UNREST IN CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100360002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 14, 1977
• Content Type: IM

/c! 611,
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Intelligence Memorandum
Unrest in China
Secret
RP 77-10004C
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January 1977
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January 14, 1977
Political factionalism and occasional outbreaks of
armed conflict have been a prominent part of the Chinese
scene since the Cultural Revolution began in 1966. The
severity of these disorders has varied with the political
situation in Peking. Disturbances generally have been
greater during nationwide political campaigns, such as
the anti-Confucius campaign in 1974 and the criticism of
former vice premier Teng Hsiao-ping last year. Western
press accounts notwithstanding, there has been less, not
more disruption since the arrest last October of the
"gang of four," the leading leftists on the Politburo.
In fact, the situation at the local levels may be calmer
now than at any time in the past decade.
The main reason for this is that the "gang of four"
themselves had been the major instigators of conflict at
the local levels. Deprived of support from national
leaders in Peking, local leftists have for the most part
been unwilling or unable to act on their own.
The Western press has erred in treating Chinese ac-
counts of the past activities of the leftists as a de-
scription of the current situation. To our knowledge,
there was only one attempt to organize open local re-
sistance to the arrests of the leftists last October.
This memorandum was prepared by the office of Regional
and Political Analysis.
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It occurred in Shanghai, long a leftist bastion and the
Subsequently, Peking has on three occasions resorted
to some military intervention in order to restore order
at local levels. These espisodes have been the object
of considerable recent attention in the Western press,
but in all three cases, the unrest had developed well
before the fall of the senior leftists.
Factionalism in this coastal province, stemming
from the Cultural Revolution and aggravated by the heavy-
handed methods of the provincial party boss in elimina-=-
ing local leftists, has been a problem for several yea,:-Is.
Local military troops have been used in Fukien
Certain
areas or k uiccien apparently remain troutle spots as local
leftists continue activities such as wall poster attacks
on local officials. We are not aware cf any armed
clashes in Fukien following the military's intervention.
In short, the situation there did not seem to worsen
after the fall of the leading leftists. On the contrary,
their arrests have allowed Peking to take more decisive
action in resolving the situation.
Railway Problems
In a well-publicized move in December, Peking sent:
an official of the national military apparatus to take
over the leadership of a much troubled railway bureau
in Chengchou in central China. This railway bureau had
been a problem for Peking since at least early last
summer. At that time, the unit, in a surprising show
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of defiance, used wall posters to attack a Peking di-
rective ordering the cessation of factional disruption
in railway work. Again in this instance, the fall of
the leftists did not aggravate the situation, but enabled
Peking to take action to restore order and remove the
troublemakers.
Paoting
Of all the areas of leftist-inspired unrest men-
tioned in the Chinese media, Paoting, a city near Peking,
seems to have been the only place where unrest actually
intensified after the fall of the Peking leftists. Paot-
Foreign Ministry
r-isituation there
The Paoting situation points to another and espe-
cially delicate problem for Peking--how to deal with
those senior military officers who were aligned with the
leftists or who were in general sympathy with them. Al-
though the great majority of the military leadership at
regional and provincial levels appears to be very much
in the corner of the new leadership, the allegiance of
at least one military regional commander is question-
able. Politburo member and commander of the Shenyang
Military Region Li Te-sheng seemed to be especially
vociferous in his attacks last year on former vice pre-
mier Teng Hsiao-ping. The propaganda emanating from
that region and from the area where he previously served
was harsher than other attacks on Teng, and party chair-
man Hua Kuo-feng indicated immediately after the fall
of the senior leftists that Li's province deserved Pe-
king's attention.
The leadership will probably move cautiously on
this problem in order to avoid refueling factional fires.
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Although the case of Li Te-sheng may now be under inves-
tigation in Peking, no action is likely until the lead-
ership is confident that the matter can be resolved with
the minimum of disruption.
The Military's Role in "Rectification"
The former left-wing affiliations of a few senior
officers, awkward though they may be for Peking, have
not prevented the military from assuming a leading role
in the campaign to identify and punish local followers
of "the gang of four." One of the more important aspects
of Peking's efforts to eliminate leftist. factionalism
was the publicity given to the use of military troops,
either through radio broadcasts or the circulation of
official directives. The rest of China is consequently
now fully aware of Peking's recent use of military
muscle. The message is clear to other areas that Peking
stands ready to use troops when the situation warrants.
This has been an effective deterrent to local leftists
throughout China.
There may in fact be some disagreement between ci-
vilian elements of the leadership and the military in
Peking over how far to push the campaign against local
leftists. Civilians appear to be arguing for a lenient
approach while the military seems to favor a more sweep-
ing campaign that calls not only for criticism of local
leftists but punishment as well. Although the "recti-
fication" process is just getting under way, it appears
now that the military is having its way. A broad cam-
paign carries with it the potential for unrest at local
levels, especially if the leftists feel they will be
harshly treated in any case and will have nothing to
lose by resisting. Many of the local ringleaders, how-
ever, have already come under attack and may be in cus-
tody. Without patrons at the national level or local
leaders, leftists will be hard pressed to organize ef-
fective resistance.
The more important thing is that Peking has shown
the rest of the nation that the military can be relied
upon to put down leftist disruptions. This should pre-
vent major unrest. The coming "rectification" campaign
--a housecleaning of local administrative organs that
will probably result in the removal from office of many
lower level leftist officials--presents Peking with an
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opportunity to sharply reduce, if not totally end, local
factionalism.
Problems Persist as Factionalism Recedes
This is not to say that all will be calm throughout
China. After the completion of the purge of local left-
ists, Peking will still be faced over the longer term
with ideological differences at the provincial level.
The leftist ideology represented by the "gang of four"
has a constituency throughout the country, and the re-
moval of disruptive leftists will not signal the end of
disputes at the local level over how best to implement
policies established by Peking. Moreover, as pressures
mount from younger party members for a larger share in
local administration, the question of who should imple-
ment these policies will become an area of contention.
This is likely to plague China indefinitely given the
traditional Chinese reluctance to assign younger people
to positions of responsibility. Nevertheless, the pass-
ing of Mao and with him the periodic nationwide cam-
paigns that encouraged open conflict, together with the
emergence of a more united leadership committed to sta-
bility, order, and long-term economic modernization,
rule out factional disorders of the magnitude that
characterized the previous ten years.
A more likely source of friction in the future at
the local level will be the new leadership's approach
to economic development. The expected heavier reliance
on economic incentives to boost production could result
in a spiral of rising expectations that Peking will not
be able to meet. Strikes for higher wages have been a
periodic problem for several years, and the clamor for
more and better creature comforts can be expected to
become a growing problem for Peking.
In short, China's fundamental ideological, genera-
tional, and economic problems will persist and become
more prominent as the political factionalism of the Mao
era recedes. But post-Mao conflict over policy issues
in these areas promises to be less explosive and divi-
sive than the open political warfare of the past decade.
That China held together throughout this period--and
especially that it survived the near civil war conditions
of the Cultural Revolution intact--is evidence of the
strong cultural and nationalistic forces that have kept
China one nation for centuries and will continue to do
so in the future.
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Secret
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