THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA (AS OF 1600 EDST) NO. 6

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100160009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 8, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
8 April 1975
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Indochina
(As of 1600 EDST)
No. 6
? VIETNAM
Politics After the Bombing
..1.- Calm has returned to Saigon following this morning's
bombing of the presidential palace. As yet, there is no,
confirmation of the plane's destination. The pilot of the
plane has been identified as a close relative of South Viet-
nam's ambassador to Thailand.
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2. The bombing appears to have been the lone act of a
disgruntled. pilot whose family reportedly was left behind at
Da Nang. the attack caught
senior government military commanders by surprise. Opera-
tions at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airbase including civilian
flights by international carriers were suspended temporarily
but have now resumed.
3. The attack apparently surprised former air force
commander Nguyen Cao Ky, who immediately contacted the
American Embassy to profess his innocence. Despite these
disclaimers, however, some members of Thieu's entourage sus-
pect that even if Ky did not specifically order the attack,
his recent actions contributed to it. Special Assistant to
the President General Quang has ordered security units to
surround Ky's residence and reportedly has urged Thieu to
DOS review(s) completed.-
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4. Thieu's speech on national radio immediately
following the attack was intended to dispel rumors that
a coup had been successfully conducted against the Presi-
dent and that he or members of his family had been injured.
Following that address; the government implemented some
additional measures to tighten scrniri. in the Saigon
area, but there has been'no
panic and a the people are reacting to the situation
calmly. Units from the Airborne Division, which Thieu
trusts, have been brought into Saigon'to reinforce the
presidential guard around the palace and some additional
roadblocks have been established at the City's outskirts.
Orders to move a Marine unit into 'Saigon were cancelled
for fear that these soldiers might be encouraged to sup-
port a coup effort.
5. Thieu also indicated in his speech that he had
no intention of stepping down and he apparently has ordered
a special meeting of his military advisers to give at least
the appearance of business as usual. There are no reliable
indications that any of his military commanders are con-
spiring against the president or that any of them have
now been persuaded to launch a coup.
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New Communist Instructions
7. The Communists apparently feel the militar momentum
.is on their side and .have
called for a continuation o eir present o ensive until.
"total victory" is achieved this year. The Communists'
Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) reportedly issued
the new instructions on, April 3, updating an earlier reso-
lution which stated that total victory would not be attempted
until 1976.
8. the new guidelines main-
tain that e most opportune time for the Communist side
has arrived" and that attacks to liberate Tay Ninh, Hau
Nghia and Binh Duong provinces will be conducted in April.
The timing for a final assault against Saigon, however,.
will apparently await the outcome of these battles -- the
instructions state that an attack on Saigon will occur "at
an appropriate time."
9. The new guidelines apparently leave little room
for considering a political settlement short of surrender.
-Talk of negotiations with the government or the formation
of a tripartite coalition, according to the guidelines, will
be used "merely as strategems" to "isolate" the South Viet-
namese.
10. The guidelines do not indicate what units will be
involved in the attacks, but state that the Communists have
sufficient strength in the region to "liberate" Tay Ninh
Province. They apparently hope, however, that local Viet
Cong political assets can make the military task easier by
appealing to South Vietnamese civilian and military per-
sonnel, to revolt against tht.government and join the Commu-
nist side. Plans already are underway
to identify which members of the government's a min--
i.sve apparatus would he useful to the Viet Cong follow-
ing their takeover and have instructed local cadre to begin
making contacts with. these people.
North Vietnamese Pull Back From 14oc: Hoa
11. The South Vietnamese have won the first round in
the fight for the northern delta. The heavy communist
shellings on April 7, originally thought by South Vietnamese
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officials to be the beginning of a major ground engagement,
were apparently actions to screen the withdrawal of the
major North Vietnamese forces -from the battlefront. Saigon's
forces were prepared to fight the Communist force and offi-
cials believed they had the military strength to defend the
area successfully.
12. The Communists, however, encountered difficulties
in launching the attack. By the time they managed to solve
their supply and transportation problems, the South Vietnamese
were able to deploy substantial reinforcements and were direct-
ing air and artillery strikes into the Communist concentra-
tions. By late yesterday, most of the North Vietnamese 5th
Division had pulled back to the Cambodian border area, and the
South Vietnamese were bombing the withdrawing units.
