CUBA: THE REVOLUTION MATURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100160003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 15, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
Intelligence Memorandum
Cuba: The Revolution Matures
Confidential
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April 15, 1975
No. 0090/75
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Summary
April 15, 1975
The 16-year-old Castro regime has entered a new and significant level of
political development characterized by growing Soviet influence, the rejection of the
utopian schemes that once overburdened the economy, a more pragmatic attitude in
domestic and foreign policy, the reorganization of virtually the entire ruling struc-
ture, and movement toward joint as opposed to individual--leadership. The revolu-
tion has matured in no small part because of the emergence as Castro's chief advisers
of a small faction of pre-revolutionary communists who have displaced some of the
"Fidelistas" -an elite made up mainly of Fidel and Raul Castro's comrades-in-arms
from the guerrilla warfare days of 1957-58.
At the end of the last decade, Castro was at last persuaded of the need for a
change in direction by a number of factors:
? His administration had reached the nadir of its popularity.
? He faced Soviet pressure, isolation in the international arena, and economic
brankruptcy.
? His problems were peaking at the very time his political maneuverability had
neared its lower limits.
Alienation of the US and heavy dependence on massive external assistance had
left him little alternative but to submit to the "advice" of the USSR and of those in
Cuba who most closely reflected Soviet points of view. This "advice," the accept-
ance of which was presumably a condition of continued high levels of Soviet aid,
included an insistence that Castro put his house in order so that the aid would not
be wasted. He immediately set about doing so despite the realization that such
institutional mechanisms as national elections, a constitution, and a party congress
will build some checks and balances into the system that he has completely
dominated.
At the regime's uppermost level, members of the two main political factions
have differing opinions on a broad range of matters. Despite this divergence,
however, the only significant minority in the leadership- the "old" communist
faction-is now being permitted a major role in shaping policy. This minority can be
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to
25X1 A f the Office of Current Intelligence,
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expected to try to capitalize on this belated recognition of its skills by solidifying its
gains and expanding its influence even further. The institutionalization process
appears to be the embodiment of that effort.
There is no reason to believe, however, that Castro is losing control or that a
power struggle is in the making. He is aware that basic changes in his flamboyant
style of rule are required, and he is willing to accept them as long as they do not
threaten his real sources of power--his control of the military and security forces,
and his magnetic hold on the Cuban masses.
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Factions Within the Leadership
The Cuban leadership today is made up primarily of the guerrilla
faction of the defunct July 26 Movement, the more flexible members of the
"old" or pre-Castro communist party (the Popular Socialist Party), and a
smattering of technicians and opportunists-some of whom had their origins
in the pre-Castro Student Revolutionary Directorate-who are basically loyal
to Fidel. Castro's guerrilla faction, which includes in its ranks a number of
professional military officers jailed in the mid-1950s for anti-Batista activ-
ities, has the backing of the armed forces and security service. It is the
strongest in terms of naked power and also has the greatest representation on
the party Central Committee and other organizations. It is this strength that
for more than a decade gave Fidel the clear authority to indulge his penchant
for making most decisions himself.
In the wake of the political and economic problems arising from the
attempt to produce ten million tons of sugar in the 1970 harvest, however,
Castro realized the need for a fundamental change in his style of governing.
For lack of alternatives, he turned to "old" communists such as Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez and Blas Roca, whose advice he had spurned for so long
but whose credibility with Cuba's Soviet patrons was of supreme impor-
tance. Since 1970, therefore, the "old" communist faction, because of its
affiliation with Moscow and the superior organizational skills of its members,
has gained influence out of all proportion to its representation in the top
offices of the party. None of its members, for instance, holds a seat in the
Political Bureau.
Moreover, the successes of the policies developed since 1970 for the
Castro regime by Rodriguez and Roca (in close cooperation with Moscow)
stand out in vivid contrast to the failures of the policies of the pre-1970 era,
when the guerrilla elite rubber-stamped Fidel's decisions. Steady economic
improvement has strengthened the ascendancy of what is in fact, a minority
faction in the leadership. Thus, the guerrilla elite maintains its grasp on the
power structure, while the weaker "old" communist faction is pre-eminent
in the policy-making field.
