FOREIGN PERCEPTIONS OF THE INCOMING US ADMINISTRATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100360003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 7, 1977
• Content Type: IM

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Intelligence Memorandum
Foreign Perceptions of the
Incoming US Administration
State Department review completed
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Top Secret
104
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RP 77-10001C
January 7, 1977
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January 7, 1977
The major themes marking Soviet thinking about the
new US administration have to do with bilateral relations.
Arbatov, director of the USA Institute, has re-
peatedly voiced concern that American doubts
about and opposition to detente raised in the
electioneering of 1976 will persist as a nega-
tive factor in US policy making into the period
of the new administration. In the weeks imme-
diately after the election, major Soviet press
commentary held off mentioning "anti-detente
forces" with which President Carter would have
to deal, but General Secretary Brezhnev ex-
plicitly revived this theme during Secretary
Simon's visit at the end of November, and it
has continued to appear since then.
Following naturally from this point, although not
raised bluntly by other Soviets, is their question of
how vigorously President Carter will want and will be
able to move ahead on bilateral issues, especially arms
control and trade.
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and Political Analysis.
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The US foreign policy appointments were generally
viewed as encouraging. The Brown appointment was seen
as showing President-elect Carter was willing to over-
come the preferences of the allegedly anti-detente
elements in Washington. Brown's knowledge of SALT is
viewed by the Soviets as a favorable factor. They
have not however, reflected in their press coverage
the views on the B-1 attributed to Brown in the US
press. The Vance appointment is seen as good, but one
Soviet journal warned (prior to Vance's meeting with
Soviet dissident Amalrik) that he should not try to
play the human rights issue to special US advantage.
On balance, the Soviets are hopeful regarding
possible movement on important bilateral matters.
SALT is the top Soviet priority. They feel it must
be addressed soon, and a fair amount of feeling out
has already occurred on arms control issues. Moscow
wants to get through the 1977 deadlines of the CSCE
review (June), the ABM Treaty review (October), and
the SALT I Interim Agreement expiration (October) as
smoothly as possible. They have shown some willing-
ness to discuss ABM Treaty-related areas that the US
has found troublesome, and the October deadline puts
pressure on both sides to get down to business on
SALT.
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Soviet spokesmen have also heavily stressed the
importance of improving trade. Arbatov has pressed
for a US sign of goodwill through the granting of MFN
status and trade credits. Next to arms control, this
is the most important issue in the Soviet view. And
as in the case of SALT, the responsibility for ini-
tiative, they contend, rests with the US.
The basic Soviet line, most clearly and often
carried by Arbatov, is that the period for marking
time while US policy was prisoner to campaign pres-
sures is over, and whatever problems may arise out of
the process of transition, the period ahead holds more
opportunities for progress than the period just left
behind. One Soviet gesture to the new administration
may possibly now be unfolding in Moscow's emigration
policy. The December figure for Soviet Jewish emi-
gres arriving in Vienna is the highest monthly total
in two years. This presumably reflects October and
November visa-permission decisions.
Brezhnev has stated that he has no intention of
"testing" the new administration, but the Soviets
have never spelled out what practical restraints on
their conduct this implies. The statement may be in-
tended to imply that they will try for some time to
avoid aggressive new initiatives intruding on US in-
terests in foreign policy areas outside the bilateral
sphere.
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EASTERN EUROPE
The East European media have given prominent
coverage to the new US administration on the eve of
the inauguration. Its overall tone has been moderate
and factual.
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Most commentaries have taken a wait-and-see
position. The East European countries, taking their
lead from Moscow, have generally either implied or
avowed that they will withhold judgment until the
new administration's policies regarding such matters
as East-West detente and international economic is-
sues are formulated. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have
carried more negative commentary than other East
European countries.
There has been little attempt in the media to
assess in any depth individual cabinet appointees ex-
cept Dr. Brzezinski. The editor of the Polish paper
Polityka considers him "friendly to Poland," while
the Sofia and Prague press emphasize that he is a
"well-known anti-Communist."
We have no information concerning the intentions
of any East European country to modify current poli-
cies toward Washington as a result of the change in
administrations. Belgrade is clearly worried about
a change in the US attitude toward Yugoslavia, and
may well be looking for some reassurance or thinking
of ways circumspectly to test that attitude.
