SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES
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S
Document Page Count:
18
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 21, 2012
Sequence Number:
3
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Publication Date:
December 10, 1976
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;A 7
Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Selected Foreign Policy Issues
Secret
4
CI Iii 76-10181
No. 0927/76
December 10, 1976
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December 10, 1976
Selected Foreign Policy Issues
That Might Arise in the Early Days
of the New Administration*
Soviet policy in the first few months of the new admin-
istration will probably reflect a cautious and hopeful atti-
tude. The Soviet leaders are likely to avoid provocative
actions that would cause a further deterioration in bilat-
eral relations and prejudice negotiations which they hope
may now move forward. They will be watching the new Presi-
dent to see what priority he assigns to US-Soviet relations
and to detente. Brezhnev and his colleagues have started to
probe and weigh the implications of policy pronouncements by
the incoming administration on questions such as SALT and re-
lated issues. This continuing assessment of US policy and
intentions will almost certainly produce numerous diplomatic
exchanges and informal explorations in which the Soviets will
attempt not only to discover and understand what US policy
will be, but also to influence as much as possible the direc-
tion of that policy. As part of this effort, the Soviets may
propose an early summit meeting between Brezhnev and the new
President.
Specifically, Brezhnev is likely to do three things
that may require President Carter to respond and that may
significantly affect the Soviet appraisal of the new Presi-
dent:
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Regional and
Political Analysis to identify some of the foreign policy
issues that might come to the fore in the early days of
the new administration.
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--He may push for an early response to So-
viet proposals now on the table, including So-
viet SALT proposals and MBFR proposals. (This
would be consistent with Soviet behavior at the
time Nixon first became President.)
--He may take soundings not on--y to try to
clarify the new President's position on various
issues, but to put him on the defensive. The
initial presidential appointments w_ll be closely
examined by Brezhnev for indications of what Presi-
dent Carter's foreign policies will be.
--Brezhnev may be tempted to exploit op-
portunities arising independently of Soviet ac-
tion, aiming in the process to find out what
manner of man President Carter is. Brezhnev is
astute enough, however, to recognize that any
such testing could have negative consequences
for the Soviet Union if the US were to react
unfavorably.
An overt Soviet move intended to test the limits of
US forbearance appears improbable. It is somewhat more
likely that Soviet-US tensions could rise if certain long-
term Soviet policies, such as Soviet-Cuban actions in
Southern Africa, continue. Certain developments outside
of Soviet control, such as a succession crisis in Yugo-
slavia following Tito's death or riots in Poland that
local forces are unable or unwilling to manage, would also
present the new administration and the USSR with a very
sensitive situation.
SALT: It is already evident that the Soviets will
take an early initiative to try to conclude a SALT II
agreement or, if this does not prove possible, to place
themselves in a position where they can claim that the
US is responsible for failure to reach agreement. The
forthcoming expiration of the Interim Agreement on Of-
fensive Arms (October 1977) doubtless has stimulated So-
viet interest in negotiating a SALT II treaty. Moscow
has indicated unofficially that it would not welcome a
lengthy extension of the Interim Agreement. In Bucharest:
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on November 24 and in Moscow on November 30, Brezhnev called
for a speedy completion of the current round of SALT nego-
tiations within the Vladivostok framework.
We expect that the Soviets will soon test the waters to
determine the new administration's position on the major un-
resolved issues--primarily the Backfire bomber and cruise
missiles. They may also respond to the President-elect's
public proposals, inter alia, to freeze qualitative improve-
ments, and his statements questioning the advisability of
the US B-1 bomber program by proposing some sort of con-
straint on the development and deployment of new strategic
systems, possibly to include Trident as well as the B-1 and
cruise missiles.
A pair of long-standing compliance issues are unresolved
and may require high-level attention prior to the next SCC
session scheduled to begin on March 21, 1977. These issues
involve Soviet silo-type launch control facilities that are
being constructed in conjunction with deployment of the new
Soviet ICBMs, and environmental shelters that are being used
by the US in conjunction with the Minuteman silo-hardening
program.
The US is concerned about the launch control facilities
because the mi ht in the future be converted to ICBM launch-
ers.
The stated basis for the Soviet concern is that t e use o
the current shelters over Minuteman launchers can be classi-
fied as a deliberate concealment measure within the meaning
of the provisions
of Article V of the Interim Agreement.
