most important
advantage of socialism over capitalism. "The systems approach," he said,
should be applied to "the problem of increasing agricultural production in
our nation at a more rapid pace." Elaborating, he noted the complexity of
agricultural production and its dependence on the "efforts of many other
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branches of the national economy." Mazurov also advocated this approach
"for the solution of the problem of supplying the public with an adequacy
of consumer goods and cultural, household, and recreational goods."
Up from Belorussia
Mazurov was born into a peasant family on April 7, 1914, in the Gomel
Oblast of Belorussia. There, in the 1930s, he graduated from a road and
motor vehicle technical school and worked for a highway agency. After
serving in the army from 1936 to 1938, Mazurov returned to Gomel to begin
his party career in the youth organization, Komsomol. He saw combat duty
in the army early in the war, was discharged after recovering from wounds,
and then worked behind German lines as a Komsomol official in the
Belorussian partisan movement.
Mazurov became first secretary of the Belorussian Komsomol after the
war, when Aleksandr Shelepin in Moscow was responsible for top-level
Komsomol appointments. He served in the Belorussian central committee
apparatus and worked as a party leader in Minsk, rising from city second
secretary to oblast first secretary. He served as Belorssian premier for the
next three years. In 1956, Mazurov became Belorussian party chief, and he
was made candidate member of the CPSU Politburo in 1957 when Khrush-
chev ousted the "anti-party group." His career struck a snag, however, when
he clashed with Khrushchev over the latter's decentralization of agricultural
management, as well as other aspects of Khrushchev's agricultural policies.
He attained full membership on the Politburo only when he transferred to
Moscow as first deputy premier in 1965, five months after Khrushchev's
ouster.
His Kremlin Colleagues
Mazurov was promoted in 1965 over the head of Deputy Premier
Polyansky, who had already been a Politburo member for five years. Seven
months elapsed before Polyansky also gained the status of a first deputy.
Mazurov assumed responsibility for the industrial side of the economy,
Polyansky for the agricultural side, and the two alternated in deputizing for
Kosygin. Rivalry would seem to have been inevitable in their positions. Their
public speeches have revealed differences of emphasis on important issues,
but they have not obviously engaged in disputes with one another.
Kosygin probably had an important say in bringing Mazurov to Mos-
cow, where he oversaw the implementation of Kosygin's economic reforms.
Until recently, Mazurov has been stingy with praise for Brezhnev. He does
seem to share some common interests with Kirilenko and Shelepin. The
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three have shown interest in several of the same innovations in economic
management (production associations and social development planning).
Mazurov and Kirilenko share responsibility for the industrial economy in
their respective government and party positions.
Keeping Options Open
Already well groomed for the premiership, Mazurov's lengthy party
service makes him eligible, in the right circumstances, for party leadership.
At present, he is hampered by not being on the party Secretariat, as this
leaves him only limited influence in the Central Committee apparatus. On
the other hand, he probably still enjoys support in the Belorussian party
organization. Masherov, Belorussia's first secretary and a candidate member
of the Politburo, followed closely behind Mazurov in his rise through the
Komsomol and party leadership in Belorussia. This indication of political
alliance is supplemented by evidence of social contacts with one another
after Mazurov moved to Moscow.
Mazurov is the first ethnic Belorussian to attain full membership on the
Politburo, and his nationality could count against his chances of becoming
party boss. The Belorussians, however, are the most Russianized of the
minority nationalities. Masherov enthusiastically supported Brezhnev's
recent campaign against national individualism and self-interest, which con-
tributed to the downfall of Ukrainian first secretary Shelest. The influence
of Mazurov and Masherov, in fact, seems to have risen just as the unity of the
"Ukrainian clique" in national politics has been dissolving.
There are signs that Mazurov has tried to maintain the stature of a party
leader. Mazurov was widely rumored to have joined Shelepin in late 1969 or
early 1970 in some sort of challenge to the drift then evident in economic
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Mazurov in the spring of 1970 harshly
criticized inept handling of preparations for the Lenin centennial in April.
Mazurov has been the only leader to elaborate publicly on Brezhnev's theme
of victory through contacts, set forth in August 1973 at Alma Ata. Speaking
last December, Mazurov urged propagandists to go from the defensive to the
offensive against the bourgeois ethic, and to do so in a manner calculated to
develop "more sophisticated, more consistent, flexible, and effective propa-
ganda." In sum, he appears to be trying to identify with issues outside his
specialty in politically advantageous ways.
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If Mazurov aspires to party leadership, he will have to overcome many
hurdles and deficiencies in his political position. None is serious enough to
rule it out, however, and he shows some signs of interest in the job. Perhaps
the greatest element in his favor is that all other possible contenders for
party leadership also labor under serious handicaps.
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GRISHIN, THE CAUTIOUS BUREAUCRAT
As party boss of the important Moscow city apparatus, Politburo
member Viktor Grishin is in a good position to succeed ultimately to a top
position in the leadership of the CPSU. Grishin reportedly suffered a
"serious" heart attack last summer, however, and how he fares politically
from now on will depend in large measure on how speedily and successfully
he recovers.
Aside from his physical infirmities, Grishin is in an enviable spot
vis-a-vis his peers. He enjoys the power and independence of other regional
party leaders, and yet, as Moscow chief since 1967, he has had almost daily
access to the senior members on the Politburo.
At age 59, Grishin has a reputation as a competent if somewhat
uninspiring performer in the traditional apparatchik mold. Grishin probably
can be expected to move along the
center of the path on policy issues,
avoiding controversy whenever
possible. As a regional party leader,
Grishin has not had a major voice in
foreign policy.
Although Grishin's recent pro-
motions have coincided with up-
ward turns in Brezhnev's political
fortunes, he is not a Brezhnev
protege. Rather, Grishin emerges as
a consensus-oriented bureaucrat, ac-
ceptable to most other members of
the political elite. In a regime that
has seemed in recent years to stress
the virtue of collective leadership,
these attributes make Grishin a
good candidate to move up in the
central party hierarchy.
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Grishin's Surprise Appointment
After I 1 years as trade union boss, Grishin was unexpectedly desig-
nated as Moscow city first party secretary in June 1967. The appointment
appears to have been the penultimate move in a fierce factional dispute
between Brezhnev and the youthful challenger Aleksandr Shelepin.
At an important Central Committee plenum on June 20, the then-
Moscow party boss, N. G. Yegorychev, sharply criticized some aspect of the
Politburo's handling of the six-day Arab-Israeli war. (His specific charges are
still uncertain.) Yegorychev reportedly had support from Shelepin. Brezhnev
made a strong and apparently effective rebuttal, and Yegorychev was re-
moved from his post a week after the plenum. Grishin replaced Yegorychev
as head of the Moscow party apparatus, and in what seemed to be an act of
calculated irony engineered by Brezhnev, Shelepin was given Grishin's old
job.
Building a Power Base
The disestablishment of the Russian Republic party bureau in Moscow
in 1966 had created a power vacuum of sorts, and Grishin, already a
candidate member of the Politburo, moved to fill it.
He first replaced the personal followers Yegorychev had left behind. By
1971 three of the top five secretaries on the Moscow city party bureau had
been removed, and new chiefs had been installed in 10 of the bureau's 13
departments.
At the 14th Party Congress in April 197 1, Grishin was made a full
member of the Politburo. The congress also called for the long-term develop-
ment of Moscow as a "model city." Grishin has used the mandate to plug for
more funds and greater autonomy in directing Moscow's development.
As leader of one of the largest industrial centers in the country, Grishin
has had to address economic policy with increasing frequency. He has always
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been careful, however, to avoid controversial or innovative ideas. For
example, Grishin began to endorse "production associations" only after the
concept had gained general acceptance in the leadership.