Yugoslavia: Yugoslav media commentary on the
new administration in Washington varies widely and
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draws mainly from the US press. Zabreb Vjesnik
stressed last week that the new cabinet is made up
of "yesterday's men" whose past mistakes do not bode
well for future US policies. Another daily takes a
slightly different tack, emphasizing the independence
of some of the new appointees and the experience of
others. Both commentaries emphasize that Dr. Brze-
zinski and President-elect Carter belong to the
"Trilateral Commission," which Vjesnik described as
an elite dedicated to strengthening the "shaken posi-
tion of the capitalist giants."
Romania: Nicolae Nicolae, Romania's new ambas-
sador to the US, has privately told US diplomats
that party leader Ceausescu appreciated Romania's
good relations with the Ford administration. Nicolae
added that Bucharest hoped this would continue under
a Democratic administration.
Poland: The editor of PoZityka has told a US
embassy officer that: "Polish leaders by and large
favored President Ford because they knew him. None-
theless, there is no dismay at Carter's victory, and
Polish leaders are waiting to see what the policies
of the new administration will be. Zbigniew Brze-
zinski is considered friendly to Poland."
East Germany: East German media commentary has
followed a cautious but sober tone since the presi-
dential election. East Berlin has been very careful
not to get out of step with or ahead of Moscow in
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this matter. While not criticizing the President-
elect, the East German media have warned that he
faces pressures from "right-wing interest groups like
the Pentagon and the CIA" for a larger defense budget
and advanced weapons systems.
Hungary and Czechoslovakia: Commentary on cabi-
net members has frequently mentioned Dr. Brzezinski
and, secondarily, Schlesinger. A Prague commentator
called Brzezinski "the well-known ideologist of anti-
communism." A lengthy Hungarian commentary was more
circumspect, but nonetheless betrayed nervousness.
It tried to end on an upbeat note by pointing out
that it remains to be seen how the professor will ap-
ply his theories. The Czechoslovak foreign minister,
in a late-December article, expressed hope that the
new administration would. initiate solutions to the
gold claims agreement that has troubled bilateral
relations.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Western Europe, because of its symbiotic rela-
tionship with the US, normally displays nervousness
when there is a change of administration in Washing-
ton. In the weeks immediately after the election,
Europeans tried to divine the new administration's
attitudes toward questions of greatest interest to
them by scrutinizing campaign statements, poring
over post-election comments, and speculating on the
views of potential cabinet members and other presumed
close to the President-elect. West European uncer-
tainties began to recede with the appointments to the
cabinet. Europeans profess to feel comfortable with
the selections to key jobs, and recent policy pro-
nouncements have reassured them that the new admin-
istration apparently does not intend to move in di-
rections that would cause them problems. The mood in
Europe is still wait-and-see, but it seems more con-
fident than before.
Europeans generally see the new administration
moving toward a more rational, ordered conception of
the world. The nomination of Andrew Young was every-
where applauded as a recognition of the importance of
the third world. There are mixed feelings about the
so-called "trilateral approach"--the US, Europe, and
Japan. Many see it as reaffirming the centrality of
the developed-underdeveloped dialogue over the next
few years; others fear it will encompass some new
grand design that will demand more of Europe than it
believes it can afford. Europeans generally agree
that the US will move away from the personalized
style of diplomacy and strengthen institutional
frameworks.
Europe Between the US and USSR
Europeans approve what they perceive as a new
recognition of the growing Soviet military threat,
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and the President-elect's message to the NATO Minis-
terial was widely applauded as a well-timed, needed
reassertion of the US commitment to the common de-
fense. Although they are disappointed with Soviet
performance under CSCE, Europeans are not interested,
in adopting a tougher approach toward the Communist
world. They want to preserve the fruits of detente
and its hope for the future. The West German gov-
ernment, in particular, has a large political invest-
ment in its Ostpolitik.
Europeans have mixed feelings about a Carter-
Brezhnev meeting on SALT. Many regard it as a
proper and necessary early first step on a subject
vital to all, but others see it foredoomed to fail-
ure. The West Germans would like a new political
initiative at the summit to get the MBFR negotiations
moving again.