The Soviets claim
that
they have received from the US "high-
level" assurances
that
the use of the shelters would be dis-
continued. The US
has
denied that any such assurances were
given.
MBFR: The MBFR negotiations in Vienna, which have
dragged on for three years without significant results, also
offer a forum in which the Soviets may choose to explore the
negotiating mettle of the new administration. A new Soviet
offer could be advertised as a litmus test of the sincerity
of the new administration's interest in promoting military
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detente in Europe. The USSR could, for example, make some
modest move to satisfy the West's interest in narrowing the
numerical disparity between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in
the area of negotiations.
This might be accompanied by an attempt to deal with
the MBFR problem on a bilateral basis, possibly even at the
summit level. Such a gambit would have the advantage of dis-
rupting the Western negotiating front as well as serving as
a gauge of the administration's interest in developing a
"special" relationship with the Soviets.
Most Favored Nation: The USSR may renew its efforts to
gain most favored nation (1-4FN) status. Such a move would be
comparatively free of risk and, if successful, result in im-
portant economic gains. In addition, from the Soviet per-
spective, it would be a tacit admission by the US of the grow-
ing international importance of the Soviet Union and -the wis-
dom of a continued policy of detente. Nevertheless, the So-
viet leadership does not, as the events of 1974 revealed,
see victory on this front as essential to Soviet interests.
Thus the USSR could save face by again terminating negotia-
tions if they took a bad turn.
In any new diplomatic forays, the Soviets would try to
separate the MFN question from other issues such as trade
credits and Jewish emigration. Mindful of the results of
past efforts, the Soviet leadership would pay close attention
to both the Congress and the President, and see MFN negotia-
tions as a measure of the new administration's interest in
improved relations and of the new President's ability to in-
fluence Congress.
Eastern Europe: The area is troubled by economic slow-
downs, chronic shortages of goods, consumer discontent, and
simmering national resentments. The situation is the worst
in Poland, where efforts to deal with economic problems
through price hikes have been frustrated by the violent op-
position of industrial workers. The regime's attempts to
deal with workers through a combination of coercion and con-
ciliation have succeeded only in bringing Poland's restive
intellectuals and the powerful Roman Catholic hierarchy out
against it. The atmosphere is also troubled in neighboring
East Germany, where a crackdown on dissident intellectuals
has provoked unrest.
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If disorders were to erupt in Poland or elsewhere in
Eastern Europe, the Soviets would go a considerable distance
to avoid a direct role in their suppression. They would
greatly prefer to leave that task to the local authorities
and probably would support economic concessions in the in-
terest of restoring order (they have already extended large
credits to Warsaw). If the local authorities should prove
incapable of restoring order, however, there is little doubt
that the Soviets would exert whatever degree of force was
necessary to restore the situation.
Yugoslavia: Major Soviet actions centering on Yugo-
slavia are unlikely to be made by the USSR before Tito's
departure or before the CSCE follow-up conference in Bel-
grade next spring. Even after these events, barring a ma-
jor deterioration on the domestic scene that would encour-
age Soviet meddling, Soviet policy is likely to be subtle
and indirect. Yugoslavia's unique position in Eastern
Europe--outside of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA and inside the
leadership of the nonaligned movement--provides it with con-
siderable protection from overt demands as long as Soviet
foreign policy remains committed to detente.
In view of Yugoslavia's strategic location, Soviet
pressures are likely to include increased efforts to obtain
expanded access to repair and provisioning facilities on the
Adriatic for Soviet naval forces. The immediate Soviet aim
is likely to be primarily to modify Yugoslav behavior in
ways favorable to Soviet interests.
Korean Crisis: The Soviets are well aware that US
troops would be-immediately involved in any renewal of major
hostilities in Korea, and this is an unlikely area of Soviet
provocation. The Soviets have made it clear in a number of
private conversations that they accept the status quo in
Korea and would expect any changes in the situation to benefit
the Chinese. Moscow probably would welcome any move Kim
Il-song might make in the direction of negotiations with the
US and away from tension-building on the peninsula. The Rus-
sians have very little leverage with him, however, and any
diplomatic initiative he may decide to take would be guided
by his view of Pyongyang's interests. Relations between the
and they have snown little
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desire to help him with his problem of.nternational trade
debts. If Kim were to resort to tension-building actions
(such as increased infiltration of agents along the de-
militarized zone), Moscow undoubtedly would try to dis-
sociate itself from him, fearful that Soviet-US relations
would be harmed by any view in Washington of Soviet support
for Kim's actions.