The key to this paradoxical relationship is Castro. As long as he sees no
threat to his own position in using the "old" communists as a source of
technical and administrative skills, the "Fidelistas" will accept his judgment
and permit the paradox to continue. Neither the fanatical anti-communists
of the July 26 Movement nor the die-hard anti-Fidelistas of the original
communist party are around to fan the flames of friction, and both elements
of the regime's leadership now find it convenient to stress their similarities
rather than their differences.
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CENTRAL COMMITTEE
POLITICAL BUREAU
THE CUBAN COMMUNIST' PARTY
irr el CASTRO- Firl Sceiviary
Raul CASTRO- Sec,rnl Secretary
Occcddo Dorticos Sergio del Valle
Icon Almeida Guillermo Garcia
Fidel CASTRO--Chi ral
Raul CASTRO- DeI ity Chaman
tJsvnldo DORTICOS Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ
Antonio PEREZ Isidoro MALMIERCA
Icrge RISQUET Raul GARCIA
Jose ABRANTES
Rogelio ACEVEDO
Armando ACOSTA
Severn AGUIRRE
luau ALMEIDA
lose M. ALVAREZ
Emilio ARAGONES
lose ARTEAGA
Flavin BRAVO
Julio E. CAMACHO
inc CARRERAS
IE-rne;to CASILLAS
Belarmino CASTILLA
Fidel CASTRO
Raul CASTRO
Angel Joel CHAVECO
Faure CHOMON
Osmoni CIENFUEGOS
Leopoldo CINTRAS
Abelardo COLOME
Raul CURBELO
Sergio DEL VALLE
Manuel DIAZ
Joel DOMENECH
Osvaldo DORTICOS
Victor E. DREKE
Vilma ESPIN
Manuel E FAJARDO
Marcelo FERNANDEZ
Oscar FERNANDEZ
Harold FERRER
Calixto GARCIA
Guillermo GARCIA
Julio A. GARCIA
Pedro M. GARCIA
Raul GARCIA
Elena GIL
Fabio GROBART
Orestes GUERRA
Raul GUERRA
Secundino GUERRA
Armando HART
Joel IGLESIAS
Omar H. ISER
Rienerio JIMENEZ
Rolando KINDELAN
Jose LLANUSA
Antonio E LUSSOt+
Manuel LUZARDO
Jose R. MACHADO
Isidoro MALMIERCA
Juan MARINELLO
Miguel MARTIN
Joaquin MENDEZ
Raul MENDENDEZ
Arnaldo MILIAN
Carlos MIR
Pedro MIRET
Jesus MONTANE
Jose NARANJO
Arnaldo OCHOA
Mario OLIVA
Filiberto OLI VLRA
Ramon PARDO
Antonio PEREZ
Faustino PEREZ
Waltredo PEREZ
Manuel PINEIRO
Lizardo PROENZA
PINAR DEL RIO-Julio E. CAMACHO
HAVANA-Jose R. MACHADO
MATANZAS-Julian RIZO
Ramiro Valdes
Armando Hart
Blas ROCA
Pedro MIRET
Faure CHOMON
Jose RAMIREZ
Jorge RISQUET
Raul ROA
Bias ROCA
Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ
Orlando RODRIGUEZ
Basilic; RODRIGUEZ
Ursinio ROJAS
Celia SANCHEZ
Aldo SANTAMARIA
Haydee SANTAMARIA
Rene de los SANTOS
Clementina SERRA
Jose R. SILVA
L onel SOTO
J> Ilo TARRAU
Diodes TORRALBA
Felipe TORRES
Ramiro VALDES
Anibal VELAZ
Roberto VIERA
Liis A. ZAYAS
LAS VILLAS-Arnaldo MILIAN
CAMAGIJEY-Raul CURBELO
ORIENTE -Armando HART
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Military Department
American Department
Afro-Asian Department
I rrrnsnortation and Communication
Department
Genercd Foreign Relations Department
Education. Science. Culture Deparment
Juridical iced State O-ganisms Department
Jrganization Department
Agricu ture and Livestock Department
Heavy Industries Department
`Sugar Department
Economy Department
Consumption and Services Department
Mcss Organiz rions Department
Central CJrganization! Service Department
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The goals of the two factions coincide, at least in the short term, and
the guerrilla faction realizes that the present symbiosis is contributing much
more to the achievement of these goals than did the pre-1970 relationship.