Europe and the US
Most European officials consider the quality of
US-European relations to be quite good, and do not
believe much change is necessary. Europeans are
flattered by the reaffirmation of their importance
to the US, see hopeful signs that the US will con-
tinue to coordinate policies with them--especially
with the EC as an institution--and believe the ad-
ministration's domestic economic program offers hope
for leading the industrial democracies out of the
economic doldrums.
Eurocommunism
There is still much speculation, especially in
Italy and France, about the new administration's at-
titude toward communist participation in West Euro-
pean governments. Initial impressions in Europe were
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that the new attitude would be more flexible than
the old--that while the US would not welcome com-
munist participation, the US would be less likely to
marshal resources to oppose it. Indeed, some offi-
cials have speculated that the US miqht tolerate such
participation in the hope that in the long run it
might prove unsettling in Eastern Europe. Since the
Time interview with President-elect Carter, however,
Europeans have concluded that the administration is
still studying the issue. The French socialists
and communists and the Italian communists hailed the
earlier signs of flexibility, but now one Italian
communist press article has suggested that the Presi-
dent-elect is not "keeping all of his promises."
Nuclear Proliferation
Germany and France, the principal producers of
commercial nuclear technology, are quite concerned
that the new administration will insist on modifying
or canceling sales deals with third countries in the
interest of limiting the potential for misuse.
The French and Germans both have significant
domestic nuclear industries whose survival depends
on the sale of nuclear plants and materials to pri-
marily third-world states. These commercial consid-
erations have until recently determined both coun-
tries' policies toward nonproliferation efforts--
principally through the nuclear suppliers talks--
based on agreed restrictions on the export of cer-
tain sensitive nuclear equipment and technologies.
Both Bonn and Paris have complied with the require-
ments of the export guidelines
I but neither country
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formerly was willing to rule out completely the ex-
port of enrichment or reprocessing facilities, thus
preventing adoption of more stringent guidelines by
the nuclear suppliers group.
Recently, however,--partly in anticipation of
what they expect to be even stricter nonproliferation
policies of the Carter administration--both countries
have begun to move closer to US policies.
Greek-Turkish Tensions
The Greeks clearly hope the new administration
will follow the lead of past Democratic administra-
tions and congresses in their generally pro-Greek
position and will honor its pre-election promises to
be more responsive to the Greek case against Turkey.
Although Prime Minister Caramanlis does not expect
dramatic change, he is hoping for some and is anxious
to meet soon with US officials. He reportedly can
go along with either approval or nonapproval of the
Greek and Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreements so
long as the US shows more understanding for Greek
rights in Cyprus and the Aegean. He also seems in-
clined to cash in on currently declining anti-Ameri-
canism in Greece to complete base negotiations and
improve relations with NATO. He is trying, however,
to tamp down pro-Carter euphoria lest the new admin-
istration create another backlash by being unable or
unwilling to fulfill Greek expectations.
On Cyprus, Makarios sees a responsive US gov-
ernment pressing the Turks as the only way to re-
coup some of the Greek Cypriot losses. He, too, re-
portedly expects no miracles, but will cooperate in
the hope that Turkey may ultimately be persuaded to
make concessions.
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The Turks, on the other hand, see the new ad-
ministration as less well disposed toward Turkey
than the last. Prime Minister Demirel fears being
squeezed between US pressure for concessions to
Greece and domestic pressure to remain firm. He
recognizes the US stake in Turkey, however, and is
taking a cautious, wait-and-see stance.
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THE MIDDLE EAST
Arab Perceptions: The principal Arab states seem to
be overcoming their concern over the change in ad-
ministrations, although there is still some residual
uneasiness over what was construed as pro-Israeli
rhetoric during the campaign. The Arabs' initial
disappointment over the outcome of the election was
prompted primarily by concern that they would have
to start from scratch in revitalizing peace negotia-
tions and by their perception of the Democratic Party
as more sympathetic to Israel than the Republicans.
Most Arab officials are encouraged by President-
elect Carter's and Mr. Vance's reputations for fair-
ness. Egyptian diplomats, for instance, are inter-
preting President-elect Carter's recent statement on
meeting with Arab and Israeli leaders as an effort
to put all parties on an equal footing. The Egyp-
tians--and to a lesser extent the Saudis--have in-
corporated the theme of fairness in their new peace
offensive; this is probably an expression both of
genuine sentiment and of their expectation of US
evenhandedness in the coming months.
