PROPOSAL FOR INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM ON SOVIET ARMOR PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00757R000100080007-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 26, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/06/06: CIA-RDP85T00757R000100080007-6
SU k kc. 1,
ARMY review completed.
26 July 1982
PROPOSAL FOR INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
ON SOVIET ARMOR PROGRAM (U)
1. (S/NF) The proposal for an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
(IIM) on the Soviet medium tank program mentioned in CIA Memorandum DDI
4966-82-d, 16 Jan 82, is supported by USAARMC. While this type document
is of great benefit to the user community,, USAARMC has noted some
intelligence deficiencies that could be corrected by the IIM. Generally
the intelligence community does an excellent job of estimating Soviet
developments. However, past products have not always been correct in
some areas of critical importance to the armor community. The purpose
of this observation is not to criticize the intelligence community for
failing to penetrate Soviet security. Rather, it is to point out that
in some areas designing equipment good enough to defeat the projected'
intelligence threat may.. not result in fielding equipment superior to the;
threat at IOC.' In the worst case, the US equipment may not be capable'''
of adequate modification.
a. (S) During the concept formulation of user requirements for the
M60A1 and M1 tanks, intelligence community understated the threat posed
by future Soviet tanks and armored fighting vehicles. Therefore,
conceptual documents were based on the best, but erroneous, available
intelligence. '
b. (C) In 1954, far example, the US Army Armor School publ',shed`
the study "Mobility, Firepower, and Protection (U)." The study forecast
that the Soviets would field one new tank between'1958 and 1968. In
fact, the T-55 and the T-62 were fielded in this timeframe. The study
forecast that the tank would have a new 100mm gun able to penetrate
300mm RHA at 919M. In fact, the Soviets fielded a new 100mm APDS round
that would penetrate 310mm at 1,000M. It was also predicted that a tank
fielded prior to 1968 would have a four-round autoloader. None did. It
was felt that the Soviets would not develop a tank gun bigger than 1.00mm
as the increased penetration at 2,000M would be marginal. In fact, in
1961 the T-62 was fielded with a 115mm gun that significantly
outperformed the 100mm at higher angles of obliquity.
P. (S)- The .study that recommended the development of the M1'Abrams MBT stated that the T.-72.would have a 115mm main gun capable of'_
penetrating 147mm of RHA at 60? obliquity at 1,000M and 120mm of RHA at
60?.obliquity.at-2,000M.: In justifying the predicted retention of the
115mm gun (although a caveat was included that other reported calibers
might include 122, 125, and 130mm), ITAC stated. that the'penetration
design could be improved. The un chamber volume and tube length could
also be increased. In fact,'the weapon developed was a 125mm gun.
capable of penetrating 161mm RHA at 60? obliquity at 2,000M. Again in
1981, it was forecast that the NST (T-80) and FST (T-80 FO) would retain
the 125mm gun, but have an improved projectile and increased chamber
pressure.
d. (S) In 1959, it was predicted that the new tank to be fielded
by 1968 would have 120mm in the front hull plate, compared to 92.5mm for
CLASSIFIED BY: DIA Special Report, Soviet Tank/
SECRET Antiarmor Threat, Aug 81
n REVIEW ON: 1 Aug 2001
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the T-54. In fact, the T-55 had a 97mm thick glacis and the T-62 had a
102mm glacis. It was predicted that the Soviets would not add the five
to seven tons of armor to the T-62 (37.5mt) to defeat main guns. It is
interesting to note that the 41-ton T-72 can defeat tank main guns.
Then in 1975, ITAC predicted that the T-72's combat weight would be
35mt. The T-72 in the studies was actually the T-64 with a weight of
38mt. The level of Soviet armor protection in the studies used to
generate requirements for the XM1 were significantly below those
actually achieved by the T-64 and T-72. The armor predicted to be
better than steel armor (ESR or TMT treated) was postulated but not as
laminated as other "special" armors.