Relationship with Brezhnev, Others
When Grishin assumed control in Moscow he had no career ties with
Brezhnev or any other important political leader. It was not long, though,
before he got his first opportunity to serve Brezhnev. In early 1968 the
leadership, faced with disturbing liberalizing trends in Czechoslovakia and
-rowing student restiveness at home, decided to tighten ideological controls.
Brezhnev introduced the "vigilance" campaign with a major speech in March
1968 at a plenum of Grishin's Moscow City Party Committee.
Grishin's task was to spearhead the campaign to suppress or isolate
those persons in the Moscow intellectual community who had condoned
politically provocative stage productions or who had signed petitions on
behalf of jailed writers. He moved with vigor, and the protest signature
movement soon evaporated. E_ I
under the circumstances the actions taken by Grishin at the
Time were relatively moderate. More people could have been jailed, and the
suppression could have been more severe.
There is little information on Grishin's relations with his Politburo
colleagues. Among the lesser lights in the central party hierarchy there may
be some antipathy toward him. Politburo candidate member Demichev,
for example, rose out of the post of Moscow City first secretary, but now
has fallen behind Grishin in party rank. Party Secretary Kapitonov, in charge
of party organizational work, was Grishin's superior in the early 1950s, when
Grishin worked in the Moscow provincial committee. These men may resent
Grishin's recent ascendency.
Foreign Policy Views
Grishin's personal views on foreign affairs are difficult to decipher
because he rarely addresses an appropriate forum. Like Kirilenko, he prob-
ably would be cautious in dealing with the West. He is certainly an ardent
supporter of solidarity in the socialist camp, and his anti-Chinese credentials
are well established.
In some of his recent foreign assignments, Grishin has demonstrated a
notable lack of finesse. On a trip to Czechoslovakia one year after the
invasion, his delegation was met by a barrage of rocks and jeers during a visit
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to a factory in Prague. Except for a one-day trip to Warsaw in late 1972,
Grishin has not journeyed abroad since his trip to Rome.
Trouble Spots at Home
Although Grishin's career has not been marred by any clearly recog-
nizable political setbacks, there have been some danger signals. On party
organizational matters, Grishin, in an uncharacteristic move, appears to have
taken a forward position on the controversial decision at the 24th Party
Congress in 1971 to hold an exchange of party cards. The exchange can serve
as a way to remove deadwood and revitalize the party ranks. Because of the
high political stakes involved, most party leaders, including Brezhnev, have
treated the matter with extreme caution, or have ignored it altogether in
their public statements.
Early on, however, Grishin expressed his dissatisfaction with the slow
pace of the exchange. In fact, he seems to have been recruiting a relatively
large number of young people for party membership and responsible posts in
the party. His position on this issue may bring him into conflict with some
of his more conservative colleagues who continue to resist any large influx of
new blood.
In 1965, Grishin, as chief of the trade unions, was politically embar-
rassed in the press debate that preceded the economic reform launched that
year. One of the more controversial proposals being aired involved the use of
"material incentives" (wages) to increase labor productivity. The concept
was vigorously opposed by conservatives who preferred to rely on the
conventional Soviet technique of "moral incentives" (competitions, banners,
and medals).
The trade union's newspaper, Trud, presumably reflecting Grishin's
thinking on the matter, gave heavy coverage to a local labor competition
with high praise for the winners, thereby signaling its support for "moral
incentives." Pravda, at that time edited by a notable "liberal" in Soviet
terms, promptly published an expose revealing that the outcome of the
competition had been rigged in advance and that Trud knew about the
deception. Grishin was obliged to issue an unprecedented, signed apology
that was published in Pravda.
Education and Early Career
Like most top Soviet party and government leaders, Grishin received his
only formal education in industrial technology. In 1937, at the age of 23, he
graduated from a technical school in Moscow, specializing in railroad engi-
neering. From there Grishin went to work in railroad administration in his
home town of Serpukhov, near Moscow. By 1950 he had risen to the top
party post in Serpukhov.
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ANDROPOV: MORE THAN JUST A KGB CHIEF
Yury Vladimirovich Andropov's present job, KGB Chairman, has
tempted many Western observers to view him simply as a specialist in
repression and espionage. This 59-year-old career party official also had
substantial earlier regional party experience, however, and has served 13
years in other capacities in the Soviet leadership. He has a good chance of
returning to other full-time party work.
Unlikely Party Boss
The top party post would seem at best an outside possibility for
Andropov. Although his long party experience and apparently good working
relationships with a broad range of leadership colleagues would work to
Andropov's advantage in circumstances requiring a compromise candidate,
his handicaps probably weigh more heavily. The KGB portfolio is a severe
obstacle to any contender for the
top party post. Leadership col-
leagues would be wary of the dic-
tatorial potential inherent in any
direct jump from the KGB to
party chief even in the case of an
Andropov, who has not been bla-
tantly ambitious in the manner of
his predecessors. The Soviet
Union's image at home and abroad
would suffer, probably to an unac-
ceptable degree, from too visible a
secret police aura around the coun-
try's top leader.
Andropov's party experience,
although extensive, is narrowly
grounded in relations with other
ruling communist parties and re-
lated matters. He lacks direct
supervisory experience in such key
sectors as the economy. By tem-
perament, Andropov has seemed
more ambitious for, and better
suited for, important behind-the-
scenes influence than for public
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political leadership. If Andropov is still KGB Chairman when Brezhnev's
successor is chosen, his support would be all but essential to the candidate
for party boss.
Likely Return to Party Foreign Affairs
It is quite possible, however, that Andropov will leave the KGB some
time in the next few years to return to work on foreign party relations at a
senior level. Already a full Politburo member, he could become a "senior
secretary" by returning to the party secretariat that he left as a "junior" in
1967 for the KGB. At that time, Andropov had for the previous ten years
headed the Central Committee's department for relations with ruling com-
munist parties. Andropov appears to be one of the few intellectuals among
Soviet leaders, and might be chosen to combine supervision of ideology or
propaganda with some aspect of foreign affairs. Suslov, the party's senior
ideologist and expert on international communism, is now 71 and reportedly
in tenuous health. Andropov, who worked for Suslov from 1954 to 1967, is
a strong candidate to inherit at least some of Suslov's responsibilities.
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Policy Views
Information on Andropov's policy views is fragmentary, but he has
been seemingly consistent in defending two priorities closely related to his
successive areas of responsibility: CPSU leadership of the international
communist movement and Soviet internal security. Andropov's most recent
speech, in Estonia on December 27, predictably contained a scathing rejec-
tion of Western interference in internal Soviet affairs.
Nonetheless, he also endorsed Soviet detente policies as contributing to
elimination of the threat of nuclear war and creating the best conditions for
social and economic development of the USSR. Additionally, Andropov has
been more positive than any other full Politburo member who has recently
spoken on the benefits achieved by Brezhnev's detente policies, saying that
"never before has the foreign policy of the Soviet Union been so effective or
produced such splendid results within so short a period." In sum, Andropov
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seems likely to support detente so long as it does not imperil internal
security or Moscow's position in the socialist community.
Andropov seems to be a highly pragmatic manager who admires effi-
ciency and results. These personality factors on occasion seem to modify his
policy views. The net result is a complex man whose opinions and actions are
not readily susceptible to neat classification as "hard-line" or "progressive."
One reflection of this complexity is Andropov's persistent reputation in
Soviet intellectual and even dissident circles as a relative progressive and a
reformer. He is reported to have argued in leadership councils against
political show trials, calling them senseless and counterproductive, and to
have been one of the leaders behind the decision to allow a safety valve of
controlled Jewish emigration.
