APEX - ONE SYSTEM FOR INDUSTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00788R000100110027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: FORM

Approved For Release 2006/12/07: CIA-RDP85T00788R000100110027-3
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
APEX - One System for Industry
FR
(C)
EXTENSION
NO. STA
Chief
Polic
an
Pla
ns Grou
,
4E-70,
y
Hdqs.
p
DATE STA
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
DD/PSI
4E-58,
Hdqs.
For your review and comment by
3 July 1980.
2.
DD/P&M
4E-60,
Hdqs.
3.
DD/CA
3D-39,
Hdqs.
4.
PTM
STA
6.
7.
6.
19.
1 i.
12.
13.
14.
13.
OW 610
Approved For Release 2006/12/07: CIA-RDP85T00788R000100110027-3
 Nondisclosure Agreement executed under NSA aegis
-- SAFSS indoctrination for access to a particular
system
Department of Energy certification for a particular
product access
3. We have an approved APEX Security Policy Manual for Industry;
DIA is drafting a large and detailed implementation manual, which I
intend to review before publication. Once both are issued, I propose
to require that all U.S. parties are bound by the two publications;
that is, CIA must abide by the added detail in the DoD implementing
procedures.
4. I believe that more effort is necessary to assure that all
hands recognize what is involved throughout the Community and that CIA
must be as pure as IVORY in this context.
5. Apart of the problem in operating a single system is alleged
by some to lie in DCIDs, especially 1/14 and 1/16, and in the NFIB
policy on physical security. Some say the problem is that they are
riot sufficiently specific and detailed. Others say that they are mis-
interpreted in accord with local circumstances--frequently having to
do with resource limitations. Another concern is "poly" or "no poly"
for contractors. DCIDs are a separate problem, bearing heavily upon
the creation of a single SCI system, but they are not proposed as a
topic of this discussion.
6. I request, consequently, that I speak, in the presence of you
and Mr. Carlucci, to the Deputy Directors, augmented by the Directors
 of Security, Logistics, perhaps Directors of OD&E, NPIC and OSO,
Ev Hineman, as CIA SIO, and whomever else you suggest on this problem.
A DCI Staff Meetin might be appropriate fn
g g ) even if it did not
some of the listed office directors. I would take perhaps ten minutes.
7. After CIA's house is very clearly in order, a presentation
probably should be made at NFIB, but a recommendation to that end
should await assurance of clear perceptions by CIA officials. As
I understand the reality, CIA and NSA are regarded by the rest of
the Community as the principal creators of difficulties in that
both impose what others consider extra-DCID standards on contractors.
This memorandum was coordted with Directors of Security, Logistics
and Office of Development and Engineering.