The Egyptians, and probably the Syrians and
Saudis as well, seem to have mixed feelings about
Dr. Kissinger's departure. On the one hand, they
lament the passing of his personal style of negotia-
ting; on the other, they seem relieved that the era
of "step-by-step" diplomacy is over and are antici-
pating greater receptivity in the US to their bid
for an overall settlement.
There is much speculation in every Arab capital
about what direction US Middle East policy will take,
and the President-elect's comments are thoroughly
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vetted for nuances.. The Egyptians profess to find
hopeful signs, while the Syrians appear to be more
pessimistic. President Asad remains dubious both of
the Israelis' readiness to negotiate and the will-
ingness of the US to press Israel for concessions.
At the same time, Syrian officials, from Asad on
down, have stressed their desire for a "just peace,"
their readiness to be patient, and their hope that
President-elect Carter will take steps to promote
progress on the negotiating front.
Israel: Israeli Prime Minister Rabin expects
Washington to begin pressing for serious negotiations
with the Arabs at a reconvened Geneva conference soon
after the Israeli national election in May. He an-
ticipates trouble with the US if it pushes too far
and too fast for concessions on the Palestinian ques-
tion or for Israeli territorial withdrawals--a con-
cern shared by the Israeli public. Rabin accordingly
will seek to maintain close contacts with Washington
so as to coordinate negotiating strategies. He also
would hope that a highly visible dialogue, implying
an endorsement by the new US government, would help
boost his sagging popularity at home and put him one
up on his arch-rival, Defense Minister Peres, for the
Labor Party's nomination.
Iran: Iranian reaction to the new administra-
tion has been low-key. The attitude at all levels
of the government has been described by the embassy
as one of "watchful optimism." Most officials be-
lieve that there will be little change in US-Iranian
relations, but there is some concern over the ten-
dency to link arms sales with the issue of human
rights.
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EAST ASIA
China: The Chinese have not had an easy time
arriving at an initial assessment of the incoming
Carter Administration. Their interpretation of sig-
nals emanating from the Carter team during the tran-
sition period has left the Chinese somewhat concerned
that their interests may receive short shrift under
the new administration.
On bilateral relations, Peking is apprehensive
that the US may relegate ties with China to the back-
burner and allow the understandings reached during
the Nixon/Ford years--in particular the Shanghai Com-
munique--to lapse. The Chinese apparently believe
that the President-elect's background predisposes
him to concentrate on domestic problems, and they
worry that when he turns to foreign affairs, the So-
viet Union and the Middle East, not China, will be
his primary interests.
Chinese diplomats abroad have expressed concern
that President-elect Carter has said relatively lit-
tle about relations with Peking, while reaffirming
on a number of occasions US ties to Taiwan. Offi-
cials at the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington
have questioned Americans on why the President-elect
has not yet mentioned the Shanghai Communique. Else-
where, Chinese diplomats have voiced the fear that
the provisions of the document may not be implemented
by the new administration. This was probably upper-
most in Foreign Minister Huang Hua's mind last week
when he told Ambassador Gates that Sino-US relations
would continue to develop "so long as both sides
strictly abide by the principles of the Shanghai
Communique."
These sensitivities led Peking, following the
election, to convey its interest in making further
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progress on bilateral relations. The Chinese, while
continuing to reserve the right to use force to bring
about Taiwan reunification, have been taking pains
to signal that they are willing to be patient and
to work toward a peaceful solution. The Chinese have
nevertheless not varied their long-standing condi-
tions for the normalization of relations: the US
must break diplomatic ties with Taipei and terminate
its security treaty with the Chinese Nationalists.
Chinese officials abroad also seem to be prob-
ing for reassurances from Washington. A PRC diplo-
mat recently suggested that the US should make "con-
crete proposals" for further implementation of the
Shanghai Communique, and ano her said that Peking
would like to see some "gesture" that Washington is
interested in improving bilateral ties.
