YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS: THE EFFECTS OF THE COMINFORMIST AFFAIR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100100007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 21, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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SEC'?R F.T
MEMORANDUM:
SUBJECT Yugoslav-Soviet Relations: The Effects of the
Cominformist Affair
The outcome of the Cominformist plot in Yugoslavia has
been shaped by two factors. They are
-- Tito's strong initial inclination to suppress.the
whole affair, and
Moscow's unaccountable refusal to accommodate Yugo-
slav demands that it stop supporting such activities,
The Soviet penchant for accompanying rapprochement
with business as usual in the espionage arena made
it impossible for Tito to keep the lid on.
One of the prime motives underlying Tito's rapprochement
with Moscow has been his desire to ensure the survival of Yugo-
slavia's independence and its peculiar brand of socialism. Re-
lations with the Kremlin had to be composed, he calculated, in
order to leave his successors as.free as possible from the
prospect of Soviet interference. By November 1973, so much
progress had been made that Tito came home from his Kiev visit
to tell his subordinates he trusted Brezhnev. In Sarajevo last
April, just as his security services were stumbling onto the
Cominformist plot, he publicly proclaimed that there was no
threat to Yugoslavia from the East.
As the evidence of Soviet complicity in the affair mounted,
Tito's growing anger was more than balanced by his overriding
concern to preserve the warm relationship he had built with the
Kremlin. Resisting the clamor among his subordinates to reveal
the plot, he chose instead to protest repeatedly, but privately,
to Moscow, in both party and government channels. Receiving
no satisfaction, he sent Edvard Kardelj off to Moscow to dis-
cuss the matter with Brezhnev. This in itself was a signal of
Belgrade's seriousness; it was Kardelj who had gone to Moscow 25X1
in 1948 to stand up to Stalin.
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That Kardelj's mission failed is clearly evident in Tito's
blistering revelation of the whole Cominformist affair two days
after Karde.ij got home. In the six weeks since Tito's speech,
Belgrade has
-- seen to it that both its own people and the West are
fully aware that the Soviets have been caught med-
dling in Yugoslavia's internal affairs, but
tried to avoid any further downturn in relations with
Moscow by keeping things as placid as possible on the
surface.
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Beneath the surface, however, there are signs that the Yugo-
slavs are increasingly uneasy on two scores. In the short. run,
they fear that in the Co.minformist affair they have only seen
the tip of the iceberg. Belgrade's allegations that the plot-
ters were trying to rally support from other anti-Tito factions
suggest its suspicion that the Soviets are conducting other,
more sophisticated operations that the security services have
not yet uncovered.
Beyond that, Yugoslavia's policymakers must consider anew
the vital question of Soviet intentions after Tito dies. They
will see in Moscow's demonstrated willingness to meddle before
he goes, and its refusal to give guarantees for the future, con-
vincing evidence that the Kremlin's distaste for Titoism remains
as strong as ever. This perception, buttressed by their recog-
nition that the "trust relationship" between Belgrade and Mos-
cow has been shattered, will shape Yugoslavia's policies for
some time to come.
What will be done may, in fact, have been decided last week.,
when both internal and foreign policy were evidently subjected to
a thoroughgoing review at three separate sessions of the collec-
tive state residenc.
On the domestic scene, we expect a continued tightening of
internal security as the regime cracks down on extremists of
every striperincluding,for balance, liberal dissidents. The
prime concern will be to prevent the coalescence of any pro-So-
viet opposition that could sieze on post-Tito turmoil to invite
the kind of "fraternal assistance" that Moscow extended to anti-
Dubcek elements in Czechoslovakia.
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Tightened security will probably be accompanied by increased
attention to defense, and particularly to Yugoslavia's "All Peo-
ple's Defense" concept of national partisan warfare. The most
recent sign of this was the creation last week of a new Council
of National Defense with Tito as its chairman.
Relations with Moscow will continue to be cooler but still
correct, unless the Yugoslavs ferret out still more evidence that
the Soviets have been poking about in their affairs.
Should such further activity come to light, Belgrade con-
ceivably might conclude that it needed to insure against Soviet
pressure by improving relations with the West. For now, matters
have not gone this far. In dealing with MoscoW, the Yugoslavs
still rely on the protection supposedly provided by allies in
the Communist movement, on the support of the non-aligned, and
most of all on their own abilities.
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