The Middle East: The most likely Soviet initiative
would be diplomatic--perhaps yet another formal proposal
for the convening of a Middle East peace conference in
Geneva. Such a move would be designed to probe the new
administration's readiness to engage in cooperative ef-
forts with the USSR in the region and its willingness to
put pressure on Israel.
Southern Africa: It is likely that. Soviet interven-
tion in three areas of southern Africa--Angola, Mozambique
(and the Rhodesian insurgency), and Southwest Africa will
increase in coming months, not in response to the change
of administrations in the US, but as part of a continuing
drive to extend Soviet influence to these areas and in ac-
cordance with the changing circumstances and opportunit=_es
that arise there.
Moscow probably views Southwest Africa as a lower
priority target than Rhodesia; it is unlikely that any dra-
matic escalation of assistance to the Southwest African in-
surgency will take place in the coming months.
It is conceivable that Moscow may opt for a military
solution in Rhodesia, by pressing or encouraging black
African participants in Geneva to make demands so great as
to ensure rejection by the Smith government and failure of
the talks. The Soviets see nothing working to their ad-
vantage in these negotiations.
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Turke : Congressional rejection of the pending US-Turk-
ish defense cooperation agreement would almost certainly re-
sult in Turkish demands to withdraw US troops from the common
defense installations
What additional retaliatory steps the Turks 25X1
might take are unclear. While most Turks probably see no
reasonable alternative to some form of security relationship
with the US, nationalism and the political exigencies of the
coming parliamentary election campaign could force Turkish
leaders into a reassessment of the relationship.
Continued delay in Congressional action on the agreement
could also lead to tension in Turkish-US relations. Many .
Turks see the delay as an affront to Turkish national honor,
and pressure is building on Prime Minister Demirel to force 25X1
F the issue.
He may even 121 e consi eying c osing
e aci. i ies i e e ense agreement remains unapproved
by election time--no later than next October. Demirel is
probably reluctant to do any of this, knowing that such tac-
tics could backfire, but here again domestic political pres-
sures could be the deciding factor.
As in the past, the Turks will probably attempt to in-
fluence Washington's deliberations on the defense agreement
by raising the specter of closer Soviet-Turkish ties. They
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are unlikely, however, to make any significant moves toward
the Soviets unless the pending agreement is rejected. Ankara
would probably be unwilling to let Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktash act on his desire for a unilateral declaration of
independence.
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Cyprus: Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities have
stepped up the expulsion of the estimated 4,000 Greek Cypriots
remaining in the Turkish-occupied north of Cyprus.
MIDDLE EAST
Egypt: Cairo is eager to revive movement toward a Middle
East peace settlement. How and when the new administration
acts in this regard will be a critical factor in determining
future US-Egyptian relations. A prolonged absence of US ef-
forts to revive peace negotiations could raise tensions not
only in US-Egyptian relations, but also in US relations with
other Arab states that depend on Egypt for leadership.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi has publicly called for
a US-Soviet initiative to reconvene the Geneva peace confer-
ence within the first quarter of next year. The Egyptians
are also pressing for a UN General Assembly resolution that
would call on the Security Council to review the Middle East
immediately after the Secretary General submits a report on
the situation on February 1. The Egyptian strategy in naming
these timetables is less to set real deadlines than to convey
a sense of urgency and to press the US to give the Arab-Is-
raeli situation priority attention.
The Egyptians, in particular Pres::dent Sadat, have a
fairly good understanding of the US political process. They
recognize that the transition to the new administration will
take time. They are also aware that too much pressure could.
be counterproductive. At the same time, however, the stabil-
ity of Sadat's domestic position and the maintenance of his
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newly re-established position of leadership among the Arabs
depend heavily on his ability to demonstrate that his rela-
tionship with the US produces results.
Egypt does not want Israel's national election now sched-
uled for October 1977 to be accepted as an automatic reason
for postponement of negotiations. If Israel refuses to par-
ticipate before the election, the Egyptians might be amenable
to waiting, provided they were convinced that the US had made
an effort, even an unsuccessful one, to dissuade Israel.