Chinese leaders continue to emphasize to US
visitors that they are willing to exercize restraint
on the Taiwan question so long as the US does not
substantially improve its relations with the Soviet
Union. Peking has been worried for some time that
US-Soviet detente will get a new lease on life. The
President-elect's expressed interest in trimming the
defense budget and his emphasis on the importance
of reaching another SALT agreement have not made the
Chinese rest any easier. In this regard, the Chi-
nese were dissappointed that Dr. Schlesinger, whose
views on international affairs closely parallel their
own, was not appointed Secretary of Defense.
But the Chinese are far from seeing the picture
as uniformly bleak. They were bouyed by Secretary
of Defense-designate Brown's remarks playing down
the possibility of a military budget cut and by the
President-elect's expression of support for NATO as
well as his tougher handling of the Soviets at his
December 27 press conference. Similarly, the appoint-
ment of Dr. Brzezinski to head the National Security
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Council has drawn implicit approval from the Chinese
through the Peking-controlled media in Hong Kong.
Although the evidence is as yet sparse, the Chinese
seem to have come to a tentative conclusion that
Brzezinski is likely to take a harder line than Vance
in dealing with the Soviet Union.
Japan: Tokyo does not expect that President-
elect Carter will bring any major changes in US pol-
icy toward Japan. Prime Minister Fukuda has publicly
stated that he hopes for an early meeting with the
President-elect, preferably before this year's in-
ternational economic summit conference. Fukuda no
doubt wants to explore common ground on issues like-
ly to be raised at the summit as well as to discuss
bilateral topics. The press of legislative business,
however, may not allow him to leave Japan, and he
may be considering sending a special envoy.
The Japanese foresee continuity in US economic
policy as it affects Japan, although some official--
and business--apprehension has been expressed over
the possibility that the new administration may in-
crease pressures on Japan to correct the current im-
balance in bilateral trade. Otherwise, official
spokesmen have reacted positively to the President-
elect's interest in promoting closer cooperation and
consultation among the industrial democracies. They
have taken special note of his previous contacts
with Japan through the Trilateral Commission.
The Japanese have expressed some concern over
the future course of US-South Korean relations.
Official statements have stressed Tokyo's desire
for a continued US military presence in South Korea
and for close consultations on any future moves in
US Korean policy. Japanese press and editorial com-
ment on this theme reflects the view that relations
between Washington and Seoul may be strained for
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some time. Officials in Tokyo have not so far pub-
licly raised questions about the US commitment to
defend South Korea. They are clearly concerned,
however, about the possible effects of alleged South
Korean improprieties in the US and are uncertain
about the policies of the new administration. Last
summer, in a message to both the current and future
administrations, Tokyo cautioned against a precipi-
tate move to establish ties between the US and China.
South Korea: South Korea continues to claim
publicly that relations with the US are on track,
but officials in Seoul privately express concern
about the future of bilateral dealings. Despite
long-term planning for greater military self-reliance,
they are particularly concerned about President-
elect Carter's proposals for a phased withdrawal of
US round forces. F_ I
Seoul has dismissed earlier plans to send a
special emissary to meet with aides of the President-
elect before the inauguration. Instead, South Korea
hopes to arrange a meeting between Secretary of
State-designate Vance and Foreign Minister Pak Tong-
chin in March before Congress debates the Foreign
Military Loan Act. Seoul wants this summit to focus
on the question of a phased troop withdrawal; par-
allel discussions with the Japanese are envisioned
for February.
North Korea: North Korea has still avoided
direct public comment on the incoming administration.
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This treatment differs from that in 1968 and 1972,
when the North Korean press was quick to brand the
US election results a "farce." North Korean Presi-
dent Kim Il-song has said privately that he would
take a "wait-and-see" attitude toward the new US
administration. North Korea media have begun to
report without comment statements by foreign groups
on President-elect Carter's "commitment" to a phased
withdrawal of US forces from Korea. In past years,
North Korean reaction to the idea of the gradual re-
duction of US troops in Korea has been distinctly
negative: they have demanded instead an "immediate"
pullout.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Southeast Asian nations generally are view-
ing the incoming administration with some reserve.
They perceive a diminished US interest in the re-
gion, and the non-communist countries are somewhat
fearful of a further reduction of the US military
presence in Asia. Most, however, are waiting for
a clearer impression of President-elect Carter's
policies before taking specific initiatives of their
own.
ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions, is sensitive to the lack of expressed interest
in Southeast Asia by the President-elect. Spokesmen
for the organization have said they would like some
indication of an awareness of the region, such as
mention of its importance in the inaugural address.
Indonesia: The Indonesians are generally upbeat
in the public commentary on the new US administration,
although they do point to the declining US interest
in Southeast Asia. High Indonesian government offi-
cials consistently express hope for increased US ap-
preciation of the importance of both Indonesia and
ASEAN in promoting security and stability in the re-
gion and increased American interest in strengthen-
ing local and regional defenses. Indonesian offi-
cials are particularly anxious to have US military
assistance continue.
Malaysia: Malaysian officials state privately
that their government favors a positive role for the
US in Southeast Asia, and hope that the US will main-
tain a military capability in the region, particularly
in Guam and the Philippines. They do not acknowledge
such a position publicly, however, because to do so
would bring into question their carefully nurtured
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third-world credentials. Perhaps contradictorily,
they would like the US to endorse their concept of
a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality in South-
east Asia.
Singapore: Lee Kuan-yew, prime minister of
Singapore, has been forthright in expressing the
hope for continued US involvement in the region,
pointing to what he perceives as a growing Soviet
influence in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.
The Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand:
These countries are open-minded, but somewhat con-
cerned about the incoming administration. The
Filipinos wonder whether the new administration will
take a harder line in the negotiations on the fu-
ture of US bases in the Philippines. Australian
and New Zealand news media have engaged in some
worried speculation that the Carter administration
might place less than the traditional emphasis on
the ANZUS alliance.
Thailand: The Thais reaction to the incoming
administration has been low-key, although they, too,
are concerned about a possible lack of interest in
Southeast Asia. The Thai government is likely to
seek reassurances about the extent of US defense
commitments to Thailand and may ask for additional
economic and military aid.
Vietnam: Media coverage on the election and
subsequent appointments has been fairly straight-
forward. Hanoi appears to be hopeful that some
progress can be made toward normalizing US-Viet-
namese relations. The Vietnamese are clearly
eager to overcome US opposition to their membership
in the UN, but are not likely to make any dramatic
concessions.
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SOUTH ASIA
Pakistan: Prime Minister Bhutto will apparently
take few initiatives until he can determine how
strongly President-elect Carter will oppose Pakis-
tan's plans to buy a French nuclear reprocessing
plant. Bhutto warned publicly in November that he
might consider withdrawing Pakistan from T
alliAnre if the U5 increased its pressure.
India: The Indians are generally optimistic
that the Carter administration will adopt a friend-
lier, more sympathetic attitude toward India,
largely because they think that Democrats have a
more positive view of India than Republicans. They
do not expect, however, that US policies toward
India will change significantly under the new ad-
ministration. Their primary concerns relate to
possible US sale of fighter bombers to Pakistan and
a possible tightening of US controls on nuclear
exports as a result of worry in the US about ro-
liferation.
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AFRICA
Black Africa: Black African countries believe
the incoming Carter administration will reaffirm the
commitment of the US to the principle of majority
rule in southern Africa.
This issue is the current focus of African in-
terest, and US intentions are likely to be measured
--with considerable emotion in some capitals--in
terms of progress toward a solution of the problems
of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia. Specific
expectations include forthright US political support
for majority rule and increased economic pressures,
especially on South Africa.
The US embassy in Lagos reports that the gov-
ernment of Nigeria is so encouraged by the Carter
election that there is risk of disappointment if
the new administration does not move quickly. Ni-
gerian head of state Obasanjo told Senator Clark,
who visited Lagos in early December, that he views
the US as a key factor in efforts to achieve black
majority rule in southern Africa.
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On other issues, black African leaders ap-
pear to expect much from the Carter administration.
This has been reflected both in media response and
in comments by high-level officials. Niger's Presi-
dent Kountche, who noted that he was also echoing
the views of Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny,
Senegalese President Senghor, Zambian President
Kaunda, and other African friends of the US, told
the US ambassador that Washington should give strong
support to Africa for economic development. He said
that if it does, Africans will take care of their
political problems themselves. Kountche indicated
that his personal assessment is that the style of
US policy under the new administration will be more
activist in Africa, and more rigid in dealing with
the Soviets across the board.
