CHINA AFTER THE PURGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100350005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 23, 1976
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
23 December 1976
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM: China After the Purge
The arrest on 6 October of what the Chinese have
come to call the "gang of four"--the leading leftists
on the Politburo--was a widely popular move that has
dramatically changed the face of Chinese politics. In
the wake of this decisive act--and of another watershed,
the death of Mao Tse-tung a month earlier--the new Chi-
nese leadership is consolidating its grip on power, ex-
amining many ongoing policies, and seeking to work out
new relationships among its leading members. This
process is likely to take some time. Already some of
the momentum imparted by the initial blow against the
leftist chieftains has been dissipated. The regime
has, moreover, been surprisingly slow in coming to grips
with a number of pressing personnel problems, and it
has appeared to be in a dither over some re-emerging po-
litical problems that had been submerged in the euphoria
of early October.
Legitimacy-
.One central problem facing the new leadership is
that of its own legitimacy. The new party chairman,
Hua Kuo-feng, was elected to that post by the remaining
members of the Politburo only after the four leftists
had been eliminated, and the document announcing his
elevation appears to acknowledge tacitly that merely a
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This memorandum was produced by the center for Policy
Support, Directorate of Intelligence, and coordinated
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"rump" Politburo took the action. Despite public
claims to the contrary, Hua's promotion has not yet
been formally approved by the party Central Commit-
tee, and is therefore legally "unconstitutional."
Many of the acts engineered by the party's left
wing in the decade since the onset of the Cultural
Revolution--in particular the moves against former
vice premier Teng Hsiao-ping earlier this year--were
widely criticized as "illegal" by more conservative
party members. It is ironic, and undoubtedly awk-
ward for the regime, that the central. act in a de-
velopment that has been billed as a restoration of
party order and proper procedure should itself be
"illegal." There are no indications that a plenum
of the party Central Committee will he held any time
soon to endorse Hua's promotion, and in fact his au-
thority at this juncture rests only cn two supports.
The first is an ambiguous remark attributed to Mao--
"with you in charge I am at ease"--which makes no ex-
plicit reference to the chairmanship of the party;
the second is raw military power.
Hua as Chairman
Currently, Hua holds three major posts: chairman
of the party Central Committee, chairman of the party's
Military Affairs Commission, and premier. Nominally,
this gives Hua a wider range of authority than Mao
ever held--the late leader was never premier. But
Hua's retention of the premiership in addition to his
newly acquired posts may be a sign of weakness rather
than strength. Hua has been on the national stage for
only five years; he was brought to Peking from a pro-
vincial post in November 1971. For much of those five
years he was more of a bit player than a leading actor;
he was appointed acting premier only in early February
of this year. Hua consequently lacks the long-standing
personal and professional ties to secondary military
and civilian leaders which Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-
ping--or for that matter the fallen ":successors" Liu
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Shao-chi and Lin Piao--had forged through years of
civil war and national administration.
The modest beginnings of a "personality cult"
around Hua are already apparent--adulation of the new
leader was particularly noticeable at a recent meet-
ing of the National People's Congress Standing Commit-
tee and at a national conference on agricultural af-
fairs--but much of the praise of the new chairman seems
somewhat defensive, designed to respond to unspoken
questions as to Hua's qualifications for his high posi-
tion. Contrary to some Western news accounts, there
has been little overt opposition to Hua
in ract
much of the popularity of the move agains e left
seems to have rubbed off on the new chairman. But it
is nevertheless true that Hua remains an unknown
quantity to much of the population and even to many
officials.
Much of the "personality cult" propaganda seeks
to portray Hua as a conciliator in the mold of Chou
En-lai; the first "quotations" attributed to the new
chairman emphasize caution and sober assessment. In-
deed, Hua showed great adroitness in forging an alli-
ance with much of the military establishment in the
months immediately preceding Mao's death, and the de-
cisiveness of the move against the left in October
surprised many Chinese as well as foreign observers.
Curiously, however, the semi-official account of the
events leading up to the arrests on 6 October attri-
bute much of this decisiveness to Defense Minister
Yeh Chien-ying rather than to Hua; in this account
Hua is said to have temporized while Yeh pressed for
action.
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Hua's caution in this as in other matters may
stem in part from his uncertainty as to the person-
alities and ultimate loyalty of many second- and
third-echelon officials; Hua's lack of long-standing
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ties to these officials is probably an inhibiting
factor in his own calculations.
