THE PROSPECTS FOR THE KARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100080003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 15, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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15 August 1974
SUBJECT: The Prospects for the Karamanlis Government
1. Karamanlis' position at the moment is strengthened
by several factors.
-- He did not ask for the job; he was requested by
a consensus of military and civilian leaders to
become Prime Minister, a move that was popularly
received by the Greek citizenry.
-~ He cannot be faulted for the reverses Greek
Cypriots are now suffering. This setback is
attributed to the former junta.
-- He can be excused for not taking a tougher
military posture against Turkey because his
senior military officers are advising him
to avoid broadening the confrontation.
r~ His return to power has been applauded by
Western Europe and well received by Greeks
who resented their international isolation
under the old junta. It is assumed by many
Greeks that the West will be sympathetic to
a Karamanlis government in future interna-
tional negotiations on Greek-Turkey disputes.
This is an important factor in view of Athen's
recognition of Turkey's military superiority.
In Greece's present difficulties, no alterna-
tive contender -- military or civilian --
would command anything like Karmanlis' sup-
port, and few would be anxious to try.
2. Greek public opinion is fickle, however, and many
of the advantages Karamanlis has now will gradually fade.
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3. Karamanlis could of course get in trouble over the
terms of the Cyprus settlement. Even though the Cyprus disaster
is not of his making, he will be forever associated with its reso-
lution. Karamanlis is sensitive to this problem and will insist
that the language be such as to minimize Greek humiliation.
(This accounted for Athen's preference at Geneva for a "cantonal"
rather than a "federal" solution.) ' Of?course Karamanlis will
not feel obligated to press for anything more than what the
Greek Cypriots can settle for, and this may ease his problem
somewhat.
4. Once the present confrontation with Turkey has sub-
sided, Karamanlis' honeymoon with a wide constituency probably
will not endure. The sense of national unity apparent during
the crisis will give way to Greek, political forces that are
historically divisive. Extreme opinion, such as that repre-
sented by leftist Andreas Papandreou, could create chaotic
conditions that would lead to a crisis. Karamanlis will be
hard pressed to keep the military assured that he can maintain
order while at the same time restoring sufficient civjl liber-
ties and representative government to satisfy the general popu-
lace.
5. if Karamanlis ran into serious trouble, he probably
would resign before being ousted. Two contingencies might
lead to his departure. His decision could be triggered early
if he faced what he considered a completely unacceptable Cyprus
solution or later if he felt unable to carry out essential ele-
ments of his domestic program.
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6. Even if Karamanlis steps down in the next few months
there would be considerable sentiment to continue a civilian
government. The botch the military has made of Greek affairs
during the past seven years would still be fresh in the public's
mind. There would be no assurance, however, that the civilian
replacement would be able to cope with the issues that caused
the departure of Karamanlis.
7. If the Greek political arena becomes badly fragmented
to the extent that civilians seem unable to govern, the mili-
tary would take over once again. In the first instance, this
might be a takeover by the senior military. It seems somewhat
more likely,owever, that officers of junior and middle level
rank would s ze power. There is considerable evidence that
younger officers are dissatisfied with the performance of their
superiors during the past seven years and they might not tolerate
another takeover by the generals.
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