DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100260017-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: March 23, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Releo
SUBJECT: DeterLcretinq SitUaLion in Lebanon
The conLinu.nq heavy fight.inq in Beirut has made it at
least temporarily impossible to proceed with implementation
of the Syrian-sponsored political compromise announced by
President Fran j yah yesterday.
With Lebanese leftist militiamen emboldened by their success
in wrestinq most of the hotel district from the Christians
and Kamal Jumblatt's rejection of the political solution
approved by the Lebanese cab? net, :'sad may now decide that
he must increase the military pressure still further. The
Syrians see the leftist attack in the hotel district as
directly aimed at Iaiici rc:;ini .cl their mediation effort.
The Lebanese left, which at the moment is comprised of
an alliance of the forces of Socialist leader Jumblatt,
Muslim radical lbrahim Qulay.lat, and rebel Muslim army
officer Abmad Khatib, has the ability to secure control of
the hotel district and most commercial areas in central
Beirut. The leftists probably could force the Christians
out of the port district and President Frenjiyah out of the
presidential palace of Bahda. Nevertheless, the leftists,
even with active Palestinian backing could not overrun the
Christian saburbs of Beirut, nor could they penetrate the
Christian core area northeast of the city.
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If the led ` ds+_s win the active support of large numbers
of rejectionist todayeen or the major fedaycen groups, how-
ever, Damascus would be forced to brine in greater numbers
of more heavily armed Syrian regulars operating as Syrian
units. The enistinq mixed units would prove much less
effective in direct clashes with the fcdayeen, largely
because discipline within the Liberation Army would erode
quickly if the group were fighting other Palestinians.
We expect that I'n_ cali chief es.ir Arafat will make every
effort to stay out of a direcr clash with either the Lebanese
Christians or the Syrians. He has been providing support
both to Khatib and to ,Iumblatt, however, and his forces could
be drawn into at least brief clashes with the Syrians or
Syrian-controlled forces if he thought the fedayeen's freedom
of action in Lebanon were fundamentally threatened. Both
Damascus and Arafat would have great- interest in negotiating
a quick end to any such clashes. Syria wants to avoid damage
to its role as premier defender of the Palestinians, and to
avoid having to bring into Lebanon so large a Syrian force
that Israel would conclude that it had no choice but to res- 25X1
pond by i.nvad in ,, southern Lebanon. Arafat, over the long
term, is heavily and unavoidably dependent on Syria's aoocl
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