Hua was apparently surprised and disturbed to
discover in the weeks after.Mao's death that the
leftist quartet were planning to hold a plenum of
the party Central Committee, presumably to strengthen
their position. Leftists are a minority--a signi-
ficant minority--in that body; the evidence that the
"gang of four" was prepared to place its confidence
in the Central Committee, however, may well have con-
vinced Hua that they had made some headway in
"winning over" additional members of the committee
to their side. Until he and his closest allies can
fully identify and weed out convinced leftist sympa-
thizers among its members, they are unlikely to con-
vene a Central Committee plenum to ratify the actions
of 6-7 October. Indeed, as time passes the odds rise
that rather than hold a plenum, the regime may con-
vene a party congress to elect a new central commit-
tee, thus obviating the problem.
The Leftists
In fact, the arrest of the "gang of four"--Mao's
widow Chiang Ching, former party vice chairman Wang
Hung-wen, former vice premier Chang Chun-chiao, and
chief propagandist Yao Wen-yuan--has eliminated the
left wing of the party as a threat to its current
leaders, but it has not eliminated the leftist move-
ment as a problem for the regime. At least a fourth
of the 30-million-strong party retains leftist sympa-
thies; this proportion is probably higher at the
lower levels of the party machine and among the young
people who make up the bulk of recent inductees into
the party. Even a widespread and fairly indiscrimi-
nate purge would remove only a fraction of this huge
mass of leftist sympathizers.
The weeding-out process, however, is well under
way, both in Peking and in the provinces. Easily
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identified second-echelon leftist leaders have prob-
ably already been eliminated, and in recent weeks
provincial party leaders, newspapers, and radio broad-
casts have begun to echo military propaganda organs
in calling for a widespread and uninhibited purge of
the "agents" of the "gang of four." There has been
no large-scale resistance to the actions against the
leftists, although in the immediate aftermath of the
arrest of the "gang of four" the situation was tense
in Shanghai, the home base of three of the leftist
quartet, and perhaps in Paoting, Hupeh Province, 100
miles from Peking.
While the initial strike against the leftist
leaders was accomplished with relative ease, faction-
alism does persist in many provinces. In almost all
cases the factional alignments date back to the chaotic
days of the Cultural Revolution when fights over power
and position at the provincial and lower levels were
at their height. As provincial leaders, almost all
of whom are veteran cadre who were "rehabilitated" in
the early 1970s, are endorsed and gradually given
greater local authority by the central leaders, old
scores are bound to be paid off as veteran aparachiks
deal roughly with their leftist tormenters who managed
temporarily to purge them.at the height of the Cul-
tural Revolution.
The beginning of this process accounts for the
strident tone already observable in the provincial
media. But however brutal the repression, the pro-
vincial leaders are unlikely to eliminate the leftist
factions entirely. Rather, they are likely merely to
drive the leftist groupings into a largely inactive,
semi-clandestine status analogous to the situation
which existed in the 1970-73 period, when the reaction
to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution was at its
height.
Indeed, the factional problem in the provinces--
that is, conflict among two or more relatively powerful
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groupings as distinguished from the use of unbridled
political power to suppress dissident cliques--is
probably already in the decline. Most of the refer-
ences to factional troubles which have recently ap-
peared in the provincial media and have been replayed
in the Western press describe the situation which ob-
tained last summer--before Mao's death and the arrest
of the "gang of four."
A more delicate problem for the new leaders in
Peking is that of rooting out suspected leftists from
military ranks.
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Hua in fact almost certainly sees a danger in al-
lowing the purge of the left to get out of hand. His
cautious, temporizing style suggests that he was re-
sponsible for an authoritative editorial in the People's
Daily last month which called for limiting the purge
of the leftists to ringleaders who were deeply in-
volved with the "gang of four"---and which contrasted
sharply with much more bloodthirsty calls to actions
which were then appearing in military-controlled pub-
lications. Given the long-standing, deep-seated po-
litical passions which have been unslaked since the
Cultural Revolution, however, it is unlikely that the
purge can easily be controlled. Indeed, the most
recent issue of the party's theoretical journal, Red
Flag, contains an article which in its unbridled and
indiscriminate attack on the left closely parallels
those which have been appearing in the military
journals.