In short, the policies of the communists of the pre-revolutionary era are
providing the regime with a much more stable economic and organizational
base, and, as long as no attempt is made to weaken Castro's position, the
guerrilla faction will continue cooperating and will cede responsibility for a
broad range of decision-making.
Should Castro decide, however, that the "old" communists are mount-
ing a challenge to his overall leadership, neither he nor the guerrilla elite
would allow the situation to continue. In such an event, even the combina-
tion of his need for their expertise, Moscow's certain displeasure, and the
threat to continued economic stability would not be sufficient to deter him
from attempting to reverse the trend, by force if necessary. Much would
depend on the nature of the threat. Anything approaching "a clear and
present danger" to his control of the military, for example, would obviously
provoke swift remedial action. A gradual process, in which the erosion of his
power is almost imperceptible, would be more difficult for him to handle.
He would be likely to allow the process to simmer, depending heavily on his
proven ability to outmaneuver his opponents through political stratagems,
and would resort to armed force only if all else fails.
Castro's ability to command the continued loyalty of the armed forces
and the security service stems from placing members of the guerrilla elite in
all key positions in the chains of command. No "old" communist, for
example, has held a strategic position in the military structure since 1964.
Moreover, both Fidel and Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro, Cuba's undis-
puted number-two man, have made a point of identifying themselves with
the new class of professional officers who are too young to have participated
in the war against Batista but in whose hands the control of important
military units will eventually lie. The Castros' hold on the nation's armed
might, therefore, seems secure should a showdown develop.
For the most part, the guerrilla elite continues to look with suspicion
on the "old" communists, a suspicion dating to the late 1950s. With the
exception of one small communist guerrilla unit whose members took to the
hills of their own volition in mid-1958 to avoid piecemeal liquidation at the
hands of the local police, the communists avoided the path taken by Castro's
insurgent forces until it became clear in late 1958 that the guerrillas had
Batista on the defensive. The guerrillas- especially Raul Castro-did maintain
some contact with the Communist Party, but if communists joined guerrilla
ranks it was usually because of personal conviction rather than as a result of
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party orders. At times, the party even acted in a manner detrimental to the
guerrillas' success and publicly ridiculed guerrilla warfare on theoretical
grounds as an inappropriate way to achieve power. This history, plus the
communists' links with Moscow as opposed to the guerrillas' intense nation-
alism, constitutes the basis for the gap separating the two groups.
Cuba's relationships with Moscow and with the US are two key poin-s
where friction could undermine the present cooperation in the leadership.
The guerrilla elite, for example, prefers to be as independent of Moscow as
of Washington. It has endured Cuba's drift deep into the Soviet orbit only
because of economic realities and because it fears Soviet patronage less than
it fears US military intervention. Cuba's proximity to the US, the concept of
super powers' spheres of influence, and past US interventions in the Carib-
bean have shaped the thinking of the faction's leaders to a degree approach-
ing paranoia.
The entire adult life of most of these relatively young and impression-
able officials has been spent in the shadow of what they see as aggressive US
military, paramilitary, and economic action. Experience has led them to
believe that the US has always been hostile. To a lar,-ee extent, their view of
the US is governed by the support Washington provided to Batista during the
guerrillas' campaign, by its participation in the Bay cf Pigs invasion, and by
its subsequent efforts to bring down the revolution by diplomatic and
economic means.
As a result, they have dragged their feet on the nolicy of detente with
Washington urged by Moscow and the "old" communists. Despite the greatly
increased influence of the minority faction since 1970, it was not until
Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Cuba in January-February 1974 that the Castro
regime ventured beyond mere lip service to detente. The 1962 missile crisis
taught the guerrilla elite that Cuba is not vital to Soviet interests and that the
Castro regime, in Soviet eyes. is expendable in the crunch of Big Power
politics. In finally agreeing to pursue detente, Havana is gambling tha-
eventual access to US trade and technology outweighs the risks involved in
drawing closer to a government that, in the elite's opinion, has so far offered
only unrelenting hostility.
Detente also offers a chance to develop a counterbalance to Soviet
pressure an option that has been absent from Castro's political arsenal for
some time. If possible, Castro would like to shift his economic reliance to a
less demanding benefactor. His guarded but persistent criticism of the failure
of the oil-producing countries to assist developing nations suggests that he
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would prefer straight economic ties with a rich oil producer to Cuba's
complex relationship with the USSR. But the next best alternative is to play
one super power against the other in an effort to achieve as much independ-
ence as possible.