Under Andropov's leadership, however, the KGB, using a discriminating
mixture of threats and arrests, has all but routed the Soviet dissidents
without unleashing a "purge." Andropov's willingness to step out of the
traditional KGB rut of uniformly crass repression, to employ subtler
methods and shifting tactics, makes him a more formidable KGB Chairman,
as well as a more effective walker of the detente-vigilance tightrope.
Highly cultured and intelligent, Andropov is generally quiet and unas-
suming in manner. He seems comfortable with responsibility, is a skilled
administrator, and is as demanding of himself as of his subordinates. Report-
edly he knows some English. Although widely traveled in Eastern Europe
and communist Asia, Andropov's only known travel to non-communist areas
was to Somalia in July 1972.
Any CPSU party head must secure his position by choosing a loyal
KGB Chairman. In 1967, Brezhnev chose Andropov, ousting Chairman
Semichastny because of his greater loyalty to Brezhnev's then principal rival,
Shelepin.
Andropov also seems to have the kind of trust and broad support among
other leaders that, in a collective, is almost as essential to a KGB Chairman as
the confidence of the party head. Suslov was probably Andropov's primary
earlier patron. There is little information on their current relationship, but
there is no evidence that they do not still find basic common ground.
Andropov's acquaintance with Kirilenko, Brezhnev's unofficial party
deputy and likeliest short-term successor, conceivably goes back to the
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mid-1930s, when both were in Rybinsk, although attending different tech-
nical schools.
Andropov's promotion to full Politburo membership in the spring of
1973 was tied to other considerations, including Brezhnev's desire to
strengthen his foreign policy support and some other, still unclear, political
tradeoffs. Andropov had outranked Gromyko and Grechko until last April,
when their promotions gave them equal status, and also indirectly advanced
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense to a party bureaucratic stand-
ing equal to that of the KGB.
Impact on the KGB
The principal effect of Andropov's KGB has been closer party-KGB
relations. The first KGB chairman since Beria to sit in leadership councils,
Andropov, unlike Beria, has the outlook of a party administrator rather than
a policeman. He has brought party control and a party leadership viewpoint
directly to bear on KGB management. Several of the new KGB deputy
chairmen appointed in recent years have been party, rather than KGB,
officials. By the same token, Andropov probably also brings some degree of
KGB perspective directly into the Politburo, with corresponding enhance-
ment of the KGB's institutional influence in that body.
Budapest and Other Influences
Born on June 15, 1914 in the north Caucasus area, Andropov com-
pleted a technical education in Rybinsk and then became a Komsomol
organizer in Yaroslavl Oblast. His Komsomol work took him in 1940-41 to
the Karelo-Finnish Republic, where he headed the party youth organization.
During most of World War II he organized partisans behind the German lines,
probably along the Finnish frontier in the Murmansk area. His partisan
experience is another common bond with Suslov, who directed this activity
in the north Caucasus area, with Pelshe (Latvia), and Mazurov and Masherov
(Belorussia).
From 1944 to 1951, Andropov was again in formal party work in the
Karelo-Finnish Republic, first as second secretary of the city of Petroza-
vodsk and then of the whole republic.
In 1951, Andropov went to Moscow and into the Central Committee
apparatus. He simultaneously attended the Higher Party School. In 1953 he
was posted to Budapest, becoming ambassador there in 1954 and remaining
through the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Information on Andropov's
personal role in the Hungarian Revolution, however, is fragmentary and
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conflicting. In 1957 he returned to Moscow as head of the Central Commit-
tee Bloc Department (relations with ruling parties). There he served until
going to the KGB a decade later. He joined the leadership as a party
secretary in November 1962. In June 1967, shortly after moving to the
KGB, he was transferred from the secretariat to become a candidate Polit-
buro member.
KGB Headquarters
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On February 3, 1973, Dmitry Polyansky was abruptly dropped from
his post of first deputy premier and appointed minister of agriculture. This
was a severe setback to his ambitions to succeed Kosygin as premier. Not
only Kremlin politics, but also the previous year's poor harvest were prob-
ably important factors in his demotion. His demotion seemed designed to
deflect from Brezhnev criticism for the almost disastrous crop failure.
Before 1973, Polyansky had been one of the most influential and
promising of the junior members of the Politburo. His strength derived from
his key position as first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers-in
which capacity he coordinated the work of the numerous agencies dealing
with agriculture-and from his excellent and extensive political connections.
A Russified Ukrainian, Polyansky was one of a group of Soviet leaders,
including Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Podgorny and Grechko, who got their start in
the Ukraine under Khrushchev and who allied themselves with him during
his rise to power in Moscow. Although they did not always agree among
themselves on policy questions, they formed the core of Brezhnev's political
support after Khruschev's ouster.
Polyansky (c) receives Australian Deputy Prime Minister McEwen (1)
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Polyansky's penchant for politicking and his tendency to generate
rather than shun controversy undoubtedly contributed to his difficulties.
Whether Brezhnev engineered or merely acquiesced in Polyansky's demotion,
the party boss ultimately benefited, and relations between the two men now
appear to be somewhat strained. This year's excellent harvest clearly saved
Polyansky his Politburo seat for the moment, but Brezhnev got the public
credit.
The present arrangement regarding Polyansky is highly unstable with
many loose ends. Polyansky long dominated the agricultural sphere-at least
behind the scenes-and his demotion left a considerable power vacuum that
has not been filled. The position of first deputy premier that he lost is still
vacant. Fedor Kulakov, the party secretary for agriculture and once Pol-
yansky's protege, is now seemingly the ranking agriculturalist in the leader-
ship. Kulakov has made clear his allegiance to Brezhnev, but has otherwise
played a cautious role, apparently unsure whether Polyansky's star is rising
or falling. A government reorganization, rumored to be in the works, could
resolve the issue.
Polyansky is not a faceless bureaucrat; he is one of the more colorful
members of the leadership. A driving authoritarian politician, his ambition is
leavened by an open outgoing manner, a mocking wit, and a tendency to say
what he thinks. Foreigners who have met him have found him to be a highly
competent and complex individual: suspicious, sensitive to his own prestige
and importance, domineering, impetuous, gregarious, and talkative.
Born Under the Right Star
Polyansky puts great stock in the fact that he was born on the day of
the Bolshevik revolution, November 7, 1917. He grew up in the Ukraine and
attended an agricultural institute there in the late 1930s. After graduating,
lie left the republic and though he kept in touch with many of his former
Ukrainian associates, his subsequent career was primarily in the Russian
Republic and then at the national level.
He served as party boss in several key grain-growing districts, and in
1958, thanks to his loyal support for Khrushchev against the anti-party
group, he was named premier of the Russian Republic and won a seat on the
Politburo. Four years later he was appointed a deputy to Kosygin and in this
capacity became the government's top agricultural administrator.
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Polyansky's approach to agricultural problems has always seemed
basically pragmatic, mixing a concern for economic considerations with a
healthy regard for political realities. He was, for example, an advocate of
buying grain from abroad and was closely involved in the first big Soviet
purchases in 1963.
Yet, Polyansky had been as responsible as anyone for some of the
ill-advised agricultural practices at that time, abetting Khrushchev in his
determination to find cheap, short-cut remedies. Polyansky came close to
losing his job as a result. He participated in the coup against Khrushchev and
expressed great bitterness in later years at the damage Khrushchev did to the
agricultural sector in the last years of his tenure as party boss.
Champion of Agricultral Interests
Polyansky was evidently the chief architect of the ambitious agricul-
tural program that Brezhnev sponsored in 1965 soon after Khrushchev's
ouster. Through high investments and a reform of planning and procurement
mechanisms, the program sought to modernize agriculture and put it on a
sound financial footing-to undo the legacy from the Stalin years when the
agricultural sector was milked to finance the development of heavy industry.
Polyansky was a staunch and outspoken champion of this program.