Hua's aim--and that of other like-minded leaders
in Peking--seems to be to reduce the possibility that
a wholesale and indiscriminate purge of suspected left-
ists will build up such resentment among the numerous
"losers" in the political readjustment now under way
that new factional trouble, in the provinces and in
Peking, would be all but inevitable. China's politi-
cal history over the past 15 years strongly suggests
that this fear is a very sensible one. The current
emphasis on experience and on tested leaders which
has been particularly apparent in military publica-
tions, for.example, has almost certainly alienated
considerable sections of China's youth, who see their
hopes for succeeding to positions of real political
responsibility fading into the distant future.
In fact, the new leaders in Peking seem quite de-
fensive about some aspects of the current political
evolution. They appear to recognize that the outright
elimination of the leftist leaders on the Politburo
coupled with the strong emphasis on order, production,
discipline, and experience leaves them vulnerable to
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the charge that "revisionism" has triumphed in China
In m.L -Nove er in
particular the central media went to some lengths to
issue reassurances--presumably meant for the large
numbers of lower level cadres whose sympathies are
vaguely leftist but who have no close and direct ties
to the "gang of four"--that the country has not taken
a sharp turn to the right and that the Cultural Revolu-
tion has not been repudiated wholesale.
Policy Review
Despite these reassurances, however, major changes
have already occurred in areas where the leftists were
particularly strong in the past decade--for example,
in the fields of propaganda, culture, and education.
The rigid cultural orthodoxy imposed by Chiang Ching
has been somewhat relaxed, and writers and artists
who had been criticized by the "empress" are now being
praised for the correctness of their political outlook.
Wholesale changes have been made in the upper levels
of the propaganda machine, and the purge is now prob-
ably extending down into the lower reaches of this
bureaucratic sector. A new emphasis on discipline and
"book learning" in the classroom seems to be under way,
and preparations are being made for greater reliance
on examinations as a means of selecting candidates
for university-level education. Moreover, apart from
the drumfire against the "gang of four," which is
likely to go on for some time, the new authorities
seem anxious to avoid--at least for the time being--EL
new series of the incessant campaigns that have roiled
China's political waters for more than a decade.
Even more striking is the great emphasis which
the central authorities are placing on economic con-
struction, industrial production, and orderly planning.
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They claim with considerable justification that the
leftist quartet undermined and dissipated efforts
along these lines in the first nine months of 1976.
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They have cited the destruction caused by the
earthquakes of last summer, balance of payments
problems, and the competing pressures of foreign
exports against domestic consumption as difficulties
which cannot easily be assessed or resolved. A ma-
jor review of China's economic situation is appar-
ently under way; a new five-year plan which was to
begin this year is being revised and will be intro-
Many of the difficulties now being mentioned
by the economic experts were precisely the points
raised by the leftist leaders to buttress their
attacks on "revisionist" policies earlier this year.
The persistence of these problems even in changed
political circumstances underlines the basic struc-
tural problems China faces in building a modern
economy as well as the relatively narrow economic
margin within which any leadership group in Peking
must work in achieving this end. Nevertheless,
the context in which these basic problems are be-
ing viewed has changed remarkably. Lip service is
still paid to the notion that "politics are in
command," but actual emphasis is being placed on
pragmatism, discipline, and expertise. An ambitious
program of agricultural mechanization, with which
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both Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping are personally
identified, is again being pressed. The idea of "self-
reliance" has not been abandoned, bzt renewed emphasis
has been placed on the importation of foreign tech-
nology as a means of speeding the transition to a
modern economy. This approach, which was stressed with
even greater vigor in 1975 than it is at present,
languished following the fall of Teng last spring.
In fact, despite a somewhat greater emphasis on
realism and caution, the entire economic program of
Peking's current leaders is hardly distinguishable
from that of Teng, who was being attacked viciously
for his "capitalist-road" mentality by the leftists
before they were purged. The attacks on Teng have
now been narrowed to his alleged inability to rec-
ognize the importance of "class struggle"--a criti-
cism attributed directly to Mao--and he has not beez
mentioned in any context by China's top leaders or
by the central media since the end of November.