The continent's two most idiosyncratic leaders
have registered Pres-
ident Amin
hopes Washington wi -consider reopening an em-
bassy in Uganda. Central African Emperor Bokassa
has already raised again the long-pending question
of an official visit to the US.
Few African leaders have commented on Presi-
dent-elect Carter's cabinet appointments. Andrew
Young, ambassador-designate to the UN, is the only
figure whose appointment has generated much re-
action--almost universally favorable--in Africa.
A Nigerian radio commentary called Young's nomina-
tion a "first positive step" toward a mutually
beneficial relationship between the US and black
Africa. An editorial in a Kenyan daily said
Young's appointment gives American blacks a voice
in the formulation of US foreign policy at the
highest levels for the first time. The official
bulletin of the government of Upper Volta said the
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appointment "puts the US at the side of the third
world" and raises expectations of "hardening of
the US attitude toward minority white regimes."
South Africa: Prime Minister Vorster took a
hard line in his New Year's address, saying that
South Africa would have to defend itself without
counting on support from the West. This line is in
keeping with the general pessimism of South African
whites regarding the President-elect's intentions.
South African officials, however, probably hope to
see the new US administration temper its political
pressures because of strategic considerations. They
were encouraged by Carter's pre-election interview
with the South African Financial Mail, in which he
said he favored an increase in US diplomatic efforts
--backed up by constructive use of US economic lev-
erage, rather than sanctions--to achieve lasting
peace in Africa on the basis of majority rule with
protection for minority rights.
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LATIN AMERICA
The prospect of a Carter administration has gen-
erally been viewed favorably throughout Latin America.
Brazilian officials, however, are concerned about the
incoming administration's negative views of Brazil's
nuclear accord with West Germany, Chile is worried
about the human rights issue, and Panama is concerned
about prospects for a favorable canal treaty.
Brazil: Brazilian leaders are disturbed by the
President-elect's recent public statements that he
will attempt to have the Brazil/West German nuclear
accord abrogated.
One prominent retired general characterized the
President-elect's remarks as a "public humiliation"
to Brazil. Similar views were voiced in a recent
press conference by Foreign Minister Silveira, who
said that "the period of better understanding with
the US is about to end."
Although President Geisel has expressed the
hope that the traditionally close relationship with
the US will be maintained and strengthened, he can
be expected to register a sharp protest if the nu-
clear contracts with the Germans fall through or if
implementation is postponed. Putting the nuclear
controversy aside, most Brazilians hope that US leaders
will continue to treat Brazil as an emerging power and
will work to strengthen bilateral economic ties.
Chile: Initial apprehension and disappointment
with the outcome of the US election appears to be
giving way to cautious optimism that relations can
be improved. The Pinochet government has made some
attempt to improve the lot of political prisoners,
clearly with a view to getting on a better footing
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with the US. The recent appointment of an influential
and capable new ambassador to the US is probably meant
to signal the junta's desire to further its poor image.
Chile's leading newspaper and semi-official voice, Et
Mercurio, recently praised President-elect Carter's
cabinet selections.
Panama: Initial Panamanian reaction to the
election of Governor Carter was probably the most wary
in Latin America. In recent weeks, however, the state-
ments of leading officials, including Chief of Gov-
ernment Torrijos, have indicated a growing optimism.
This does not mean, however, that Panama will cut
back on its campaign to gain international support
for its position on the canal treaty.
Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd expressed consid-
erable concern at some of Carter's campaign state-
ments, but also welcomed the return of a Democratic
administration, which, he said, have traditionally
been more concerned with Latin America. More re-
cently, the combination of the appointment of Cyrus
Vance as Secretary of State designate and the publi-
cation of the Linowitz Committee's recommendations
concerning the region have led to greater Panamanian
optimism. The appointment of Vance, who was inti-
mately involved with the canal problem in the 1960s
was well received in all quarters. The priority ac-
corded the canal treaty as a hemispheric issue in
the Linowitz report was also welcome, as was the re-
turn of the US negotiating team for talks in December.