When other leaders, including Brezhnev, flagged in their support, Polyansky
spoke out publicly in its defense. In an all-but-unprecedented move in late
1967, shortly after a decision had been taken to cut back on agricultural
investments, Polyansky wrote an article in the leading Soviet theoretical
journal, warning of the dangers of slighting that sector.
Polyansky's most serious and long-drawn-out feud over agriculture
appears to have been with Gennady Voronov, who succeeded him as premier
of the Russian Republic in 1962. Among other points of disagreement,
Voronov held that a radical reform in the organization of labor and in the
system of wages on the farms would reduce the need for the high invest-
ments in agriculture that Polyansky proposed. As the argument wore on,
both were driven to somewhat ridiculous extremes. Polyansky was ulti-
mately the victor in this controversy. Voronov was dismissed from the
premiership in July 1971 and dropped from the Politburo in early 1972. The
feud caused much bad blood, a fact that may not have helped Polyansky
later when the harvest failed.
Polyansky's friendly relations with Kirilenko and others like Demichev
made it easy for him to smooth over policy differences with them, but this
was not the case with Voronov. Polyansky seems to have had nothing but
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scorn for him and repeatedly dismissed his proposals as "nonsense." Pol-
yansky has expressed the same outspoken intolerance towards others he has
considered either wrong or of no consequence.
Polyansky Dabbles in the Arts
Polyansky's primary concern has been with the agricultural sector, but
there have been persistent reports over the years of his interest in cultural
affairs. He may have had some official responsibilities for this area as part of
his duties as deputy premier. In contrast to his generally pragmatic and
flexible approach to economic matters, Polyansky is thoroughly conservative
in his attitude toward the arts, perhaps because he recognizes there is a
constituency holding such views. Furthermore, his name has been linked
with the more reactionary Slavophile movements and with various anti-
Semitic and Stalinist writers.
...and in Foreign Affairs?
This same message seemed implicit in Polyansky's appointment as
minister of agriculture last spring. "Concentrate your able talents on agricul-
ture and stay out of their affairs." There were hints in the previous year that
Polyansky may have flirted with those in the central committee who had
reservations about Brezhnev's detente policies.
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SHELEPIN: A POLITICAL PORTRAIT
Aleksandr Shelepin, once in the running to become the regime's strong
man, has in recent years been clinging to a precarious political existence.
Despite his reduced status, Shelepin still bears watching. His ambition and
abilities seem unimpaired, and at 55, he is the youngest full member of the
Politburo.
Shelepin's success in surviving many reverses indicates that he retains
significant support built up during his career as head of the Komsomol, head
of the KGB, and ultimately as holder of top party and government posts. His
policy preferences seem to have had an important influence, even in recent
years, on the direction of policy adopted by the leadership.
The high point in Shelepin's career came in November 1964 following
Khrushchev's ouster, when he attained membership on the Politburo. He was
the only Politburo member to also hold important executive posts in both
the party (Central Committee secretary) and the government (deputy
premier).
Shelepin reportedly used his strong position to challenge Brezhnev for
the leadership of the party sometime in 1965, but he was thwarted by
Brezhnev's political skill and, very likely, by the other leaders' fear of his
ambition. Over the next few years, the layers of Shelepin's offices and
responsibilities were gradually peeled away. When in June 1967, Moscow
party boss Yegorychev, an ally of Shelepin, criticized the leadership's
handling of the Arab-Israeli crisis, Shelepin was removed from the party
Secretariat and made chief of the trade unions, a position that usually has
not merited Politburo membership. At the 24th Party Congress in 1971,
Shelepin was listed last (1 1 th) among incumbent leaders, a fall from 7th
place at the 1966 Congress. The two leaders, Voronov and Shelest, who were
ranked just ahead of Shelepin in 1971 have since been forced out of the
Politburo.
Shelepin has demonstrated unusual ability and readiness to shape his
policy to serve his political ambitions. The resultant shifts have frustrated
attempts to pin a political label on him, although he has the reputation of
advocating modern, efficient management as well as traditional Soviet prin-
ciples such as centralized control.
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Shelepin
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Shelepin was born in Voronezh, RSFSR, in 1918, the son of a railroad
worker. He is one of the few Soviet leaders with a background in social
sciences, having studied at the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy, and
Literature in the late I 930s. He served in the army in the Russo-Finnish War
of 1939-40 as a political education instructor and a squadron commander.
During World War II he began his career in the Komsomol in Moscow and
reportedly led a partisan group near Moscow.
Shelepin rose through the Komsomol hierarchy and in 1952 became its
first secretary, a position he held until 1958. In this post he was able to
develop ties with a whole generation of future leaders throughout the
country. Shelepin still retained considerable influence over the Komsomol in
the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the organization and its newspaper
were open to new ideas and freer discussion of political and social questions.
For example, the Komsomol undertook to popularize sociology and the use
of questionnaires and polls.
In 1958, Shelepin worked briefly in the Central Committee apparatus
before being appointed chief of the KGB. This post contributed to his
sinister image abroad. In fact, however, Shelepin took strenuous measures to
bring the secret police under closer party and government supervision and to
end its role as an instrument of political terror. Shelepin left the KGB in
1961 after being elected to the party Secretariat. The next year he was
named deputy premier and chairman of the watchdog Party-State Control
Committee.
The Voice of Neo-Stalinism
In his drive for power in the mid-1960s, Shelepin adopted a neo-
Stalinist program that in many ways suited the post-Khrushchev climate. He
appeared to be in league with those who favored administrative fiat in
directing the economy, cultural and ideological retrenchment, rapproche-
ment with China., and hostility toward the West. Brezhnev, however, took
the wind out of Shelepin's sails by adopting a conservative tack himself.
Brezhnev also moved to erode Shelepin's organizational strength. In
December 1965, Shelepin was relieved of his post on the Council of Minis-
ters and dismissed as head of the Party-State Control Committee, which was
dismantled. In the Secretariat, Shelepin momentarily gained responsibility
for the cadres sector, but was forced to turn this over to Kirilenko in April
1966. He ended up with the relatively minor responsibility of overseeing the
consumer goods industry.
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Shelepin Changes His Colors Again
Following his demotion in 1967, Shelepin seemed to begin to moderate
his conservative views, perhaps recognizing that he needed new constitu-
encies and new issues. For example, in May 1968, Shelepin's trade union
newspaper published a favorable review of a controversial play, Bolsheviks.
The play examined the Bolshevik leaders' decision, with its portentous
meaning for Soviet history, to introduce the Red Terror after an attempt
against Lenin's life. The play shocked and aroused Moscow audiences still
deeply concerned about Stalin's crimes.
According to most reports, Shelepin was among those who opposed the
Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. As trade union
chief, Shelepin became active and effective in promoting closer ties with
foreign trade unions, particularly those of Western Europe.
Shelepin continued to show interest in consumer welfare even after he
lost responsibility for it on the Secretariat in 1967. Although Shelepin
apparently opposed the economic reform of 1965, his economic outlook
seemed to become somewhat more flexible by the end of the decade.
According to reports in 1970 and 1972, he joined such leaders as Mazurov,
Suslov, and Kirilenko in criticizing drift in economic policy and calling for
more modern methods of management. He gave early support to the organ-
ization of production associations, which was decreed last year.
Shelepin Casts His Lot With Brezhnev
Since Brezhnev unveiled his programs of consumer welfare at home and
peace abroad at the 24th Party Congress in 1971, Shelepin has become, at
least in public, one of the warmest supporters of the General Secretary and
his policies. Speaking just after the Congress, Shelepin outdid other leaders
in praising the new deal for consumers. In January 1973 he credited
Brezhnev with successes in detente and became the first Politburo member,
apart from Brezhnev's protege Kunayev, to refer to the General Secretary as
head of the Politburo. During the leadership's round of speechmaking late
last year, Shelepin heaped praise on Brezhnev and was more enthusiastic
than even Brezhnev on many specific aspects of detente.