The Teng Problem
In fact, there is strong sentiment within the
party apparatus and among some elemE:nts of the mili-
tary leadership to "rehabilitate" T-E:ng once again--
he was returned to prominence in 1973 after an
initial purge in the early stages of the Cultural
Revolution--on the ground that the charges against
him were trumped up or distorted by the leftist
quartet,,that Mao had intended to criticize but not
to purge him, and that his removal from office in
April was "illegal." Teng is widely admired for his
opposition to and contempt for the leftist leaders,
whose political power he attempted to circumscribe,
with some success, in 1975.
An investigation into the origins of the riot
in Tienanmen Square in early April--the occasion of
Teng's downfall--is now under way under the auspices
of Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying. This investiga--
tion will almost certainly clear Teng of any respon-
sibility for the riot, placing the blame on the
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"gang of four." Since the announcement of Teng's
removal from office explicitly linked his fall with
instigation of the riot, his second "rehabilitation"
is probably inevitable. He is already rumored to be
an "adviser" to Hua Kuo-feng.
Teng's "rehabilitation," however, presents a
number of problems for the new leadership in Peking
and for Hua Kuo-feng in particular. If Teng's re-
moval from office is declared to have been illegal,
then it would seem to follow that a determination
to this effect would automatically restore him to
the posts he held before his latest fall--first
vice premier, member of the Politburo Standing Com-
mittee, and chief of staff of the PLA. These are
positions of great power, and it might be easy to
make the argument that in them Teng would once more
give free rein to his well-known tendency toward
abrasiveness and autocratic decision-making.
Still more important are the direct consequences
to Hua Kuo-feng of Teng's return to power. Hua has
in effect stepped into Teng's shoes as party and
government leader in succession to Mao and Chou En-
lai. Teng's return to office would underline that
fact as well as provide a constant reminder that
Teng, not Hua, was Chou En-lai's choice for the top
posts in party and state. In short, a resurgent
Teng would be a natural rival to Hua, who might
additionally hope to avoid the impression that he
was a captive of the right wing of the party, where
Teng's greatest support seems to lie.
Hua Kuo-feng is not the only Chinese leader
who may well have qualms about the restoration of
Teng Hsiao-ping to positions of real authority.
Continuing criticism of Teng in at least a few prov-
inces suggests that several provincial leaders may
have doubts about the wisdom of entrusting consider-
able power to the abrasive Teng.
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Additionally, Peking party boss Wu Te, who was
nominally in charge of the suppression of the
Tienanmen riot, might suspect that a complete clear-
ing of Teng would involve him in political difficul-
ties. Above all Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, for-
merly a strong supporter of Teng, may now have
reservations about the return of the former leader
to high office, since Li himself is now the obvious
candidate for the premier's job in succession to
Hua. None of these leaders is likely to oppose a
nominal "rehabilitation" of Teng Hs=_ao-ping; it is
his restoration to high office that might be troub-
ling to them.
On the other hand, Teng retains formidable
assets. Most second- and third-echelon party lead-
ers have long-standing ties to Teng, and they would
probably feel more secure in their own posts if
Teng were again an official of consequence. Hsu
Shih-yu, a Politburo member and the powerful com-
mander of the Canton Military Region, appears to
be an uncompromising supporter of the former vice
premier. Most importantly, Defense Minister Yeh
Chien-ying seems to be firmly in Teng's corner, as
he has been all year. Indeed, Yeh's well-known de-
votion to the memory of his close friend and col-
league Chou En-lai might impel him to demand that
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Teng not only be restored to office, but that he
be made premier in accordance with Chou's wishes.
It is possible--although the evidence is scanty--
that some such demand is the principal reason Li
Hsien-nien has not formally been named premier de-
spite frequent rumors that this move was about to
be made. In fact, the longer the regime delays
taking this step the greater the odds that Teng be-
comes a viable candidate for the premier's post.
Musical Chairs
The Teng Hsiao-ping problem and the issue of
the premiership is the most intractable but cer-
tainly not the only major personnel problem facing
the new leadership. The post of chairman of the
National People's Congress--China's equivalent to
head of state--has been vacant since the death of
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cla ime
that e ien-yang wouia assume with
Peking Military Region Commander Chen Hsi-lien suc-
ceeding him as defense minister and Li Hsien-nien
taking the premier's portfolio. This scenario was
quickly denied by Foreign Mini.stry spokesmen in
Peking, and the posters seemed to be a trial balloon
floated on behalf of the ambitious Chen Hsi-lien.