Tactical Lull Continues
14. The general lull in military activity continues in
the provinces around Saigon, and the level of Communist-
initiated attacks in the delta has fallen off. Many of the
Communist initiatives have been in Dinh Tuong Province, but
the numerous shellings and.gxound probes there have given
them no significant gains.
15. Communist pressure on Can Tho City is also easing
with some parts of the North Vietnamese 4th Division with-
drawing to the west. The commander of the South Vietnamese
21st Division believes that after 11 days of almost continu-
ous contact, during which the Communists were also hit hard
by air and artillery strikes, the three regiments of the
4th Division badly need supplies, replacements, and rest.
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Because the 21st Division commander expects the North Viet-
namese to assault the city again within the next few drays,
he is directing artillery fire and air strikes against known
concentrations of Communist troops and supply caches in the
vicinity of Can Tho.
The Situation at Nha Trang
17. Aerial photography taken yesterday afternoon does
not indicate that government forces have reoccupied the city
of Nha Trang. No concentrations of government troops or
operational ecruipment were seen. Contrary to South Viet-
namese reports yesterday, there was no activity at the air-
field, and only fishing boats could be seen in the harbor.
The photographs showed normal civilian traffic moving through
the city.
18. Several North Vietnamese antiaircraft positions
were observed along the beach and at a nearby soccer field.
Soviet-made trucks were also in town. The only other mili-
tary activity photographed in the vicinity of Nha Trang were
air attacks in progress to cut the roads leading from the
city.
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CAMBODIA
The Tactical Situation
19. Khmer Communist forces launched new attacks
against government units holding riverside positions on
the east bank of the Mekong River near Phnom Penh today.
Ground fighting on most other fronts around the capital
was limited to inconclusive shellings and skirmishes.
Shelling at-Lacks against Pochen-gong airport have also
slackened somewhat during the past 24 hours, although
the proportion of artillery to the less accurate rocket
20. In the countryside, stiff fighting continued
today around the southwestern provincial capital of Kompong
Speu, and several positions just outside the town are iso-
lated. In the southeast, the Communists are keeping steady
pressure on. the defensive perimeter around the provincial
capital of Prey Veng, but government units there appear to
be holding their own.
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Evacuation Status
21. The US Mission staff in Phnom Penh has been re-
duced to.58 persons and the number of non official Americans
in the capital should now number less than 100. Small num-
bers of Cambodians have also been leaving aboard airlift
flights leaving Pochentong airport, but the total number of
Cambodians on the evacuation list presumably still stands
at more than 600. Security forces at Pochentong today
began preventing vehicles carrying Cambodian employees of
the US Mission from entering the airfield, but Ambassador
Dean intended to take immediate steps to resolve this situa-
tion. Eagle Pull assets in the Gulf of Thailand are prepared
to implement the final phase of the evacuation plan as of
first light of each day.
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Political Developments
.22. Prime Minister Loner Boret returned to Phnom Penh
today amid intense speculation that some sort of breakthrough
toward "negotiations" has occurred. Much of the speculation
was fueled by Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai's disclosure to
newsmen that Boret met with a "representative of the opposi-
tion government" while in Bangkok and by Boret's own claim
that peace prospects had been explored in both Thailand and
Indonesia. Beret's discussions in Bangkok were almost cer-
tainly with Sihanouk's son, Prince Yuvaneath, but it is
doubtful that Yuvaneath could do much more than relay some
message to his father.
23. Boret's allusion to a possible Indonesian role in
trying to spark a dialogue with the other side is curious..
Lon Non and Suharto almost certainly discussed negotiation
prospects when they met in Bali on April 5, and the Indo-
nesians in the past have tried to encourage talks between the
two Cambodian sides. --There is no evidence, however, that
Jakarta has made any recent initiatives in regard to Cam-
bodian negotiations.
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24. Ambassador Dean rciet with acting president Saukham
Koy yesterday and this morning. Koy said that he planned to
confer with Boret as soon as the latter returned in order to
decide upon a course of action. On Sunday, Koy. told US Con-
gressional staff members that under present conditions the
"best feasible solution" would be to invite Sihanouk back
and tie the invitation to an agreement that. Communist forces
would not enter Phnom Penh or hinder the flow of relief sup-
plies to the city. This may be the proposal Koy plans to put
before Boret. In any event, Koy claimed that a course of
action would be decided within the next day and that the
government would then try to got a message through to the
other side either through private channels or by public media.
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