APEX--ONE SYSTEM FOR INDUSTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00788R000100110029-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: July 1, 1980
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2004/0wJ1t1A4Wft5T00788R000100110029-1
DRAFT: 1 July 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
to the DCI for Compartmentation
SUBJECT : APEX--One System for Industry
1. As APEX proceeds, I am convinced that the single most difficult
task will be to assure that the U. S. Government does, in fact, deal
with industry in accord with a single set of SCI rules. As previously
noted, at least some industrial representatives are completely without
faith in the Government's ability to act on one set of rules even though
all agree that all parties, especially the taxpayer, would benefit
significantly from uniform action. A recomendation is contained in the
last paragraph.
2. I am concerned that, even within CIA, not all senior managers
recognize what is involved in creating a uniform Government-wide process
for dealing with SCI and industry. For example, "one system" means CIA
acceptance of:
CONFIDENTIAL WORKING PAPER
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Navy background investigations
Amy physical inspection of SCI facilities
DoD adjudications of security investigations
NSA-granted exceptions to the two-person rule
Air Force periodic security examination of
physical affairs
Nondisclosure Agreement executed under NSA aegis
SAFSS indoctrination for access to a particular
system
Department of Energy certification for a particular
product access
3. A really integrated single system would involve even more,
e.g., CIA acceptance of Air Force inspection, from a security point
of view, of Oprocedure in handling a CIA contract.
4. We have an approved APEX Security Policy Manual for industry;
DIA is drafting a large and detailed implementation manual, which I
intend to review before publication. Once both are issued, I propose
to require that all U. S. parties are bound by the two publications;
that is, CIA must abide by the added detail in the DoD implementing
procedures.
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5. I believe that more effort is necessary to assure that all
hands recognize what is involved throughout the Community and that
CIA must be as pure as IVORY in this context.
6. A part of the problem in operating a single system is
alleged by some to lie in DCIDs, especially 1/14 and 1/16, and in
the NFIB policy on physical security. Some say the problem is that
they are not sufficiently specific and detailed. Others say that
they are misinterpreted in accord with local circumstances--frequently
having to do with resource limitations. Another concern is "poly"
or "no poly" for contractors. DCIDs are a separate problem, bearing
heavily upon the creation of a single SCI system, but they are not
proposed as a topic of this discussion.
7. I request, consequently, that I speak, in the presence of
you and Mr. Carlucci, to the Deputy Directors, augmented by the
Directors of Security, Logistics, perhaps Directors of OD&E, NPIC,
and OSO,
as CIA SIO, and whomever else you suggest on
this problem. A DCI Staff meeting might be appropriate, even if it
did not include some of the listed office directors. I would take
perhaps 10 minutes.
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CONFIDENTIAL
8. After CIA's house is very clearly in order, a presentation
probably should be made at NFIB, but a recommendation to that end
should await assurance of clear perceptions by CIA officials. As I
understand the reality, CIA and NSA are regarded by the rest of the
Community as the principal creators of difficulties in that both
impose what others consider extra-DCID standards on contractors.
9. I recommend that you approve a brief discussion by me of
these concepts and problems and an appropriate gathering when you
and the DDCI can participate. This memorandum was coordinated with
Directors of Security, Logistics and Office of Development and
Engineering.
10. All of the above paragraphs are classified CONFIDENTIAL.
25X1
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SUBJECT--One System for Industry
Director of Central Intelligence Date
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