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A more recent and persistent rumor claims that
the chairmanship of the National People's Congress
will be assigned to Peking party boss Wu Te, an
obvious and leading candidate for the job, while
Chen would be consoled with the post of minister
of security--yet another job now nominally filled.
by Hua Kuo-feng. In this reading Yeh would remain
in place as defense minister, Li Hsien-nien would.
become premier, and Teng Hsiao-ping would become
"adviser" to Hua Kuo-feng, presumably as a first
step to eventual resumption of his duties as first
vice premier. This in fact is a logical and likely
scenario, but bargaining over the various posts in-
volved is probably still under way.
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The Military Problem
In fact the relationship between leading mili-
tary and civilian authorities will be the central
factor in the Chinese political equation for some
time to come. Hua Kuo-feng's personal relationship
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with leading military figures may well shape the im-
mediate course of the political evolution now under
way, but the issue certainly transcends purely per-
sonal considerations of this sort.
As Mao's health began rapidly to fail last sum-
mer, Hua recognized that he would need military sup-
port in the almost inevitable showdown with the
"gang of four." Adroitly, he strongly praised the
army for its efforts in relief work following last
summer's earthquakes. Hua himself was deeply in-
volved in the relief effort, and by simultaneously
stressing the army's "devotion to duty" and identi-
fying himself with its fortunes he formed a tacit
alliance that was probably no less important than
Adolf Hitler's more explicit pact with the German
General Staff just before the death of President
Hindenberg. Implicit in this alliance was the
thought that neither party could afford to see the
"gang of four" triumph.
The military establishment, for its part, had
been to a greater or lesser degree in the political
doghouse since former defense minister Lin Piao's
attempted "coup" in late 1971. Hua's words of
praise were. the strongest endorsement of the mili-
tary establishment since that event. Most top
military leaders, moreover, distrusted and in many
cases strongly disliked the leftist quartet--a
mutual antipathy that dated back to the Cultural
Revolution. Many--and Yeh Chien-ying in particu-
lar--apparently believed that Hua, as premier and
party first vice chairman, was the logical center-
piece in any move to block a leftist grab for power
after Mao's death--and even more importantly, the
source of legitimacy for any pre-emptive move
against the "gang of four."
The action taken against the leading leftists
was almost certainly pre-emptive. The military not
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only supplied the muscle that ensured its success
but also appears to have had a major voice in urging
that the action be taken. As a result of its central
role in the events of early October, the military
establishment is once again at the center of the
political stage. It is likely to demand political
and institutional rewards for its "loyalty" in a
period of crisis.
Signs that the military will not be shy in
making such demands are already evident. Major an-
nouncements and decisions are being made in the name
of the party's Military Affairs Commission as well
as those of the highest party and government orgar..s.
Provincial and central media continue to be unstirt-
ing in their praise of the army. And military-
controlled journals are not only speaking with great
authority but have taken the lead in demanding a
wide and thorough-going purge of leftists where-
ever found, in calling for greater discipline, and.
in urging an increase in industrial production.
Most extraordinary of all is the special atten-
tion being accorded Yeh Chien-ying. Adulation and
a "cult of personality" are still being reserved for
Hua Kuo-feng alone (and for the deceased Mao and
Chou En-lai), but Yeh is being treated with a def-
erence--even a reverence--that actually rivals that
accorded to Hua. Yeh's picture is frequently
coupled with that of Hua and on public occasions
he receives almost equal billing with Hua. This
special treatment was never accorded to Chou En-la.i;
it is reminiscent of that given to Lin Piao in his,
heyday as Mao's "successor."
At least at this point, however, the military
does not seem to be playing a "usurper's" role.
The military journals have been adamant in stress-
ing the primacy of the party in all matters and in
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calling for military subordination to the highest
party organs; this is in sharp contrast to the period
of army ascendancy in the late 1960s, when the role
of the party was all but ignored. Moreover, the
military journals themselves have taken the lead in
promoting Hua Kuo-feng's "cult of personality."
Until recently they alone were lavish in their
praise of Hua as an individual.
It is of course possible that all this merely
represents an attempt on the part of the military
establishment to promote Hua--and through him the
party he heads--as a "front" for virtual military
rule.