2. (S/NF) Proposals to be included in the IIM on Soviet medium tank
programs are as follows:
a. (S/NF)'`''Increaserythe scope of the I I M to include ant.iarmor
weapons systems, technology, and alternate possibilities,. The need to
study this field is its impact on design and employment of US Armor
systems, i.e., one version of the M1 turret armor is rated as 750mm RHA
against chemical munitions and 400mm RHA against kinetic energy
munitions. Between 1980-89 three new ATGM's are predicted to enter the
Soviet inventory with penetration estimates ranging from 750-950mm RHA
(AT-PROJ-1) to 875-1-025mm RHA (AT-PROJ-4). Should the Soviets achieve
the same muzzle velocity in the RAPIRA-2 125mm smoothbore AT gun as they
do with the T-64/T-72 main gun, they will be able to penetrate 359mm of
RHA at 2,100M. In other words, USAARMC is also increasingly concerned
about KE warhead composition (WA,.DU), and development of a
hypervelocity antitank system which may become a threat to the Ml
system, especially at shorter ranges.
b. (S/NP) Within the current concept paper there appears to be
some conflict with the data presented. USAARMC Threat files do not
confirm the presence of the T-64B in GSFG. This'r-lates to a problem in
identifying nomenclature. It has become apparent to USAARMC that there
is no. acceptable uniform-'system for designating projected Soviet ..'..
equipment. There does exist a STANAG on designating known equipment
which is used by the intelligence communit;!. The absence of a uniform
system for projected. equipment is confusing and leads to unnecessaryLL"misunderstandings..
.... , ..
(1) (S) For example, the projected T-80 has been designated
the NST (Next Soviet Tank). The former T-80 follow-on is now designated
FST (Future Soviet Tank). While this nomenclature precisely defines
specific projected tanks, it is an ad hoc solution. After the NST is
fielded, the next Soviet tank to be fielded would be the 1ST. What
nomenclature will be adopted to describe the follow-on to the FST? If
the FST is redesignated NST, then older documents will be available that
will confuse which tank is being described. A real problem of this type
was already surfaced. The DIA ATGM and S&T projections - ECC (U) DST-
11105-209-79, December 1979, has six projected ATGM designated AT-PROJ-1
through 6. The AT-PROJ-2 became the AT-7 ATGM after publication of the
document. The 1980 Executive Summary (DST-11105-209-80) deleted the AT-
MJ-2 but did not renumber the projected ATGM. DIA Special Report
SECRET 2
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--) ~tUKL I
Soviet Tank/Antiarmor Threat, (1981-2000) (U), DST-1120F-015-81, 1
August 1981, lists the same five projected ATGM but renumbered the
sequence.
(2) (U) The problem with renumbering the sequence is that for
computer wargames a list of weapons characteristics to be used may be
furnished. If the AT-PROJ-3 was listed, the recipient of the weapons
list could refer to either document and get a different set of
characteristics. USAARMC recommends that the system established by MIA
be extended'to all ground force equipment. Tanks would be TANK-PROJ-1;
BTR's would be BTR-PROJ-1, etc. The sequence should be one-up-numbering
and projected systems should not be renumbered when actually observed.
Then vehicles would be designated IAW the NATO STANAG..(BTR M1978).,_until
the actual nomenclature is confirmed (BTR-70). One central activityz
-3^?should.be?designated as.-the-office of record for.the.procedures.
(3) (U) We realize that there are international implications
when dealing with some projections. Nonetheless, most. projections
documents are NOFORN. For those systems already discussed with foreign
nations, conferees could use the older nomenclature. We believe the
advantages of the newer system of uniform nomenclature will stop
proliferations of FST-FO, "T-90", "BUMP-4" and other nomenclatures.
c. (S/NF) There are five known variants of the T-64/T-72 which. are
known to be product improved systems. These product improvements are in
keeping with Soviet practice and not a new "generation" tank.
(1) (S) In addition to a good background on past Soviet,. design
practices, new design possibilities need to be discussed. If the PST
follow-on is a turretless vehicle, the target our systems will engage
has changed considerably. Therefore, changes are required in US fire
control systems accuracy and ammunition. The subsystems that go into
the decisionmaking process of new vehicle designs must be looked at more
closely. Information on the various subsystems allow for a better
understanding of that vehicle's capabilities and vulnerabilities, before.
the tank is either observed at the factory or-paraded. Subsystems of
most concern to USAARMC 'are night vision capabilities, ammunition and
ammunition. technology, NBC. systems, automotive systems,-
armor, armanent and.especially ammunition.
(2) (S/NF) The IIM should also cover Soviet countermeasuresto
US armor vehicle technology This broad area needs to cover items such
as the type of.?.smoke~-used in vehicle grenade launchers, the type and
capabilities of Soviet antitank~mines, and signature-'reduction..effor.ts.
The main point is that, we tend to track research and finished products
more closely than subsystems and applied technologies which indicate the
systems capability.
SECRET
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