APEX - ONE SYSTEM FOR INDUSTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00788R000100110019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 30, 1980
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/12/07: CIA-RDP85T00788
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
-
APEX One System for Industry
I n / L EXTENSION NO.
FRO
d
Chief, Policy and Pans Group DATE
4E-70, Hdqs. 0 .UN 1980
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWA OW
-DD/PSI
30 ~~o
For your review and comment by
4E-58, Hdgs.
3 July 1980.
DD/P -
4E-6 Hdgs.
3.
DD/
3D-3 Hdqs.
4.
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U EDITIONS
Approved For Release 2006/12/07: CIA-RDP85T00788R000100110019-2
STAT
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INF]\DR-\NDU11 TAR: Director of Central intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Special. Assistant to the DCI for Co partmentation
SUBJECT: APEX--One System for Industry
1. As APEX proceeds, I am convinced that the single most difficult
task will be to assure that the L.S. Government does, in fact, deal
with industry in accord with a singrlset of SCI rules. As previously
noted, at least some industrial representatives are completely without
faith in the Governmentts ability to act on one set of rules even
though all agree that all parties, especially the ta-~"-payer, would
benefit significantly from uniform action.
STAT
2. I an concerned that, even within CIA, not all senior managers
recognize what is involved in creating a uniform Government-wide procose,
for dealing with SCI and industry. For example, one system means
. -------CIA acceptance of:
-- Natty background investigations/
-- Ai;ny- physical inspection of SCI facilities
-- DoD adjudications of security investigations C C P{G'~i
icy
- NSA-granted exceptions toRtc~~o-person rule
- Air Force periodic security examination of physical
and procedural' of Ea i rs
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-= Nondisclosure Agreement executed under NSA aegis
-- SAFSS indoctrination for access to a particular
system
Department of Energy certification for a particular
product access
3. We have an approved AMEX Security Policy Manual for Industry;
DIA is drafting a large and detailed implementation manual, which I
intend to review before publication. Once both are issued, I propose
to require that all U.S. parties are bound by the two publications;
that is, CIA. must abide by the added detail in the DoD itit lementing
procedures.
4. I believe that more effort is necessary to assure that all
hands recognize what is involved throughout the Comrntmity and that CIA
must be as pure as IVORY in this context.
5. A part of the problem in operating a single system is alleged
by some to lie in DCIDs, especially 1/14 and 1/16, and in the NFIB
policy on physical security. Some say the problem is that they are
not sufficiently specific and detailed. Others say that they are mis-
interpreted in accord with local circumstances--frequently having to
6. 1 request, consequently, that st?eak, in the presence of you
and !Ir. C,tr[ucci, to the Deputy Directors, augmented by they Directors
the creation of a single SCI system, but they are not proposed as a
topic of this discussion.
do with resource limitations. Another concern is "poly" or "no poly" C l~
for contractors. DCIDs are a separate problem, hearing heavily uponC~j pr~
,J t
 of Security, Logistics, perhaps Directors of OD&E, NPIC and OSO,
Ev Hineman, as CIA SIO, and whomever else you suggest on this problem.
A DCI Staff Meeting might be appropriate) even if it did not try ..
some of the listed office directors. I would tale perhaps' ten minutes.
7. After CIA's house is very clearly in order, a presentation
probably should be made at NNFIB, but a recommendation to that end
should await assurance of clear perceptions by CIA officials. As
I understand the reality, CIA and NSA are regarded by the rest of
the Community as the principal creators of difficulties in that
both impose what others consider extra--DCID standards on contractors.
This memorandtmi was coordiLted with Directors of Security, Logistics
and Office of Development and Engineering.
8?
C/cb
STA