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On the contrary, it is far more likely that
the current military stress on the primacy of the
party and on the individual importance of Hua
Kuo-feng can be attributed to Yeh Chien-ying's
sense of what is necessary in China's present po-
litical circumstances. By dint of his long service
at the upper levels of the party as well as the
military bureaucracy, Yeh appears to possess a
"statesmanlike" view of political necessity and a
loyalty to party shiboleths rather than a parochial
and narrowly military outlook.
Indeed, there is some evidence that rather
than simply dictating to the party--and to Hua--
the military establishment has not always found
it easy to get its own way even on matters of con-
siderable importance to it. Last month's People's
Daily editorial which called for a narrow and lim-
ited purge of leftists contrasted sharply with the
much more strident calls for a broad purge then
being trumpeted-by the military journals.. If Hua
himself was primarily responsible for the editor-
ial, which seems likely, he is certainly not an
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army puppet. Nevertheless, it is probably true that
at this juncture he needs the military establishment
even more than it needs him.
This point can hardly have been lost on civil-
ian party cadre, and it is probably worrying to
them. The civilian--and particularly the party-
bureaucracy has spent much of the past five years
wresting political power away from the military,
which inherited administrative responsibility for
running the country from the shattered party appar-
atus during the Cultural Revolution. It will almost
certainly be unwilling to see its political authority
eroded again, and its concerns on this score coupled
with increasing military assertiveness are likely to
lead to renewed tensions between the civilian author-
ities and the military establishment.
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Although in present circumstances potential
civilian-military political rivalry in the prov-
inces can probably be contained, a different set
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of tensions is likely to persist at the national
level. Not only is the military establishment
likely to press its political views forcefully on
the civilians, but the PLA is also almost certain
to demand a greater slice of China's limited budget
to build up its partially obsolescent military ar-
senal. Arguments on this score have persisted at
least since the fall of Lin Piao, and they are un-
likely to die away now that the military's political
clout has obviously increased. Military journals
are already claiming that the "gang of four" sabo-
taged Teng Hsiao-ping's plans for a leaner but bet-
ter equipped military force. Many of the civilians
in Peking's current leadership, however, are eco-
nomic administrators who advocate balanced economic
growth without undue emphasis on military hardware.
The emphasis these economic officials are cur-
rently placing on the weakness of the Chinese econ-
omy and on the limitations of China's resources
could be related to pressures from the PLA for
greater military spending.
That establishment, however, is not a monolith,
and this fact probably gives Hua Kuo-feng and other
top civilian leaders some room for maneuver as well
as cause for additional concern. Rivalries have
long persisted among military leaders, and these
rivalries are not likely to vanish overnight. I
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In any event, Hua is likely to play off various
groupings within the military against each other,
thereby hoping to keep the army under control. This
is a potentially fruitful but somewhat dangerous
game. Teng Hsiao-ping appeared to play it in 1975,
but his machinations may have cost rim the support
of Chen Hsi-lien at the crucial moment when succes-
sion to the premiership was at stake.
This amalgam of troubling problems and unfin-
ished business will not be mastered easily. With
the elimination of the leftist quartet from the
Politburo the potential for leadership instability
has diminished dramatically but has not disappeared.
Those towering figures Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai
are gone, and Hua Kuo-feng's staying power is still
untested. Low-level leftist resentment against the
turn of political events persists, and rightist
pressures to go further in the direction of "ration-
alization" than is politically expedient remain
strong. Potentially destabilizing rivalry between
Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping or, more importantly,
between the civilian and military bureaucracies
looms in the background. The new leaders have not
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yet apportioned power among themselves and antagon-
isms among military leaders remain a possibility.
Underlying economic and demographic problems per-
sist, and although they are likely to be tackled
energetically, they cannot be easily solved. More-
over, the regime has not yet addressed such poten-
tially troublesome problems of foreign policy as the
relationship with the US and the USSR; either or
both could be the source of bitter dispute.
From the point of view of the Chinese leader-
ship, the current situation is probably more hopeful
than any in the recent past. The present lack of
momentum in domestic affairs, however, suggests
that as old problems are fading, new ones are coming
to the fore. Indeed, Chinese politics seem to be a
perfect demonstration of the Hegelian dialectic:
the solution to each major crisis bears within it
the seeds of new, and perhaps equally complex,
disputes.
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