Shelepin's current public views probably stem from his precarious
position and a judgment that ostentatious backing of an increasingly secure
Brezhnev and his policies offers the best hope for survival. Yet, Shelepin
does seem to have a knack for anticipating the direction of policy. The
change of heart he showed in the late 1960s suggests that he may genuinely
believe in the new directions in policy.
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In recent years Shelepin's contacts with Westerners have been largely
confined to trade union leaders. He makes widely varying impressions on
foreigners he meets. He often comes across as heavy-handed in meetings with
foreign communist party and communist trade union officials.
By contrast, an American trade union official who met Shelepin in
Moscow in June 1968 described him as a good listener with a friendly
personality and a sense of humor. Shelepin avoided communist cliches and
jargon and related a joke at the expense of the Chinese. He expressed regret
and amazement over the assassination of Robert Kennedy, remarking that
"these are the methods of Stalin."
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Of the 23 full and candidate members on the ruling Politburo, seven
represent regional or local interests. Their Politburo status exposes them to a
certain extent to national policy concerns and issues. As a matter of practical
politics, however, these regional leaders find themselves championing the
interests of their own constituencies, especially with regard to the continuing
scramble for development funds and resources.
Shcherbitsky in the Ukraine
In May 1972, Vladimir Shcherbitsky became first secretary of the
Ukraine, bringing the largest of the non-Russian republics under the control
of a close protege of Brezhnev. Both men have political roots in the
Dnepropetrovsk district of the Ukraine, where they had openly maneuvered
against the previous first secretary, Petr Shelest. During this contest, Shelest
sought to shore up his position in the republic by echoing some of the views
of the more nationalistically minded element in the Ukrainian party, while
Brezhnev and Shcherbitsky moved steadily toward a tougher, more centrist,
Moscow-oriented stance.
At the same time, Shelest began to challenge Brezhnev more openly on
policy issues, such as detente with West and the domestic consumer program,
presumably in hopes of attracting support from other quarters. He also
began defending the interests of his republic constituency even more vigor-
ously. At the 24th party congress in the spring of 197 1, Shelest criticized
Moscow's policy of heavy investment in oil and gas projects in Siberia,
claiming that the Ukrainian coal industry was stagnating.
It was at the party congress that Brezhnev moved decisively to weaken
Shelest's position. Shcherbitsky, then Ukrainian premier, was promoted
from candidate to full membership on the Politburo. It is very unusual for
both top posts in any republic to be held by full members of the Politburo,
and it was apparent that either Shelest or Shcherbitsky would have to go.
The climax came at the Central Committee meeting on the eve of the
Moscow summit in May 1972. The immediate cause for Shelest's transfer
from the Ukraine to a deputy premiership in Moscow was probably his
opposition to going through with the summit, although he had already laid
himself open to charges of nationalism by his conspicuous defense of
Ukrainian special interests. A year later Shelest was ousted from the Polit-
buro.
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The campaign against Shelest
has colored Shcherbitsky's policies.
He has supported detente and the
consumer program. He publicly re-
futed Shelest's criticism of invest-
ment in Siberia. In the past year
Shcherbitsky has quietly removed
officials in the Ukraine closely iden-
tified with Shelest and has acted to
muffle manifestations of national-
ism in the republic. Once he feels
more secure in his position, how-
ever, he could become more inde-
pendent in his views and pay more
attention to Ukrainian interests.
Shcherbitsky, who is 56, has
not traveled abroad as much as
some other republic leaders, but he
is one of the few to have visited the
US. He represented the Ukraine at a
special session of the United Na-
tions General Assembly in 1967. Shcherbitsky
Like most Soviet leaders, Shcherbit-
sky received his only formal education at a technical school, a chemical
engineering institute in the Dnepropetrovsk area, from which he graduated in
1941.
Masherov in Belorussia
The Kremlin is seeking to strengthen the country's economic base while
maintaining close internal control. In its quest for these twin goals, it has an
articulate and dynamic spokesman in Petr Masherov, first party secretary of
the Belorussian Republic and a candidate member of the Politburo.
Masherov has consistently championed scientific and technological in-
novation as a means to economic and social progress in Belorussia, but has
also stressed the need for ideological purity. In particular, he has warned
against the dangers of "consumerism," noting that this tends to sap the
party's elan and make man a slave to his material possessions.
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Masherov has taken a strong
centrist view on the nationality
question, favoring a more rapid eco-
nomic integration of the Soviet re-
publics and the blurring of all na-
tional and cultural distinctions.
Masherov's frequent references to
the "new Soviet man" reflect the
regime's fundamental premise that,
in time, the USSR's multinational
population can be molded into a
homogeneous citizenry dedicated
to advancing the interests of the
whole Soviet state.
expense of the national interest was clearly directed against Shelest. It was
one of the sharpest public attacks in the campaign against the former
Ukrainian party boss, and was even more sweeping than Brezhnev's in its
condemnation of local nationalism.
The absence of nationalist
pressures in Belorussia and the long-
standing political rivalry between
the Belorussian and Ukrainian party
organizations are important reasons
for Masherov's pro-centrist stand.
His criticism in late 1972 of the
efforts of some local leaders to
favor their own republics at the
Under Masherov, Belorussia is experiencing an economic boom, largely
because Moscow is investing more in the republic, including construction of
a number of large petrochemical complexes. In order to bolster his argu-
ment for more money while not laying himself open to the charge of
nationalism, as did Shelest in the Ukraine, Masherov has stressed the import-
ance of these industrial complexes for the USSR as a whole. He has
emphasized, moreover, that labor is recruited from all the Soviet nationali-
ties and that construction funds and materials are drawn from all the
republics.
Masherov's personal relationship with Brezhnev is not clear. He has
enthusiastically supported some of the General Secretary's programs, but has
been cool or even hostile to others.
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Masherov probably has an important ally in Moscow in Politburo
member and First Deputy Premier Kirill Mazurov who, like Masherov, is an
ethnic Belorussian. Masherov followed closely behind Mazurov in his rise
through the Komsomol and party leadership in Belorussia. When Mazurov
moved to Moscow in 1965, Masherov succeeded him as the republic's first
party secretary. It is true that Masherov, in his efforts to strengthen his
personal control over the Belorussian party organization, has removed some
of Mazurov's close associates, thus creating the potential for some strain
between the two. Nevertheless, Mazurov is the odds-on favorite to succeed
Premier Kosygin, and is in a good position to advance Belorussian interests.
The influence of both Mazurov and Masherov, in fact, seems to have been
rising just as the unity of the "Ukrainian clique" in national politics has been
dissolving.
Since he became Belorussian party chief, Masherov has visited a number
of European countries. Now 56, he attended a teachers' college in Belorussia
in the late 1930s and for a short period before the war taught physics and
mathematics in a secondary school.
In July 1971, Mikhail Solomentsev was named premier of the Russian
Republic (RSFSR), the largest of the 15 Soviet republics. He replaced one of
Brezhnev's political adversaries, Gennady Voronov, who had quarreled with
Brezhnev over agriculture investment policies. Solomentsev may have had
early ties to Suslov and Shelepin, but he nows seems to be playing a
relatively independent role. The RSFSR premier is usually entitled to full
membership in the Politburo. Solomentsev, a candidate member since 1971,
has missed several opportunities to be promoted. This may mean either that
he has some high-level detractors or that he lacks strong allies in the party
hierarchy.