Panama will probably assume a relatively re-
sponsible posture toward the US in the early months
of 1977, but it is not likely to alter its energetic
campaign to gain international support for its posi-
tion. For starters, Foreign Minister Boyd and other
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officials are traveling to various Latin American
capitals as part of an effort to obtain written docu-
ments from heads of government supporting Panama's
position.
Cuba: Comments in the Cuban press during the
US election campaign made clear that the Cubans con-
sidered the Democratic slate as the lesser of two
evils. Since the election, the tone of the Cuban
media and statements by Cuban leaders has been one
of cautious optimism.
The Castro regime is committed to an improve-
ment in relations with the US. Even Raul Castro, who
is generally believed to be skeptical of the benefits
of improved relations with the US, said in a speech
in early December that he, too, was committed to
better ties. He commented that Havana would "look
with anticipation" for signs of "realism" among the
new US leaders.
Although Havana clearly wants to improve rela-
tions with the US, the Cubans insist that the US
must be the first to move and that the blockade must
be terminated before talks on a reconciliation begin.
Havana has little to offer in return. There may be
a temporary slackening of propaganda demanding Puerto
Rico's independence, but the Castro regime will re-
main committed to that goal and to the support of
revolutionary movements throughout the world.
Peru: Peruvian military circles perceive the
President-elect as "anti-Chilean" and believe Peru
will have a "special relationship" with the US. They
base this expectation on what they claim is the per-
sonal friendship of the President-elect with several
Peruvian officers, including Admiral Arturo Calisto
Morey, an Annapolis graduate who is to become Peru's
naval attache to Washington.
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Jamaica: Prime Minister Manley expressed ex-
pectations for improved relations with the Carter ad-
ministration in a televised interview on November 29;
"We are looking forward with great interest to de-
veloping a new set of relations with a new administra-
tion. We have noticed that Mr. Carter has gone out
of his way to say that he wished the US to seek better
relations with third-world countries. We are very
interested in the remark, very encouraged." Manley
added, however, that his government would not pursue
better relations with the US at the expense of its
principles. "We will not," he said, "change as third
worldists, as anti-apartheidists, as people who are
part of a struggle for justice in the world."
The Manley government will expect substantial
assistance from the US to help them meet what they
consider to be their needs of $150 to $200 million
in the near future.
Mexico: President Jose Lopez Portillo will be
President Carter's first official visitor, and the
Mexicans view this as an indication that the new US
administration will take a greater interest in re-
lations with Mexico. The Mexican President probably
will want to discuss the customary bilateral issues
(trade, narcotics, illegal immigration) as well as
new matters such as the pending treaty on exchanging
citizens sentenced to jail.
Venezuela: President-elect Carter continues to
receive generally favorable coverage in the local
media. The Caracas press, in particular, appears to
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be attempting to satisfy the Venezuelans' curiosity
about the President-elect and his views on Venezuela
and Latin America.
Much of the editorial comment reflects aspira-
tions for improved relations with the US and hopes
that an economic confrontation between the industrial-
ized countries and the developing nations can be
avoided.
President Carlos Andres Perez has refrained from
all but the most bland comments on the President-
elect. He has told Ambassador Vaky privately that he
is worried about the course that the new administra-
tion will follow in Latin America. Perez went out of
his way to justify Venezuela's international economic
policies, defending OPEC and recent petroleum price
increases and warning that the new administration did
not have much time to establish "an effective and
constructive relationship with Latin America."
President Perez and high government party offi-
cials have reacted negatively to President Ford's
proposal for Puerto Rican statehood. They have ex-
pressed the hope that the Carter administration will
bury this proposal quickly and pursue a goal of self-
determination and independence for the island.
Opposition party leaders evidence more skepti-
cism about prospects for improved US ties. There
is general approval of what they expect to be the
new administration's commitment to human rights and
morality in foreign affairs, but even here they are
waiting for the President-elect "to honor his words."
Argentina: The Argentines appear to have ambi-
valent-feelings about the advent of a Democratic
president and a heavily Democratic Congress. On the
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one hand, they applaud the return of the party of
John F. Kennedy, widely revered in Latin America.
On the other, the Argentines are concerned over what
they expect to be an increasingly liberal US govern-
ment that will pursue more vigorously questions con-
cerning the abuse of human rights. Argentine com-
mentators and officials probably view this as the
single most worrisome aspect of the incoming
administration.
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