Attempting to develop a balance between super powers, of course,
would also entail. a continuation of warm ties with Moscow, an arrangement
the guerrilla elite would continue to suffer. The members of the elite may
detest the almost overwhelming Soviet influence in Cuba's internal affairs,
but at the same time they realize that, short of all-out war, the USSR is
Cuba's best insurance against the US. Until they are convinced that the US is
no longer a threat, they will look to Moscow for military backing no matter
what their relationships are in the economic sphere.
The "old" communists, on the other hand, look for an ever closer
association with Moscow and view detente as an extension of Soviet policy
that will allow other countries to bear some of the onerous economic burden
that Cuba has become for the USSR. The willingness of the members of the
Rodriguez-Roca group to urge detente on Castro suggests that they, and
Moscow as well, are extremely confident in the security of their position and
expect to continue exerting a major influence on Cuban policy. The minor-
ity faction will attempt to use the institutionalization process to increase its
representation in the regime's leadership to the point where Castro's acquies-
cence is no longer needed to guarantee the acceptance of its policies. The
"old" communists know well his mercurial nature, however, and realize how
easily he can turn against them. They have not forgotten the purges in 1962
and 1968, and they are aware of how vulnerable they are as a minority
without a true power base.
This does not mean that there is anything resembling a power struggle
in Havana today, or that the "old" communists want Castro replaced in the
near term. For one, he is much too valuable to them as a head of government
who still enjoys unparalleled popularity with the masses. Moreover, he has
shown that cooperation between the "old" communists and the guerrilla
faction is not only possible but is mutually rewarding, and that there are
circumstances in which he will allow the "old" communists unprecedented
authority and responsibility.
Other Areas of Divergence
The "old" communists would vigorously reject any attempt by Castro
to resurrect the exportation of revolution except in those specific times and
places where it might parallel Soviet policy. They look upon the Cuban
guerrilla experience as a case in which fortuitous circumstances allowed a
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group of armed rebels to win out for all the wrone reasons. Some of the
ex-guerrillas, on the other hand, still look upon direct action as the most
efficient means of achieving their goals and have ?'ittle time for esoteric
theory. But the success of the present diplomatic approach in the very arena
where the violent approach failed seems to have convinced them that
indiscriminate violence is generally counterproductive as a foreign policy
tool.
The majority of the guerrilla elite also seems to have been convinced
that the domestic policies of the "Guevaraists"-tho::>e among their number
who championed the naive economic and ideological concepts of Ole
Guevara-were unsound, given Cuba's rudimentary stage of socialist political
development. Thus, the earlier stress on moral incentives and calls for the
elimination of the use of money have fallen victim to the less colorful bt.t
more realistic theories of the "old" communists, w',o gauged much more
accurately the degree of political consciousness-and- thus, the motivational
susceptibility --ofthe Cuban people.
A more sensitive area of disagreement involves C.rba's relations with the
Communist parties of Latin America. Here, too, the g _ierrilla elite has draw n
back from its radical position of hostility and n,rw accepts the "old"
communists desire to repair interparty relations in the hemisphere. The
restoration of ties is probably largely cosmetic, however, at least insofar as
the guerrilla faction is concerned. The failure of thc Bolivian Communist
Party to support the Che Guevara operation in 196". the abandonment of
the guerrilla struggle by the Venezuelan Communist Party earlier in the same
decade, and similar if less spectacular examples of alleged party perfidy,
elsewhere in the hemisphere have Left a residue of ill will that Castro and his
coterie are not about to sweep under the rug. no matter what steps may be
taken over the short term to achieve mutual tactical advantage.
For their part, the Latin American communists ,eem well disposed to
maintain the cordial relations- particularly with Cuba's "old" communists-
that have been built up with Havana over the last six years. They are
unlikely, however, to forget, or forgive, Castro's bitter public denunciations
of them for allegedly abandoning their political ideals in exchange for
personal comfort, and of confining their political acti,,_ty to such safe areas
as pamphleteering and armchair criticism of those who chose the path of
action. Modest interparty cooperation is likely to continue, but the relation-
ship is a brittle one that cannot be subjected to much strain. Aware of th