FAR EAST
China: The Chinese perceive two key problems in their
relations with Washington. The first--and most important--
is the continuing political/m_-litary link between the US and
the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan. The other is
what the Chinese view as the failure of the US to resist
forcefully Soviet "social imperialism" in many areas of the
world--an inherent defect, they say, of the US policy of
detente.
Although Chinese officials have privately expressed some
concern that President-elect Carter may not be willing to
change the US position on these issues, they seem prepared
to be patient with the new administration. Some officials
have commented that they will await the selection of top
policy-making officials before forming an opinion about the
new administration's attitude toward China. Even then, Peking
will probably not make any quick judgments as to the future
direction of the Carter administration, preferring to wait
for the first moves from the other side.
The issues that are most important to Peking are not
ones on which the Chinese can exert a great deal of leverage
at the moment. They seem persuaded that pressure on the
Taiwan question--especially any military posturing--could
work to Peking's disadvantage by regenerating support in the
US for the Nationalists. Although Peking is almost certainly
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prepared to take additional steps at some point to demonstrate
that it will not consider guaranteeing a non-military "lib--
eration" of Taiwan, most of the Chinese leaders are stressing
their "reasonableness" on the issue. Certainly, the Chinese
will be reluctant to make any moves during the first months
of the Carter administration that might lead the US to give
greater support to Taipei.
The Chinese are likely to try to convince the new admin-
istration of their reasonableness, by attempting to show that
they are earnestly seeking to resolve the Taiwan question.
They might, for example, circulate rumors that they want to
begin talks with the Nationalists.
Eventually, the Chinese might see merit in moving toward
an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations on the assumption that
it would create pressures in the US to bolster its own links
with Peking. For the time being, however, this option will
probably not be exercised. The Chinese have gone to some
lengths to belittle current Soviet gestures toward Peking,
describing them as "fake moves." Nonetheless, the Chinese
are probably not entirely displeased that the Soviet overtures
have provoked speculation in the Western press that there
might soon be dramatic improvements in Sino-Soviet relations.
In short, there are few areas where the Chinese feel
pressure on the US would be to Peking's advantage, especially
during a period when, they feel, the new administration will
be doing its own probing. The Chinese leadership clearly
places a high value on improving relations with the US; they
may even recognize that they need the US more than the US
needs them. If that is the case, the Chinese almost cer-
tainly are persuaded that a cautious, patient approach to-
ward the new administration is the best course to follow.
North Korea: Pyongyang is very interested in the Carter
administration's view of the US troop presence in Korea. In
an unusual display of restraint, North Korean media have not
yet branded the US election result a "farce," as was the case
within days after the 1968 and 1972 elections. Pyongyang
ma be content to have the US make the first move;
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In order to explore the chances of any policy changes,
however, Pyongyang might make a public diplomatic initiative,
essentially involving a repackaging of earlier proposals:
--It might propose bilateral talks with
the US without conditions or a prescribed agenda
to discuss means for reducing tensions in Korea.
Since the spring of 1974 the North Koreans,
through a series of public statements and reso-
lutions, have attempted to draw the US into bi-
lateral talks on a "peace agreement" to replace
the 1953 armistice agreement.
--Alternatively, Pyongyang might announce
qualified acceptance of the US concept of four-
power talks, perhaps with a proviso that South
Korea, China, and possibly additional interested
powers would participate only as observers after
the ground had been initially explored in private
US - North Korea talks.
Any North Korean political initiative would be designed
to encourage American sentiment for an early removal of US
military forces from South Korea. It might be accompanied
by efforts to establish direct, private contacts with US of-
ficials. Similar rounds of "diplomatic" approaches by North
Korean officials occurred in the fall of 1974 and again in
the spring of 1975. Although less likely, North Korea might
enlist a third country as an intermediary for secret Washing-
ton-Pyongyang talks.
We believe it unlikely that Pyongyang would resort to
tension-building tactics along the DMZ or elsewhere in Korea
at the outset of the Carter administration in advance of any
Korean policy review. The Panmunjom incident in August again
demonstrated to the North that such tactics are counterproduc-
tive. Even so, over the years Kim I1-song has demonstated
a flair for abruptly changing course, and he could assume a
tougher stance if he judges that no US troop withdrawal is
in the immediate offing.
Vietnam: Hanoi is likely to sound out the new adminis-
tration's position on the conditions for allowing Vietnamese
entry into the UN and for normalizing bilateral relations.
