THE STATUS OF CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100170001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 2, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approve
25X1
No. 0545/75
2 May 1975
SUMMARY
Cuban efforts to promote revolution in Latin America
remain at a low ebb, reflecting Havana's desire to gain re-
spectability in the hemisphere and its recognition of the
absence of revolutionary conditions in countries whose
governments Castro opposes.
To promote normal government-to-government relations
with the countries that supported the lifting of sanctions
last November, Havana is loosening ties with the few il-
legal and guerrilla groups it still assists. It is un-
likely that for the sake of any marginal subversive group,
Castro will compromise the formal ties he has worked so
persistently to acquire or endanger prospective ties with
other potentially friendly Latin American governments.
Even in countries hostile to the Castro regime, Havana
no longer sponsors insurgent groups. Eschewing subversion
in these countries is a tactical decision, however, and the
Cuban leadership reserves the option in the future to sup-
port well organized armed groups that demonstrate an ability
to attract broad popular support. This attitude stems from
a belief that in the long run governments ideologically com-
patible with the Castro regime can carry out the broad social
changes necessary to fulfill Castro's definition of revolution
only by violent means. In the meantime, Cuban representatives
in Latin America will provide unobtrusive assistance to leftist
groups in order to promote mass organizations that might per-
suade existing governments to move further to the left.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current
InteZZigence and has been coordinated with Directorate
of Operations. I
25X1
25X1
Approv
 25X1
Appro~
DISCUSSION
25X1
1. After sponsoring revolution in Latin America for
nine years, Castro began in 1968 to reappraise his methods
and objectives. Successive and costly failures by revolu-
tionary groups and their poor prospects for the future, in-
creasing Soviet pressure to promote the policy of detente,
rapidly changing conditions in the hemisphere, and domestic
problems gradually persuaded him to eschew violent methods.
Subsequent efforts to extend Cuban influence through more
conventional means succeeded dramatically, and a significant
change in Castro's view of his role in the region became ap-
parent. For a time he continued to assert that he would es-
tablish formal ties only with "revolutionary" governments,
but by the early 1970s he had broadened his definition of
the term to include "patriotic" regimes "independent of the
US. ar
2. The Castro regime's heightened interest in pursuing
conventional diplomacy has been greatly influenced by the
current mood in Latin America. The increasing readiness of
many Latin American governments to cooperate with other Third
World governments especially on economic issues, the dimin-
ished sense of mutual interest between Latin America and the
US, and the growing respectability of Castro himself in the
hemisphere have made government-to-government ties seem more
profitable than the subversive approach. Castro has used his
improving ties with the leaders of friendly countries to press
for Latin unity on issues which affect US interests. Even
with those governments with which the Cuban leadership does
not share a world view--such as Argentina and even Brazil--
Havana has found a pragmatic approach to be advantageous.
25X1
Approve or Release - 1-7
 25X1
Approvo
Cuba's Advocates at Quito
4. Since the meeting of OAS foreign ministers in Quito
last November, Cuba has even further broadened the range of
governments with which it is willing to conduct relations
through accepted and orthodox means. Late last November
Castro stated that "the Cuban revolution must take into
consideration the governments that voted against the block-
ade;,...and if any of these governments decides to reestablish
relations with Cuba, we will have no objection.'*
5. Havana maintains good relations with the governments
of Panama, Mexico, and Venezuela and will take pains to keep
relations at this level. There is no evidence of recent Cuban
support to subversives in any of these countries. In the case
of Mexico, for example, Castro feels a mutuality of interest
with the Echeverria government. In fact, Castro apparently
played a role in planting the idea of the Economic System of
Latin America (SELA) with the Mexican president. Venezuela's
President Carlos Andres Perez is another leader of Third World
causes and thus shares some of Castro's interests. Castro's
speeches indicate that he looks upon Venezuela as a supplier
of oil that could enable Cuba to escape its heavy dependence
on the Soviet Union and also as a potential source of large-
scale financial assistance for national development. He
therefore undoubtedly feels that there is much more to gain
from government-to-government relations than from supporting
Venezuelan subversive groups that, in any event, are weak and
disunited. In the case of Panama, while having no illusions
about Torrijos' conviction as a "revolutionary," Castro has
found the present government a useful ally because of its
strongly nationalistic posture, particularly on the canal
issue.
'F Twelve governments--members of the Rio Pact--voted to
lift the OAS sanctions at Quito; these included seven with
which Havana now has relations--Argentina, Colombia, Mexico,
Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela--as well
as five others--Costa Rica, Ecuador, EZ Salvador, Honduras,
and the Dominican Republic. Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana and
the Bahamas were not present at Quito because they are not
signatories of the Rio Pact, but Havana has relations with
all four; and government-to-government relations have been
so profitable that the Castro regime would have little motive
for supporting subversives.
25X1
Appro'
 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approv
7. There is no evidence that Cuba has financed or armed
Colombian guerrilla groups since the mid-1960s. The impending
opening of a Cuban embassy in Bogota may raise the expectations
of the pro.-Havana ELN or even the pro-Moscow PARC for assis-
tance', but the Castro regime is not likely to provide anything
more than token financial support--even to a unified guerrilla
movement--in order not to endanger newly established relations
with the Lopez government.
8. In the case of the Dominican Republic, Cuba continues
to provide a safehaven for a small number of revolutionaries
and apparently is providing some financial assistance to a
small left-wing terrorist group that Castro reportedly admires.
There is no evidence, however, that Cuba is sponsoring insur-
gent or terrorist activities in the Dominican Republic, and
the Castro regime would be unlikely to promote subversion in
light of its willingness to restore relations with the Balaguer
government. Balaguer apparently sees restoration of ties with
Cuba as a way of getting the Castro regime to be even more
careful of its links with Dominican leftist extremists.