Solomentsev has had broader experience than most of the other repub-
lic leaders. He has served in a high party post in another republic (Kazakh-
stan), and for five years was responsible for heavy industry in the CPSU
Secretariat. Westerners who have met with him say he exudes ruthless
self-confidence.
Nevertheless, Solomentsev's position as a "regional" leader is somewhat
anomalous. The post of RSFSR premier, with a seat in Moscow, is in many
ways a national office. The Russian Republic is twice the size of all the other
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republics combined and contains
over half the population of the
USSR. Solomentsev administers an
RSFSR government bureaucracy al-
most as vast and complex as Pre-
mier Kosygin's USSR Council of
Ministers.
On the other hand, Soloment-
sev has no direct party authority
over the area he supposedly rules.
Party affairs for the RSFSR are run
from the CPSU Central Committee
and its Secretariat. The absence of a
separate party organization for the
Russian Republic results in part
from the central leadership's desire
to avoid concentration of power in
the hands of one man. For Solo-
mentsev, it means that any number
of central Politburo leaders can,
and often do, meddle in the affairs
of the RSFSR.
Solomentsev, like Shelest and Shcherbitsky in the Ukraine, must deal
with nationalism in both its emotional and economic aspects. Russian
national sentiment is an important element in Moscow's intellectual life, and
long-established regional rivalries must be taken into account. Solomentsev
has, for example, promoted the development of Siberia in the eastern
RSFSR. But he cannot do this too vigorously without antagonizing im-
portant political and economic interests in the heavily industrialized area of
the western part of the republic.
Solomentsev, who is 60, has begun to travel more frequently since
being named RSFSR premier. Last December he went to Japan to open an
exhibit devoted to Siberia. Solomentsev is of Russian descent. He attended a
polytechnical institute in Leningrad, graduating in 1940.
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THREE PROMINENT REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION
The Soviet leadership includes three members under 55 years of age:
party secretaries Konstantin Katushev, 46; Vladimir Dolgikh, 49; and candi-
date member of the Politburo Grigory Romanov, 5 1. They represent the first
contingent of a third generation of leaders on the scene behind the top
officials, all of whom are over 65, and the middle-level officials, generally
between 55 and 65. As a group, they cannot be considered Brezhnev's men,
although he seems to have had a hand in the rapid rise each of them has
experienced.
The three began their careers in industry and have devoted much of
their later party careers to economic management problems. In this field
they have been innovative and have pushed several of the organizational and
management schemes now coming into vogue. This may say something about
the shape of the leadership to come.
The present regime scrapped a regional organization of economic
management in 1965 in favor of a strictly centralized branch system. Yet, in
promoting these three young regional leaders who have been successful in
the economic field, the regime has advanced advocates and practitioners of
more regional control. These regional leaders have stressed the importance of
improving local infrastructure and welfare in conjunction with the produc-
tion tasks that are the focus of central ministries, and they have also used
sociological studies (traditionally suspect in the Soviet Union) to bolster
their programs.
Since April 1968, Konstantin F. Katushev has been the Central Com-
mittee secretary responsible for relations with ruling Communist parties
abroad. His earlier career did little to prepare him for this assignment, which
he apparently owes largely to Brezhnev.
Katushev was born and made his career in Gorky, RSFSR. He served in
the army at the front late in World War 11. In the late 1940s, he began
studies at the Gorky Polytechnical Institute, where he majored in automo-
tive technology. In 1951 he went to work at the Gorky Automotive Plant,
then the army's biggest supplier of tanks. He rose through various positions
as a designer and party worker at the plant to become secretary of the
plant's party bureau in 1961 and first secretary of Gorky city in 1963.
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In December 1965, Brezhnev
visited Gorky to supervise Katu-
shev's promotion to first secretary
of the oblast. Until then, Brezhnev
had not appeared to be involved in
Katushev's career, and this remains
the only time Brezhnev, as party
leader, has presided over a promo-
tion at the oblast level. Although
there were signs in the central press
of opposition to Katushev's
advancement, Brezhnev returned to
Gorky in January 1967 to give the
oblast the Order of Lenin and his
praise.
Under Katushev's aegis in the
early 1960s, a progressive system of
quality control and improvement
was adopted by factories in Gorky.
The program apparently originated
in defense-related electronics enter-
prises but was soon picked up by
other industries, including the Gorky Automotive Plant. At the party con-
gress in 1966, Katushev noted the success that the 1965 economic reform
was meeting in Gorky. A year later, however, he associated himself with a
proposal to establish in Gorky tight party control over the plant managers'
incentive funds instituted by the reform.
Katushev's support of the principle of party control, however, was not
wholly orthodox. In 1965 the Gorky city party committee established a
public institute of sociological research to provide more scientific studies of
economic and social problems. Gorky also early began experimenting with
social development plans at enterprises to accompany production plans.
These plans usually encompass worker training, safety and health measures,
housing, recreation facilities, and ideological education.
Katushev assumed his current responsibilities for bloc affairs at a time
when Brezhnev was supervising this aspect of foreign relations more closely
than others. At the Central Committee meeting that promoted Katushev in
April 1968, Brezhnev laid down an uncompromising ideological line in
reaction to the liberal trends in Czechoslovakia. Katushev was heavily in-
volved in reasserting Soviet control in Czechoslovakia after the August 1968
invasion. As the focus of Soviet foreign policy has shifted to the West and to
detente, Katushev has appeared to lose some of the prominence he enjoyed
in the late 1960s.
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After seven years as second secretary of Leningrad Oblast, Grigory V.
Romanov became the party chief there in September 1970, replacing V. S.
Tolstikov who left as ambassador to Peking. In April 1973, at the Central
Committee meeting preceding Brezhnev's trips to Bonn and Washington,
Romanov was elected a candidate member of the Politburo.
With these moves, Brezhnev apparently reached accommodation with a
previously rather hostile Leningrad party organization. Leningrad regained
the representation on the Politburo that it enjoyed under Stalin, and also
gained recognition and support from Brezhnev for some of its pet schemes in
the field of economic management and party work. At the same time,
Romanov departed from Tolstikov's silent treatment of Brezhnev and began
giving the General Secretary generous praise.
Romanov's political roots are in the party organization, which has a
reputation for being progressive on economic matters and reactionary on
cultural and ideological questions. After serving in the army during World
War II, he, worked as designer in the Leningrad ship-building industry and
graduated from the Leningrad Ship-building Institute. He began full-time
party work in 1954 and moved up the city and oblast party hierarchy until
he became Tolstikov's deputy in January 1963.
Tolstikov ran afoul of Brezh-
nev in 1970, particularly over for-
eign policy, just when Brezhnev was
taking his first steps in the direction
of detente. In June, Leningrad
authorities foiled an attempt by
Jews to hijack an airplane. A wave
of arrests of Jews around the coun-
try followed, and the would-be
hijackers were tried, with two
receiving death sentences. This
brought an outcry from the West. In
December, presumably as a result of
intervention of the leadership, the
death sentences were commuted,
and the next year saw the beginning
of freer emigration of Jews.
R o manov's personal involve-
ment in these matters is unknown.
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As Leningrad party boss, he has maintained rigid cultural and social disci-
pline, but apparently without complicating Brezhnev's foreign policy.
Romanov, however, worked closely with Tolstikov in developing his eco-
nomic programs and continues to be their champion.
Leningraders greatly resented the abolition of regional economic units
in 1965 and the re-establishment of central production ministries. In the
economic schemes they have advanced, Leningrad leaders have tried to
improve their ability to integrate the activities of the central ministries in the
region and to become better masters of their own house.
Leningrad has become the recognized leader in amalgamating enter-
prises and scientific institutes into associations and in formulating social
development plans at the factory, city, and oblast level. At the party
congress in 1971, Romanov stated that further development of associations
would "sharply reduce the number of projects subject to control from"
Moscow and would free central bodies from having to deal with many
operational questions. Under Romanov, Leningrad officials have worked not
only to achieve integrated comprehensive planning within the oblast, but
also to extend their influence over economic affairs in the surrounding
region of the country.
