PORTUGUESE POLITICAL SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100260009-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 15, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/06/15 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100260009-9
15 March 1976
SUBJECT Portuguese Political Situation
1. Portugal has witnessed a pronounced shift back
toward the political center since government forces crushed
a leftist military rebellion last November. The high-flown
armed forces rhetoric about "revolution" and achieving
socialism, which marked the first 18 months following the
overthrow of the Caetano government, has now been replaced
by references to political pluralism and the need to achieve
economic stability. The moderate military officers now in
control in Lisbon have reaffirmed Portugal's ties with
Western Europe and its role in NATO.
2. An agreement signed last month between the military
and the political parties set Portugal on the road toward
parliamentary democracy. When the agreement comes into
force this summer, the day-to-day running of the government
will revert to civilian hands. The armed forces will retain
important leverage, however, through its role as guarantor
of the constitution and of government institutions.
3. The military is also expected to participate directly
in the government through the office of the president and the
Revolutionary Council, which will advise and instruct him.
The pact does not specify that the president be a military
officer, but there is general agreement between the parties
and the armed forces that he will be. The leading contenders
for the presidency at this time appear to be Prime Minister
Azevedo, Army Chief 'of Staff Eanes, and former Vice Air Chief
of Staff Galvao de Melo.
CI M 76-10086
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4. General Eanes--who many believe is the power behind
the scenes in Lisbon--probably could be president for the
asking, but he may prefer to retain his present position,
which is less prestigious but potentially more powerful.
Prime Minister Azevedo was an early presidential favorite,
but his questionable health and the fact that his branch of
service is navy rather than army may work against his can-
didacy. Galvao'de Melo would be the candidate of the right
and at present is given only an outside chance.-
5. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for April
25, but the new government will not be appointed until after
the June presidential vote. The parties contesting the
legislative elections are the Socialists, the centrist
Popular Democratic Party, the center-right Social Democratic
Center, the Communists, and ten smaller parties and
splinter groups, mostly of the far left.
6. The Socialists, headed by Mario Soares, led all
parties in the constituent assembly elections last spring
and are hoping to achieve a near majority this time in
order to form a government on their own. The number two
man in the party, Finance Minister Salgado Zenha, has
made a major contribution to the party's success through
his organizational efforts. The Popular Democrats are
counting on a broadly based constituency in the populous
north to gain a plurality, while the Social Democratic
Center seeks to capitalize on its present opposition status
and the burgeoning conservative sentiment in the country
to make a strong improvement on its meager 8 percent showing
in the last election.
7. Despite the Socialists' denials that they will
participate in a coalition government, the election is
likely to force them to accept cooperation with one or
both parties on their right. Recent polls appear tv'favor
the Popular Democrats and the Social Democratic Center,
which together could capture 50-60 percent of the vote.
The Socialists may receive around 30 percent and the
Communists, who are expected to be the big losers, could
see their vote decline from 13 percent in the last election
to 5-8 percent.
CONFIDENTIAL
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8. Even though the Communists are not expected to do
well at the polls, they retain considerable strength in
the labor movement. The Co~~.munists and other extremist
groups may well try to disrupt the elections. Their labor
strength, provides a large pool to draw on, and Portugal's
severe economic problems provide many issues for the
Communists to exploit in organizing popular protests.
9. The government that is to be elected will face
some difficult decisions in its effort to move toward
economic recovery, and the Communists will be watching
for every opportunity to disrupt the process. Should the
elected government prove unable to deal with this situation,
those military officers who already hold political parties
in low regard are likely to press for increased armed forces
intervention in the government. From such conditions a new
Portuguese strongman might well arise.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/06/15 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100260009-9