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The Vietnamese have decided not to press the UN issue
further until the new administration takes office, and they
have a chance to assess its position and the extent of domes-
tic pressures in the post-election period. They could make
a gesture, such as the release of more names or the cordial
reception of an American delegation, to project an image of
reasonableness without changing their essential negotiating
position--reparations for information.
Laos: It is quite possible that the Lao Communist re-
gime will confront the new President with a renewed demand
for so-called "reparations"--a term it uses in lieu of "eco-
nomic assistance."
To support this demand, the Lao Communists usually quote
the 1973 Vientiane agreement, which referred to a US govern-
ment statement promising that "it will contribute to the
healing of the wounds of war and to the postwar reconstruc-
tion of the whole of Indochina."
In putting forward that demand, the Lao regime may make
some vague promises to search for Americans still missing in
action in Laos. Recent statements by a Lao Central Committee
member, however, have made it clear that the Lao authorities
are not in a position to account for all those missing.
The Lao approach to the US will be coordinated with that
of the Vietnamese Communists, whose influence on Lao foreign
policies has been visible in the past year.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Panama: We expect Chief of Government Omar Torrijos to
be probing the new administration's intentions regarding the
canal treaty negotiations from the outset. Although Pana-
manian spokesmen have put a cautiously optimistic face on
Carter's victory, they were upset by some of his campaign
statements and would have preferred a Ford triumph. Conse-
quently, Torrijos will not only be pressing Panama's vigor-
ous international campaign to make the canal issue a prior-
ity US concern, but will be looking for signals of US inten-
tions. Deepening domestic difficulties--serious economic
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problems and weakening political support--have persuaded the
General that a treaty may be his only long-term solution.
Panama's initial diplomatic campaign is expected to be
fairly reasonable. Torrijos would not be surprised by some
hiatus in full substantive discussions on outstanding treaty
issues. He will be pushing, however, for at least some sign
of continued commitment by the Executive Branch to the 1974
statement of negotiating principles. As time passes, and
especially if the domestic situation worsens, Torrijos will
be more prone to dramatize his warnings to the US.
Cuba: There are several things Castro might do to ex-
plore the new administration's policies. The cancellation--
effective April 15, 1977--of the February 1973 hijacking
accord between the US and Cuba was almost certainly intended
as an early probe of the new administration's attitude toward
Havana. Prime Minister Castro announced the cancellation on
October 15, 1976, but did not make his action effective im-
mediately. He could have done so based on his claim that
the US had not honored the agreement. Instead, he announced
his intention to let the agreement's cancellation clause run
its full six months, thus extending into the next administra-
tion.
Dispatching troops to Mozambique, increasing propaganda
pressure for Puerto Rican independence, or attempting to
threaten US SR-71 reconnaissance flights over Cuba are other
things the Cubans might do early in the new year. Castro will
want to see if the warnings about further Cuban military ad-
ventures made by high officials of the present administration
in the wake of Angola remain valid after January 20. He will
also want to see how sensitive the next administration is on
Puerto Rico and whether he can force a review of US policy on
Cuban overflights.
LDCs
Certain key LDCs at the Paris Conference on International
Economic Cooperation (CIEC) will seek an early exposition of
President Carter's policy toward North-South relations. They
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have made clear that their support of the postponeme:zt (until
March) of the CIEC Ministerial Review Conference is based on
expectations that the new administration will agree ':o soften
the current US/EC position on LDC debt rescheduling and will
also ask Congress for increased US ccntributions to the World
Bank's "soft" loan facility. These LDCs maintain that such
initiatives will be essential not only to the continuation
of the CIEC, but also to US diplomacy in the UN General As-
sembly. This will be especially true on such issues as Law
of the Sea, the International Development Strategy, reform
of the GATT, and the regulation of the export of nuclear
technology. Initiatives, they say, would also be helpful
for the UNCTAD Commodity Consultations scheduled through
mid-1978.
In the absence of the initiatives described above, the
evidence now available indicates that many of the LDCs that
have acted as moderating influences at the CIEC may threaten
to reconsider their positions. They are likely to voice
skepticism about the US commitment to a North-South dialogue,
and at least some of them will seriously consider withdrawal
of their behind-the-scenes support for US-proposed compromises
at the CIEC and other North-South negotiations.
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