These efforts have been closely directed by the oblast party committee,
which has developed several new organizational forms to enhance party
supervision over the economy. At the party congress, Romanov mentioned
their experience in creating unified party organizations in production associ-
ations, enlarging party committees in large enterprises, and granting such
committees the rights of a city ward committee. Sociologists have been
enlisted by party organizations at all levels to aid in the formulation of social
development plans. The Leningrad party committee has formed a council for
economic and social development to draft comprehensive city and oblast
plans for 1976-80 and 1980-90.
Brezhnev incorporated many of these ideas in his report to the party
congress in March 1971. He particularly urged that production associations
become the "basic.. .links of social production." His real effort to woo the
Leningraders came in December of that year, when he traveled to the city
and gave official endorsement to the work on regional planning. Leningrad
had already received public support for many of its programs from leaders
such as Kirilenko, Mazurov, and Shelepin. Last year, a party-government
decree ordered the nationwide formation of production associations.
Romanov has traveled widely abroad, most recently with Brezhnev to
Cuba early this year. Last September, the US consul general in Leningrad
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became the second non-communist head of a consulate to be received by
Romanov. At that meeting, Romanov said he was a strong advocate of
improved relations with the US and favored a proposal to establish a "twin"
relationship between Leningrad and San Francisco, where a Soviet consulate
is located.
Dolgikh
Vladimir I. Dolgikh became Central Committee secretary for heavy
industry in December 1972 with only three years of experience as a regional
party secretary behind him. He brought to the leadership proven managerial
ability and a history of strong advocacy of Siberian development.
Dolgikh served in the army in World War II and graduated from the
Irkutsk Ore Mining and Smelting Institute in Siberia in 1949. He worked as
an engineer in Krasnoyarsk and in 1958 joined the Norilsk Mining and
Metallurgical Combine as chief engineer. He was director of this combine
north of the Arctic Circle from 1962 to 1969, when it was growing rapidly.
In 1965 the combine was one of the first enterprises in the country to adopt
the economic reform system, and Kosygin went to Norilsk in January 1968
to inspect its accomplishments.
Dolgikh was promoted from
plant director to first secretary of
the sprawling Krasnoyarsk Kray in
April 1969. In that capacity, he pre-
pared a ten-year plan for the com-
prehensive development of the kray
and submitted it to Moscow. He said
later that Brezhnev "gave a high
evaluation" of the plan and the Cen-
tral Committee adopted a decree on
it. In June 1971 Brezhnev praised
the Krasnoyarsk plan "as an ex-
ample" for Siberian development.
Dolgikh also publicly presented
the case for Siberian development-
in speeches, articles, and even in an
interview with Western newsmen.
One of his themes has been the eco-
nomic rationale for such develop-
ment. At the party congress in
1971, Dolgikh emphasized the cheapness of Krasnoyarsk coal. He thus
seemed to be vying with the Ukrainian coal industry, which Ukrainian party
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leader Shelest complained was being slighted. Dolgikh's other theme was that
Siberian development has been hampered by the disjointed activity of
central ministries and their failure to provide infrastructure and social
amenities along with new production facilities.
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THE KREMLIN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Soviet leaders work within a system of power-sharing that gives voice at
the top policy-making level to all the most powerful institutions and regional
interest groups. This voice is roughly proportionate to the political weight of
these institutions and groups in the country. Conflicting regional and bureau-
cratic pressures are thus joined at the Politburo level in a complex interplay
of power and policy considerations.
The need to heed and reconcile many different points of view has
produced a cautious and conservative leadership. The system of committee
rule-"collective leadership" in Soviet parlance-has inhibited sudden or
radical shifts in policy and has fostered a high degree of stability within the
top ranks of the leadership. Although the political standing of certain
Politburo members has at times changed sharply, removal of a Politburo
member apparently requires a near consensus among his colleagues. There
has, therefore, been very little attrition in the Politburo.
Soviet leaders walk to Lenin Mausoleum on May Day 1972
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The system has allowed for the emergence of party boss Brezhnev as
the pre-erninent leader, but it does impose restraints upon his power.
Brezhnev has been able to play off one regional or bureaucratic faction
against another and has been the main beneficiary of the Kremlin's delicate
balance of power. He has, however, been able to advance his own position
only by paying close heed to the views of the most powerful interest groups.
Anyone who hopes to succeed him will have to do likewise.
Collective Leadership -Modus Operandi
Khrushchev in his time paid lip service to the Leninist principle of
collective leadership in which members of the Politburo share, although not
equally, in formulating policy, but he increasingly violated it toward the end
of his tenure. In fact, his tendency to bypass his Politburo colleagues on
controversial issues was a major factor in uniting them against him. The
group that ousted him in October 1964 informally agreed upon a number of
organizational and procedural safeguards that have become more and more
institutionalized with the passage of time. One was the decision to keep the
two top posts of party boss and premier in different hands-certainly one of
the main obstacles to the re-emergence of one-man rule.
Collectivity has also been protected to a certain extent by an elaborate
system of mutual checks that prevents any one institution from dominating
the policy-making process, or any one individual from establishing a foot-
hold in more than one institution. This inhibits a member of one faction
from moving against his rivals or his boss. Thus, when Andropov was
appointed to the government post of KGB head, he was immediately
dropped from the party Secretariat. He was, however, compensated with a
position on the Politburo as a candidate member, which gave him direct
access to the policy-making circle.
The current composition of the Politburo closely reflects and is respon-
sive to the power relationships among the major interest groups in the
country. In contrast to Khrushchev, who was constantly waging war against
one bureaucratic element or another, the present leaders appear to want to
avoid offending any of the major interest groups.
The party apparatus, the government, the military-industrial complex,
the agricultural lobby, and important regional districts, all have someone on
the Politburo to represent their interests. Even a party official like Andro-
pov, who was given the top KGB post to ensure the party's control over the
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security forces, finds it wise to represent the agency he was sent to supervise.
His need for a power base and the KGB's need to be heard in policy-making
circles are bound to make for a mutuality of interest.
The appointment of Defense Minister Grechko and Foreign Minister
Gromyko to the Politburo last April and the elevation of Andropov to full
membership continued the trend of giving broad representation on the
Politburo to key interest groups. An overriding consideration in Grechko's
elevation, however, probably was the strong political support he had demon-
strated for Brezhnev personally and for his detente policy.
Alignments among the 16 members of the Politburo tend to be based
on mutual and institutional associations, but cliques have not turned out to
be hard and fast. They tend to overlap and to shift from issue to issue. One
question may pit the seniors-Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin, and Suslov-
against the junior members of the Politburo. Another may join party
representatives against government officials.
The most durable, although now slowly dissolving, faction has been
Brezhnev's "Ukrainian group." It is made up of the members of the Polit-
buro-some Ukrainians, some Russians-who, like Brezhnev, got their start in
politics in the Ukraine. While they have not always agreed with Brezhnev or
each other on policy issues, they once formed the core of his political
support. The group, which includes Podgorny, Kirilenko, Polyansky, and
Grechko, now seems to be in the process of dissolution, and Brezhnev
appears to be seeking new tics and new support elsewhere. He has, for
instance, appeared of late to be more actively cultivating Russian interest
groups than in the past.
There are no other groupings within the leadership comparable to the
Ukrainians, although others may find a sense of solidarity by virtue of being
the "outs."
The relative influence of the various institutional and regional groupings
is best reflected in the composition of the Party Central Committee's voting
membership. Its 229 current members make up a roster of the power elite
and are an important forum of opinion. Although its role is primarily that of
a rubber stamp, it has been called upon in the past to resolve political and
policy disputes within the Politburo and could be called upon to do so again.