9. Relations with Peru seem to fall into a special cate-
gory. In order to ensure the continuation of the Peruvian
revolution, the Castro regime apparently is willing to support
armed para-military organizations. Havana considers the Velasco
government its closest ally in Latin America, but fears that
when the ailing Velasco leaves office his successor may attempt
to slow down the revolution.
25X1
Approv
 25X1
Approve
Governments Hostile to the Castro Regime
11. The Castro government, although antagonistic toward
Brazil, is aware that armed subversion has virtually no chance
of succeeding there. Castro reportedly now sees the most
likely impetus for change in Brazil as coming from within the
military, rather than from any guerrilla movement. Havana has
cooperated with the Brazilians on some economic issues, and is
apparently hopeful that Brazil eventually will loosen its ties
with the US.
12. Uruguayan Foreign Minister Blanco's repeated charges
that Cuba has not ceased its efforts to foment revolution in
Uruguay have yet to be substantiated. The Castro government
provides a safehaven for an unknown number of former Tupamaro
guerrillas and may also provide training and technical assis-
tance. Raul Roa is reported to have stated recently that the
Tupamaros have almost disappeared as a movement, and the Cuban
leadership apparently has little hope that they will again be-
come a threat to the government. There is no evidence of Cuban
support for subversives in Paraguay or Bolivia and so long as
there are no viable leftist opposition groups in those coun-
tries, Havana is not likely to get involved.
13. Castro maintains the strongest enmity for the Chilean
military government, but with the destruction of leftist orga-
nizations there he has apparently become resigned to the reali-
ties of a situation he has little ability to influence. Havana
25X1
Approvefd For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100170001-7
 25X1
25X1
2 5AXp prG
continues to invest small amounts of money to aid Chilean ex-
tremist groups and has encouraged the disorganized Chilean
exile organizations to unify and form a common front. Castro
remains committed to the need for the revolutionary overthrow
of the Pinochet government, nonetheless, and if a viable in-
surgent force were put together, the Cubans would probably
provide them with significant support. At present, Havana
sees external military intervention--a war between Peru and
Chile for example---as the only possible, though somewhat un-
realistic, way of unseating Chile's military government. I
14. The successful terrorist attack last December by
the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) has
aroused Havana's interest in events in Nicaragua. The per-
petrators of the act were subsequently granted asylum in
Cuba where they joined other Nicaraguan revolutionaries.
The overthrow of the Somoza regime is a long-term personal
ambition of Castro's. However, stepped-up Cuban support--
beyond token training and funding--will likely be contingent
upon the FSLN's ability to demonstrate that it is a viable
force with mass appeal.
15. Despite the high level of Cuban interest in Guatemala,
Castro apparently is not optimistic about the short-run pros- 25X1
pects for revolution. The rebel movement is so disorganized
and disunited as to endanger continued Cuban support.
Guatemala will remain high
on as ro s list o priorities, ut Cuba's support of revo-
lutionaries will probably continue at a very low level until 25X1
there is a change in the political situation which either ob-
viates the need for armed struggle or creates better conditions
for its success.
Conclusions and Outlook
16. Castro is unlikely, for the sake of any marginal
subversive groups, to compromise the formal ties he has worked
so persistently to acquire in Latin America or endanger pro-
spective ties with governments that may soon restore relations
with Havana. He will be increasingly mindful of Cuba's im-
proving image throughout the region and anxious to capitalize
on it. Even when his intrinsic revolutionary sensitivities
ATYre
 25X1
Appro
are strained by governments he is contemptuous of, he will
remember the deleterious effects that proof of Cuban subver-
sion would have on his entire foreign policy.
17. Nevertheless, the Cuban leadership--deeply influ-
enced by the overthrow of Salvador Allende---continues to be-
lieve that in the long run "national liberation" in Latin
America can be achieved only through the use of violence.
Several top Cuban leaders including Raul Roa, Blas Roca, and
reportedly Castro himself have expressed the view that there
is no peaceful road to socialism. Furthermore, a Cuban of-
ficial who presumably spoke for the leadership stated last
October that "it is impossible to implant a revolution from
above via an established government no matter how good its
intentions."
25X1
18. The draft constitution released in early April re-
flects Havana's intention of keeping open the option to re-
turn to "exporting the revolution." It specifically acknowl-
edges the "right of peoples to reject imperialist violence
with revolutionary violence" and "recognizes the legitimacy
of wars of national liberation as well as armed resistance
to aggression and conquest, and considers its right and its
internationalist duty to aid the besieged and the peoples
who fight for their liberation."
19. It is clear, however, that the Cuban leadership
now recognizes that there are no quick solutions to complex
political conditions. Castro realizes that Cuban efforts can
no longer be the catalyst of revolution in Latin America in
the absence of local revolutionary conditions and local cadres
capable of exploiting them. _F- I
Castro will o open the option
o supporting insurgents in countries such as Chile, Guatemala,
or Nicaragua if their prospects dramatically improve, but he
apparently feels that even in these areas revolutionary con-
ditions are not sufficiently advanced to warrant significant
support.
20. Until conditions are more favorable for leftist
armed insurgents, the Castro regime will probably concen-
trate on expanding and maintaining normal diplomatic and
economic ties with governments friendly to Havana. Where
possible the Cubans may try to assist left-leaning govern-
ments--such as that of Forbes Burnham of Guyana--to develop
25X1
Apprc
 25X1
Appro
a broad base of mass support. Cuba can provide expertise
in creating or further developing mass organizations--such
as student, labor, and peasant groups. The Cubans could be
expected to use whatever influence they have with the leader-
ship of these mass organizations to strengthen the leftward
inclination of the government.
App"IJ For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100170001-7