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Full-time party officials still make up the bulk of the voting member-
ship with approximately 45 percent of the seats. The government executive
branch comes next with 29 percent, while the legislative branch has only 5.4
percent. The representation of the military establishment has risen somewhat
in the past decade and now accounts for a little over 8 percent. Because of
the relatively greater cohesion within the military establishment than in
other institutions, its political influence is probably greater than its numbers
would indicate. This probably holds true also for the security and judicial
agencies whose representatives on the Central Committee account for only
1 .2 percent of the membership. Shelepin's trade union organizations have
less than 1 percent of the seats. Intellectuals of any sort, particularly those
who are associated with the creative arts or have liberal sympathies, are
woefully under-represented.
Breaking down the membership in terms of economic interests, 23
percent are associated with farm affairs and 38 percent with industrial
production. Of the latter, 23 percent are associated with the heavy industry
and defense production and only 3.3 percent with consumer affairs.
The bloc of party officials is largely composed of regional party leaders,
while the representation of the executive branch is heavily weighted with
officials from the central government apparatus in Moscow.
This would seem to set the stage for party-state rivalry to take on the
additional character of a conflict between regional and central interests. For
example, some aspects of past and ongoing debates over economic adminis-
tration apparently pit the regional bias of the party officials against the
Moscow orientation of the government workers. The 1965 economic reform
attempted to centralize economic decision making again by re-creating
central ministries while at the same time expanding the rights of the
individual plant managers. The real losers were regional officials at the oblast
and republic level. Local party officials, the most vocal spokesmen for that
level of management, were quick to make their discontent known.
Collectivity Versus Special Intersts
In recent years Brezhnev has given some recognition to the needs of
local leaders. He has backed the Leningraders' scheme for putting regional
planning under greater local control. He also lent his support to the Mol-
davian plan to group small farms into large associations, again under firm
control of the republic party.
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The leadership continues to wrestle, however, with the problem of
reconciling the interests of regional officials with those of the Moscow
government bureaucracy-and fitting these local experiments into a coherent
system of administration. There seems to be a general recognition that the
entire system of economic management needs to be simplified and improved,
but little agreement on how this is to be achieved. Brezhnev in December
forcefully called for one integrated system of planning and management, but
provided no details. Any reorganization, when it finally emerges, will un-
doubtedly contain large, indigestible chunks of compromise.
The history of Brezhnev's detente policy provides another example of
the way in which the system of collectivity has acted as a brake on new
policy initiatives. A workable consensus within the leadership in support of a
policy of detente with the West was slow to emerge. It was apparently
obtained only because Brezhnev made concessions in other areas of domestic
policy and only at the cost, finally, of a rupture in the leadership ranks and
new strains within the Ukrainian group.
Ukrainian party boss Shelest was the most outspoken critic of detente
within the leadership. He was not a member of the Ukrainian clique in
Moscow, but seemed to be close to two who were, Podgorny and Polyansky.
None of the Ukrainian group, in fact, appeared to be out in front in support
of detente. Moreover, some of Shelest's reservations concerning detente were
apparently shared by party ideologist Suslov and by Belorussian party boss
Masherov. In addition, there seemed to be considerable opposition to
detente among regional party officials, perhaps because of their generally
more insular outlook.' Here again,'the strength of this group on the Central
Committee may well account for Shelest's success in holding out for so long.
Brezhnev was very slow to move against Shelest; he did so only after he
had some successes to show for,detente. When Brezhnev did move, he was
careful not to criticize Shelest for, his stand on foreign policy. Instead, he
chose safer grot nd--Shelest's somewhat permissive attitude toward Ukrai-
nian nationalism. On this issue Brezhnev could count on the support of both
Suslov and Masherov, for despite their reported sympathies with Shelest's
views on detente, they both were even more Moscow-oriented in their views
on the matter of Soviet national minority relations than Brezhnev.
At the same time, Brezhnev sought to win over other conservative
regional critics of detente by lending his name to some of their pet local
schemes. This goal appears to have been a major factor in Brezhnev's support
of the industrial and agricultural management experiments of the Leningrad
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and Moldavian party leaders. The party organizations in both regions tend
toward rigid orthodoxy on ideological matters.
Shelest's position was seriously undermined by these tactics. Even so,
he might not have been ousted from his Ukrainian post had he not,
according to reports, over-reached himself at a Central Committee meeting
by trying to reopen the question of the impending May 1972 summit after a
decision to go ahead had already been reached in the Politburo.
Shelest's removal from the Politburo a year later in April 1973 and the
other changes made in the membership of the Politburo at that time, such as
the elevation of Grechko and Gromyko, seem to have significantly
.strengthened Brezhnev's hand in the pursuit of detente.
Brezhnev may also now be in a stronger position to ensure that whoever
eventually succeeds him will be of his own choosing and will continue the
broad outlines of his domestic and foreign policy initiatives. Unlike Khrush-
chev, who fretted about it openly and endlessly, Brezhnev has given no
outward signs of being concerned with succession. He may be content to
procrastinate or to leave it in the hands of the Politburo and the major
interest. groups. There are, however, dangers in this. The senior members of
the Politburo are getting on in years. Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov and
Grechko are all in their 70s, and Brezhnev is 67. None of the top leaders
enjoys robust health, and the chance of all of them leaving the political scene
in rapid succession increases with time. If this, were to happen, severe strains
would be placed on any orderly transfer of power.
Meanwhile, the most dynamic and outspoken younger members of
post-Khrushchev leadership-Shelepin, Polyansky and Shelest-have fallen
victim of their own political ambitions. In the system of collective leader-
ship, favoring caution and compromise as it does, it is the more bureaucratic
and self-effacing who have flourished.
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Soviet Leadership
i O ;OF
CENTRAL tcOMMITTEEt
Members
BREZHNEV-66
ANDROPOV-59 GRECHKO-69
GRISHIN-58 (party boss of Moses.
GROMYKO-64
KIRILENKO-66
KOSYGIN-69
KULAKOV-55
KUNAYEV-61 (party boss of Kazal
+General Secretary
SREZHNEV """
SECRETARIAT"'OF
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Secretaries
KIRILENKO (Brezhnev's unofficial
deputy, plus heavy industry
MAZUROV-59-'-
Party Control Committee Chairman
PELSHE-74 --------------- PELSHE
PODGORNY-70
POLYANSKY-55
SHCHERBITSKY-55 (party boss of Ukraine)
SHELEPIN-54
SUSLOV-70
Candidates
DEMICHEV-55 "'-- -
MASHEROV-55 (party boss of Belorussia)
PONOMAREV-68
RASHIDOV-55 (party boss of Uzbekistan) -
ROMANOV-50 (party boss of Leningrad area)
SOLOMENTSEV-59
USTINOV-64
All-Union Central
Council of Trade
Unions Chairman
--SHELEPIN
COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS
Chairman
KOSYGIN
First Deputy Chairman
MAZUROV
Members (84 plus the 15 Republic Premiers)
ANDROPOV (Chairman of KGB)
GRECHKO (Minister of Defense)
GROMYKO (Minister of Foreign Affairs)
POLYANSKY (Minister of Agriculture)
PRESIDIUM OF
SUPREME SOVIET
Chairman (Titular Chief of State)
-PODGORNY
Deputy Chairmen (The chairmen
of the Supreme Soviet Presidiums
of the 15 Republics)
Members
-BREZHNEV
USTINOV (defense industry & space)
DOLGIKH-48 (heavy industry)
KAPITONOV-58 (party personnel director)
KATUSHEV-45 uniting Cps)
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A9
Secret
Secret
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